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SUMMARY
This thesis explores a number of aspects related to occupational health and safety. It 
discusses health and safety at work legislation and policy, and reviews trends in 
reported workplace accidents and illnesses. Empirically, it considers the impact that 
various labour market characteristics and policies have upon a workplace’s injury and 
ill-health record, focussing especially upon arrangements common in today’s 
workplace such as working more than 48 hours per week and flexitime policies. It 
also returns to Adam Smith’s compensating wage differentials theory, and examines 
its relevance today in the context of whether workers receive a wage premium for 
being exposed to high accident risk. The impact that trade unions have upon the risk 
premium is reconsidered, given ambiguity in the earlier literature. As an emerging 
labour market institution, the role of the health and safety committee is also 
considered. It further investigates workers’ aversion to accident risk, and whether 
personal characteristics, specifically gender and family composition, can be used to 
predict which workers will sort into relatively hazardous occupations. The 
contribution that differences in accident rates between occupations will make to 
occupational gender segregation is then explored. Following a similar hypothesis, it 
also examines if there is a relationship between smoking behaviour and the accident 
risk of a person’s occupation.
2
DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS
DECLARATION
This work has not been previously accepted in substance for any degree and is not 
being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.
Signed
Date. 1.5. {.l/. Q S .........................................
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. 
Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is 
clearly marked in a footnote(s).
Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A 
bibliography is appended.
Signed.
Date...I
STATEMENT 2
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying for 
inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations.
Signed.
CONTENTS
SUMMARY................................................................................................................... 2
DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS................................................................ 3
CONTENTS................................................................................................................... 4
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES...........................................................................7
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...................................................................................... 10
ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS.............................................................. 11
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................12
CHAPTER 2
WORKPLACE INJURY AND ILL-HEALTH: LEGISLATION, DATA AND 
TRENDS.......................................................................................................................15
2.1 Introduction......................................................................................................... 15
2.2 Health and Safety at Work Legislation and Enforcement...............................17
2.2.1 UK and EU Legislation and Enforcement.....................................................17
2.2.2 US Legislation and Enforcement...................................................................21
2.3 UK Work-Related Accident Reporting.............................................................23
2.4 Accident Reports under RIDDOR 9 5 ...............................................................26
2.5 Context to Changes in Accident Rates..............................................................30
2.6 International Work-Related Accident Comparison.........................................33
2.7 UK Work-Related Ill-Health Reporting............................................................36
2.7.1 Surveys of Self-Reported Work-Related Ill-Health (SWI).......................... 37
2.7.2 Reports under RIDDOR 95............................................................................ 39
2.7.3 Voluntary Reporting by Specialist Doctors under The Health and 
Occupation and Reporting Network (THOR)................................................. 40
2.7.4 Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (IIDB) Scheme............................. 40
2.8 Ill-Health Statistics............................................................................................. 41
2.8.1 SWI Surveys................................................................................................... 41
2.8.2 RIDDOR 9 5 .................................................................................................... 42
2.8.3 IIDB Prescribed Disease D ata....................................................................... 44
2.8.4 THOR...............................................................................................................47
2.9 UK Illness Data Summary and International Comparison............................. 48
2.10 Accuracy of Accident and Illness Reports..................................................... 48
2.11 The Future of Policy and Data Collection..................................................... 53
CHAPTER 3
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY AND THE COMPENSATING 
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS LITERATURE...........................................................55
Part A: Accident and Illness Rates Literature...................................................... 55
3A.1 Gender..............................................................................................................56
3A.2 Age................................................................................................................... 57
3A.3 Industry and Occupation.................................................................................58
4
3A.4 Atypical Employment.....................................................................................60
3A.5 Trade Unions and Health and Safety Committees........................................65
3A.6 Firm Size..........................................................................................................69
3A.7 Economic and Seasonal Effects..................................................................... 71
3A.8 Government Policy.........................................................................................74
3A.9 Safety Culture and Safety Policies at the Workplace Level........................ 76
3A.10 Interpreting and Forecasting Trends in Workplace Injuries......................78
Part B: Compensating Wage Differentials Theory............................................... 79
3B.1 Model Outline................................................................................................. 79
3B.2 Policy Implications..........................................................................................83
3B.3 Criticisms.........................................................................................................86
3B.4 Trade Unions................................................................................................... 93
3B.5 Measurement................................................................................................... 96
3B.5.1 Hedonic Wage Methodology......................................................................96
3B.5.2 Measuring R isk............................................................................................98
3B.5.3 Measuring Worker and Firm Characteristics........................................... 105
3B.5.4 Inter-Industry Differentials....................................................................... 105
3B.5.5 Trade Union Measurement........................................................................ 106
3B.5.6 Endogeneity.................................................................................................109
3B.5.7 Worker Heterogeneity................................................................................115
3B.5.8 Panel D ata...................................................................................................118
3B.6 Estimation Results......................................................................................... 119
3B.6.1 Fatal and Non-Fatal Injury........................................................................ 120
3B.6.2 Work-Related Illness..................................................................................129
3B.6.3 Controlling for Endogeneity...................................................................... 133
3B.7 Summary........................................................................................................134
CHAPTER 4
WORKPLACE INJURIES AND ILLNESSES: DETERMINANTS AND 
INFLUENCES...........................................................................................................136
4.1 Introduction and Background......................................................................... 136
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics....................................................................... 138
4.3 Negative Binomial Regression Model............................................................146
4.3.1 Testing for Endogeneity................................................................................156
4.4 New Workplace Variables...............................................................................160
4.5 Tobit and Alternative Models......................................................................... 170
4.6 Manufacturing and Service Sectors................................................................175
4.7 Worker Survey................................................................................................. 179
4.8 Conclusions.......................................................................................................183
CHAPTER 5
COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS FOR EXPOSURE TO 
ACCIDENT RISK................................................................................................... 187
5.1 Introduction and Background......................................................................... 187
5.2 Methodology.....................................................................................................190
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics....................................................................... 194
5.4 Interval Regression Results............................................................................. 202
5
5.5 Trade Unions.................................................................................................... 208
5.6 Health and Safety Arrangements....................................................................211
5.7 Heckman Selectivity Correction.....................................................................217
5.8 Risk Endogeneity.............................................................................................225
5.8.1 HausmanTest................................................................................................ 229
5.8.2 Controlling for Endogeneity........................................................................ 230
5.8.3 Instrument Tests............................................................................................ 233
5.9 Value of Statistical Life and Injury.................................................................236
5.10 Conclusion..................................................................................................... 238
CHAPTER 6 
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE AND SORTING BY ACCIDENT RISK 240
6.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 240
6.2 Methodology.................................................................................................... 245
6.3 Data and Sample.............................................................................................. 247
6.3.1 Sample............................................................................................................247
6.3.2 Accident and Employment Data..................................................................249
6.3.3 Occupational Characteristics.......................................................................255
6.3.4 Family Variables...........................................................................................258
6.4 Conditional Logit Estimation Results.............................................................261
6.4.1 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives..................................................... 268
6.5 Further Tests.................................................................................................... 271
6.5.1 Gender-Specific Variables........................................................................... 272
6.5.2 Demographic Characteristics....................................................................... 273
6.5.3 Occupations Requiring Absences from Home............................................275
6.5.4 Number of Children......................................................................................279
6.6 Occupational Gender Segregation..................................................................280
6.7 Conclusion....................................................................................................... 282
CHAPTER 7
RISK PREFERENCES AND SMOKING BEHAVIOUR................................ 284
7.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 284
7.2 Background...................................................................................................... 285
7.3 Data and Sample..............................................................................................292
7.4 Descriptive Statistics........................................................................................294
7.5 Smoking as an Instrument............................................................................... 301
7.5.1 Tests.............................................................................................................303
7.6 Tests for Compensating Wage Differentials..................................................307
7.7 Conclusion....................................................................................................... 312
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................ 314
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................... 318
6
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
CHAPTER 2
Table 2.1: US and UK Work Safety Enforcement Record 1995.................................. 21
Table 2.2: RIDDOR 95 Major Injuries........................................................................... 24
Table 2.3: Fatal Injuries Reported Under RIDDOR...................................................... 26
Figure 2.1: Rate of Fatal Injury per 100 000 Employees and per 100 000 Worker.....27
Table 2.4: Major Injuries Reported Under RIDDOR.................................................... 28
Figure 2.2: Rate of Major Injuries per 100 000 Employees and 100 000 Workers.....28
Table 2.5: Over 3-Day Injuries Reported Under RIDDOR...........................................29
Figure 2.3: Rate of Over 3-Day Injuries per 100 000 Employees................................ 30
Table 2.6: Rate of Injuries by Occupation per 100 000 Employees 2005/06................31
Table 2.7: Employment by Occupation (1982, 1992, 2002)..........................................31
Table 2.8: EU Standardised Rates of Fatal and Over 3-Day Injury per 100,000
Workers 2003.................................................................................................................... 34
Table 2.9: EU Standardised Rates of Fatal and Over 3-Day Injury per 100,000
Workers 2000.................................................................................................................... 35
Table 2.10: Standardised Rates of Fatal Injury per 100 000 Workers.......................... 35
Figure 2.4: Standardised Rates of Fatal Injury per 100 000 Workers.......................... 36
Table 2.11: SWI Surveys Ill-Health Prevalence Rates.................................................. 41
Table 2.12: SWI Surveys Ill-Health Prevalence Rates by Type of Complaint........... 42
Figure 2.5: SWI Surveys Ill-Health Prevalence Rates per 100 Ever Employed.......... 42
Table 2.13: Incidences of Work-Related Ill-Health Reported Under RIDDOR 95
(Numbers)......................................................................................................................... 43
Figure 2.6: Incidences of Work-Related Ill-Health Reported Under RIDDOR 95
(Numbers)......................................................................................................................... 43
Table 2.14: Number of Prescribed Diseases Accepted and Assessed.......................... 45
Table 2.15: Industrial injury assessments in payment by prescribed disease.............. 46
Table 2.16: Work-Related Ill-Health Incidence Reports to THOR.............................. 47
Table 2.17: Rate of reported Non-Fatal Injuries.............................................................50
CHAPTER 3
Figure 3B. 1: The Market Offer Curve............................................................................ 82
Table 3B.1: Key Accident Studies.................................................................................121
Table 3B.2: Key Illness Studies..................................................................................... 130
CHAPTER 4
Table 4.1: Number of Injuries and Illnesses Reported in WERS 04 (weighted)........140
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Workplace Injuries and Illnesses (weighted)................... 141
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Injury and Illness Variables (workplaces with 5 or
more employees)............................................................................................................. 142
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics for Injury and Illness Variables (workplaces with 10
or more employees).........................................................................................................142
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics.................................................................................... 144
Table 4.6: Negative Binomial Regression Results.......................................................150
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics for Instrumental Variables (5 or more employees) 156
7
Table 4.8: Key Reduced Form Regression Results......................................................157
Table 4.9: Key Negative Binomial Regression Results including Reduced-Form
Residuals..........................................................................................................................159
Table 4.10: Additional Explanatory Variables Descriptive Statistics........................ 161
Table 4.11: Negative Binomial Regression Results with new Workplace-Level
Variables....................................................................................................................... 1612
Table 4.12: Descriptive Statistics for Fortyeighthrs and Fortyeightmangs................167
Table 4.13: Key Negative Binomial Regression Results with Forty Eight Hours
Variables..........................................................................................................................168
Table 4.14: Descriptive Statistics for Injrisk and Illrisk.............................................. 171
Table 4.15: Tobit Estimates........................................................................................... 172
Table 4.16: Descriptive Statistics by Sector................................................................. 175
Table 4.17: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates................................................. 177
Table 4.18: Worker Survey Variables Descriptive Statistics.......................................180
Table 4.19: Key Negative Binomial Regression Results with Worker Survey 
Variables..........................................................................................................................181
CHAPTER 5
Table 5.1: Risk Variable Descriptive Statistics (per 1000 workers)........................... 196
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation)...............................199
Table 5.3: Interval Regression Estimates (Fatal risk variable only)..................... 203
Table 5.4: Interval Regression Results (Fatal and Major Injury)..........................206
Table 5.5: Interval Regression Results....................................................................210
Table 5.6: Correlation Coefficients............................................................................... 212
Table 5.7: Interval Regression (Fatal, Commspecific).......................................... 212
Table 5.8: Interval Regression Results (split by Commspecific)..........................216
Table 5. 9: Correlation Coefficients.............................................................................. 218
Table 5.10: Union Probit Results.................................................................................. 219
Table 5.11: Interval Regression Results with Union Selection term (Lambda) 220
Table 5.12: Health and Safety Committee Probit Results...........................................222
Table 5.13: Interval Regression Results with Health and Safety Committee Selection
term (Hslambda).............................................................................................................224
Table 5.14: Risk Regression Results............................................................................ 226
Table 5.15: Hausman Tests............................................................................................229
Table 5.16: Interval Regression Results Controlling for Endogeneity.......................231
Table 5.17: Instrument Test...........................................................................................233
Table 5.18: F Tests......................................................................................................... 235
Table 5.19: VSL Estimates............................................................................................237
CHAPTER 6
Table 6.1: Men and Women in Employment (2004) and Average number of Fatal and
Major Injuries at Work (2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05).................................................. 250
Table 6.2: Occupational Fatal and Major Injury Rates per 100 Workers and Fraction
.......................................................................................................................................... 252
of Female Workers......................................................................................................... 252
Table 6.3: Correlation between Log Fatal and Fraction Female................................. 253
Figure 6.1: Correlation between Log Fatal and Fraction Female............................... 254
Figure 6.2: Correlation between Log Major Injury and Fraction Female...................255
8
Table 6.4: Occupational Attributes Variables............................... ...............................256
Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics by Family Composition...........................................260
Table 6 6: Conditional Logit Fatal and Major Injury Estimates by Family Group (Full-
Time and Part-Time Workers of all Ages)...................................................................262
Table 6.7: Conditional Logit Estimates: Pooled Sample.............................................265
Table 6.8: IIA Test Results............................................................................................270
Table 6.9: Main Place of Work by Occupation (Full-Time and Part-Time Workers of
all Ages) 2001.................................................................................................................277
Table 6.10: Conditional Logit Estimates: Families with Two or More Children 279
Table 6.11: Index of Segregation.................................................................................. 281
Table 6.12: Index of Segregation with 3 Digit Occupational Classification (81 
Occupations)...................................................................................................................282
CHAPTER 7
Table 7.1: Relative Risks for Fatal Diseases for Current and Ex Smokers by Gender
 286
Table 7.2: Smoking Variables: Mean and Standard Deviation.................................. 295
Table 7.3: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, Standard Deviation and T Test)..................296
Table 7.4: Correlation Coefficients............................................................................... 299
Table 7.5: Smoking Variable Means and Standard Deviations.................................. 300
Table 7.6: Descriptive Statistics Manual Workers (Mean and Standard Deviation).300 
Table 7.7: Risk Regression Smoking Estimates (Male and Female Workers Sample)
.......................................................................................................................................... 302
Table 7.8: F Tests............................................................................................................304
Table 7.9: Wage Regression Smoking Estimates........................................................ 305
Table 7.10: Risk Regression Smoking Estimates........................................................ 306
Table 7.11: Wage Regression Risk Coefficients......................................................... 308
Table 7.12: Wage Estimation Results........................................................................... 309
Table 7.13: Wage Estimation Risk Estimates (Split according to Smoker).............. 311
Table 7.14: Wage Estimation Risk Estimates (Split according to Smokel6)............ 312
9
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Peter Sloane for all his guidance and 
encouragement over the last three years. I would also like to thank everyone in the 
Economics department at Swansea University for their help, and especially Professor 
Philip Murphy and Dr Reza Arabsheibani. I also gratefully acknowledge the funding 
received from the ESRC to undertake my PhD.
For their continuous support throughout my time at university, I would like to thank 
my parents and my brother, Doug, Yvonne and Paul Grazier. Finally, I owe a huge 
thank you to my partner Richard Fry. On a personal level, you have been a constant 
source of support and encouragement, and I am extremely grateful.
10
ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
ASHE Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
BHPS British Household Panel Survey
BLS Bureau of Labour Statistics
CFOI Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries
CPS Current Population Survey
EC European Commission
EODS European Statistics on Occupational Disease
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPIDERM Occupational Skin Surveillance
EUROSTAT European Union Statistical Office
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHS General Household Survey
HSC Health and Safety Commission
HSCER Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations
HSE Health and Safety Executive
IDBR Inter-Departmental Business Register
IER Institute for Employment Research
IIA Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
LFS Labour Force Survey
NES New Earnings Survey
NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
ONS Office for National Statistics
OPCS Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys
OPRA Occupational Physicians and Reporting Activity
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
RHS Revitalising Health and Safety Strategy
RIDDOR Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulation
RSI Repetitive Strain Injury
SCELI Social Change and Economic Life Initiative
SIC Standard Industrial Classification
SOC Standard Occupational Classification
SRSCR Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations
SWI Self-Reported Work-Related 111 Health Survey
SWORD Surveillance of Work-Related Occupational Respiratory 
Disease
THOR The Health and Occupation and Reporting Network
UK United Kingdom
US United States
VSI Value of a Statistical Injury
VSL Value of a Statistical Life
WERS Workplace Employment Relations Survey
WIRS Workplace Industrial Relations Survey
2SLS Two Stage Least Squares
3SLS Three Stage Least Squares
11
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Occupational health and safety research remains a priority for the government with 
the frequent launch of various United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) 
strategies for improving workplace safety. This thesis examines the impact that 
modem day labour market characteristics and policies have upon workplace health 
and safety, thus providing a discussion of where policy needs to be directed. Given 
the many economic changes since Adam Smith published The Wealth o f Nations, we 
also examine if his theory of compensating wage differentials, whereby workers 
receive a wage premium for sorting into occupations with a high accident risk, is still 
applicable today. Although there have been many papers examining the compensating 
wage differentials theory using US data, there has been comparatively little research 
using UK data. Furthermore, such investigations use accident data from the 1970s and 
1980s. We further investigate if personal characteristics can be used to predict which 
workers are likely to sort into occupations with relatively low accident rates. 
Specifically, the hypothesis that aversion to risk will vary by gender and family 
composition, with the expectation that workers with dependent children will reveal 
themselves to prefer safer work, is tested. As smokers are potentially revealing 
themselves to be relatively less risk averse than non-smokers, we also consider if 
there is a correlation between smoking behaviour and the accident rate of a person’s 
occupation.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 examines occupational health and 
safety legislation and methods of enforcement so as to provide an introduction. The
12
various sources that can be used for accident and illness data are then discussed, as 
such data will form the basis of the empirical work. Finally, trends in reports of 
workplace accidents and illnesses over a period of approximately 10 years are 
reported and analysed. An examination of the occupational health and safety literature 
then follows in chapter 3, based on empirical findings relating to influences on 
accident and illness rates. The theory of compensating wage differentials is then 
outlined, and the papers that have tested whether a wage premium is received for 
hazardous work are reviewed.
Chapter 4 uses the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) to examine 
what influences workplace safety, focusing upon workplace injuries and illnesses. 
Given the skewed nature of the dependent variable, with many firms reporting no 
accidents, the negative binomial regression model is used. The wealth of firm-level 
data is utilised to assess the impact that personnel policies, for instance flexitime and 
working over 48 hours per week, have upon occupational health and safety.
In an investigation of the compensating wage differentials theory, chapter 5 again uses 
WERS and accident data from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to test the 
applicability of the theory today, using an ordinary least squares regression model. 
The chapter specifically focuses upon the impact that trade unions have upon the risk 
premium, on which there is conflicting evidence in the earlier literature. As an 
extension to earlier studies and recognising the emergence of health and safety 
committees and safety representatives, it further considers their role in relation to the 
risk premium.
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Chapter 6 investigates the proposition that workers sort into occupations based on 
their accident rate according to gender and family composition. Using HSE accident 
data and worker data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), conditional logit models 
are estimated to compare the impact that accident risk has upon occupational choice 
between gender and different family structures. The hypothesis that such sorting 
contributes to occupational gender segregation is then examined, using the Duncan 
and Duncan (1955) Index of Dissimilarity. An amended version of this chapter, 
Accident Risk, Gender, Family Status and Occupational Choice in the UK, co­
authored with Peter Sloane, is forthcoming in Labour Economics.
Using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and HSE accident data, chapter 7 
investigates whether there is a relationship between smoking behaviour and the 
accident rate of a person’s occupation, using descriptive analysis and ordinary least 
squares regression models. The suitability of smoking behaviour as a potential 
instrument in two-stage estimation to proxy risk aversion is also considered.
Chapter 8 provides a summary of the empirical findings and discusses policy 
implications. Unresolved issues are also highlighted, pointing towards potential for 
further research.
As three out of the four empirical estimations rely on accident data from the HSE, the 
Accident Risk Appendix discusses the main issues arising from trying to capture 
accurately work accident risk. Accident rates using various methods are considered 
and compared.
14
CHAPTER 2
WORKPLACE INJURY AND ILL-HEALTH: LEGISLATION, DATA AND 
TRENDS
2.1 Introduction
Davies and Teasdale (1999) estimated the cost of work-related accidents and illness to 
society to be substantial, equating to between £9.9 billion and £14.1 billion in 
1995/96, which is equivalent to between 1.4 per cent and 2 per cent of total British 
GDP1 (p.53). Reducing work-related accidents and illnesses therefore, remains a 
priority in the UK, with the government and Health and Safety Commission (HSC) 
introducing the Revitalising Health and Safety (RHS) strategy in 2000. The 10 year 
strategy outlines a number of action points through which the government and HSC 
aim to reduce the incidence rate of fatal and major injury accidents by 10 per cent and 
the incidence rate of work-related ill-health by 20 per cent by 2010. In doing so, they 
also aim to reduce the number of working days lost from work-related injury and ill- 
health by 30 per cent.
Lee (1987) outlines three general approaches to reducing workplace risks: limiting 
exposure, legislating for safer exposure, and changing attitudes so that exposure is 
reduced voluntarily. The Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions 
(2000) sets out an action plan for achievement of the RHS targets, which centres on
1 The study calculated direct costs only, which included costs arising from loss o f  output, from a HSE 
investigation, and resource costs arising from damage, administration, and medical treatment.
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changing and improving attitudes towards hazards rather than modifying existing 
legislation (p.53). The plan includes engaging with small firms more effectively, with 
sector-specific guidance upon how to improve safety within the workplace.
Recently Davies and Jones (2005) have suggested that setting and monitoring 
progress towards reaching targets to reduce the incidence of workplace accidents may 
not be an appropriate way to measure progress in improving workplace safety. Many 
labour market factors impact upon the number of injuries; Davies and Jones (2005) 
for instance, find “the dominant influence that contributes to an individual’s risk of 
injury is their occupation” (p. 102). Any changes in occupational composition over 
time therefore, will have a large effect upon the number of workplace injuries. Any 
monitoring of rates of workplace injury over time, therefore, needs to be in the 
context of any changes in labour market composition.
In order to monitor progress, there must be adequate occupational health and safety 
reporting mechanisms. It is through accident and illness reports, in addition to the use 
of self-reported surveys, that we are able to monitor and capture the level of risk 
associated with particular employment, enabling policy both to be devised and 
evaluated. There are however, many issues to consider when using health and safety 
reports. For instance, it is important to distinguish between accidents and ill-health. A 
workplace with a particular accident record can potentially have a very different 
record with regard to cases of work-related ill-health. One must also consider the 
specific requirements of reporting, such as what accidents and illnesses are reportable, 
and which specific circumstances warrant being classed as a workplace incident.
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This section outlines health and safety legislation and enforcement in the UK and 
elsewhere. It also considers accident and illness reporting legislation, and specifically 
the accuracy of health and safety data. Finally, using accident and illness reports, 
trends in workplace safety over time are considered.
2.2 Health and Safety at Work Legislation and Enforcement
The workplace health and safety strategies and enforcement record of the UK is 
compared to that of other EU countries. This is particularly relevant given that the EU 
is attempting to ensure harmonisation of legislation and reporting methods relating to 
work safety across member states. The enforcement record of the UK is also 
compared to that of the United States (US).
2.2.1 UK and EU Legislation and Enforcement
Prior to the 1970s, health and safety legislation was governed by many legislative 
provisions and administered by several government departments and independent 
inspectors. With no downward trend in accident rates, the Robens Committee was 
formed in 1970, charged with the task of reviewing occupational health and safety 
legislation. The committee reported its findings in 1972, and had many concerns. 
Specifically, the committee called for more emphasis on self-regulation by employers 
and employees, believing that legislation was too prescriptive. Drawing upon many of 
the committee’s recommendations, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 was 
established. The Act places duties upon employers to safeguard the welfare of 
workers as far as is reasonably practicable, and to inform employees on issues related
17
to occupational health. Workers also have a duty to take reasonable care and to co­
operate with their employer over safety matters (James and Walters, 1999).
Communication between the employer and employee is of central importance to the 
Health and Safety at Work Act, with the belief that “the standard of protection 
accorded to workers would be higher where employees, through their representatives, 
had a more significant voice and involvement in the consultative process” (Robinson 
and Smallman, 2006, p.88). To achieve such consultation, under the Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations (SRSCR) 1977, safety 
representatives can be appointed by a trade union recognised by the employer. Safety 
representatives have the role of investigating possible dangers at work, causes of 
accidents, general health and safety welfare issues, and consulting with employers. If 
two or more safety representatives request that the employer set up a health and safety 
committee, the employer must do so within three months. Managers and 
representatives must agree on who chairs the meetings, how regularly they should be 
held, and what they hope to achieve.
In an effort to achieve convergence and harmonisation of health and safety legislation
across member states, six new regulations came into force in Britain on the 1st January
1993, as part of an EU Framework Directive. Commonly known as the ‘Six-Pack’
Regulations, the Management Regulation in particular, places specific duties upon
employers . This regulation requires employers to conduct a risk assessment, with
workplaces employing five or more workers required to record findings. Employers
must ensure the safety of its workers as far as is reasonably practicable. The Health
2 Further regulations introduced by the Directive are: Workplace Regulations, Manual Handling 
Regulations, Display Screen Equipment Regulations, Work Equipment Regulations, and Personal 
Protective Equipment Regulations.
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and Safety Executive (HSE) emphasise that this means “an employer does not have to 
take measures to avoid or reduce the risk if they are technically impossible or if the 
time, trouble or cost of the measures would be grossly disproportionate to the risk” 
(HSE, 2003, p.2). Thus, employers have the freedom to decide how to control risk in 
the workplace. However, in particularly hazardous industries, specific regulations 
place more obligations upon employers. For example, the Personal Protective 
Equipment at Work Regulations requires protective clothing and equipment to be 
made available. In an investigation into the awareness of the new regulations, HSE 
(1998) found that only half of British workplaces had heard of all six (p.l).
In terms of consulting with employees, the Management Regulations extended 
employers’ duties. Safety representatives have to be provided with appropriate 
facilities and assistance; employers must also ensure they consult with representatives 
in good time over any safety issues. In 1992 the European Court of Justice found in 
two separate cases that the UK failed to fully implement the regulations . This was 
due to the fact that consultation was only required in firms with a recognised trade 
union. The Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations (HSCER) 
1996 was therefore introduced, which requires employers to consult with all 
employees who are not represented by a recognised trade union on health and safety 
issues, either directly or indirectly through a representative. However, James and 
Walters (2002) suggest that non-unionised workplaces may still be at a disadvantage 
because of “the difficulties that workers in non-unionised workplaces face in gaining 
access to representation” (p. 154). In addition, there is evidence4 that worker 
representation is most effective when trade unions are present, leading to further
3 Commission o f  the European Communities v United Kingdom (C-383/92)
Commission o f  the European Communities v United Kingdom (C382/92)
4 See for example Litwin (2000) and Reilly et al. (1995).
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disadvantages for workers in non-unionised firms. James and Walters (2002) conclude 
that “a much more radical approach is needed” to “increase worker access to 
representation” (p. 154).
Health and safety inspectors have a significant role to play in enforcing the 
legislation. In the UK, inspectors have statutory powers, and can enter work premises 
without prior notice. If dissatisfied with the level of health and safety in a workplace, 
inspectors have a number of options to obtain improvements, depending upon the 
scale of the breach. They can offer advice to an employer about how safety should be 
improved to prevent prosecution. If the breach is more serious, they can issue an 
improvement or prohibition notice, which prevents workplace activity from 
continuing until the breach is corrected. If workplace safety does not improve, or if 
the breach is particularly serious, an employer can be prosecuted in the criminal 
courts. In England and Wales, magistrates can impose a maximum fine of £20 000. 
The case could however, be referred to a higher court, where there is no limit on the 
fine that can be imposed (HSC, 2004, p. 18). In the case of a fatality at work, there 
may also be a manslaughter investigation. The names of all firms that are convicted of 
a health and safety offence are listed in a publicly available Offender’s Database. 
Investigations by the HSE, which sent out questionnaires to businesses of all sizes, 
found that 82 per cent of respondents felt that complying with health and safety 
regulations was important to protect their business’s reputation. Furthermore, 90 per 
cent felt health and safety improvements were important for productivity and morale 
(HSE, 2004a, p.3). The cost of failing to comply with occupational health and safety 
legislation can therefore, be large not just in monetary terms, but in the case of lost 
business through a damaged reputation.
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2.2.2 US Legislation and Enforcement
The main piece of legislation governing workplace health and safety in the US is the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970. Similar to the UK Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974, this places duties upon both employers (to provide a safe working 
environment) and employees (to comply with all regulations and standards).
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) are responsible for 
enforcing health and safety at work policy in the US. The main method of 
enforcement is through the workers’ compensation system. Firms pay workers’ 
compensation insurance, with the amount dependent upon their accident record. Firms 
with a high accident rate pay the most insurance, which for high-risk firms can 
typically amount to over 10 per cent of their total wage bill (Wei et al., 2005, p.324). 
In the UK, insurance is only used to cover liability if employees sue their employer 
for negligence; it is not used to pay employee compensation. Furthermore, a high 
level of proof is required in such liability cases, and any pay-outs are often small (Wei 
et al., 2005, p.323). Wei et al. (2005) compare the occupational health and safety 
experiences of Hong Kong, US and UK, in an attempt to inform policy in Hong Kong 
where the “workplace safety record lags behind leading industrial countries” (p.321). 
Inspections are carried out in the UK and the US, although data in Table 2.1 show this 
to be comparatively less important in the US than in the UK.
Table 2.1: US and UK Work Safety Enforcement Record 1995
US UK
Inspections 94,539 88,571
Inspections resulting in citations 31,198 (33.9%) 1,499(1.7%)
Average fine per Inspection US$955 US$4,597
Probability of Inspection 0.09 0.31
Source: Wei et al. (2005) p.323
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Wei et al. show that although the total number of inspections in 1995 was higher in 
the US than in the UK, this number does not take into account the number of firms. 
Comparatively, UK firms are much likely to have an inspection than US firms, as 
shown by the probability of inspection figure. The average fine per inspection was 
calculated as $4,597 for the UK compared to $955 for the US. Furthermore, a greater 
percentage of inspections in the US resulted in a citation notice. Wei et al. note that 
the OSHA was criticised due to the fact that inspectors had quotas for issuing citations 
and as a result, trivial errors often resulted in prosecution. Inspections are now 
focused in establishments with high injury rates, similar to the UK’s system of 
inspections, which are “highly targeted and cover 100 per cent of high-risk firms” 
(Wei et al., 2005, p.324). Despite such changes, the worker compensation system 
remains the primary enforcement method in the US, with it placing “relatively little 
reliance in its systems of fines and inspections” (p.324).
Through devising a simulation model to assess the effectiveness of different safety 
policies, Wei et al. find that although increasing the amount of workers’ compensation 
would encourage employers to improve workplace health and safety, it would at the 
same time encourage workers to take riskier jobs (p.351). Increasing fines for 
violation of safety regulations was found to have a significant impact, but “the 
required increase in fines would have to be very substantial” (p.351). The differences 
in the enforcement systems of the US and UK should be considered later when health 
and safety records of the two countries are compared.
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2.3 UK Work-Related Accident Reporting
Accident data refer to cases in which a person has an accident at work that results in 
fatality or an injury of a specific degree of severity (the details of which vary between 
sources). When an accident at work occurs, we would expect attribution to the 
working environment to be relatively straightforward. When an accident results in a 
fatality, the degree of severity of an accident is also unambiguous. Due to the 
accuracy that is assumed for existing sources therefore, there is no need for several 
data sources.
Statistics available from the HSE on work fatalities, major injuries and over 3-day 
injuries are compiled from reports made to them and local authorities. The Reporting 
of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulation 1995 (RIDDOR 95) 
came into effect on the 1st April 1996, and places a legal requirement upon employers 
in Britain to report specific incidences of fatalities and injuries at work. Specifically, 
RIDDOR 95 states that employers must report incidences of an accident resulting in 
death or major injury arising out of, or in connection with, work. Employers are also 
required to report incidences of an accident that results in an employee being 
incapacitated from work for more than three consecutive days; these three days 
exclude the day of accident but include days which would not have been working 
days, such as weekends. Injuries to members of the public that occur at a business 
premises must also be reported if the person has to be admitted to hospital.
Incidences that are not reportable under RIDDOR 95 include road traffic accidents 
that involve people travelling in the course of work, which is covered by road traffic
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legislation5. Accidents to members of the Armed Forces are also excluded. In 
addition, injuries to the self-employed due to an accident at their own premises are not 
reportable.
RIDDOR 95 replaced RIDDOR 85, and made a number of changes to reporting 
requirements. For example, under RIDDOR 95 injuries to members of the public need 
only be reported if the person is taken to hospital for treatment. The definition of an 
injury, to be discussed in detail later, was also widened. RIDDOR 95 also extended 
the definition of an accident to include acts of non-consensual violence at work, and 
acts of suicide occurring on transport systems, such as railways, that result in the 
death or injury of a worker on that transport system. The HSE stress that statistics on 
fatalities compiled from reports made under RIDDOR 95 are comparable with earlier 
figures, but other injury statistics from 1996/97 cannot be compared with previous 
years.
As a result of incidences reported under RIDDOR 95, statistics are divided into 
fatalities, major injuries, over 3-day injuries, injuries to members of the public and 
dangerous occurrences. The regulation specifically defines a major injury for its 
purposes, which includes some differences from the RIDDOR 85 definition. Table 2.2 
reports.
5Some accidents that occur in occupations that involve mostly travel are reportable. For instance, if  a 
lorry driver had a road accident and was injured by the substances he was transporting this would be 
reportable. If he were injured whilst carrying or unloading the substances he was transporting, this 
would also be reportable.
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Table 2.2: RIDDOR 95 Major Injuries
MAJOR
INJURY
RIDDOR 95 DEFINITION COMPARISON WITH 
RIDDOR 85
Fractures Any fracture other than to the 
fingers, thumbs and toes.
RIDDOR 95 now includes 
fractures of the hand and foot
Amputations Any amputations. Unchanged
Loss of Sight Includes permanent and temporary 
loss of sight.
RIDDOR 85 excluded 
temporary loss of sight.
Electric
Shocks
Injury resulting from electric shock 
or electrical bum leading to 
unconsciousness, resuscitation, or 
admittance to hospital for more than 
24 hours.
Unchanged
Exposures Loss of consciousness caused by 
asphyxia or exposure to a harmful 
substance or biological agent.
New to RIDDOR 95
Absorption
of
Substances
An acute illness requiring medical 
treatment, or loss of consciousness, 
caused by the absorption of any 
substance by inhalation, ingestion, 
or through the skin.
Unchanged
Exposure to 
Toxins
Acute illness requiring medical 
treatment resulting from exposure to 
a biological agent or its toxins of 
infected material.
Unchanged
Other
Injuries
Injury leading to hypothermia, heat- 
induced illness or unconsciousness. 
Injury requiring resuscitation or 
admittance to hospital for more than 
24 hours.
Extended from any other 
injury resulting in the person 
being admitted to hospital for 
more than 24 hours.
Source: UK Legislation
To examine the rate of reported injuries under RIDDOR, the HSE also use the LFS as 
a source of information on workplace non-fatal injuries. Since 1993, the LFS has 
annually included a limited set of questions on workplace injury. Respondents are 
asked if they have suffered an injury at work in the 12 months before the interview. 
Workplace injury estimates obtained from the LFS can be used in conjunction with 
reported rates of injury under RIDDOR to give an estimate of the level of reporting of 
injuries. As rates obtained from the LFS can be subject to sampling error fluctuations,
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they are presented as 3-year moving averages. Use of the LFS enables reporting 
trends to be examined, and hence is an important complement to injury data obtained 
from reports made under RIDDOR.
2.4 Accident Reports under RIDDOR 95
Reports that use RIDDOR 95 data are usually restricted to employees, as accidents to 
the self-employed are only reported if the person was not working at the premises 
they own or occupy at the time of the accident. Table 2.3 reports fatality rates that are 
calculated by the HSE, who use LFS employment data.
Table 2.3: Fatal Injuries Reported Under RIDDOR
Emplo] e^es Self Employed Workers
Year Number Rate* Number Rate* Number Rate*
1986/87 355 1.7 52 2 407 1.7
1987/88 361 1.7 84 3 445 1.9
1988/89 529 2.4 80 2.7 609 2.4
1989/90 370 1.7 105 3.3 475 1.9
1990/91 346 1.6 87 2.7 433 1.7
1991/92 297 1.4 71 2.3 368 1.5
1992/93 276 1.3 63 2 339 1.4
1993/94 245 1.2 51 1.6 296 1.2
1994/95 191 0.9 81 2.5 272 1.1
1995/96 209 1 49 1.5 258 1
1996/97 207 0.9 80 2.3 287 1.1
1997/98 212 0.9 62 1.8 274 1
1998/99 188 0.8 65 1.9 253 0.9
1999/00 162 0.7 58 1.7 220 0.8
2000/01 213 0.9 79 2.4 292 1
2001/02 206 0.8 45 1.3 251 0.9
2002/03 183 0.7 44 1.3 227 0.8
2003/04 168 0.7 67 1.8 235 0.8
2004/05 172 0.7 51 1.3 223 0.8
2005/06 160 0.6 52 1.4 212 0.7
*rate per 100 000
Workers = Employees + Self-employed 
Source: HSC (2006); HSE (online)
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Figure 2.1: Rate o f Fatal Injury per 100 000 Employees and per 100 000 Workers
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1 illustrate a general downward trend in the rate of reported 
fatal injury. Since 2002/03, the rate of fatal injuries per 100 000 employees has 
remained fairly stable at around 0.7, falling to 0.6 in 2005/06.
As outlined, the definition of a major injury was extended in RIDDOR 95 from 
RIDDOR 85, and so major injury data from 1996/97 are not comparable with earlier 
data. Table 2.4 and Figure 2.2 show the number and rate of major injuries to 
employees and workers fell between 1996/97 and 2000/01. After increasing slightly 
between 2001/02 and 2003/04, the rate has now started to fall steadily.
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Table 2.4: Major Injuries Reported Under RIDDOR
Emplo yees Self-emp oyed W or ters
Year N um ber Rate* N um ber Rate* Num ber Rate*
1986/87 20695 99.1 690 26.9 21385 91.2
1987/88 20057 94 867 31 20924 86.7
1988/89 19944 91.4 1152 39.4 21096 85.3
1989/90 20396 91.8 1310 41.2 21706 85.5
1990/91 19896 89.9 1326 41.2 21222 83.7
1991/92 17597 81.7 1101 35.9 18698 76
1992/93 16938 80.3 1115 35.8 18053 74.6
1993/94 16705 79.3 1274 40.6 17979 74.2
1994/95 17041 80.4 1313 40.4 18354 75.1
1995/96 16568 77.1 1166 36 17734 71.7
1996/97 27964 127.5 1356 38.4 29320 115.1
1997/98 29187 127.6 815 23.3 30002 113.8
1998/99 28368 121.7 685 20.3 29053 108.8
1999/00 28652 116.6 663 19.7 29315 104.9
2000/01 27524 110.2 630 19.2 28154 99.6
2001/02 28011 110.9 929 27.8 28940 101.2
2002/03 28113 111.1 1079 32.3 29192 101.9
2003/04 30689 120.4 1283 33.9 31972 109.2
2004/05 30451 117.9 1251 33.0 31702 107.1
2005/06 28605 110.1 1251 32.9 29856 100.3
*rate per 100 000
Black line denotes inability to compare 1995/96 reports with later data 
Workers = Employees + Self-employed  
Source: HSC (2006); HSE (online)
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Table 2.5 and Figure 2.3 show that the rate of over 3-day injuries, when a person is 
incapacitated from work for more than 3 consecutive days because of a work-related 
accident, has gradually fallen from 1997/98. The rate increased in 2003/04, for the 
first time since 1997/98, from 506.5 to 514.2 per 100 000 employees, but has since 
fallen to 452.2 per 100 000 employees.
Table 2.5: Over 3-Day Injuries Reported Under RIDDOR
Emplo yees Self-emp oyed Worl ters
Number Rate* Number Rate* Number Rate*
1986/87 159011 761.1 1029 40.1 160040 682.2
1987/88 159852 748.9 1169 41.4 161021 666.5
1988/89 163119 747.7 1503 51.4 164622 665.4
1989/90 165244 743.4 1865 58.6 167109 657.7
1990/91 160811 726.5 2077 64.5 162888 642.3
1991/92 152506 708.5 1832 64.5 154338 633.3
1992/93 141147 669 2136 68.5 143283 591.8
1993/94 134928 640.2 2531 80.7 137459 567.7
1994/95 139349 657.2 2869 88.4 142218 581.6
1995/96 130582 607.4 2394 73.8 132976 537.5
1996/97 127286 580.1 2282 64.6 129568 508.7
1997/98 134789 589.2 984 28.1 135773 514.8
1998/99 132295 567.3 849 25.2 133144 498.8
1999/00 135381 550.9 732 21.8 136113 487.3
2000/01 134105 536.9 715 21.8 134820 477.1
2001/02 129655 513.5 917 27.5 130572 456.7
2002/03 128184 506.5 951 28.4 129135 450.7
2003/04 131017 514.2 1114 29.5 132131 451.6
2004/05 121779 471.7 1143 30.2 122922 415.2
2005/06 117471 452.2 1174 30.8 118645 398.4
*rate per 100 000
Black line denotes inability to compare 1995/96 reports with later data 
Workers = Employees + Self-employed  
Source: HSC (2006); HSE (online)
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Figure 2.3: Rate o f Over 3-Day Injuries per 100 000 Employees
2.5 Context to Changes in Accident Rates
Any comparison of accident rates over time needs to take account of any changes to 
the composition o f employment over the same period. Davies and Jones (2005), in a 
report to the HSE, investigate the attribution of various factors that have contributed 
to the fall in accident reports between 1986 and 2003. Using an Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) model, they find occupation is the key explanatory factor, contributing 
approximately 40 per cent in predicting the occurrence of a workplace injury6 (p.69). 
Table 2.6 reports injuries to employees by occupation in 2005/06 using 1 digit 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 2000, using reports made under 
RIDDOR 95. Process, Plant and Machine Operatives have the highest rate of fatal 
injury, with 2.9 fatal injuries per 100 000 employees in 2005/06. This occupation also 
has the highest rate o f non-fatal injury. Skilled Trade occupations and Elementary
6 The industry a worker is employed in accounts for less than 2 per cent o f  the probability o f  
experiencing an injury.
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occupations also have a relatively high injury rate. This highlights the extent of which 
injury rates vary by occupation.
Table 2.6: Rate o f Injuries by Occupation per 100 000 Employees 2005/06
Fatal
Injury
Major
Injury
Over 3-day 
Injury
Managers and Senior Officials 0.3 45.8 99.8
Professional Occupations 0.3 55.5 141.1
Associate Professionals and Technical 
Occupations
0.2 74.2 353.5
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations 0 31.3 86.5
Skilled Trade Occupations 1.9 235.0 774.8
Personal Service Occupations 0.1 116.5 569.8
Sales and Customer Service Occupations 0.1 89.3 356.5
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 2.9 386.8 1753.0
Elementary Occupations 1.3 205.7 1010.8
Rates per 100 000 employees 
Source: HSE (Online)
Table 2.1: Employment by Occupation (1982, 1992, 2002)
Share of Total 
Employment (%)
Occupation 1982 1992 2002
Managers and Senior Officials 10.7 12.6 14.9
Professional Occupations 8.0 9.4 11.3
Associate Professionals and Technical Occupations 9.6 11.3 14.0
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations 15.5 15.8 13.2
Skilled Trade Occupations 17.0 14.6 11.4
Personal Service Occupations 3.7 4.9 7.3
Sales and Customer Service Occupations 6.1 6.7 7.9
Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 11.8 9.7 8.4
Elementary Occupations 17.7 15.0 11.6
Source: Davies and Jones (2005) Table 2.2 p.9
Davies and Jones (2005) further consider the contribution changes in occupational 
composition have made to the decline in accident rates between 1986 and 2003. Table
2.7 highlights a fall in the share of manual occupations, such as Process, Plant and 
Machine Operatives and Skilled Trade Occupations. In contrast, the share of white-
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collar jobs such as Professional Occupations and Managers and Senior Officials, has 
increased.
Considered in conjunction with Table 2.6, which highlights the declining manual 
occupations as the most likely to experience an accident at work, we would expect a 
general downward trend in injury rates since the 1980s, as has been the case. Davies 
and Jones (2005) report the rate of major injury was 45 per cent higher in 1986 
compared to 2003. Given changes in occupational composition only, we would have 
expected it to be 23 per cent higher in 1986. In terms of attribution therefore, 
approximately half of the fall in the major injury rate would have been expected given 
occupational change, with the remaining half due to other factors (p.75). Such factors 
include other changes in the workforce such as gender composition and changes in 
patterns of hours worked. It also includes however, improvements in health and safety 
within occupations, possibly due to policy. The fact that occupation is a key 
determinant of the probability of experiencing a workplace accident has important 
implications for the empirical analyses that follow. Not only does it stress the 
importance of controlling for occupation in any investigation of workplace health and 
safety, but also suggests accidents are best classified according to a person’s 
occupation7.
As many changes in workforce composition will impact upon the workplace accident 
rate, it is difficult to quantify the effect that health and safety policy has had upon 
injury rates. Davies and Jones create a statistical model that controls for numerous 
personal, establishment and economic characteristics and developments over time, to
7 Chapter 3 and the Accident Risk Appendices further discuss the relative advantages o f  classifying 
accidents by occupation as opposed to industry.
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generate predicted injury rates. When compared to actual injury rates, they find “the 
series of predicted injury rates closely followed the series of actual injury rates”
(p. 102). The challenge for the HSE therefore, is to prove “a direct link between
workplace injury rates and the regulatory activity” (p. 104) by separating the policy 
contribution from that due to evolving market conditions. They stress that when 
assessing progress towards meeting the RHS strategy targets, they should be at the 
very least, considered in conjunction with occupational composition.
2.6 International Work-Related Accident Comparison
As reported, incidences of fatality at work in Britain are very low with just 0.6 
fatalities at work per 100 000 employees in 2005/06. This point is emphasised by 
comparing the number of work-related fatalities in Britain with the number in other 
European member states. In an attempt to give consistency to workplace accident
statistics, the European Union Statistical Office (EUROSTAT) calculated accident
statistics for all member states based on common definitions. Standardised incidence 
rates of fatal and over 3-day injuries were calculated for member states, and as an EU 
average. This rate takes into account variation in employment by industrial sector, as 
the profile of employment in member states will affect the incidence rate of industrial 
accidents.
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Table 2.8: EU Standardised Rates o f Fatal and Over 3-Day Injury per 100,000 
Workers 2003
Member State Standardised Rate of 
Fatal Injury
Standardised Rate of 
Over 3-Day Injury
Great Britain 1.1 1614
Sweden 1.2 1252
Denmark 1.8 2443
Finland 1.9 2847
Netherlands 2.0 1188
Germany 2.3 3674
Belgium 2.4 3456
EU Average 2.5 3334
Italy 2.8 3267
France 2.8 4689
Greece 3.0 2090
Ireland 3.2 1262
Luxembourg 3.2 5033
Spain 3.7 6520
Austria 4.8 2629
Portugal 7.6 4054
Source: HSE (online)
Note: All rates o f  fatal injury exclude road traffic and transport accidents. Rates o f  over 3-day injury 
for Britain and Ireland exclude road traffic and transport accidents, but are included for other member 
states
Table 2.8 reports that the standardised rate of fatal accidents in 2003 in Britain was 
calculated to be the lowest in the EU, with 1.1 fatalities per 100 000 workers, 
compared to an EU average rate of 2.5 per 100 000 workers. Similarly for over 3-day 
injuries, the British standardised rate was calculated as 1614 per 100 000 workers, 
compared to an EU average of 3334. Compared to the rest of Europe therefore, 
Britain has a below average work-related accident rate.
EUROSTAT also calculated standardised accident rates for 2000, and included an 
equivalent measure for the US. Table 2.9 shows the rate of fatal injury of 2.2 per 100 
000 workers was higher than the rate of 1.7 per 100 000 for Britain, but lower than the 
EU average. These rates can be considered in conjunction with the earlier section on
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differences in health and safety at work enforcement policy between the US and the 
UK, as displayed in Table 2.1. As noted earlier, the UK places more emphasis on 
inspections and fines as a deterrent rather than an experience-related workers’ 
compensation insurance system as in the US.
Table 2.9: EU Standardised Rates o f Fatal and Over 2-Day Injury per 100,000 
Workers 2000
Country Standardised Rate of 
Fatal Injury
Standardised Rate of 
Over 3-Day Injury
Great Britain 1.7 1607
EU Average 2.8 4016
USA 2.2 2780
Source: HSE (2000)
The HSE also undertook an analysis to compare injury statistics in Great Britain, 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain, over a five year period. Similar to the analysis 
undertaken by EUROSTAT, the statistics were adjusted to make them comparable, 
which involved excluding road traffic accidents. As shown in Table 2.10 and Figure 
2.4, the average rate of fatal injury in Britain between 1999 and 2003 has consistently 
been below the EU average.
Table 2.10: Standardised Rates o f Fatal Injury per 100 000 Workers
Great Britain Germany France Italy Spain EU Average
1999 1.4 2.4 3.4 3.4 5.0 2.9
2000 1.7 2.1 3.4 3.3 4.7 2.8
2001 1.5 2.0 3.2 3.1 4.4 2.7
2002 1.4 2.5 2.6 2.1 4.3 2.5
2003 1.1 2.3 2.8 2.8 3.7 2.5
Source: HSE (Online)
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2.7 UK Work-Related Ill-Health Reporting
Occupational ill-health and disease cover a wide range o f disorders, some o f which 
are easier to attribute to work than others. Illness risk is cumulative, and attribution 
will differ between workers, reflecting their own perspectives, knowledge and 
awareness. Unlike workplace fatalities and injuries, ill-health does not always occur 
immediately after exposure to the hazard, there is likely to be some delay: reporting 
the number of cases of occupational ill-health is therefore difficult. The HSE use a 
range of sources on occupational ill-health, unlike cases of occupational fatalities and 
injuries, where reports made under RIDDOR 95 coupled with LFS data are sufficient. 
Selections of the main sources of ill-health data are considered.
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2.7.1 Surveys o f  Self-Reported Work-Related Ill-Health (SWI)
SWI are household surveys of self-reported occupational ill-health that were 
conducted in 1990, 1995, 1998/99, 2001/02, 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2005/06. Surveys 
use a screening question included in the LFS to isolate workers who have suffered 
from a work-related illness. The SWI then asks these particular individuals further 
questions about the nature of their illness. The screening question has varied between 
surveys. SWI 90 asked workers if in the last 12 months they had suffered from any 
illness, disability, or other physical problem that was caused or made worse by work, 
including work done in the past. SWI 90 covered workers in England and Wales only. 
SWI 95 asked the same screening question, but covers workers in Great Britain. SWI 
98/99 was commissioned by EUROSTAT and included most member states; data are 
therefore available at the UK level. The screening question was re-worded slightly to 
include mental illness, asking respondents if within the last 12 months they had 
suffered from any illness, disability, or other physical or mental problem that was 
caused or made worse by their job. However, unlike all of the other surveys, coverage 
is restricted to people working in the past 12 months rather than to people ever 
employed. In other surveys, people who no longer work but may still have 
experienced an illness caused by work done in their previous job are included. This is 
important given the cumulative nature of illness, as in some cases it may be many 
years after initial exposure before a person has symptoms. Later surveys have used a 
screening question that includes mental illness like SWI 98/99, but also includes past 
workers. SWI 01/02, 03/04, and 04/05 cover workers in Great Britain, and are the 
most comparable (Jones et al., 2006, p.xxv).
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Respondents who indicated in the screening question that they had suffered a work- 
related illness in the last 12 months, took part in a follow-up questionnaire which 
asked for more details. This included the nature of the illness, the job which caused it, 
the number of work-days lost, other characteristics of the illness, and the nature of the 
person’s job. If more than one illness was reported, follow-up questions concentrated 
on the most serious. As the survey is based only on peoples’ perceptions, the doctor or 
specialist who treated the illness was contacted and asked to confirm the diagnosis. 
They were also asked if they thought a link with work was likely. Responses were 
excluded if there was a poor link with work, and also if the illness was as a result of 
an accident.
The responses are used by the HSE to code the illnesses based on the International 
Classification of Disease. Jones et al. (2006) list the broad categories of disease used 
in the surveys as follows:
• Stress, depression or anxiety
• Headache or eyestrain
• Hearing problems
• Heart disease/attack, other circulatory system
• Breathing or lung problems
• Skin problems
• Musculoskeletal disorders
• Infectious diseases (virus, bacteria)
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2.7.2 Reports under RIDDOR 95
In addition to requiring employees to report incidences of work accidents, RIDDOR 
95 also requires employers to report cases of a defined list of diseases occurring 
amongst their employees’. Employers have to report cases when an employee has 
received a doctor’s written diagnosis and when there is a clear link with the disease 
and the employee’s work activity. In addition to a list of reportable diseases, RIDDOR 
95 includes a list of work activity that is associated with each disease. The following 
main categories of diseases are reportable (the full list of which is available from UK 
Legislation):
• Conditions due to physical agents and the physical demands of work
• Infections due to biological agents
• Conditions due to substances
Stress-related illnesses are not reportable, with the regulation more concerned with 
reporting occupational disease. Similar to accident reports, the list of reportable 
diseases is slightly different from RIDDOR 85, the main difference being that 
RIDDOR 95 includes specified musculoskeletal disorders and occupational 
dermatitis. The HSE stress there is significant under-reporting of occupational 
diseases under RIDDOR 95. Due to this, 2002/03 is the last year for which RIDDOR 
disease reports have been compiled by the HSE.
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2.7.3 Voluntary Reporting by Specialist Doctors under The Health and Occupation 
and Reporting Network (THOR)
The Reporting Network THOR has operated since 2002, and brought together seven 
schemes concerned with reporting specific types of work-related disease. The main 
schemes that will be considered are the Surveillance of Work-Related Occupational 
Respiratory Disease (SWORD), the Occupational Skin Surveillance (EPIDERM) and 
the Occupational Physicians Reporting Activity (OPRA). The network relies on 
specialist doctors and physicians reporting voluntarily cases of work-related disease. 
However, as not all workers will have access to such specialists at their work-place, 
figures reported under THOR should be regarded as minimum estimates.
2.7.4 Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (IIDB) Scheme
The IIDB compensates workers that have a disease that has been prescribed to be as a 
direct result of his or her occupation, and has resulted in disability. Although it does 
vary for different diseases, the benefit is usually paid to those whose extent of 
disability is assessed at being 14 per cent or more compared to a non-disabled person. 
The HSE stress IIDB data will not be a true reflection of workplace illnesses for many 
reasons. It may be difficult to identify and prove that a person’s occupation caused the 
disease and this is especially true when there is a long latency period. Individuals may 
also be unaware that they are able to claim the benefit, and also that their condition is 
as a direct result of their work. The HSE stress that a large proportion of claimants’ 
suffer from ailments that are as a result of poor past working conditions that would, in 
many cases, be illegal by today’s health and safety standards. Data is rounded to the 
nearest 5 cases to maintain anonymity.
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2.8 Ill-Health Statistics
Reports of ill health over time using the sources discussed are now considered.
2.8.1 SWI Surveys
The previous section highlighted the many differences between the six surveys, and 
stressed that the HSE advise that SWI 01/02, 03/04, 04/05 and 05/06 are the most 
comparable. Therefore, data are compared between these four surveys only. When 
interpreting the data, a distinction between incidence and prevalence rates must be 
made. Annual incidence refers to the estimated new cases of work-related ill-health 
occurring in the 12 month period, whereas annual prevalence is the number of people 
with a work-related illness at any time during the 12 month reference period. Only 
prevalence rates can be compared between surveys. Prevalence is also arguably the 
most appropriate measure of work-related ill-health, because of the likelihood of 
persistence of symptoms after initial diagnosis.
Table 2.11: SWI Surveys Ill-Health Prevalence Rates
Rate per 100 ever 
employed
2001/02 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
Male 6.4 6.2 5.5 5.3
Female 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.8
All persons 5.3 5.2 4.7 4.5
Source: HSE (2007)
Table 2.11 reports a fall in the prevalence of workplace illnesses between 2001/02 and 
2005/06 for both men and women. The prevalence rate per 100 ever employed of 
people suffering from a work-related illness equated to an estimated 2 million people 
in 2004/05, with 576 thousand first aware of their illness in the previous 12 months
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(Jones et al. 2006). Decomposing the total illnesses by type of complaint (Table 2.12 
and Figure 2.5) illustrates that bone, joint or muscle problems are by far the most 
prevalent.
Table 2.12: SWI Surveys Ill-Health Prevalence Rates by Type o f Complaint
Rate per 100 ever employed 2001/02 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
Bone, joint or muscle problem 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4
Breathing or lung problem 0.39 0.43 0.32 0.36
Skin problem 0.088 0.071 0.067 0.062
Hearing problem 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16
Stress, depression or anxiety 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.97
Headache and/or eyestrain 0.12 0.087 0.073 0.075
Heart disease/attack, other 
circulatory system
0.19 0.15 0.13 0.15
Infectious disease 0.074 0.065 0.065 0.063
Other type of complaint 0.39 0.32 0.29 0.33
Source: HSE (2007)
■  Other type of complaint
□  Infectious disease
■  Heart disease/attack, other circulatory system
□  Headache and/or eyestrain
■  Stress, depression or anxiety
□  Hearing problem
□  Skin problem
■  Breathing or lung problem
□  Bone, joint or m uscle problem
Figure 2.5: SWI Surveys Ill-Health Prevalence Rates per 100 Ever Employed 
2.8.2 RIDDOR 95
As discussed, HSE have stressed there is significant under-reporting, and so statistics 
are unavailable after 2001. Statistics reported under RIDDOR refer to new incidences
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of work-related ill-health, rather than its prevalence. For completeness, Table 2.13 
reports the number of new incidences of each category of occupational disease from 
1996/97-2000/01.
Table 2.13: Incidences o f Work-Related Ill-Health Reported Under RIDDOR 95 
(Numbers)
1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01
Conditions due to physical agents 
and the physical demands of work
1019 1123 1389 1703 1697
Infections due to biological agents 160 131 105 94 93
Infections due to substances 465 633 702 737 588
TOTAL 1644 1887 2196 2534 2378
Source: HSE (2001), Table A 2 .1 1
3 0 0 0
2 5 0 0
2000
 Conditions due to physical agents and the
physical demands of work 
Infections due to biological agents
1500
Conditions due to substances
TOTAL REPORTED OCCUPATIONAL  
DISEASES
1000
5 0 0
1 9 9 6 /9 7 1 9 9 7 /9 8 1 9 9 8 /9 9 1 9 9 9 /2 0 0 0 2000/01
Figure 2.6: Incidences o f  Work-Related Ill-Health Reported Under RIDDOR 95
(Numbers)
Since 1996/97, the total number of occupational diseases reported under RIDDOR 95 
has steadily increased. It fell for the first time in 2000/01 from 2534 to 2378.
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2.8.3 IIDB Prescribed Disease Data
IIDB data by prescribed disease is available in many forms, from the number of 
assessments made in a particular year, which is a measure of incidence, to the number 
of IIDB awards being paid in a particular year, which is a measure of prevalence. 
Table 2.14 reports the number of first diagnosed prescribed diseases assessed from 
1998 by type of disease. In order to have reached the assessment stage, the prescribed 
disease will have been accepted.
Table 2.14 shows there has been an overall reduction in the number of assessments for 
IIDB due to a prescribed disease, in line with observation from other data sources. 
However, it is important to stress that there is likely to be a delay, the duration of 
which will vary from case to case, from when a worker contracts a disease, to when, 
and of course if, they apply for IIDB. Figures should therefore be used a guide only. 
The majority of claims are due to pneumoconiosis and diffuse mesothelioma. Both 
RIDDOR and IIDB data show incidences of pneumoconiosis, and mesothelioma are 
increasing.
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2.9 UK Illness Data Summary and International Comparison
It is difficult to compare ill-health statistics between sources due to many factors. The 
diseases that are reportable for each source vary, and there is a definite distinction 
between sources as to whether they measure incidence (RIDDOR and THOR) or 
prevalence (SWI and IIDB in payment). However, some broad conclusions can be 
made by comparing figures over time for specific occupational illnesses. For 
instance, SWI and THOR report an increase in stress, depression and anxiety due to 
work. RIDDOR and IIDB and THOR all show an increase in new reports of 
pneumoconiosis, and mesothelioma, although due to the potential for a long latency 
period, contraction of many such illnesses is likely to have occurred many years ago.
Given the difficulty in comparing occupational ill-health data in the UK, we are 
unable to compare data internationally as we were able to do for accidents. However, 
the EU strategy, Adapting to Change in Work and Society: a New Community 
Strategy on Health and Safety at Work 2002-06, emphasises the importance of 
improving ill-health data collection to enable comparability in the future. The strategy 
recommends member states should ensure all cases of occupational disease are 
reported. The European Statistics on Occupational Diseases (EODS) programme 
should soon publish comparable data on occupational illness within the EU.
2.10 Accuracy of Accident and Illness Reports
Under-reporting of both occupational accidents and illnesses is an issue that is of 
particular concern to the government and the HSC. Although legally employers have 
to meet the requirements of RIDDOR and report incidences of work-related accidents
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and ill-health as outlined in the regulation, there are still concerns that there is 
significant under-reporting. From the results of a health and safety module included in 
the British Social Attitudes Survey 2001, it was estimated that employers had been 
made aware of 80 per cent of accidents, and only 46 per cent of work-related illnesses 
(HSE, 2002, p.27). They noted this was an area for concern, with the potential for 
“adverse effects both on monitoring and on the potential for action by employers to 
reduce the occurrence of work-related illnesses at their workplace” (p.31). Daniels 
and Marlow (2005) were commissioned to conduct a review of the literature on under­
reporting, and found that “whilst reporting of workplace fatalities is thought to be 
accurate, HSE remain concerned regarding the reporting of non-fatal workplace 
injuries” (p.2). They emphasise that this problem is not just observed in the UK, but is 
a “worldwide phenomenon” (p.iv).
In an effort to confirm whether under-reporting exists, and to what extent, the HSE 
compares reports of non-fatal injuries made under RIDDOR with estimates obtained 
from the LFS. As expected, Table 2.17 shows that the LFS estimated rate of 
reportable injury is greater than the RIDDOR reported rate, suggesting there is a 
certain amount of under-reporting of non-fatal injuries under RIDDOR. For example, 
in 2004/05, the averaged LFS rate is estimated to be 1 200 per 100 000, but only 590 
per 100 000 injuries were actually reported under RIDDOR. Therefore, 49 per cent of 
non-fatal injuries were actually reported. Furthermore, there has been no significant 
improvement in reporting since 1999/2000.
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Table 2 .17: Rate o f  reported Non-Fatal Injuries
1999/00 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
RIDDOR reported injury 
rate to employees
667 624 618 635 590
LFS reportable injury rate 
to workers
1 490 1 500 1 430 1 330 1 200
Percentage of injuries 
reported
45 42 43 48 49
* = rate per 100 000 employees/workers 
Source: HSC, 2006, p .l 1
The RHS strategy outlines plans to address the issue of under-reporting of non-fatal 
accidents, part of which involved commissioning the review by Daniels and Marlow 
(2005). Their review considers the characteristics of firms and individuals that are 
found to be most likely to under-report, and also offers best-practice examples of 
when accurate reporting of accidents and illnesses is most likely.
Comparison between the LFS rates and RIDDOR reports show “actual report rates 
differ significantly by sector” (Daniels and Marlow, 2005, p.7) with accuracy 
particularly low in hotels and restaurants and finance and business sectors. In 
addition, under-reporting is prevalent in the healthcare sector. In a UK study of 
surgery theatre nurses and midwives, Cutter and Jordan (2004) found 32 per cent of 
their sample admitted failing to report an injury (p.441). Research also indicates there 
is significant under-reporting in the agriculture sector, where some of the highest 
occupational injury and mortality rates are observed. Daniels and Marlow (2005) 
summarise that in the literature “estimates of up to a 77 per cent under-reporting rate 
are cited” (p.8). They cite the main reasons for under-reporting in particular industries 
to be related to the perception of reporting as being time-consuming, and to the belief 
that nothing can be done about reducing the injuries they suffered at work.
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Under-reporting is also thought to be common in small firms. Daniels and Marlow, in 
summarising the literature, find this to be due to “lack of awareness of legal reporting 
requirements among smaller enterprises” and “completing the relevant paper work 
posing a greater relative burden for smaller rather than larger firms” (p.iv). McKnight 
et al. (2001) emphasise that, whilst small firms will have a smaller number of injuries 
due to the smaller workforce, rates of injuries are usually found to be higher in small 
firms, as discussed in chapter 3 A.6.
Management commitment and adequate reporting mechanisms are considered to be 
significant determinants of accurate accident reporting. Specifically, the ‘safety 
culture’ of a firm (which is discussed in more detail in chapter 3A.9) will greatly 
influence whether accidents are reported, as it will affect “the attitudes and beliefs in 
terms of health and safety performance” (Gadd and Collins, 2002, p. 17) of the firm 
and ultimately its employees. Daniels and Marlow remark that “active and visible 
management commitment” (p.5) to a reporting scheme is needed. They further 
emphasise that “conscientious organisations with a strong managerial commitment to 
safety make it clear to all employees and supervisors that under-reporting of accidents 
is unacceptable” (p.5). The HSE attach great importance to the role of safety 
representatives in providing a signal of a firm’s commitment to safety, and also in 
communicating the reporting procedure to workers who are unaware of it. Although 
management commitment to safety is clearly a key aspect in minimising under­
reporting of accidents, some safety policies designed to reduce accidents may not 
always be beneficial. Specific examples of workplace safety policies will be discussed 
in chapter 3A.9, but policies designed to reward workers for a low accident rate may 
result in under-reporting, as “workers may try to hide minor injuries or be encouraged
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to continue to work despite being injured so as to avoid jeopardising their chances of 
receiving the incentive” (Daniels and Marlow, 2005, p. 13). Collinson (1999) 
considered a case study of offshore oil rig workers, who received a collective bonus 
for a good safety record. Whereas managers were confident most accidents were 
reported, interviews revealed 50 per cent of workers had concealed an accident at 
some point in order to safe-guard their bonus. To ensure accurate reporting therefore, 
a firm must ensure management is committed to safety and reporting procedures, but 
recognise and address any potential incentives to manipulate the true firm’s accident 
record arising from workplace safety policies.
The RHS strategy outlines a plan to review the reporting regulations to consider if 
changes can be made to reduce under-reporting. However, the review by Daniels and 
Marlow (2005) highlights that rather than being a problem with the reporting 
procedure, under-reporting is likely to occur because of a variety of other firm- 
specific reasons. The strategy suggests the possibility of devising an information and 
communications strategy to emphasise the importance of accurate accident reporting 
to employers. Conway and Svensson (1998) in an examination of potential under­
reporting of accidents in the US, concluded that disincentives to report “often reflect 
psychological factors and attitudes among people in the organisation” (p.38) making 
the problem difficult to address.
Workplace accident under-reporting will have an impact upon the empirical work that 
follows. Chapters that concentrate upon workplace fatalities (for example chapter 5) 
will be less affected as such reports are considered accurate. Those that use non-fatal 
injury data however, will need to consider the impact of under-reporting. In particular,
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the finding that under-reporting is more common in specific sectors and in small firms 
will need to be considered in any interpretation of results. This is especially true for 
chapter 4 which relies on manager-reported injury data.
2.11 The Future of Policy and Data Collection
This chapter has summarised work safety legislation and enforcement, data sources 
and statistics in the UK and compared them to policies and equivalent rates in the EU 
and the US. In terms of the future for health and safety at work, the EU strategy 
Adapting to Change in Work and Society: a New Community Strategy on Health and 
Safety at Work 2002-06 highlights many challenges. Specifically, policy must take 
account of changes in “work organisation, working time arrangements, hierarchical 
relations, transport-related fatigue, and the degree of acceptance of ethnic and cultural 
diversity within the firm” (EC, 2002, p.8). Linked to this, the strategy emphasises the 
need to consider “new and emerging risks” (p.8) given that recent years have seen an 
increase in stress, depression, anxiety and violence at work. A key element of the 
2002-06 strategy was to encourage member states to devise their own, national 
strategy for targeting occupational health and safety. The EU recently published a new 
strategy, Improving Quality and Productivity at Work: Community Strategy 2007-12, 
which aims to continue with the work of the 2002-06 strategy by further supporting 
member states with their national strategies and focussed national action programmes.
Central to ensuring health and safety at work policy develops to take account of 
changing risks and conditions within the workplace, is the availability of accurate 
data. At the EU level, the strategy observes that data “remains incomplete, obscure or
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uncertain for many relevant topics” (EC, 2003, p.89). To improve this, many steps are 
being taken. The EODS for example, as previously discussed, is harmonising 
occupational illness data between member states. By making use of improved data 
collection, the EU also hopes to be able to provide data on the causes of a particular 
occupational injury or illness. By harmonising and increasing the accuracy and level 
of detail in data collection therefore, emerging risks due to changes in the composition 
of the workplace should be anticipated, assisting preventative policy.
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CHAPTER3
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY AND THE COMPENSATING 
WAGE DIFFERENTIALS LITERATURE
This chapter first reviews the literature that has investigated the influences upon 
occupational injury and illness (part A). A second section (part B) then considers the 
compensating wage differentials theory literature, whereby workers receive a wage 
premium for their exposure to adverse health and safety risk.
PART A 
Accident and Illness Rates Literature
A large literature examines the relationship between aggregate workplace injury and 
illness and a variety of factors. Time series analysis looks at variations in injury rates 
over periods of changing economic conditions, government policy and industrial 
structure. Cross section analysis is also used to examine the relationship between 
injury rates and characteristics at the individual and firm level. Any significant 
influences upon injury rates are important to consider, in terms of determining any 
potential pattern in reports of injury rates and therefore guiding future workplace 
health and safety policy. However, Davies and Jones (2005) highlight that “there are 
likely to be a number of factors within the economic environment which are beyond 
the control of the HSE, that will influence the incidence of workplace injuries” (p.2), 
such as the unemployment rate and the change in occupational structure. This needs
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to be considered when attempting to make policy recommendations, and also when 
evaluating policy effectiveness.
3A.1 Gender
EC (2004) reports that men are three times more likely to have an accident at work 
than women (p.31). Although this is partly due to men working in more high-risk 
sectors and working longer hours, even after adjusting for such differences, “men are 
about twice as likely as women to suffer accidents at work” (p.34). Women may be 
performing less risky tasks within sectors. Differences in incidence rates however, are 
observed in financial, real estate and business sectors, where we would not expect the 
tasks of men and women to be significantly different. McKnight et al. (2001) for 
example, using LFS data, find that even after adjusting for the fact that men are more 
likely to work in manual occupations, men are more likely to experience workplace 
injury than women. The differences in male and female injury rates are likely to be 
partly due to differences in attitudes and willingness to accept workplace risks. A 
large literature examines this possibility (including investigations by Dohmen et al. 
2005, and Ekeland et al. 2004), and this is discussed in detail in chapter 6.1.
When investigating geographical variations in injury rates, Davies and Elias (2000) 
find, surprisingly, that regional increases in female participation are related to 
increases in overall employee injury rates. Therefore, although women are least likely 
to have an accident at work, regions with increasing female participation are likely to 
have a higher injury rate. In a time series analysis, Davies and Elias (2000) find that 
although the rate of workplace injuries is following a long-run downward trend, the 
“overall trend is a net effect masking quite different trends for men and women”
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(p.63). Whilst the male injury rate is following a downward trend “female injury rates 
are estimated to follow an upward quadratic trend, although the rate of increase 
diminishes over time” (p.63). Overall therefore, female injury rates are lower than 
male injury rates but following an upward, yet diminishing trend.
3A.2 Age
Theoretically, we may expect older workers to be more likely to have an accident, as 
age “lessens the person’s ability to cope with job demands” (Laflamme and Menckel, 
1995, p. 145). However, Laflamme and Menckel (1995) highlight the importance of 
experience in enabling “efficient utilisation of resources” (p. 146), reducing the 
likelihood of an accident for older workers. Their literature survey reports the most 
common finding to be that as workforce age increases, accident frequency falls. 
Davies and Elias (2000) also find that age has a negative effect upon regional injury 
rates. Similarly, McKnight et al. (2001) find 16-24 year olds are 20 per cent more 
likely to have an accident than older workers (p. 17). EC (2004) also report “for non- 
fatal accidents at work the incidence rate is at least 50 per cent higher among 18-24 
years than in any other age category” (p.35). It should be noted however, that the age- 
effect is likely to be activity-specific. Laflamme and Menckel (1995) emphasise there 
will be a point where increases in age begin to cause accident frequency to rise, 
especially for physically demanding occupations.
Fenn and Ashby (2004), using WERS 98, show age has a different effect upon 
workplace illnesses than accidents; while workplaces with a younger workforce have 
a higher risk of reported accidents, their illness regression results indicate 
“establishments with a high proportion of young workers have lower illness rates”
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(p.473). Robinson and Smallman (2006) find a similar result when workplaces are 
divided into manufacturing and service sector establishments (p. 100).
3A.3 Industry and Occupation
The industry and occupation of an employee are very significant in terms of defining 
an employee’s risk of having a work-related accident. This is emphasised in Davies 
and Elias (2000), who in their model to explain geographical variations in injury rates 
in the UK, find that “the industrial and occupational composition of employment 
accounts for a majority of regional variation in the risk of a workplace injury” (p.4). 
Specifically, they find higher injury rates are associated with employment within the 
manufacturing and construction industries. In terms of occupation, Fenn and Ashby 
(2004) find that personal and protective service employees and the unskilled have 
“more than four times the injury risk faced by clerical workers” (p.473). Interestingly 
however, “the effects of occupational group on the risk of illness are not statistically 
significant” (p.473).
Given the importance of a worker’s industry and occupation on the determination of 
their risk of having a work-related accident, it is important to consider the effect of 
changes in the concentration of employment within certain sectors. Davies and Elias 
(2000) highlight the fact that “since 1971 there has been a clear shift in employment 
away from primary industries, utilities and manufacturing, towards the service 
sectors” (p. 14). For instance, between 1971 and 1997, they calculate employment in 
manufacturing fell from 31.2 per cent to 16.5 per cent of the workforce. Employment 
within business and miscellaneous services during the same period, however, 
increased from 11.5 per cent to 22.2 per cent (p. 14). They emphasise that such “shifts
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in employment from traditional manual employment will have a significant impact 
upon the incidence of industrial injuries” (p. 17).
Similarly, in the US, Loomis et al. (2004) highlight the shift from manufacturing 
employment to service sector employment (p.616), and discuss two potential impacts 
of this deindustrialisation on injury rates. First, the movement of workers from 
manufacturing employment where accident rates are relatively high, to jobs with 
lower risk, is likely to reduce the risk of injury for the average worker. Second 
however, on the negative side, there could be potential problems with struggling 
manufacturing firms having to “forego maintenance and replacement of obsolete 
equipment, and eliminate health and safety programmes” (p.616) which would have 
an adverse effect on injury rates. Their investigation however, “did not find evidence 
of a strongly negative or strongly beneficial effect of deindustrialisation on the rate of 
fatal occupational injuries in the US 1980-96” (p.617). They found that it did 
contribute to what they phrase “the long-term decline of fatal occupational injury 
rates”, but explained only 10 to 15 per cent of the change over 17 years (p.617).
In an interview with the HSC chairman, Altman (2000) reports that in the UK the 
movement from traditionally high-risk manufacturing industries “has been a 
significant factor behind the long-term decline in overall accident rates” (p. 10). 
Although this shift in employment has contributed to a fall in work-related accidents, 
he cautions that this change will present new risks, such as an increase in occupational 
illness. For instance, we are likely to see a reduction in physical injuries and an 
increase in stress related illnesses. As such therefore, the change in employment 
structure has meant “the nature of risk has become far more diverse” (Fenn and 
Ashby, 2004, p.461). This may explain Fenn and Ashby’s and Robinson and
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Smallman’s recent findings that a worker’s occupation is insignificant in determining 
their risk of an occupational illness: it may be that incidences of occupational illness 
are more evenly distributed amongst occupations compared to accidents. Overall 
therefore, the changing structure of the economy has meant that “it no longer seems 
justifiable to focus exclusively on the manufacturing sector in relation to health and 
safety at work” (Fenn and Ashby, 2004, p.461) and that “many of the future 
challenges lie in the area of occupational health” (Altman, 2000, p.9).
3A.4 Atypical Employment
Davies and Elias (2000) define atypical employment as “any type of work that is not 
full-time and permanent” (p. 12). Altman (2000) notes that the insecurity associated 
with a “short-term contract culture” (p. 10) can lead to an increase in stress-related 
illnesses. In addition to the potential for the increase in temporary employment 
causing an increase in anxiety-related illnesses, there are also concerns that it is 
associated with a reduction in health and safety standards generally in the workplace. 
For instance, it is hypothesised that firms with temporary contract workers may be 
associated with a reduction in the level of planning and organisation in the workplace, 
resulting in inadequate attention being paid to health and safety regulations. Although, 
as Burchell (1989) comments, health and safety legislation gives equal rights to all 
employees, in practice, workers with atypical contracts may be less likely to receive 
such rights, such as adequate health and safety training. Some forms of atypical 
employment may also be associated with a payment-by-results system. Davies and 
Elias (2000) emphasise that such a payment system could “contribute to the 
production of industrial accidents through the use of financial incentives to increase 
work intensification” (p. 13).
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Considering the empirical results of the effect atypical employment has upon 
occupational health, in an estimation examining variations in regional injury rates in 
the UK, Davies and Elias (2000) find the use of temporary workers increases injury 
rates (p.67). More recently, Robinson and Smallman (2006) find evidence that fixed- 
term workers are also associated with greater incidences of workplace illness (p.99). 
Similarly, Guadalupe (2003) in an estimation of injury rates in Spain found a 
temporary-contract effect, which “results in an increase of 5 points in the accident 
probability” (p.355). However, the results of Amuedo-Dorantes (2002) also using 
Spanish data, provide no evidence that temporary employment is associated with a 
higher likelihood of work injuries and illnesses “once working conditions and other 
factors are controlled for” (p.262). Hemanz and Tohana (2004) also reach similar 
conclusions with their study of the effect temporary workers has upon occupational 
health in Spain and Italy. While they observe that temporary employment tends to be 
correlated on average with higher accidents, they find the correlation “is not so 
significant when personal and job characteristics are controlled for” (p.5). They 
conclude that the balance of evidence in the literature tends to suggest that “contract 
type does not appear to be the main determinant of the risk of accidents” (p. 16).
The effect that working unusual hours or shifts has upon occupational injury rates 
should also be considered. A study commissioned by the EC (2004) highlights the 
increased risk from working unusual hours. They attribute this to shift work “affecting 
the concentration of the workers, affecting the work environment (e.g. illumination) 
and by affecting the working arrangements (e.g. lower number of personnel, less 
supervision)” (p.39). Many papers in the psychology literature also highlight that 
working extended shifts, particularly night shifts, increases the likelihood of injury 
because of the pattern of work interfering with a person’s circadian rhythm.
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Harrington (2001) highlights that “mammals have a natural rhythmicity to many 
bodily functions” which is timed according to a day-night cycle with body 
temperature at its peak in the late afternoon (p.69). As people function best when 
they follow their body’s natural circadian rhythm, any change in this pattern due to 
atypical work patterns will interrupt a person’s natural pattern of alertness, increasing 
the likeliness of an accident. EC (2004) reports evidence that workers who usually or 
sometimes work in shifts, have 50 to 70 per cent higher incidences of accidents at 
work than those who do not (p.39).
Robinson and Smallman (2006) investigate whether there is an impact upon accidents 
and illnesses in workplaces that have a flexitime policy. They comment upon the 
trend for many workplaces to offer workers flexible hours, where employees can 
organise their working week to fit their own needs, with this now seen as a critical 
element to ensure competitiveness across Europe due to an increasingly diverse 
workforce (p.90). From a sociological point of view, Smith (1997) notes that such 
flexibility empowers workers enabling them to work in a fulfilling work environment, 
which we would expect to lead to a reduction in workplace stress and anxiety 
illnesses. However, summarising the findings of many papers, Sparks et al. (2001) 
highlight potential detrimental effects due to an often condensed working week, 
which diminishes workers’ ability to identify hazards (p.497). Robinson and 
Smallman find flexitime is associated with a greater risk of reported injuries and 
illnesses in both the manufacturing and service sectors (p.99) which they attribute to 
increased work intensity.
Robinson and Smallman also examine the impact that working from home has upon 
workplaces’ accident and illness records. Felstead (1996), using LFS data, highlights
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how the number of home workers tripled between 1981 and 1994, with the majority of 
home workers female and in the clerical and secretarial services industry. Quinlan 
(1999) argues that home working “presents major regulatory difficulties” as “many 
home workers operate in cramped conditions in a setting not designed for work, 
under tight home production schedules and at low rates of pay” (p.446). Robinson and 
Smallman (2006) however, find that home workers are associated with fewer 
workplace injuries. Conversely, employing home workers has the effect of increasing 
workplace illnesses (p.99) which could partly be attributed to working in continuous 
isolation.
It is also important to consider work intensity, and specifically whether there is a 
relationship between occupational health and safety and overtime working. Logically, 
we would expect an increase in hours to result in an increase in injury rates, if only 
because workers are exposed to the risk for an increased amount of time. However, 
there is evidence to suggest that overtime and extended work hours increase the 
hazard rate itself, not just the number of injuries, with workers suffering from fatigue. 
For instance, Sparks et al. (2001) report that working persistent 10 to 12 hour shifts 
resulted in increased fatigue with reduced reaction time and reasoning ability (p.491). 
Dembe et al. (2005), using panel data spanning from 1987-2000, consider the effect 
that extended hours per week (60 or more hours regularly), extended hours per day 
(12 or more hours regularly) overtime (the interpretation of which is left to the 
respondent), and extended commute time (2 or more hours per day regularly) have 
upon workplace injury rates. Their results indicate extended hours and overtime are 
positively associated with an increased risk of injury at work, which “lends support to 
the idea that there may be a causal process linking long work schedules with 
occupational injury” (p.594). Extended commute time however, had no significant
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impact upon occupational injuries. Overtime had the greatest effect “with overtime 
workers having a 6 per cent higher injury hazard rate compare to workers in jobs 
without overtime” (p.594). Furthermore, results persist after age, gender, occupation, 
industry and region are controlled for, showing jobs with longer working hours are 
not riskier simply because of the occupations and industries they are concentrated in 
or because of any dominant employee demographic characteristics. Commenting 
upon the findings of Dembe et al., Loomis (2005) highlights the fact that in the US, 
overtime has been increasing; “American workers -  and many others around the 
world- have been working longer hours as global competition has intensified” (p.585). 
However, contrary to the findings of Dembe et al., which would suggest this would 
result in an increase in injury rates, “the overall rates of occupational injury and 
illness have been declining over time” (p.585). Loomis therefore emphasises that 
there are many other important factors impacting upon work-related injury, and while 
working hours have an effect, “they clearly do not tell the whole story” (p.585).
In terms of policy, Dembe et al. suggest that there should be more protective measures 
for employees working overtime. In particular, the study “supports the initiatives of 
the EU and other governments to regulate the length of working schedules” (p.595) 
and propose the US should consider the impact of introducing a similar schedule. The 
EU Working Time Directive, issued in 1993, limited working hours to 48 per week; 
however, the UK introduced a schedule to enable workers to opt out of the directive. 
Summarising the often detrimental impact that changing working practices in terms of 
flexible hours and overtime is likely to have upon occupational health and safety, 
Robinson and Smallman (2006) conclude that although it may aid productivity and 
competitiveness “perceived flexibility and choice is not without its costs” (p.90).
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3A.5 Trade Unions and Health and Safety Committees
Freeman and Medoff (1984) describe how trade unions are viewed in two different 
ways, describing these as the ‘two faces’ of unionism. Unions can be seen as 
monopolies in the labour market that raise members’ wages at the expense of non­
members. Described as the ‘monopoly face’, this perspective views unions as having 
a harmful effect upon the functioning of the economy. Conversely, the ‘collective 
voice/institutional response face’ protects members “against arbitrary management 
decisions” and provides them with a “voice at the work place and in the political 
arena” (p.4). It is through the ‘collective voice/institutional response face’ that trade 
unions could theoretically improve health and safety in the workplace. In providing a 
collective voice, unions enable direct communication between employers and 
workers. Freeman and Medoff stress collective rather than individual bargaining is 
necessary within the workplace. For instance, for an individual worker, expressing 
concern about working conditions may be risky, but collective voice “is protected 
both by the support of all workers and by the country’s labour law” (p.9). In addition, 
workplace safety is a public good by nature, with all workers benefiting from any 
improvements. Economic theory has shown “competitive markets will not provide 
enough of such goods; some form of collective decision making is needed” (p.9). 
Overall therefore, we may expect the presence of trade unions to reduce occupational 
injury rates.
There are however, arguments to suggest unionised workplaces will have a higher 
accident rate. Unions may provide members with health and safety information which 
will raise worker’s awareness of their rights, and if an injury is sustained, encourage 
them to report it. Borooah et al. (1997) suggest that union members are more likely to
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report an accident at work. Fenn and Ashby (2004) comment that in unionised 
workplaces, accident reporting systems are more likely to be clearly established, 
which may in turn “give the false appearance of higher accident rates” (p.464) with 
unions trying to recover compensation for risk for their members. Furthermore, higher 
accident rates may be expected in the presence of trade unions because of the 
endogeneity of union membership; Wooden and Robertson (1997) raise this issue, 
suggesting workers in dangerous industries choose to belong to a unionised firm 
because of the potential safety benefits. Nichols (1997) supports this view, finding 
evidence that industries with higher union density also have higher injury rates.
Theoretically therefore, the effect that unions have upon health and safety in the 
workplace is ambiguous. Empirically, Currington (1986) and Wooden and Robertson 
(1997) find no statistically significant relationship between trade union membership 
and industrial injuries. Fenn and Ashby (2004) using WERS 98, also find no 
statistically significant relationship between union density and injury risk, but in terms 
of illness risk, find that workplaces with higher union membership are associated with 
a higher risk of reporting an illness. They acknowledge this is likely to reflect many 
factors including “the existence of better reporting practices or more generous sick 
pay arrangements in unionised workplaces” (p.475). Furthermore, tests for 
endogeneity do not enable them to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, suggesting 
employees who are at a greater risk of experiencing an injury are likely to choose to 
work for a unionised firm. A positive and significant relationship between union 
membership and industrial injuries is found by Lanoie (1992) and Worrall and Butler 
(1983). Using US data, Worrall and Butler (1983) find union members are “23 per 
cent more likely to have a health condition caused by either a job accident or bad
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working conditions” (p.344). They attribute this relationship to be due to the greater 
likelihood that union members report health and safety breaches.
In addition to considering the role of trade unions in occupational safety, studies have 
also investigated the role of safety representatives and health and safety committees. 
Chapter 2.2.1 discusses the regulations that were developed in the UK to enable safety 
representatives to be appointed in unionised, and more recently, also in non-unionised 
firms. Safety representatives have the role of investigating possible dangers at work, 
causes of accidents, general health and safety welfare issues, and consulting with 
employers. The HSC emphasise that they “attach great importance to the role played 
by safety representatives in securing good standards of health and safety” (HSC, 
2000, p.29). This should include reviewing risk assessments and safety reports, 
monitoring all arrangements for health and safety in the workplace, and considering 
the adequacy of health and safety communication.
In terms of health and safety committees, an investigation by Reilly et al. (1995) 
highlights that in the UK, “these committees may adopt an even more important role 
given the potential for a continued decline in union workplace strength” (Reilly et al., 
1995, p.276). They examine the effect that committees have upon workplace injuries 
using a sample of manufacturing establishments from the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey 1990 (WIRS 90). Results “confirm a relatively positive role for 
union safety representatives” (p.283) with firms with a health and safety committee 
having on average 5.7 fewer injuries per 1000 employees compared with firms with 
no such committee. Overall, they find “joint consultative health and safety committees 
(either with or without union-nominated safety representatives) perform a significant
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social role in reducing workplace injuries” (p.284) and suggest mandatory committees 
“may be one way of achieving a socially efficient level of safety” (p.284).
Cully et al. (1999) find evidence from WERS 98 that health and safety committees are 
important for occupational health and safety in the UK, with their presence prevalent 
in 39 per cent of workplaces. They found that even in non-union workplaces, 
representative structures for dealing with health and safety issues had been 
established, which can be attributed to the emergence of the HSCER 1996. Focussing 
specifically upon non-unionised workplaces, a study by Sheam (2005) comments that 
sites with a health and safety officer showed a much greater commitment to 
minimising workplace accidents. Compared to the non-unionised workplaces with no 
such officer, these sites dedicated more time and resources to improving safety (p. 19).
Fenn and Ashby (2004) comment that the focus of research in this area is now upon 
union involvement in health and safety committees, and the impact this has upon 
injury rates, believing “the involvement of unions in health and safety issues in this 
way could provide a more direct indicator of their influence” (p.464). They do 
however, caution that examining the impact that health and safety committees have 
upon injury rates could suffer from the same endogeneity problem as a trade union 
variable, as health and safety committees “are more likely to emerge in establishments 
where workplace risk is higher” (p.464). They do find a significantly positive 
relationship between injury risk and the presence of health and safety committees, 
although they do not find conclusive evidence that the health and safety committee 
variable is endogenous. It should be emphasised however, that such endogeneity tests 
rely on the accuracy of available instruments.
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Overall, the effect of the presence of unions and health and safety committees upon 
injury rates remains ambiguous. The relationship must be interpreted with caution, as 
reporting mechanisms are likely to be more established in unionised firms and firms 
where health and safety committees exist. Estimates may be affected by endogeneity, 
with unions and committees present in those firms where risk is greater.
3A.6 Firm Size
Theoretically, as outlined by Nichols et al. (1995), we may expect larger 
establishments to be associated with higher injury rates. We may expect worker 
morale to be lower in large, bureaucratic establishments, and if injuries are more 
likely when morale is low, this may increase the likelihood of injury. Also, injuries 
may be more likely in large firms because of the lack of worker autonomy. Finally, 
also stemming from the association of large firms with bureaucracy, poor 
communications could also lead to a higher injury rate. Larger firms however, may be 
expected to have lower accident rates for a number of reasons. Fenn and Ashby 
(2004) highlight that “larger establishments are more likely to be targeted by health 
and safety inspectors” (p.473). The incentive effect should therefore result in lower 
injury rates for larger firms. Larger firms are also more likely to have the capital to 
invest in health and safety training programmes, and to replace obsolete, potentially 
unsafe, equipment.
In the US, Currington (1986) and Lanoie (1992) find increased firm size is associated 
with smaller injury rates. In the UK, Reilly et al. (1995) and Nichols et al. (1995) 
using WIRS 90, find the same result. Reilly et al. (1995) find that a 1 per cent rise in 
an establishment’s employment lowers injuries by around 0.9 per 1 000 employees
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(p.280). Fenn and Ashby (2004) find “a doubling of the number of employees in an 
establishment is associated with a 33 per cent reduction in the risk of reported injury” 
(p.475). In Europe as whole, EC (2004) reports that “the incidence rate of accidents at 
work is higher in small and medium sized units” (p.37) compared to firms that employ 
over 250 workers. Overall therefore, Fenn and Ashby (2004) conclude that “it seems 
that larger establishments are safer establishments” (p.477).
There are many potential explanations for larger firms being relatively safer. Reilly et 
al. (1995) suggest “larger establishments can exploit economies of scale in the 
provision of safety” (p.280). Frick and Walter (1998) also list numerous potential 
reasons for small firms to have a poorer safety record, including poor knowledge of 
legal requirements and safe working practices, and limited management resources to 
devote to health and safety (p.367).
The RHS Strategy recognises the tendency for smaller firms to have higher accident 
rates, and also, as discussed in chapter 2.10, a poorer reporting accuracy compared to 
larger firms. The HSC consultation process identified that “many small firms have 
difficulty understanding their legal duties and are unclear about the action they should 
take” (HSC, 2000, p.31). Furthermore, many small firms were deterred from seeking 
advice for fear of enforcement action being taken out against them. To address this, a 
Small Business Service was established in 2000 “to promote a one-stop shop for 
information and advice, free from any threat of enforcement action” (HSC, 2000, 
p.31) with regard to many issues facing small firms, including workplace health and 
safety. At the European level, the recent strategy Improving Quality and Productivity 
at Work: Community Strategy 2007-2012 on Health and Safety at Work, also stresses
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the need for member states to help small and medium-sized firms improve their 
health and safety record.
3A.7 Economic and Seasonal Effects
Many papers have examined the relationship between workplace injuries and 
macroeconomic conditions, with the unemployment rate often used as a proxy for 
economic conditions. In the UK, Davies and Elias (2000) use data provided by the 
HSE on the number of work-related accidents as reported under RIDDOR. Their 
estimation results indicate a negative relationship exists between employee injury 
rates and the claimant unemployment rate (p.60). However, it is important to consider 
the possible explanations for the relationship before concluding that policy should be 
directed towards improving workplace safety during periods of economic expansion.
Kossoris (1938) also found evidence of a negative relationship between the 
unemployment rate and workplace injuries using 1929-35 US panel data. He provided 
three possible explanations for his results. First, in periods of economic downturn 
redundancies are likely, with employees most recently hired more likely to be made 
redundant. During recession therefore, a firm’s workforce is likely to be more 
experienced than the workforce during a boom. A more experienced workforce will 
be less prone to accidents, resulting in injury rates falling during a recession. Second, 
Kossoris (1938) highlights that work intensity is likely to fall during an economic 
downturn. During a boom, when demand for services and products are generally high, 
work intensity increases to meet this demand. Therefore, accidents are more likely 
when work intensity is greater, during a period of economic expansion. Finally, the 
vintage capital hypothesis is used to potentially explain the observed variation in
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injury rates with economic conditions. During periods of economic expansion, older 
and less efficient machinery may need to be used to meet demand. This increases the 
likelihood of an accident.
Alternatively, Nichols (1986) considers how the bargaining strength between 
employers and workers varies with the business cycle. When unemployment is high, 
employers have a bargaining advantage as the probability of a worker finding 
alternative employment is reduced. Workers then have little choice but to accept 
working conditions, increasing the likelihood of injury. Trade unions however, may 
prevent this from occurring through acting as a collective force.
Boone and Van Ours (2006) highlight two potential explanations for the relationship 
between the economic cycle and injury rates. The first is referred to as the ‘working- 
conditions explanation’; like those explanations offered by Kossoris (1938), it directly 
refers to changes in a firm’s accident rate in the workplace as a result of changes in 
economic conditions. Conversely, the alternative ‘reporting explanation’ attributes 
variations in the workplace injury rate with economic conditions directly to variations 
in reporting. If this explanation is correct, changes in working-conditions due to the 
economic cycle are not responsible for any observed relationship with injury rates.
The ‘working-conditions explanation’ considers variations in worker effort 
throughout the economic cycle. If more (inexperienced) workers are hired during a 
boom and a greater degree of effort is required from them, it is hypothesised that these 
workers will become less careful, leading to more work-related accidents. 
Consequently “if effort is procyclical (employers require higher effort levels in
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booms) so are workplace accidents” (Boone and Van Ours, 2006, p. 1071). 
Empirically, this argument would suggest that during a boom there are more accidents 
at work. Alternatively, the ‘reporting explanation’ relates the variation in workplace 
accidents directly to the variation in absence rates. Brown and Sessions (1996) note 
that firms are more likely to fire workers who are frequently absent, and use this as a 
“worker discipline device” (p.40). Leigh (1985) finds evidence that this is more likely 
to occur when economic conditions are poor. Workers are aware of their vulnerability 
during an economic downturn and so will be less likely to report an accident. 
Consequently, research has shown there to be an inverse relationship between the 
unemployment rate and absence rates. Johanssen and Palme (1996), using Swedish 
panel data, find that “an increase of 1 per cent in the unemployment level would 
decrease the number of days absent by 0.45 per cent” (p.211). Workers are less likely 
to be absent during an economic downturn because of the increased likelihood of 
being fired. Using UK data, Davies and Jones (2005) also find evidence that economic 
growth is associated with more injuries, and specifically find “moving from a 
recession to a boom has been estimated to contribute to approximately an 11-12 per 
cent increase in the rate of major injuries among employees” (p. 101). This effect 
varies by sector, with the greatest impact in the construction industry where an 
economic boom is associated with a 12-14 per cent increase in major injuries. They 
further find evidence that there is a significant correlation between injury rates and 
new hires and increased worker effort, supporting the ‘working conditions’ 
hypothesis.
Boone and Van Ours (2006) argue that in terms of workplace accidents, when 
unemployment is high “workers are reluctant to report accidents when they fear that
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employers will hold this against them” (p. 1071). This explanation is directly related to 
variations in the reporting of accidents during changing macroeconomic conditions. 
To support this explanation, there must be a significantly negative relationship 
between the level and the change in unemployment and the number of accidents. 
Empirical results show that “workplace accidents are inversely related to both the 
level of unemployment and the change in unemployment” (p. 1086). Furthermore, 
fatal accidents have no significant relationship with economic conditions. This leads 
Boone and Van Ours (2006) to conclude that the fluctuations in accident rates with 
the economic cycle are due to the reporting behaviour of workers. If unemployment is 
high or increasing, workers are less likely to report an accident. Therefore, they find 
“no evidence that working conditions deteriorate in cyclical upturns” (p. 1086). The 
variations in the reporting behaviour of workers with the economic cycle must 
therefore be considered in the analysis of any data in a specific time period.
Davies and Elias (2000) also find evidence of seasonal variations in injury rates in 
their time series analysis. Results show injury rates are greatest during October for 
both males and females. They further observe that these seasonal effects are larger for 
males. Specifically, they calculate that “male employees are 18 per cent more likely to 
experience a workplace injury during October relative to April” (p.62). Overall, with 
the exception of December when fewer hours are worked, injury rates are found to be 
greatest during the winter months.
3A.8 Government Policy
Chapter 2 has discussed the RHS Strategy that sets specific targets to reduce 
workplace accidents and illnesses by 2010. The effect that such policy has upon injury
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rates however, is difficult to isolate. Davies and Jones (2005) highlight that “the 
establishment of such targets reflects a desire to demonstrate that the regulatory 
regime can have a positive impact on ‘bottom line’ measures of health and safety” 
(p. 1), but in practice, there are many economic factors that impact upon the number of 
work accidents, which are beyond the control of health and safety at work policy. As 
discussed, workplace injury rates are influenced by the business cycle, personal 
characteristics, employment characteristics, and most importantly occupational 
composition within the labour market. The problem of assessing whether government 
policy has had an impact upon workplace safety “is being able to identify the separate 
and additional contribution of HSE against a background of varying economic 
conditions and a continually evolving labour market” (Davies and Jones, 2005, 
p. 104). Whilst progress reports highlight some progress towards achieving the RHS 
strategy targets, economic conditions need to be considered alongside safety statistics 
when monitoring progress.
The effect government policy has had upon injury rates in the US and Canada, has 
been examined by a number of authors. Viscusi (1986) investigated the impact the 
OSHA in the US has had upon national injury rates. The OSHA was established in 
1971, with the general philosophy of setting workplace health and safety standards. 
Viscusi (1986) estimates the OSHA’s impact using a sample of injury rates from 
manufacturing industries between 1973-1983. Results are mixed, with evidence of a 
significant OSHA impact “only for the incidence of lost workday injuries and 
illnesses” (p.567), although there is no evidence of a significant impact on overall 
injury rates. Their evidence does however, show that “OSHA prevents from 1-2 
injuries involving at least one lost day of work per 1000 employees annually” (p.578). 
Although acknowledging the impact is not large, they emphasise that evidence of
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some beneficial effect should be noted. Lanoie (1992) conducts a similar study into 
the effectiveness of the Canadian Board of Occupational Safety and Health from 
1983-1987. Results, like those of Viscusi, are mixed; no significant effect upon the 
injury rate was found. However, the industry inspection rate was found to have a 
significant negative effect upon injury rates.
In terms of predicting the effect of potential health and safety policies in the US, 
Kniesner and Leeth (1988) use techniques to simulate hedonic labour market 
equilibrium in a bid to identify the labour market effects of various policy measures. 
They consider the effect of introducing an injury tax, where firms with a high accident 
record pay higher fines. Their model indicates “a clear negative effect on work-related 
injuries, which becomes more substantial as the tax rate grows” (p.780). In contrast, 
when considering the effect of an insurance scheme where firms pay benefits which 
compensate injured workers, they find little effect upon injury rates. These results are 
re-enforced by Wei et al. (2005) who, using Kniesner and Leeths’ simulation model, 
consider the effect of various policies in Hong Kong. They too find an increase in 
workers’ compensation benefits has little effect upon workplace injury rates. They 
attribute this to the fact that although it provides an incentive for firms to increase 
workplace safety it encourages workers to take more risky jobs. Alternatively, they 
find increasing fines for violating safety regulation, and a progressive injury tax 
would have a significant effect upon reducing injury rates (p.351).
3A.9 Safety Culture and Safety Policies at the Workplace Level
At the workplace level, firms can adopt various safety policies designed to reduce the 
accident rate. Adopting an overall ‘safety culture’ is seen as being the most effective
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workplace policy, involving adopting a commitment to safety within “the prevailing 
norms, values, attitudes, beliefs and practice” (Daniels and Marlow, 2005, p.l 1). In a 
review of the effect a positive safety culture has upon accident rates, Gadd and Collins 
(2002) remark that management’s commitment to safety is crucial.
In addition, there are various safety incentive policies that workplaces can adopt. 
Daniels and Marlow (2005) comment that supporters of such policies “herald their 
merits as a means of encouraging worker safety and promoting safe behaviour” 
(p. 12). Those who oppose them however, “stop little short of accusations of bribery 
and of buying safe behaviour” (p. 12). Safety policies that reward workers for low 
accident rates can simply discourage accurate accident reporting, hence “the 
underlying cause of workplace hazards remains unaddressed” (p. 12). Collinson (1999) 
provides evidence that such a policy in the US had this exact effect. Policies linking 
productivity to bonus schemes, including piece work rates, could also compromise 
safety. For instance, in a case study of foundry workers Dickety et al. (2002) found 
workers on piece rates were reluctant to wear safety gloves as they slowed their work 
pace. Sawacha et al. (1999) considered another safety policy that gave hazard pay to 
construction workers who were exposed to a greater level of risk than others. They 
found evidence that hazard pay encouraged workers to take risks, going against the 
promotion of safety in the workplace. Given that the compensating wage differentials 
theory, to be discussed in the following section, predicts that the market itself 
compensates workers exposed to hazards, such a policy would mean workers were in 
fact over-compensated.
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3A.10 Interpreting and Forecasting Trends in Workplace Injuries
Although, as shown in chapter 2, there has been a general downward trend in 
workplace injuries between 1986 and 2006, given the preceding discussion this needs 
to be analysed in the context of changing economic conditions during this period. 
Primarily, a shift away from manufacturing employment will have contributed 
substantially to the fall in accidents, as highlighted in chapter 2.5. In addition, a period 
of economic expansion will have increased injury rates, for reasons previously 
outlined.
McKnight et al. (2001) consider the future movement of injury rates, using a forecast 
of employment by occupation, industry and gender, by the Institute of Employment 
Research (IER). This forecast includes changes in the composition of employment, 
with employment increasing in Distribution, Transport and Business (p.26). The 
forecast of workplace injuries takes no account of future changes in injury rates, but 
considers what would happen to injury rates if factors known to influence them 
change in the predicted way. They predicted that between 1996-2006, without policy 
intervention, reported injuries would rise for two reasons. First, an increase in white 
collar employment should more than offset the decline in employment in 
manufacturing, and “while injury rates are higher in the latter sectors, the scale of the 
expansion in employment in white collar occupations is such that this more than 
outweighs the decline in elementary occupations” (p.27). Second, the growth of 
employment in personal service occupations should contribute to a rise in reportable 
injuries. Overall, Mcknight et al. conclude that “if there is no decline in injury rates by 
occupation and industry sector over the 10 year period 1996-2006, we would expect 
workplace injuries to rise by more than 5 per cent” (p.30). Chapter 2 highlighted
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reported injuries over this period fell, suggesting occupational health and safety 
policy, most notably in the form of the RHS strategy, may have had a positive impact.
PART B 
Compensating Wage Differentials Theory
The theory of compensating wage differentials is now considered in terms of if a 
wage premium is received to compensate workers exposed to health and safety risks.
3B.1 Model Outline
The theory of compensating wage differentials originates in Adam Smith’s The 
Wealth o f Nations, where he explains that:
“the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments 
of labour and stock must,....be either perfectly equal or continually tending
toward equality. If, there was an employment evidently either more or less
advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one 
case, and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon 
return to the level of other employments” (Smith, 1776, p.l 11).
Jobs with disagreeable characteristics must therefore, pay wage premiums to attract 
workers. Thus, we can view the wage rate as embodying a series of implicit prices at 
which each of these characteristics is bought and sold. Although the theory of
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equalising differences dates back to 1776, the modem labour market still comprises of 
jobs with numerous characteristics as outlined by Smith: the theory, therefore, is still 
of interest today. Empirical studies are continually testing the theory, highlighting its 
importance. In enabling us to have a better understanding of the structure and 
determination of wage rates, Rosen (1986) emphasises its significance, believing it to 
make “legitimate claim to be the fundamental (long-run) market equilibrium construct 
in labour economics” (p.641).
A disagreeable characteristic that is frequently applied to the theory in the literature 
concerns the risk of a worker experiencing a fatal or non-fatal workplace accident. 
This is because, as discussed in the previous section and as Thaler and Rosen (1976) 
summarize, “different work situations exhibit vastly different work-related 
probabilities of death and injury” (p.266). The compensating wage differential would 
be the price employers are required to pay workers in order for them to accept 
employment with an increased risk of fatality or injury. Recently, studies have 
attempted to consider the theory in terms of whether a premium is paid to compensate 
for the risk of an occupational long-term illness as they “are far more common than 
deaths at work” (Sandy and Elliott, 2005, p.745) although, for reasons discussed in 
chapter 2 and later, data problems have restricted the number of empirical studies in 
the literature.
Just as jobs will differ in their degree of hazardous conditions, firms and workers are 
heterogeneous. Firms will differ in their ability to provide safety; workers will vary in 
their willingness to accept a relatively hazardous job.
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To provide a safe working environment, firms will face costs incurred from the 
installation and maintenance of various safety devices. To maintain a given level of 
profit however, firms will only invest in such devices if it translates into lower wage 
costs. Consequently, “greater safety (at constant profits) will be provided only at ever- 
increasing wage reductions” (Smith, 1979, p.340). It should be noted that the Health 
and Safety at Work Act 1974 places a duty upon employers to ensure the safety of 
workers and members of the public, as discussed in chapter 2.2.1. The Act gives 
employers significant freedom to decide how to control risk in the workplace; 
although in particularly hazardous industries, specific regulations place more 
obligations upon employers. Rationally, we would expect firms to assess the level of 
workplace safety and compare the cost of improving conditions to the cost of failing 
to comply with the health and safety legislation.
Figure 1 plots isoprofit curves for Firm 1 (Pi) and Firm 2 (P2) showing combinations 
of the wage rate paid to workers, and the level of risk in the working environment that 
yield a given profit level. Isoprofit curves show that a relatively high level of risk will 
result in a greater wage bill, because of the high wage premium required to induce 
workers to accept a job with such a firm. As firms differ in their ability to provide a 
safe working environment, each firm will have a different set of isoprofit curves. For 
instance, in Figure 1, Firm 2 finds it more costly than Firm 1 to provide a safe 
working environment.
Workers will vary in their preferences for job safety and consequently have different 
attitudes towards accepting risk. A worker’s preference for safety will be captured in 
his or her utility function. Desirable job characteristics and the wage will enter
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positively into this function, the magnitude of which depends upon the preferences of 
each individual worker. Thus, we can draw a set of indifference curves for each 
worker, illustrating “the trade-off each worker is willing to make between wages and 
risk level" (Smith, 1979, p.340). For an increasing level of risk in the workplace, 
workers require a higher wage to compensate them for the hazardous conditions. 
Figure 3B.1 illustrates that Worker 1 (Ci) places a greater value on safety than 
Worker 2 (C2). Worker 2 is willing to accept a high level of risk for a relatively lower 
wage than Worker 1 would require for the same level of risk.
Risk Level (r)
Source: S im on et al. 1999
Figure 3B.1: The Market Offer Curve
In equilibrium. Firms maximise expected profits and workers maximise expected 
utility. As Rosen describes it, “the labour market must solve a type of marriage 
problem" (p.642) in matching jobs with particular levels of risk to individuals with
corresponding preferences for risky work. This occurs when a worker’s indifference 
curve and a particular firm’s isoprofit curve are tangential. Here, employee and 
employer preferences are consistent. The market offer curve W(r) maps out points of 
equilibrium in the labour market, where isoprofit and indifference curves are 
tangential. Along W(r), the number of workers applying for jobs at each level of risk 
equals the number of jobs at each risk level. As shown, the most risk averse workers 
(Worker 1) who place the highest value on safety, are matched with firms that find it 
relatively easy to provide a safe working environment (Firm 1). Worker 2, who is 
relatively less risk averse, is matched with a comparably riskier job (Firm 2). In order 
to attract Worker 2 however, Firm 2 must pay a wage premium to accept the high 
level of risk associated with the job. This wage premium is less than the wage 
premium Worker 1 would have required in order to accept the same level of risk. As 
workers and firms make decisions based on a rational consideration of the risks and 
remuneration involved, W(r) illustrates points of optimal allocation of risk and 
earnings in the labour market. The process of allocating workers with particular 
preferences for risk to appropriate jobs “leads to socially optimal outcomes, where the 
social welfare criterion is the maximisation of the surplus received by employers and 
workers” (Viscusi, 1980, p. 175). This neoclassical outcome requires there to be 
perfect labour market mobility, perfect information and perfect rationality.
3B.2 Policy Implications
There are several implications for public policy that result from the theory of 
compensating wage differentials. Siebert and Wei (1994) describe how the 
compensating wage differential “acts as a natural fine for unsafe working conditions” 
(p. 172). If as the theory implies, workers are compensated through the market for
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being employed in a dangerous job then the “arguments for government intervention 
involving occupational safety and health are less compelling” (Leigh, 1989, p.823). 
However, as Purse (2004) observes, “this is an extreme position and is not one that is 
universally shared by all” (p.600). This is largely due to the acceptance that many of 
the neoclassical assumptions are unlikely to hold perfectly, as discussed later. 
Evidence of a positive compensating wage differential, however, certainly indicates 
the force of competition within the labour market.
The extra wage, or wage premium, that is received for being exposed to extra risk at 
work, can be viewed as the compensating variation for accepting extra risk. Thus, 
once a risk coefficient has been estimated, this can be used to evaluate the benefits of 
reducing risk. This concept has been termed the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) or 
Injury (VSI). These calculations have been used in the application of numerous public 
policy areas which “involve a balancing of additional risk reduction and incremental 
costs” (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, p.5). VSL estimates obtained from hedonic wage 
equation studies have had a substantial impact on US public policy, and have been 
used in “evaluating environmental issues, public safety in travel, medical intervention 
and in many other areas” (Ashenfelter, 2006, p. 10) . Following a review of the 
literature, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) observe that “the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) guidelines recommend a VSL of $6.2 million (2000 US $), reflecting 
the arithmetic mean of 26 studies” (p.54). Use of VSL from labour market studies in 
the UK however, has been less frequent than in the US. This is likely to be because 
“there have been far fewer such analyses for the UK, and the resulting empirical 
estimates have been much more unstable” (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, p.56).
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Empirical estimations that have included a non-fatal injury variable in their equations 
have also calculated VSI estimates, which have also been wide ranging. However, 
Viscusi and Aldy observe that the VSI in the US usually ranges from $20 000 to $70 
000. Cousineau et al.’s (1992) estimate for Quebec of $33 600 in 1986 US dollars also 
falls within this range. Martinello and Meng’s (1992) VSI estimates are however, 
“substantially lower than those reported in most other studies” (p.341), ranging from 
$9 568 and $12 789 per injury in 1986 US dollars. It has been emphasised however, 
that VSI estimates are likely to vary substantially across studies, “reflecting both the 
differences in the risk measures used, as well as whether mortality risk is included in 
the results” (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, p.35).
The use of VSL estimates to aid policy decisions has received criticism. Purse (2004) 
comments that “value of life studies are highly controversial and have attracted 
criticism from both within and without the economics profession” (p.601). For 
instance, Smith (1979) observes that VSL estimates are attacked as “underestimating 
the losses attached to death” (p.348). However, Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) stress 
that the term VSL is misleading and should not be taken literally. Estimates are meant 
to provide a rough guide as to the benefit of reducing risk in a project, and are not 
meant to place a statistical value on life, as the name suggests. Ashenfelter (2006) 
comments that “when we expend wealth to avoid potentially fatal risks, and accept 
wealth to take such risks, we are implicitly defining a trade-off between wealth and 
the probability of death” (p. 10), even though we are not as such, attaching a value to 
life.
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The accuracy of VSL estimates depends upon the accuracy of empirical studies. 
Following concerns over the accuracy of VSL calculated from hedonic wage equation 
estimations, Dockins et al. (2004) commissioned an investigation into how robust 
such estimates are. In a review of numerous studies, they highlight findings from 
Black et al. (2003), who found the risk estimates were highly sensitive to the job risk 
measure used and the specification of the equation. This sensitivity resulted in “severe 
doubts about the usefulness of existing estimates to guide public policy” (p.3). Such 
findings were “of obvious concern to EPA given the Agency’s reliance to date on the 
hedonic wage-risk literature in determining its central default VSL for use in policy 
analyses” (Dockins et al., 2004, p.8). Criticisms are supported by the fact that VSL 
estimates are so wide-ranging. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) in a review of VSL estimates 
found that in the US, VSL estimates typically range from $5.5 million to $12 million 
(p.28). They emphasise that VSL should not be considered as a single correct number, 
as a particular VSL will reflect the preferences of workers in a given sample. VSL 
estimates should provide government with an estimate to assist them when 
formulating policies of risk-reduction. They do however, stress that refining VSL 
estimates remains an important priority with the aim of assisting in “more informed 
government interventions to address market failures related to environmental, health, 
and safety mortality risks” (p.63).
3B.3 Criticisms
The theory of compensating wage differentials rests upon a number of key 
assumptions; it assumes workers behave rationally, have sufficient labour market 
mobility, and have perfect information. Studies that have raised objections to the 
theory have centred on criticising the applicability of these assumptions. This is
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because, as Leigh (1989) observes, “the logic cannot be faulted” and so “an attack on 
the neoclassical theory must be an attack on the assumptions” (p.825). Dorman and 
Hagstrom (1998) discuss the importance of the assumptions to the theory, as “if one 
of them is sufficiently at variance with the real world, actual compensation may be 
less than utility-offsetting, nonexistent, or even negative” (p. 116). Purse (2004) 
attacks the assumptions that the theory is centred on, believing “they are not 
representative characterisations of how the labour market actually operates” (p.613). 
The relevance of each assumption will now be considered.
The assumption of labour mobility, also referred to as the ‘exit option’, requires all 
workers to have the ability to change jobs, if they wish to do so, when faced with 
hazardous working conditions. If workers are unable to move between jobs, 
employers would not need to pay a wage premium, as employees would have no 
employment alternative. Purse (2004) however, emphasises that “in the real world, 
workers are not at complete liberty to change jobs when they feel inclined to do so” 
(p.609). This is particularly true for low skilled workers; John Stuart Mill (1852) 
emphasised this point, suggesting “desirable workers, those whom everyone is 
anxious to have, can still exercise a choice. The undesirable must take what they can 
get” (p.385). However, Viscusi (1979) argued that relaxing the assumption of labour 
mobility may not compromise the compensating wages theory. In an investigation 
into labour turnover, he found job risk to be an important determinant of quit rates, 
with his multi-period model predicting that “workers should be more likely to quit 
jobs that pose health and safety risks” (p.54). He concluded that complete labour 
mobility is not essential for the theory to hold, as workers will quit jobs that pose an 
unacceptable level of risk.
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The importance of full employment to labour mobility has been highlighted by many. 
In times of high unemployment, the degree of labour mobility will be substantially 
reduced, as “workers understandably are most unlikely to quit a job unless they have 
reasonable prospects of finding new employment elsewhere” (Purse, 2004. p.609). 
However, as Rees (1975) comments, Smith “could not have known involuntary 
unemployment of the kind that is present in modem industrial countries” (p.339). As 
such, in times of high unemployment, we would expect the degree of labour mobility 
to be substantially reduced, with the consequence that workers’ who have been 
unemployed for long periods “will accept disagreeable work at low wages rather than 
have no work at all, and this makes compensating differentials unnecessary” (p.339). 
A major criticism of Viscusi (1979) is that his data are based on a period when 
unemployment was very low. Robinson (1991) carried out a similar estimation, 
examining the quit rate of manufacturing workers during an economic downturn. His 
results revealed the quit rate to be significantly lower for workers in hazardous jobs as 
compared to workers employed in safer jobs. Workers, therefore, may not always 
have complete labour market mobility to quit a hazardous job.
Labour market mobility will also be constrained if employers have a certain degree of 
market power. In the case of monopsony, where there is a single employer, the 
monopsonist is able to exercise its market power and pay below the competitive wage. 
For instance, coal mining towns are commonly used as an example of a monopsony, 
and we would expect coal miners to have a relatively high probability of being injured 
on the job. However, as Leigh (1989) comments, a monopsonist will be able to 
“thwart competitive forces that would normally require compensating wages for mine 
work” (p.826). Although we may think a monopsony model to be an unrealistic view
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of the labour market, Manning (2003) recently argued that a monopsony is “the best 
simple model to describe the decision problem facing an individual employer” (p.3), 
particularly concerning the determination of wages and employment. However, 
arguments for a monopsonistic labour market have been deemed unrealistic, “unless 
one focuses on workers with very specific skill types in very defined geographical 
areas” (Kuhn, 2004, p.376). Furthermore, labour markets dominated by a single 
employer seem even more unlikely “as barriers to goods and factor flows across 
regions and countries continue to fall.” (Kuhn, 2004, p.376).
Worker mobility may also be constrained if the labour market is segmented. 
Doeringer and Piore (1971) argue that dangerous jobs will be within the ‘secondary 
labour market’, which is also characterised by poor wages and promotion prospects. 
The implication for labour market mobility is that “if dangerous jobs are 
predominantly in the secondary labour market, then possibilities of alternative 
employment are severely circumscribed for persons in dangerous jobs” (Leigh, 1989, 
p.827). Overall, in terms of the importance of the assumption of labour market 
mobility for the theory of compensating wage differentials, Leigh (1989) summarises 
that “if for whatever reasons employers offering dangerous jobs have a partially 
captive labour force, then those employers need not pay a premium” (p.827).
In order for workers to require a wage premium for dangerous work, they must have 
information about the risk levels of various jobs. Purse (2004) remarks however, that 
“the lack of risk information available to workers has been a major and long-standing 
issue of concern” (p.610). A study by Shilling and Brackbill (1987) found that in 
1979, only 5 per cent of US workers were fully informed about the hazards associated
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with their occupations. There are a number of potential explanations for this apparent 
lack of information. We may expect poor awareness of hazards to be particularly 
prevalent today as changes in technology and work organisation have resulted in 
“dramatic increases in, often poorly understood, musculoskeletal and psychological 
injuries” (Purse, 2004, p.611). Workplace illnesses are often difficult to observe 
because of their cumulative nature which may mean it is unobservable until several 
years have passed since the initial contraction. Thus, Leigh (1989) suggests this lack 
of knowledge on workplace dangers may “undermine the ability of the market to 
generate compensating wages for health and disease hazards” (p.829).
We must also consider how workers would acquire information concerning hazards. 
In the UK, employers are legally required to display basic health and safety 
information under the Health and Safety Information for Employees Regulations 
1989. In addition, the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) 
Regulations 2002, requires all dangerous chemicals to be appropriately classified and 
labelled, and for safety sheets to be provided. However, this does not specifically 
provide information to employees about how hazardous their job is, although 
occupational fatality and injury statistics are publicly available from the HSE. Purse 
(2004) suggests that specific information concerning workplace hazards are unlikely 
to be gained from an employer, mainly because they themselves are poorly informed, 
largely due to rapidly changing technology and therefore production processes. 
Furthermore, employers who are aware that their workplace is particularly hazardous, 
have an incentive to keep such information from workers and potential workers: “it is 
unlikely that employers with poor records would want to have this information made 
public” (Purse, 2004, p.612). Overall, Purse (2004) concludes “a lack of information
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means that workers seriously underestimate the risk of injury and death and to the 
extent that this occurs, they receive lower risk premium or none at all” (p.612).
O’ Connor and Viscusi (1984) argue that workers learn about workplace hazards 
through on the job experience. Their evidence suggests that “workers are engaged in 
an ongoing experimentation process in which they learn about the risks posed by their 
job and quit once the position becomes sufficiently unattractive” (p.943). As such, 
Leigh (1991) emphasises that “lack of information may be especially serious for new 
entrants to dangerous jobs” (p.391). Mitchell (1988) finds that inexperience is indeed 
a strong predictor of work-related injuries, as “employees under age 25 are more 
prone to on the job risk than their more senior counterparts” (p. 12). However, Purse
(2004) emphasises that this does not enable us to conclude that experienced workers 
have perfect information. In order to make informed decisions as the level of risk they 
find acceptable, workers also need data and information concerning the health and 
safety record of alternative employers. A constant stream of information would 
therefore be required in order for the assumption of perfect information to hold; “the 
issue of how they are supposed to obtain this information has not been addressed by 
the neoclassical literature on compensating wage differentials” (Purse, 2004, p.612).
The compensating wages theory also assumes that workers behave rationally. Given 
the assumption that workers have perfect knowledge about the hazards of various 
occupations and the corresponding wage rates, the theory then assumes they use this 
information to make rational decisions. For instance, if an employee observes that 
their job is very hazardous in comparison to others, and pays little or no wage 
premium, we would expect them to quit, given the assumption of labour mobility, and
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move to a job with either safer conditions or a higher wage premium. Workers “select 
among jobs based on a rational consideration of wages, working conditions and 
hazards” (Leigh, 1989, p.825). However, the assumption of rationality has been 
criticised, largely because of evidence from the psychology literature; Purse 
emphasises that “the significance of these psychological findings on risk perception 
cannot be ignored” (p.613).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that people underestimate the actual probability 
of low probability events occurring. This finding is especially relevant to the literature 
on compensating wage differentials for hazardous work, as the rate of fatal injury to 
workers was just 0.6 per 100 000 employees in 2005/06 (HSC, 2006, p.9). If workers 
underestimate the probability of it occurring however, they may accept jobs that have 
a higher likelihood of occupational fatality than they realise. In such a case, workers 
will not make a rational decision. Cognitive dissonance can also be applied to 
consider the behaviour of workers employed in dangerous jobs. Outlined by Akerlof 
and Dickens (1982), cognitive dissonance allows workers to ignore probabilities of 
work-related fatality, as workers will not want to believe they are exposing 
themselves to danger. As workers prefer not to acknowledge the true risk posed by 
their job, Akerlof and Dickens found workers “sometimes failed to have the 
appropriate marginal rate of substitution between safety and wages” (p.317). As a 
result, even if workers have the ability to change jobs and have perfect information, 
the failure of workers to behave rationally may result in wage premiums for hazardous 
work being unnecessary. Workers that choose to ignore the true threat of their job to 
their health will not require the optimal wage premium.
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3B.4 Trade Unions
The fact that Adam Smith’s theory was developed in the context of a perfectly 
competitive market, where “there is no productive role for unions” (Viscusi, 1980, 
p. 175), means that the theory of compensating wage differentials does not take into 
account their influence in the labour market. Rees (1975) emphasises, the growth of 
trade unions has meant “the influence of market forces on wage structure is less direct
i.L
and perhaps less sure than it was” (p.349) compared to in the 18 century. As “it 
seems plausible to suggest that neoclassical labour market theory is least likely to 
apply when wages are heavily influenced by collective bargaining” (Arabsheibani and 
Marin, 2000, p.247), the effect that trade unions have upon the wage premium for 
hazardous work has been widely considered in the recent literature.
Unions were created as a response to industrialisation “as a form of protection against 
possible or real exploitation by employers” to ensure “acceptable wages and 
conditions” (Bosworth et al., 1996, p.346). Trade union membership in the UK 
peaked in the late 1970s when over 50 per cent of the labour force was a union 
member. Closed shop agreements, where employees had to belong to a workplace’s 
recognised union, were widespread in the 1980s, with 20 per cent of manual 
establishments and 9 per cent of non-manual workplaces having a closed-shop 
agreement (Booth, 1995, p.35). With closed shops now illegal, trade union 
membership has fallen, with 28.4 per cent of employees union members in 2006 
(Grainger and Crowther, 2007, p. 12). However, many workers remain covered by 
trade unions in practice, with 47.1 per cent of UK workers employed in a firm with a 
trade union presence, and as a result 33.5 per cent of all UK employees report that 
their pay and conditions are affected by a collective agreement (p.36). Forth and
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Millward (2002) estimate that when collective bargaining covers between 70-99 per 
cent of employees, a wage premium of around 8  per cent of hourly pay is received. 
(p.557).
The impact trade unions may have upon injury rates has been discussed, but consider 
the impact that we would expect trade unions to have upon the wage premium 
received for dangerous work. Theoretically, as Olson (1981) emphasises, “there are 
several reasons to believe that union members may receive higher accident 
differentials” (p. 170). We have discussed the context within which Adam Smith 
developed his theory, when the assumptions of labour mobility, perfect information 
and rational behaviour hold. Criticisms related to the assumption of labour mobility 
have been discussed, as workers are often not able to quit their job and so have no 
‘exit’ option if confronted with work they believe to be too hazardous. In such a case, 
trade unions provide members with a ‘voice’ option in providing a collective route 
through which they can complain about, amongst other aspects, hazardous conditions. 
As oppose to complaining individually, “unions have a comparative advantage in this 
role because they are permanent institutions” (Fenn and Ashby, 2004, p.463). In this 
case therefore, trade unions may assist in the neoclassical outcome occurring, by 
ensuring workers, if constrained in their labour mobility, have a collective voice. For 
instance, Viscusi (1980) highlights that in a monopsonistic context, unions can act as 
“a source of countervailing power” (p. 190) to ensure a balance is achieved between 
workplace safety and wage compensation.
Trade unions can also assist in the collection of information. If workers do not have 
perfect information about the danger to which they are exposed in their work, unions 
can assist by ensuring their members are informed. Unions are more effective than
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individual workers in this collection as they “provide economies of scale in the 
acquisition of and processing of data” and also “provide a solution to the externality 
problem” (Fenn and Ashby, 2004, p.463) as workers individually have little incentive 
to acquire information that will be used freely by fellow workers8. Viscusi (1979) 
highlights that this is because unions are a permanent institution, and so are in a better 
position to gather and communicate information than are individual workers who 
change jobs. Through this method, Gegax et al. (1991) hypothesise that “unions may 
heighten awareness of safety hazards” (p.593) which one would expect to result, 
through collective bargaining, in either a positive union wage premium for risk or a 
reduction in risk, or most likely, a combination of the two.
We would expect union members to benefit from the bargaining power of their union, 
which can be used to negotiate higher risk premiums; non members, and especially 
those not employed in a workplace with no union presence, may be considered to be 
at a relative disadvantage when it comes to negotiation with employers. The finding 
that unionism raises the premium may indicate labour market failure, as in the 
absence of trade union intervention, employers have an incentive to understate the 
hazards that threaten their employees. Any evidence that unions have a positive effect 
upon the wage premium for risk therefore, suggests that “one might question the 
adequacy of the non union market” (Olson, 1981, p. 185). Alternatively however, a 
higher union premium may be because unions have forced employers off the 
competitive equilibrium offer curve by demanding higher premiums.
8 Health and Safety Committees also take on a similar role to trade unions, only specifically related to 
workplace health and safety. Consequently, it is important also to consider the impact that such 
committees have upon the wage premium.
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Unions could theoretically also lower the wage premium received for exposure to risk. 
As Sandy and Elliott (1996) highlight, preferences for the trade-off between wages 
and risk exposure are likely to be decided through union voting. As the median voter 
theorem reveals, such a mechanism is likely to “fail to reflect the preferences of the 
minority of union members who face the highest risks” (p.293) and therefore the 
process may fail to gain adequate wage compensation for the members that have the 
greatest exposure to hazards. As Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) conclude, union 
mechanisms may mean that “the wage settlement could only consider some average 
degree of riskiness” (p.834). Furthermore, in specifically considering the labour 
market in the UK, unions campaign directly for improvements in work safety rather 
than for increasing the wage to compensate for hazardous working conditions. 
Therefore, “risk would seem less relevant and play less of a role in earnings 
determination by collective bargaining” (Marin and Psacharopoulos, 1982, p.834).
The effect that trade unions have upon the wage premium is an empirical issue, as “in 
theory, unions may either raise or lower the fatal risk premium” (Sandy and Elliott, 
1996, p.293).
3B.5 Measurement
3B.5.1 Hedonic Wage Methodology
Numerous empirical labour market studies have attempted to test the theory of 
compensating wage differentials using US data, although there are few using UK data. 
Empirical studies have focused upon estimating a wage equation that includes, in 
addition to a range of personal and job characteristics that influence the determination
96
of an individual’s wage, a variable that measures risk of fatality at work, and in some 
studies, risk of work-related injury or disease. The equation takes the following form:
Ln Yj =  p0 +  Pi X , +  p2 D , +  p3 Ui Di +  p4 Di2 + 6i [1]
Where Yj denotes the earnings of the ith individual, X is a vector of other 
determinants of earnings, Dj is a measure of fatal or non-fatal risk in individual i’s 
job, the interaction term UjDj denotes the union impact on the risk premium, and £j is 
a random error term which has an expected value of zero and zero covariance. A 
positive and significant p2 coefficient indicates a wage premium is received for 
exposure to accident risk.
Equation 1 is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which entails the 
assumption that all explanatory variables, including risk and union status, are 
exogenously determined. We are also interested in whether the wage-risk trade-off 
takes a linear or concave form. If the relationship is concave, it implies that an 
increase in the level of risk results in a less than proportional increase in the wage 
differential. Alternatively, if the relationship is convex, an increase in the level of risk 
results in a greater increase in wages. To test this, an additional variable, Dj2 is often 
included in equation 1 , with a negative p4 coefficient indicating the relationship to be 
concave. Most have found the relationship to be concave, including Olson (1981), 
Dorsey and Walzer (1983), and Martinello and Meng (1992).
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3B.5.2 Measuring Risk
Tests of the theory before the 1970s were largely unsuccessful due to the fact that 
large data sets on individual workers were not available (Viscusi, 1993, p. 1916). 
Although more data are now available, empirical work has been constrained by 
measurement error, with numerous factors citied that could potentially cause results to 
be biased. The extent of this is summarised by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) who observe 
that “every compensating differential study employs a less than perfect measure of 
any particular worker’s job-related fatality risk” (p. 14).
The construction of the risk variable is of central importance to estimations, as it will 
“significantly influence the magnitude of the risk premium estimated” (Viscusi and 
Aldy, 2003, p. 10). Many studies have included a risk of death variable only as “a less 
ambiguous measure of risk” which is “much less susceptible to measurement error 
associated with reporting effects” (Purse, 2004, p.602). The fatality variable itself 
however, can take many forms. The most common approach is to create a variable 
based on published numbers of workplace deaths by occupation or industry. A risk of 
death rate is then derived using numbers of workers and or hours worked in a 
particular industry or occupation. The risk measure will be the average for an 
industry or occupation, and can be though of as an accident probability. The risk rate 
is matched to a data set that includes information on personal and worker 
characteristics, by using industry or occupation codes.
There are potential measurement problems with this method. The decision of whether 
to match risk measures by industry or occupation is vitally important. A disadvantage
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of matching by industry is that hazard rates will be the average for the entire industry. 
As a result, “the industry risk measure assigns the same job risk to a secretary in the 
coal mining industry as to the coal miner” (Black and Kneisner, 2003, p.208) which 
clearly overstates the risk to the secretary and understates the risk to the miner. 
Although matching by occupation also has potential problems, with occupations 
within certain industries arguably more dangerous than in others, this is usually now 
the preferred method9. Matching occupation risk by industry is a further method, 
which would capture the degree of risk to which a worker is exposed more accurately 
than risk by solely occupation or industry. However, the ability to assign risk by this 
method is constrained by data availability, with a large sample size required.
Smith (1979) highlights that matching average characteristics to individuals will 
create an “error-in-variables problem that tends to bias the tests against finding 
compensating wage differentials” (p.34). There are likely to be differences in the 
industry or occupation risk and the true risk facing an individual worker. To minimise 
the extent of this problem, studies usually restrict their sample to male blue-collar 
workers, “for whom the risk data are more relevant” (Viscusi, 1993, p. 1928).
A further problem arises with regard to matching hazard rates. As this method relies 
on using industry or occupation codes, there is the potential for coding errors to 
introduce measurement error. In surveys, respondents provide interviewers with 
details about their workplace and their duties, from which industry and occupation 
codes are assigned. Mellow and Sider (1983) found that miscoding can seriously 
affect the results of compensating wage differential studies. By adjusting for
9 Chapter 2.5 discusses the findings o f  Davies and Jones (2005) who find occupation is the greatest 
determinant o f  a person’s risk o f  having an accident.
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disagreement between employee and employer-reported industry in the 1977 Current 
Population Survey (CPS), they found coding errors could “lead to a downward bias of 
almost 50 per cent in estimates of the wage-risk trade-off’ (p.377). Coding errors can 
also occur because of mistakes by the coders themselves. Keech and Orchard (1996) 
examined the accuracy of the assignment of industry and occupation codes in the New 
Earnings Survey (NES) by comparing codes assigned by coders and an expert panel. 
They found a 10 per cent disagreement rate for 3 digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) and Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes which 
was attributed to imprecise descriptions. However, they concluded that “coding errors 
have no greater effect on the accuracy of the NES results than do sampling errors” 
(p.33). Using a similar method, Martin et al. (1995) found a 23 per cent disagreement 
rate in occupation codes in the Family Resources Survey. Overall, Black and Kneisner 
(2003) comment it appears to be that “a worker’s industry is measured more 
accurately than a worker’s occupation” (p.208). Therefore, although we have 
concluded that matching by occupation codes is the most appropriate way to capture 
risk in testing the theory of compensating wage differentials, the assignment of 
occupation codes is found to be more prone to errors. Furthermore, Sandy et al. 
(2 0 0 1 ) comment that fine occupation and industry codes “contain some irreducible 
error because a worker’s duties can span more than one conventional occupation and a 
firm’s product or services can span more than one industry” (p.38). The potential for 
measurement error involved with the use of industry and occupation codes to assign 
risk to individuals should therefore be considered when deciding upon the 
appropriateness of a risk measure, and when analysing any results.
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Lalive (2003) discusses further potential problems with using aggregate industry or 
occupation measures to capture accident risk. Specifically, he comments that this 
method will give an inaccurate reflection “if there is substantial within industry or 
occupation heterogeneity in workplace risks” (p. 172). He compares an aggregate 
industry injury and illness measure with a firm-specific injury and illness measure, 
using Austrian matched employer-employee panel data. His investigation reveals that 
“compensating wage differentials are very sensitive to the risk measure used” (p. 188) 
with the aggregate industry measures resulting in estimates that are upward biased. 
Lalive attributes this to substantial within industry variation in risk. Arguably 
however, there is less variation in risk within occupations, which is the reason the 
majority of studies in this area calculate their risk measures by occupation. In a recent 
study using UK data, Wei (2007) constructs establishment-specific illness and injury 
rates using WERS 98. Aggregating risk by industry and occupation is found to cause 
an upward bias, similar to that found by Lalive (2003). Studies that use establishment- 
specific measures however, are unable to control for varying degrees of severity of an 
injury, and in particular, are unable to include a variable denoting the number of 
fatalities. Failing to control for this is likely to give biased results, and means 
comparison with studies that do include a risk of death variable is difficult.
Although much estimation is restricted to risk of death, several studies have attempted 
to estimate whether a wage premium is received for risk of non-fatal injury. Efforts to 
estimate a wage premium for non-fatal risk have however, proved problematic. Many 
issues need to be considered when constructing a non-fatal risk variable, largely 
because of “the high correlation (collinearity) between injury and mortality risks” 
(Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, p. 15). However, as found by Cousineau et al. (1992),
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omitting injury risk may cause “a positive bias in the estimation of the value of a life” 
(p. 169). As a consequence, “ideally, one would like to distinguish the compensation 
for fatality risks from that for non-fatal risks” (Viscusi, 1993, p. 1931).
In terms of constructing a non-fatal risk variable, there are many different measures 
that can be used, such as the overall injury rate, the rate of injuries resulting in lost 
workdays, and the rate of lost workdays. When considering and comparing the 
estimation results of studies that include non-fatal risk variables, it is vital the method 
of measurement adopted is considered as “studies using different measures of nonfatal 
job risks will generate different risk premiums” (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, p.35). The 
non-fatal risk variable can be constructed using a similar method to that discussed for 
constructing a mortality variable. By using published statistics to construct a variable 
for particular industries and occupations, rates can be matched to individual workers 
through codes. In order to distinguish between the severities of different injury risk 
however, detailed information would need to be made available and degrees of 
assessment made by the estimator as to which injuries are most severe. Alternatively, 
estimators can use the number of days an employee was absent from work due to an 
accident, to proxy the degree of severity of an injury. This method is however, subject 
to measurement error, as the relationship between days absent and degree of severity 
of an injury is not exact and will vary between individual workers.
As an alternative to using published statistics, some studies have used self-reported 
risk variables whereby workers assess subjectively the degree of risk they feel they 
are exposed to at work. This method may be thought to be preferable, as it is indeed 
the worker’s perception of risk that ultimately leads them to accept or reject a job
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offer. Viscusi (1993) makes this point believing that “the ideal risk measure would 
reflect subjective assessment” (p. 1918). This could involve incorporating a simple 
dummy variable where it takes the value 1 if the worker believes their job to be 
hazardous. However, Smith (1979) notes the results of such studies are “rather 
ambiguous” (p.344) as would be expected given the over-simplification of such a 
measure. A subjective variable however, could be constructed using a larger scale, 
reflecting perception of the severity of exposure more fully. Viscusi (1993) notes that 
some caution must be made when using such data as individual assessments of risk 
are likely to be biased, with workers overestimating low probability events and 
underestimating high probability events. Few studies have adopted this method, partly 
due to limited data availability, but also because it means comparisons with other 
studies are difficult, and therefore it is difficult to draw many conclusions with respect 
to policy.
A further issue that has received little consideration in the literature is the risk of 
disease and illness posed by a particular job. The distinction between an accident and 
illness is discussed in chapter 2. Sandy and Elliott (2005) highlight reasons why we 
may expect illness risk to generate a higher wage premium than accident risk. They 
emphasise “the greater incidence and longer duration of long-term illnesses” has the 
potential to “generate higher economy-wide wage premiums” (p.745). Workers are 
also likely to be very aware of the risk of occupational illness, having observed 
symptoms of co-workers, and so may be more likely to require a wage premium. 
However, problems with data have limited the inclusion of workplace illness variables 
within compensating wage estimations, with the focus of such studies instead on 
accidents, which pose fewer measurement problems in terms of data. The fact that the
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origin of some illnesses are difficult to identify creates a major problem, as illnesses 
“can develop slowly and may be exacerbated by outside-of-work factors” (p.748). 
Initially, the illness may result in no lost work-days, but may eventually force early 
retirement. Early retirees need to be considered in measures of workplace illness, as 
the group of workers that may have been exposed to illness risk in a particular 
occupation for the greatest duration. For the same reason, the measure should also 
take account of regular retirees with an occupational illness. Lost work days are 
therefore, a poor measure of workplace illness in failing to capture both workers in the 
early stages of an illness, and retired workers at the later stage. Sandy and Elliott
(2005) estimate that in the UK, “a measure of occupational illnesses based solely on 
lost -days of work would miss two-thirds of all reported illnesses” (p.750). They 
discuss the ideal measure identifies the fraction of a group of workers who entered an 
occupation in the same year who have either have become ill or died as a result of an 
occupation illness, including those no longer working. Sandy and Elliott’s measure 
does not entirely fit their ideal because of a lack of information on fatalities due to a 
long-term illness. Wei (2007) tests an establishment-specific illness rate, derived from 
WERS 98, similar to his accident variable. This measure is again far from ideal, as it 
is based on reports of managers, who may be unaware of workers who have 
developed an illness since leaving the establishment. Alternatively, and yet to be 
tested in the UK, subjective measures could be used in a similar way as discussed to 
measure exposure to accident hazards. Workers could then identify the extent to 
which they believe they are at risk of contracting a work illness.
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3B.5.3 Measuring Worker and Firm Characteristics
Studies of compensating wage differentials often use additional data sets to obtain the 
variables, other than risk, that are required to estimate a wage equation. Therefore, in 
addition to potential problems caused by constructing the risk variable, there are other 
potential measurement issues. The fact that proxy responses are often used in the type 
of household surveys that are commonly utilised in the literature should be 
considered. Although interviewers try to collect information from each respondent, 
this is not always possible if they are not at home. In this case, information relating to 
the individual is collected from another person in the household. These are called 
proxy respondents. As Sandy et al. (2001) highlight however, male manual workers, 
the subject of most compensating wage differential studies, are less likely to be at 
home during the day and so “the proportion of proxy respondents among this group is 
substantially higher than the overall proxy rate” (p.38). Proxy respondents are less 
likely to know about the workplace and may give incorrect information. The extent to 
which this affects the results of estimations is, however, debatable. Mellow and Sider 
(1983) concluded that “information from proxy respondents appears to be no less 
accurate than that from self-respondents” (p.342).
3B.5.4 Inter-Industry Differentials
It has been claimed that risk premium estimates simply reflect an industry wage 
premium rather than a premium for an individual worker’s exposure to hazards, 
because the risk variables usually reflect an industry-average level of risk. Leigh
(1995) comments that poor health and safety conditions will be correlated, and will 
hence capture, other unpleasant aspects of jobs in certain industries. Dorman and 
Hagstrom (1998) suggest that a review of the literature supports this hypothesis, as
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“estimates of wage compensation for risk are highly sensitive to model specification 
and choice of risk variable” (p. 133). In comparing models with and without industry 
dummy variables, they find a positive and significant risk premium when no industry 
dummies are included and an insignificant premium when they are. They therefore 
conclude that there is “strong support for the expectation that including industry-level 
effects will reduce measured wage compensation for risk” (p. 127) casting doubt on 
the existence of compensating wage differentials. However, this theory has been 
criticised by Viscusi and Aldy (2003). The fact that numerous studies have included 
industry dummy variables and still found significant risk premiums, including Viscusi 
(1978) and Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982), does not support the hypothesis.
3B.5.5 Trade Union Measurement
Many studies have focused upon estimating the effect that trade unions have upon the 
risk premium, due to the theoretical ambiguity discussed in chapter 3B.4. Here, we 
first consider the methods researchers have employed to capture the union-risk 
premium. A union-risk interaction term in the wage equation, U j D j  in equation 1, is 
often used to capture the effect unions have upon the wage compensation workers 
receive for being employed in a hazardous job. A variable capturing union 
membership is also included as an explanatory variable in the specification to capture 
the pure union wage premium. Alternatively, separate equations can be estimated for 
union and non-union workers. Fairris (1992) believes this to be the most appropriate 
method because of “important institutional differences between the union and non­
union sectors” (p.266).
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The definition of the variable used to capture union status is also particularly 
important. The majority of studies have focused upon defining the trade union 
variable as individual union status. However, subsequent researchers have argued this 
may be inappropriate. Siebert and Wei (1994) highlight the public goods nature of 
working conditions, meaning that any collective bargaining in a firm that recognises 
trade unions “will affect the working conditions of most workers in the firm, whatever 
their union status” (p.64) in a spillover effect. The union variable Sandy and Elliott 
(1996) utilise distinguishes between non-members of trade unions and those “though 
not members of trade unions, are still covered by union terms and conditions” (p.291). 
This may be particularly relevant to the UK, as Blackaby et al. (1991) find that 65 per 
cent of male blue collar workers belong to a trade union, with a further 1 2  per cent 
covered by union conditions at their workplace. To gain a more accurate 
understanding of the effect that trade unions have upon the risk premium therefore, 
the union variable should be defined in the context of whether a worker is employed 
by a firm that is covered by union terms and conditions.
A further measurement issue concerning the influence of trade unions is the possible 
endogeneity of union status. Union status may be a decision variable with workers’ 
choosing to belong to a union or to work for a firm in the covered sector. This is 
particularly relevant since the Employment Acts of 1982 and 1988 made closed shops 
illegal. As Heckman (1979) suggests, “one observes wages for union members who 
found their non-union alternative less desirable” (p. 153). There is hence the 
possibility of a selectivity bias which may affect the subsequent remuneration that is 
received for risk by both union and non-union members. Sandy and Elliott (1996)
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emphasise that not taking into account such sorting will result in “biased estimates of 
the size of both the union wage and the risk premium” (p.294).
As a solution to the problem of union selection, the Heckman Selectivity Correction 
method can be used, if the selection processes for risk level and union status are 
independent. Selection variables for union and non-union workers are derived, 
involving estimating a reduced form probit equation where union membership or 
coverage is estimated. Selection variables include employee and employer attitude to 
unions. Location variables and partner attitude to union variables are also often 
included, although often found to be insignificant in explaining union status. Sandy 
and Elliott (1996) for instance, find employer and employee favourable attitudes to 
trade unions are significantly positively related to union status, as is firm size and 
labour force experience (p.301). Results from the union probit are used to calculate 
the Inverse Mills Ratio:
M t ) = - f ( t ) / F ( t )  [2]
where f  is the standard normal density function, F is the cumulated normal and t = y’y 
calculated from the probit with y the explanatory variables. Lambda is included as an 
additional explanatory variable in the wage equation. In terms of interpreting lambda, 
a significantly negative coefficient would suggest the error terms in the selection and 
wage equation (without selection control) were negatively correlated; hence 
unobserved factors that make union coverage more likely would tend to be associated 
with lower wages.
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Most empirical estimates that have controlled for union selectivity bias find 
“controlling for the endogeneity of union status makes only a small difference” 
(Sandy and Elliott, 1996, p.302) and therefore is “relatively unimportant for 
estimating the compensating differential for risk of a fatal accident” (Arabsheibani 
and Marin, 2000, p.263). However, it should be noted that the Heckman correction 
method requires the assumption of independence between selectivity into risky 
occupations and into union status. “If the process is more complex, the Heckman 
correction may not pick up the effects of selection on union status” (Sandy and Elliott, 
1996, p.301).
3B.5.6 Endogeneity
Most studies assume job risk is exogenous, with workers choosing to be employed in 
a particular job with a given level of risk, independent from any other variable that 
determines wages. Viscusi (1978) suggests job risk is endogenous with “the optimal 
job risk for a worker negatively related to his wealth” (p.416). If we assume safety to 
be a normal good, we would expect those with greater earnings potential to choose 
safer jobs. Viscusi (1978) finds evidence to support this in his estimations with “the 
injury rate for an employee’s industry negatively related to worker assets” (p.416). 
This has implications for the estimation of compensating wage differentials. As Garen 
(1988) goes on to explain, it implies that there is a correlation in the disturbance terms 
for wage determination and the choice of job risk. This would mean that estimation by 
OLS is biased.
Similarly, there may be unobserved heterogeneity influencing the wage premium for 
job risk. Sandy and Elliott (1996) hypothesise that “some individuals may possess
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unobserved characteristics which make them more productive in dangerous 
situations” (p.293). This includes individual attitudes towards risk: those with low risk 
aversion will be employed in the more dangerous jobs. Unobserved attributes can 
include ‘cool-headedness’, which makes workers more productive in dangerous 
situations. Workers that have such attributes will select into risky jobs, as they will be 
able to earn more through such employment. Thus, empirical studies that fail to take 
account of such unobserved heterogeneity will be biased in not fully considering the 
effects upon the risk premium.
Hwang et al. (1992) consider the effect that excluding such unobserved productivity 
differences between workers has upon estimations of compensating wage 
differentials. They specify intelligence, perseverance, and the ability to work well 
with others as qualities that increase productivity, but are unobserved by the 
econometrician. They show that the failure to take account of such qualities will result 
in a downward bias of the estimated risk premium of approximately 50 per cent, and 
so “contemporary labour market studies may severely underestimate workers’ 
marginal willingness to pay for job attributes” (p.837). As a result, they conclude that 
safety in the workplace “may be much more important to workers than previous 
studies have indicated” (p.855). Shogren and Stamland (2002) present a case where 
workers differ in whether they possess a risk-handling skill which is again, 
unobserved. They hypothesise that workers with high risk-handling skills will choose 
risky jobs. They show that failing to take account of this skill will result in the wage 
premium being overestimated. Bell et al. (2004) conclude that the direction of the bias 
will depend upon the importance of these characteristics: “if the variations in risk-
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handling skill are small relative to the general unobserved productivity the bias would 
be downward” (p.5) and vice-versa.
The issue is best illustrated algebraically. Following Garen (1988) consider the 
following hedonic wage equation:
L n  Y j  =  0 0  +  |3] X j  +  p 2 F j  +  P 3 M j  +  8 j +  cpi j F j  +  cp2 i M j  [3 ]
As in equation 1, Y j  refers to workers earnings and X j  to variables that determine 
earnings. The variable D j  in equation 1 is then divided into fatal ( F j )  and non-fatal 
injury ( M j ) .  As before, 8 j represents unobservables which influence earnings 
regardless of the risk of death and injury involved in a job. In contrast, errors cpi and 
cp2 are disturbances whose effect on earnings does depend on the risk of death and 
injury. Individuals who have unobserved risk-handling skills which make them more 
productive in risky situations will have large values of cpi and cp2 as “their marginal 
wage gain to employment in a risky job is greater” (Garen, 1988, p. 10). As F and M  
are choice variables, correlated with 8 , cpi and cp2, equation 3 cannot be estimated by 
OLS, as this requires the expected value of the disturbance term conditional on the 
regressors to be zero. Furthermore, as the expectation of e + cpiF + (P2M is non-zero, 
simultaneous equation methods such as Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and Three- 
Stage Least Squares (3SLS) cannot be used.
Garen (1988) proposes an Instrumental Variables method for obtaining unbiased 
estimates of the compensating wage differential, which has been extensively used in
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the literature. The first stage involves estimating the following risk equations 
(equation 4):
F = no + 7iiX] + 712X2 + 7C3Z + r|
M — 80 + 81X1 + 82X2 + 83Z+ |x [4]
where X2 proxies risk aversion, Z is non-wage income, and r\ and \i are unobserved 
heterogeneity. r\ and p may depend on the wage equation (equation 3) disturbances e, 
(pi and <p2» as workers with unobservable characteristics that make them more 
productive in risky jobs, will choose higher F and M.
In order to estimate equation 4, a measure of risk-aversion must be available; risk 
aversion however, cannot be directly measured and so a proxy must be used. Garen 
(1988) acknowledges that “finding proxies for the degree of risk aversion is a difficult 
task” (p. 12). Measures of the stability of an individual’s lifestyle are frequently used, 
assuming that such measures are inversely correlated with the degree of aversion to 
risk. Such stability measures include household income other than wages, marital 
status, house value, and number of dependents. Instrumental variables, as Sandy et al. 
(2001) emphasise, must be “uncorrelated with unobserved ability while being 
correlated with the level of risk” (p.46).
The second stage of the estimation involves estimating the following equation:
Y = RJ3 + yx rj+ y2 ju+ ij.F + y4/j .F + )'5Tj.M + y6/ j .M + 0 [5]
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Where tj = F - X n  andfi = M  - X  A, where n  and A are the OLS estimates of n 
and | l i  from equation 4. Garen shows that estimating equation 5 will yield consistent 
estimates.
Studies have highlighted problems with employing Garen’s method. Central to this is 
the importance of the choice of instruments used in risk estimations. It was noted that 
stability variables are often used to proxy risk aversion, including non-labour income, 
marital status and number of children, which theoretically should all be negatively 
related to risk aversion. However, many studies have found these instruments to be 
poorly related to risk, resulting in very low R2 values. For instance, Sandy and Elliott
(1996) find wife’s income, house ownership and marital status to be insignificant in 
their estimation of an equation similar to equation 4, resulting in an R2 of 17.7 per 
cent (p.296). Hausman tests further suggest problems with the choice of instrumental 
variables in many studies. Sandy et al. (2001) find “modest support for the 
endogeneity of job risk” (p.47). However, Siebert and Wei (1994) conclude that “the 
imprecision of our instrumental variables is such that the Hausman test never supports 
the hypothesis of endogeneity” (p.72). A test of overidentifying restrictions further 
confirms the inadequacy of instruments in many studies. A chi-square statistic from 
this test that is significant indicates that the instruments should be included in the 
earnings equation, and are therefore not suitable instruments. In conclusion, Sandy et 
al. (2001) summarise that “the R2 of the risk equation, the Hausman test, and the test 
of overidentifying restrictions” suggest the instruments used throughout the literature 
“are usable although far from ideal instruments” (p.47).
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Subsequent papers have highlighted that the use of weak instruments will lead to 
biased results in the final estimation of the wage premium. Bound et al. (1995) 
acknowledge that “it is common to find that the candidates are only weakly correlated 
with the endogenous variable” (p.443). They show however, that using weak 
instruments will result in estimates that are biased towards the original OLS 
estimation. Staiger and Stock (1997) went on to find that when testing the strength of 
an instrument, the F statistic must take the value of at least 10. Similarly, Stock, 
Wright, and Yogo (2002) found that an F statistic of 9 or above is needed for an 
appropriate instrument. Overall therefore, these studies have shown that “it may be 
even harder than many have thought to find legitimate instruments for potentially 
endogenous variables” (Bound et al., 1995, p.444). As a result, unobserved 
heterogeneity remains “the greatest challenge facing researchers in estimating 
compensating wage differentials for workplace risks” (Bell et al., 2004, p.l).
A recent paper, Lalive and Ruf (2006) seeks to estimate how important controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity is to studies in compensating wage differentials. Using 
Austrian longitudinal data, they are able to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and 
compare their results to those obtained with cross-section data. They show the 
compensating wage differential is roughly equal to the one obtained in the standard 
cross-sectional wage regression, and so conclude that they “find no evidence for a 
bias of the compensating differential obtained from a standard cross-sectional hedonic 
wage function that can be attributed to unobserved worker productivity” (p.4). The 
potential implications of this paper are very important, as it “suggests that the bias of 
the compensating differential obtained from a standard cross-sectional hedonic wage 
function that is due to unobserved productivity of workers or unobserved ability to
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cope with risks is small”(p.l9). Further research using similar, large-scale data sets is 
needed to examine this claim.
3B.5.7 Worker Heterogeneity
The theory of compensating wage differentials recognises that workers are 
heterogeneous in their preferences for risk. The model, therefore, takes into account 
that some workers are more risk averse than others, and will consequently require a 
greater wage premium for accepting a job with the same level of risk than a worker 
who is less risk averse. DeLeire and Levy (2004) find that preferences for risk cause 
workers to sort into occupations in the US. They further show these risk preferences 
vary by gender and family structure, with women and parents being the most averse to 
risk and consequently sorting into relatively safe occupations. Earlier studies within 
the compensating wage differential literature also recognise that “women, by and 
large, do not take risky jobs” (Leigh, 1987, p.256). Leigh and Gill (1991) suggest this 
can be partly attributed to “the historical division of labour in the household” which 
“has perhaps kept women from seeking high-risk employment because of child- 
rearing responsibilities and other family concerns” (p.729).
Problems of measurement error have restricted empirical estimations of wage premia 
for women, with risk variables often failing to capture the true risk women face at 
work. DeLeire and Levy (2004) emphasise “there are too few fatalities and too few 
women in the occupations with the most fatalities” (p.942) to calculate reliable 
measures. Several studies in the US however, have attempted to estimate a wage 
premium for females. Hersch (1998) uses a gender-specific risk variable, and finds 
“strong evidence of compensating wage differentials for the job risk faced by female
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workers” (p.606). The evidence is less clear however, in the results of Leeth and 
Ruser (2003) who attempt to estimate equations by gender. They find women do not 
receive a wage premium for being exposed to the risk of death, but do for being 
exposed to the risk of non-fatal injury. Other estimations by Barry (1985), Filer 
(1985) and Leigh (1987) find no evidence of compensating wage differentials for 
females. Leigh and Gill (1991) conclude that “analyses of samples of women have 
yielded little evidence of compensating differentials” (p.729).
Recent empirical tests have found that the traditional model of compensating wage 
differentials may not fully explain results with regard to worker heterogeneity. 
Viscusi and Hersch (2001) distinguish between smokers and non-smokers in their 
estimations, finding that smokers are less risk averse and more prone to accidents. The 
finding that preferences for risk vary by smoking status, suggests that smoking may 
be used as an instrument for proxying risk aversion to estimate equation 4. However, 
the evidence is not completely conclusive with regard to smokers being less risk 
averse. Dohmen et al. (2005) for instance find “smoking can only be considered a 
very imperfect substitute for more direct measures of risk attitude” (p.31) and so 
caution should be exercised when using smoking status as an instrument.
Viscusi and Hersch (2001) explain that for all workers to face the same offer curve, as 
in Figure 1, smokers would select a greater job-risk level than non-smokers and 
consequently receive greater total risk premia. However, their results show smokers 
choosing riskier jobs but receiving a total wage compensation that is less than non- 
smokers. They emphasise that “such a finding is inconsistent with smokers and non- 
smokers facing the same wage offer curve” (p.269). Their results can only be
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explained by smokers facing a wage offer curve that is flatter than that of non- 
smokers. This result is explained by smokers being more hazard-prone, with evidence 
found that smokers are more hazard-prone at work and in their personal actions. 
Viscusi and Hersch (2001) highlight that this result is dependent upon firms’ having 
information concerning the smoking status of workers, “monitoring smoking-related 
differences must be feasible for firms to be able to link wages to smoking status” 
(p.270). It is likely, particularly when employment is offered, that smoking status is 
unknown to the employer, and so the employer would not know which market-offer 
curve is relevant. In this instance, the differences in market offer curve would be 
revealed through worker preferences. As the Viscusi and Hersch (2001) analysis finds 
smokers and non-smokers to have different preferences for risk, certain wages will be 
unacceptable to non-smokers for employment in an occupation with a given level of 
risk. The finding that risk attitudes vary by smoking status is “an important result” 
(Sandy and Elliott, 2005, p760) for the development of the compensating wage 
differential literature, as it “confirms the need to adjust for worker heterogeneity” 
(p.760).
A further study by Viscusi (2003) estimated separate wage equations by race using 
US data. Results show black employees face higher job risks than whites, but receive 
less total fatality compensation. He further emphasises that “although differences in 
preferences could be influential, such differences cannot reconcile the various 
empirical findings” (p.254) and so separate offer curves must exist. The result is only 
explained by black workers facing a flatter market offer curve. He attributes the 
results to differences in “safety-related productivity, discrimination, or other factors, 
but the role of these factors is not resolved” (p.243). Viscusi (2003) emphasises that
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the explanation is unlikely to be due to varying preferences for risk. Instead, 
“explanations such as those pertaining to structurally different labour market 
opportunities by race are more likely explanations” (p.251).
Arguments for separate market opportunity curves, as Viscusi (2003) concludes, “cast 
considerable doubt on the traditional model of compensating wage differentials for 
risk” (p.255) that have estimated a single curve for all workers. Studies that continue 
to examine how risk preferences vary according to worker heterogeneity should 
consider if the traditional model is capturing these differences.
3B.5.8 Panel Data
Given the problems associated with estimating wage-risk premiums due to 
unobserved heterogeneity, it has been suggested that measurement error could be 
reduced by using panel data. This was recognised in an early paper by Brown (1980), 
who noted the importance of being able to control for all variables that influence 
earnings, with cross-section data often “deficient in that they provide no information 
on many potentially important characteristics” (p. 1 2 1 ) resulting in omitted variable 
bias. More recently, panel data has been seen as a potential way to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity that influences workers’ preferences for risk, such as that 
described by Hwang et al. (1992) and Shogren and Stamland (2002). Bell et al. (2004) 
suggest that a fixed-effect panel estimate should control for unobserved ability that 
remains constant. Specifically, they use the New Earnings Panel data to capture 
changes in risk exposure through occupation switches. Although this controls for 
differences in worker characteristics and preferences towards risk, it does not control 
for the endogeneity of occupation switching. Some workers may be forced to change
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their occupation and so may switch from a low risk occupation to a high risk 
occupation, meaning any occupation-specific human capital will depreciate. As Bell 
et al. observe, the decision to switch occupation would be endogenous as “it would be 
related to an unobservable component of the error-term -  the obsolescence of the 
worker’s skill” (p 7). To correct for this, they use the annual rate of increase or 
decrease in employment in an occupation as an instrumental variable. The availability 
of suitable panel data sets for compensating wage differential studies however, is 
limited. The sample size must be significantly larger than usually required for cross- 
sectional data estimation. However, Bell et al. conclude that the use of panel data in 
empirical estimations is the most effective way to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity as “it seems clear that many attempts, beginning with Garen, to use 
instruments to control for unobserved heterogeneity in a cross-sectional framework do 
not fully control for unobserved heterogeneity” ( p.27).
3B.6 Estimation Results
Many studies focus exclusively upon the risk of fatality at work, with estimators 
believing workers are more likely to be compensated for this. Martinello and Meng 
(1992) comment “most empirical studies find a strong positive relationship between 
industrial or occupational fatality rates and earnings” (p.334). Leigh (1989) observes, 
however, that “the attempts to find compensating wages for non-fatal injuries and 
illnesses have had mixed results” (p.832). Findings from estimations will now be 
considered.
119
3B.6.1 Fatal andNon-Fatal Injury
Table 3B.1 provides a summary of the main papers in the literature that consider 
whether a risk premium is received for exposure to accident risk.
Most of the early US studies relied on data provided by the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics (BLS) on work-related fatalities and injuries, which was constructed from a 
survey of industries. Most estimation using such data provided evidence of a wage 
premium. There have, however, been major criticisms of BLS data for two main 
reasons. First, BLS data only include firms employing more than 10 workers, which 
as Leigh (1989) comments excluded approximately two-thirds of work-fatalities in the 
US (p.832). Second, the fact that the data is based on a survey means the data will be 
subject to sampling error.
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Due to the problems associated with BLS survey, the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the US initiated its own death statistic 
system. These data is based on a census of all occupational fatalities, and so there is 
no sampling error. Moore and Viscusi (1988) compare the use of BLS and NIOSH 
risk data in wage premium estimations and find “the performance of the NIOSH 
death-risk variable is consistently superior to that of the BLS risk measure” (p.485) 
with “value of life over double those obtained using the BLS risk estimates” (p.486). 
Hence they conclude that such an extensive change in death-rate statistics 
“undermines the validity of the value-of-life estimates generated using BLS risk data” 
(p.477); there are however, problems with the NIOSH data. Data are only available at 
the one digit industry level, restricting its accuracy. There are also, as discussed, 
general problems associated with assigning risk by industry data to individuals. Since 
1994, the BLS has provided detailed data on fatal occupational injuries via the Census 
of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI). Viscusi and Aldy (2003) observe these data 
draw “on multiple sources such as death certificates, worker’s compensation records, 
and other federal and state agency reports” (p. 11).
The data used by Thaler and Rosen (1975), from the 1967 Occupation Study of the 
Society of Actuaries, have also been subject to major criticism. The actuarial risk data 
reported data for 37 occupations, from which the annual risk averaged approximately 
1 in 1000. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) stress that estimations using this data will suffer 
from a selection bias, as the data reflect workers in extremely high-risk occupations. 
Furthermore, in measuring the risk of death of people in particular occupations, they 
fail to separate the risk of death due to the occupation from non-work related reasons. 
Hence, as Viscusi and Aldy (2003) comment, they “do not distinguish fatalities
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caused by the job but rather reflect the overall fatality rates of people within a 
particular job category” (p. 10). The misleading nature of the data is apparent upon 
close examination, as “one of the highest risk occupations based on these actuarial 
ratings is actors” (p. 10). This error seriously undermines the results of studies using 
these data.
Other studies have however, constructed a risk variable by occupation successfully. 
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982), in the first empirical estimation of the wage 
premium for fatal injury in the UK, constructs two risk of fatality variables, using the 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) Occupational Mortality 
Decennial Supplement 1978, which is based on deaths in occupations between 1970- 
72. Genrisk is defined as the extra risk of dying, measured as the actual death rate 
minus the death rate that could have been expected given the age and social class 
structure in the occupational group. Conversely, Accrisk is the rate of deaths from an 
accident at work minus the rate expected given the occupational age structure. They 
acknowledge that Accrisk is “much more clearly a labour-market-specific variable, as 
compared with Genrisk which refers to deaths in general” (p.833). As this method of 
calculating the risk of death takes into account the average accidental workplace death 
rate in all occupations, the variable can have a positive or negative value. Results of 
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) show “the theory of compensating differentials 
does apply in the UK” (p.848). As predicted, estimations using the Accrisk variable 
give stronger results. As the fatality data includes information on 223 occupations, 
Leigh (1989) comments that “Marin and Psacharopoulos appear to have assembled 
the best data to date to test for compensating wages for risk of death” (p.835). Further
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UK studies have used the OPCS data, and all find significant compensating 
differentials for risk of death.
It is also possible to create a risk variable that is constructed from occupation by 
industry data. Siebert and Wei (1994) use data from the HSE for the years 1986-88. 
They calculate a mixed industry-occupation risk variable with data on 150 
occupation-industry cells. They observe that their accident data “should be quite 
accurate with regard to fatal injury rates, since the method of averaging over three 
years will help pick up rare events” (p.66). Their estimation results indicate “there are 
significant compensating wage differentials for both unionised and non-unionised 
male manual worker groups” (p.71).
In a follow-up study that compares the estimation results of Siebert and Wei (1994) 
and Sandy and Elliott (1996), Sandy et al. (2001) argue that the OPCS risk data are 
superior to the HSE industry-occupation cells. They highlight the fact that OPCS data 
“allow the risk measure to be standardised for the age composition of the workforce in 
each occupation” (p.42) as a significant advantage. They also suggest that “the greater 
number of possible risk categories (371 versus 50) allows the nature of risk to be more 
finely distinguished” (p.42). In terms of defining the risk variable therefore, Sandy et 
al. (2001) conclude that “using fine occupational codes is superior to an assignment 
using either a mix of aggregated occupations and industry codes or industry codes 
alone” (p.49).
A subjective risk measure, whereby workers rank on a scale the level of risk to which 
they believe their job exposes them may be preferable, as it is indeed the worker’s 
perception of risk that ultimately leads them to accept or reject a job. Some caution
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must be exercised when using such data however, as individual assessment of risk is 
likely to be biased (Viscusi 1993). Despite this difficulty with measuring individual 
perceptions Gegax et al. (1991) believe that data reflecting some subjectivity are 
“arguably superior” (p.589).
Viscusi (1978) compares the effectiveness of two risk variables, one of which is self- 
reported, in supporting the theory of compensating wage differentials. Viscusi 
constructs a self-assessed dummy variable, denoted as Danger. This variable “is not 
an objective index but rather the subjective assessment of the risk, the magnitude that 
motivates individual behaviour” (p.412). For comparison, he creates a variable 
denoted Injrate, defined as the number of injuries per million hours worked in 1969 
for the worker’s industry, constructed using data from the BLS. Results reveal 
positive and statistically significant wage premiums for both variables, with a slightly 
larger premium estimated for the subjective variable Danger. This supports the 
suggestion that workers may overestimate the extent of the risk to which their job 
exposes them. The accuracy of subjective measures is however emphasised, as 
Viscusi shows “there is a strong positive relationship” (p.412) between the two 
variables.
Few other studies have included subjective measures of risk, partly due to limited data 
availability, but also because it means comparisons with other studies are inadequate, 
and therefore it is difficult to draw conclusions with respect to policy. As Smith 
(1979) comments, self-reported measures “suffer from a lack of comparability across 
individuals because of their subjectivity” (p.342).
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Most studies have found a positive wage premium for being exposed to risk of 
fatality, but estimation results are less clear with respect to non-fatal injury. As 
discussed, there are numerous specifications of the non-fatal injury variable, which is 
likely to influence whether a premium is found.
Siebert and Wei (1994) include a non-fatal variable in their estimations using UK data 
from the HSE, where accident data is available for serious injuries, defined as absent 
from work for 3 or more days. They do however, comment that such data are not very 
satisfactory “since serious accidents are lumped together with non-serious” as well as 
exposing the data to “reporting and moral hazard problems associated with less 
serious injuries” (p.66). Probably due to such measurement error associated with their 
non-fatal accident variable, they find little evidence of its significance. The issue of 
distinguishing non-fatal injuries by degree of severity is also highlighted as being 
potentially important for estimating a non-fatal wage premium by Arabsheibani and 
Marin (2000). Their non-fatal injury variable uses data from the GHS 1987-89, which 
asks respondents if they have had an accident at work or during hours of work that 
resulted in a visit to a doctor or hospital. A non-fatal injury variable for occupations is 
thus constructed, defined as the “excess rate (per thousand per year) of non-fatal 
injuries during hours of work” (p.255). Their results show that including a non-fatal 
variable makes no difference to the significance of the fatal-risk coefficient. However, 
they find that when both a fatal and non-fatal variable is included, the non-fatal 
variable coefficient is sensitive to the sample used and the other variables included in 
the regression. Furthermore, the non-fatal accident variable “is always negative” 
(p.264). They conclude that the issue of non-fatal accident wage premiums “remains
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to be investigated with data which distinguish non-fatal accidents by their degree of 
severity” (p.264).
Cousineau et al. (1992) find that including a severity variable in their estimation in 
addition to a non-fatal accident variable, defined as the average number of days of 
absence per injury, results in a significant wage premium. They conclude that 
“severity considerations do also appear to play a significant role in the determination 
of compensating differentials” (p. 169). Martinello and Meng (1992) are also able to 
classify injuries as severe or minor. Their results show significant premiums for 
severe injuries, but find that “workers do not receive more compensation for higher 
risk of minor injuries” (p.343). Overall, there are many issues to consider in the 
construction of non-fatal accident variables, with results highly dependent upon how 
the variable is constructed. Data availability will often constrain the measure that is 
used.
There has been considerable interest in the effect that trade unions have upon the 
wage premium received for dangerous work because, as discussed, theoretically there 
are arguments for unions to potentially lower or increase the premium. Also, as an 
institution of the modem labour market, there is great interest in the effect that unions 
have upon this neoclassical theory. As Table 3B.1 reports, the majority of empirical 
studies in the US suggest that union workers receive a larger premium for dangerous 
work. This result is not exclusive to the US however, with some studies from Canada 
and the UK also reaching this conclusion. Most studies use a risk-union interaction 
variable in their estimations, with the exception of Fairris (1992), Siebert and Wei
(1994) and Wei (2007), who estimate separate equations for union and non-union
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workers, with Olson (1981) comparing the two methods. All four studies find union 
workers receive a higher wage premium. Theoretically therefore, these studies suggest 
that unions may bargain for safety and provide members with safety information. 
Siebert and Wei note that under UK law at the time, workers in firms that did not 
recognise a trade union were unable to demand a safety representative. This led them 
to question whether special provisions were needed to protect workers in non-union 
firms. They do, however, conclude that such measures are unnecessary, “since the 
higher levels of non-union accidents need not be due to worse communication or less 
knowledge in the non-union plant, but rather to worker and firm choices” (p.73). 
However, since Siebert and Wei published their results, the HSCER 1996 has meant 
firms that do not recognise unions can elect safety representatives. We may, therefore, 
expect there to be a smaller difference between union and non-union workplaces in 
terms of safety and compensation using data post 1996, as both have the potential to 
benefit from safety representatives and health and safety committees. However, the 
findings of Reilly et al. (1995) and Litwin (2000) suggest that worker representation is 
most effective in unionised firms.
Just as much empirical estimation has found unions increase the risk premium, many 
have found unions reduce it, particularly those using UK data. Marin and 
Psacharopoulos (1982) highlight the significance of this, suggesting unions in the UK 
campaign directly for improvements in safety rather than increasing the wage 
compensation for hazardous working conditions, hence “risk would seem less relevant 
and play less of a role in earnings determination by collective bargaining” (p.834). 
The conflicting results with respect to the effect that unions have upon the wage 
premium mean that “all results should be interpreted with a good deal of caution”
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(Dillingham and Smith, 1984, p. 145). Sandy et al. (2001) comment that the balance of 
studies seems to suggest a higher premium for union workers, but caution against 
concluding that unions do increase the wage premium solely based on this 
observation. Specifically, they highlight the fact that the majority of studies that find 
a higher union-risk premium use industry risk data whereas the majority of studies 
using occupation risk data find a higher premium for non-union workers. Hence, “the 
contradictory results appear to be related to measurement error and the assignment of 
risk” (Sandy et al., 2001, p.40). The effect trade unions have upon the wage premium 
overall therefore, is still subject to disagreement empirically as well as theoretically, 
requiring that interpretation of the union-risk premium must take into account the data 
used and specification of the risk and union variables in each individual estimation.
3B.6.2 Work-Related Illness
Table 3B.2 provides a summary of the main papers in the literature that consider 
whether a risk premium is received for exposure to illness risk.
Few studies have attempted to estimate a wage premium for exposure to illness risk, 
largely due to the problems of measurement (see chapter 3B.5.2). As Sandy and
Elliott (2005) emphasise “measurement errors in data have plagued research in this
area” (p.748). However, despite the difficulties involved in creating an adequate 
illness-risk measure, studies that have considered illness risk emphasise the 
importance of including it in estimates of compensating wage differentials. Meng 
(1991) notes that diseases may be particularly prominent in certain occupations which 
“could lead to greater awareness of the long term costs of chronic diseases and a
requirement for greater compensation” (p.331).
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Table 3B.2: Key Illness Studies
STUDY COUNTRY ILLNESS DATA EVIDENCE OF
ILLNESS
PREMIUM?
Meng (1991) Canada Labour Canada Workers 
Compensation Board
Yes
Fishback and 
Kantor (1992)
US Historical Labour Statistics 
Project 1884-1887, 1890, 
1892, 1903, 1992
Some limited 
evidence
Lott and 
Manning (2000)
US Carcinogenic Exposure 
Compensation
Yes
Sandy and 
Elliott (2005)
UK SW I1990 Yes
Wei (2007) UK WERS 98 Yes
Meng (1991) uses data that enables causes of work-place fatalities to be distinguished 
as due to short-term hazards, defined as resulting from an accident, and long-term 
hazards, due to a prolonged disease. In his wage equation estimations, “the risk 
premium for additional diseases exceeds the one for accidents” (p.335) suggesting 
that workers demand a greater wage premium for being exposed to risk of death from 
disease. Meng (1991) attributes this to workers having greater knowledge of the risk 
of death from disease. Sandy and Elliott (2005) point out however, that the measure of 
occupational illness used is limited, as it does not consider occupational illnesses that 
do not result in death (p.748).
Fishback and Kantor (1992) use data from US industries from 1884-1903, when 
“dusts, fumes, gases, vapours, acids, compressed atmospheres” (p.835) posed 
significant threats to the health of workers. They use an employer-reported measure of 
illness and injury risk that resulted in absence from work. However, they find limited 
evidence of a wage premium for exposure to illness risk, which “lends credence to 
social reformers’ claims that the private market inadequately compensated workers” 
(p.835). However, Sandy and Elliott (2005) criticise using a variable of lost work-
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days to capture illness risk, as the long-term nature of many occupational illnesses 
may not result in lost work days until the later stages of the illness. Some workers 
may also be more willing than others to be absent from work. It also fails to take 
account of workers who have been forced to retire early or switch occupations 
because of a long-term illness. Therefore, “any method of identifying occupational 
illnesses which relies on lost days of work is unlikely to offer any real insight into 
overall compensating differentials for illnesses” (p.6).
Lott and Manning (2000) investigate whether workers receive a wage premium for 
exposure to cancer risk in US industries. Using the Hickey-Keamey carcinogen 
exposure indicator, they calculate exposure variables for each industry. A statistically 
significant wage premium is estimated. This study only considers one type of 
occupational illness however, and so the risk variable does not take into account the 
risk of other illnesses in industries. Results from these estimations however, do 
suggest wage premiums are received for exposure to risk of disease, suggesting the 
need for further investigation.
As the first paper using UK data to estimate whether workers receive a wage premium 
for exposure to the risk of occupational illness, Sandy and Elliott (2005) use data from 
the SWI 1990 survey which was included as a trailer questionnaire to the LFS in the 
second quarter of 1990. The survey, as described in chapter 2.7.1, utilises professional 
interviewers and the link with the illness and work is investigated to minimise 
measurement error. There are difficulties in relying on self-reported data as “answers 
might not be thoughtful and the respondents may not have reflected sufficiently on 
what they believed to be the causes of their illnesses” (p.749). Jones et al. (2006) in a
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discussion of the surveys main findings however, do note high rates are found for 
diseases that have a known link with work. Sandy and Elliott (2005) further 
emphasise “we judge that this is the most robust data yet to be made available for a 
study of this nature” (p.749). They calculate a measure of illness probability for 
occupations based on current workers and former workers who had an illness caused 
by their former occupation. Estimations, which also include variables for risk of death 
and major injury (using data from the HSE), “find significant compensating 
differentials for male manual workers but none for male non-manual workers” 
(p.762). Furthermore, their results suggest wage premiums for illness risk are more 
important than compensation for accident risk. As a result, they conclude that 
“reducing workplace illnesses is now a matter of high priority” (p.762). They 
specifically suggest increasing the available information on illness rates by 
occupation.
Subsequently, Wei (2007) performs an estimation to test for compensating wage 
differentials for illness risk using WERS 98. Establishment-specific measures of 
illness and injury risk, with rates defined as per injury/ illness per employee per year, 
are calculated. Wei suggests that this method is particularly appropriate when 
measuring illness risk, as “many job-related illnesses may be caused by the factors 
prevailing at the same establishment” such as “bad working environment, high noise 
level, and chemical pollutants” (p.92). Descriptive analysis reveals that the illness 
rates derived from WERS 98 data are lower than those calculated using SWI 99 data, 
which is to be expected for a number of reasons. The SWI definition of an illness is 
much wider compared to the WERS question. Also, as the WERS illness question 
relies on manager reports, “individuals are perhaps more likely to over-report work- 
related illness incidences than managers of firms” (p.88). Further, the WERS 98
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sample included firms with 10 or more employees only, which is likely to lead to 
downward biased rates, as large firms are consistently found to be safer. Wei does 
note, however, that the ranking of industries in terms of the number of illnesses each 
has reported is fairly consistent between the two data sets. Wei finds evidence of 
compensation for illness risk for both men and women (p.92), although estimates are 
lower than those found by Sandy and Elliott (2005), to be expected given the many 
differences in measurement of illness risk between the two studies, with 
establishment-specific illness risk hypothesised to give smaller risk premium 
estimates by the author (p.86).
3B.6.3 Controlling for Endogeneity
Following Garen (1988), whose estimations provide evidence that risk may be 
endogeneously determined, studies have attempted to control for endogeneity using 
the method he proposes. Garen himself (1988) shows that “the endogeneity of job 
riskiness causes a substantial bias in the estimation of the wage premia” (p. 15) with 
the risk coefficient “substantially larger than OLS indicates” (p. 14). As previously 
discussed, there have been problems in finding appropriate instruments to proxy risk 
aversion, as required to perform Garen’s estimation technique. However, studies that 
have utilised the method have found similar results. For example, Sandy and Elliott 
(1996) find an “increase in the fatal risk coefficients using Garen’s method” (p.300). 
Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) also find using the method substantially increases the 
risk coefficient. The finding that OLS estimations are biased downward is consistent 
with Garen’s argument, as it implies “workers with high unobserved earnings 
capacity, s, are willing to ‘pay’ for occupations with more safety” (Sandy et al., 2001, 
p.47).
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Problems arising from using Garen’s technique however, have been highlighted. 
Siebert and Wei (1994) note that estimates are “sensitive to the choice of instruments” 
(p.72) with results of a Hausman test in their estimations failing to support the 
hypothesis of endogeneity. Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) similarly find that “the 
values were very sensitive to precise specifications” (p.265). In a further paper, 
Arabsheibani and Marin (2001) return to this issue, by testing various specifications 
of the risk equations. They express particular concern over the “very high collinearity 
between the risk measure and the residual in the first-stage regression” (p. 1909), with 
their estimates very sensitive to model specification. They recommend that when 
using Garen’s technique, “users should examine the sensitivity of their estimates to 
minor changes in the specification of the second-stage equations” (p. 1910). Overall 
therefore, although as Sandy and Elliott (1996) find “controlling for the endogeneity 
of risk makes a substantial difference to the value of life calculations” (p.302), these 
results are sensitive to the instrumental variables that are used in estimations.
3B.7 Summary
Adam Smith’s theory has received considerable criticism, largely related to the 
question of whether its neoclassical assumptions can still be applied in today’s labour 
market. The fact that “the theoretical case for wage compensation for risk is plausible 
but hardly certain” (Dorman and Hagstrom, 1998, p.l 16) has led authors to question 
whether the wage will compensate for disagreeable job characteristics and resulted in 
many empirical studies. Despite the criticisms, the theory does influence labour 
market policy, and as Rees (1975) summarises “it would be hard to imagine a theory 
of relative wages that did not make some use of this concept” (p.349)
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In terms of testing the theory, this review has emphasised the problems associated 
with constructing an accurate measure of the risk variable, and studies within the 
literature have varied greatly in the type of data utilised to construct such a variable. It 
is therefore, perhaps not surprising that “where evidence for compensating wages is 
found, estimates of the amount of compensating wages for risk of death vary 
considerably” (Leigh, 1991, p.382). This discussion has shown that the majority of 
studies do find evidence of wage premiums; however, estimations are highly sensitive 
to the data and model specifications. Emphasis within the compensating literature is 
hence on constructing the appropriate measure of risk. Most recently, emphasis within 
the literature has been upon attempting to address measurement problems of 
endogeneity. Worker heterogeneity has also influenced recent literature, with studies 
testing how workers’ preferences for risk vary. Some have gone further to suggest the 
traditional model does not capture differences in preferences by race and smoking 
status. If different groups of workers, sorted by characteristics such as race and 
smoking status, have different preferences for risk translating into different wage 
premiums being required by each group at each level of risk, it suggests groups of 
workers face separate market offer curves. Results of these studies “cast considerable 
doubt on the traditional model of compensating wage differentials for risk” (Viscusi, 
2003, p.255). There is hence the opportunity to test how preferences for risk vary for 
many groups of workers. However, as is true for attempts to address many 
measurement problems within the compensating wage literature, empirical work is 
constrained by “the absence of injury statistics at the necessary level of detail” (Leeth 
and Ruser, 2003, p.250).
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CHAPTER 4
WORKPLACE INJURIES AND ILLNESSES; DETERMINANTS AND
INFLUENCES
4.1 Introduction and Background
There has been considerable research as to what causes injuries and illnesses in the 
workplace in order to inform policy upon how to reduce their incidence further. This 
is following the government’s targets to improve safety in the workplace, as outlined 
in chapter 2. Given continuous economic and labour market changes, such research 
that takes into account changing workplace conditions is essential
This chapter uses data from WERS 04, and in particular utilises the questions in the 
Management Survey upon establishment injuries and illnesses, to consider what 
influences workplace safety. Reilly et al. (1995) and Nichols et al. (1995) use WIRS 
90 to consider the influences upon workplace injuries in manufacturing 
establishments. Subsequently, Fenn and Ashby (2004) recognised that changes to the 
UK economy in terms of a reduction in manufacturing employment meant “it no 
longer seems justifiable to focus exclusively on the manufacturing sector in relation to 
health and safety at work” (p.461). Their paper therefore, using WERS 98, considers 
influences upon injuries in all establishments. A further paper, Robinson and 
Smallman (2006) conducted a similar analysis to Fenn and Ashby, again using WERS 
98. They distinguish between the manufacturing and service sectors in their analysis, 
arguing that factors that have an impact upon workplace injuries and illnesses may
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vary “given the different incidences of work and employment practices and reported 
injury and illness rates between sectors” (p.94).
WERS 98 introduced a workplace illness question, enabling this element of 
workplace risk to be considered. This is particularly relevant given the reduction in 
manufacturing employment has meant that in terms of workplace safety, “many of the 
challenges lie in the area of occupational health” (Altman, 2000, p.4). The impacts 
upon workplace illness may be very different to workplace injuries; given the 
expected increase in occupational illnesses, it is therefore important such impacts are 
understood. In addition, WERS 98 increased its sample to include organisations with 
10 or more employees, whereas WIRS 90 only included workplaces with 25 or more 
employees.
The sample for WERS 04 was increased further from WERS 98 to include workplaces 
with 5 or more employees. Changes to WERS and to the nature of the injury and 
illness questions means it is difficult to consider over time how the influences upon 
workplace safety have changed or remained the same using this survey. Analysis 
using this new data set however, will add further to the understanding of the 
influences upon injuries and illnesses within the firm.
Chapter 3A discusses papers that have estimated the influences upon workplace 
injuries and illnesses. As it is important to ensure all factors that impact upon safety at 
work are controlled for in any regression analysis of workplace injuries and illnesses, 
this will be considered when deciding which variables to include and in the analysis 
of results.
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4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
WERS 04 is based on a stratified random sample of establishments, with the Inter- 
Departmental Business Register (IDBR) used as the sampling frame. Workplaces with 
5 or more employees were eligible for inclusion, with around 2 300 establishments 
taking part (Chaplin et al., 2005, p .I)10. The data used here are the result of face-to- 
face interviews with a workplace manager, where manager is defined as “the senior 
manager dealing with personnel, staff or employment relations at the establishment” 
(ibid).
The sample design of WERS means that large workplaces are over-sampled. Purdon 
and Pickering (2001) note that “whereas the population of establishments has a 
considerable skew towards small establishments, the sample distribution has little or 
no skew by size” (p.2). Therefore, the achieved WERS sample is unrepresentative of 
the population and weights are required to produce unbiased estimates. Sampling 
weights in WERS therefore, give added weight to smaller establishments. In a paper 
that concludes sampling weights should almost always be used when using WERS, 
Purdon and Pickering observe that “the use of sampling weights in survey analysis has 
been the subject of a number of academic papers in recent years” (p.l) with some 
researchers arguing that “associations between variables will be approximately 
unbiased, and the interpretation of models, whether or not weighted, will be broadly 
the same” (p.l). Fenn and Ashby use sampling weights throughout their analysis to 
correct for the variation in sampling errors (p.465). The fact that the model seeks to 
investigate the relationship between workplace size and workplace accidents and 
illnesses further justifies the use of weights so the model is representative of
10 WERS 98 achieved a sample size o f  just under 2 200 establishments.
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establishments within Great Britain. The sampling weight ESTWTNR is used in the 
analysis that follows; an unweighted model however, will also be estimated for 
comparison.
The injury question asks managers how many, if any, employees in the establishment 
have sustained any of the following injuries during working hours in the last 12 
months: i) bone fracture, ii) amputation, iii) dislocated joint, iv) loss of sight 
(permanent or temporary), v) chemical or hot metal bum to the eye, vi) penetrating 
eye injury, vii) acute illness requiring medical treatment, viii) any other injury leading 
to unconsciousness or requiring resuscitation or admittance to hospital for more than 
24 hours. Compared to the injury question in WERS 98, dislocated joint is added to 
the list of injuries. WERS 98 also includes physical injury resulting from a work- 
related physical assault, a category which is not included in the WERS 04 question.
The illness question asks managers if any employees have suffered from any of the 
following types of illnesses, disabilities, or other physical problems that were caused 
or made worse by work: i) bone, joint or muscle problems, including back problems 
and Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI), ii) breathing or lung problems (including asthma), 
iii) skin problems, iv) hearing problems, v) stress, depression or anxiety, vi) eye 
strain, vii) heart disease/attack, or other circulatory problems, viii) infectious disease 
(vims, bacteria). Although the wording of the WERS 98 question is the same as in 
WERS 04, some illnesses are added to WERS 04, namely hearing problems, eye 
strain, heart disease/attack, and infectious disease.
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The potential for managers to under-report the number of injuries and illnesses needs 
to be considered. Chapter 2.10 highlights research that has concluded under-reporting 
is a common occurrence with regards to non-fatal accidents and illnesses. Managers 
may be unaware of all incidences, with employees not reporting every case. Managers 
may also choose not to report all cases, for fear of their firm gaining a reputation for a 
poor safety record. Arguably, neither would be possible in the case of the most severe 
cases and so the WERS question should at the very least reflect major occurrences. 
The likelihood of under-reporting is greater for workplace illnesses. Chapter 3B.5.2 
highlighted how illnesses are more difficult to attribute to work; as many illnesses 
develop slowly managers may be unaware of all cases amongst workers, and so the 
WERS data may underestimate the number of work-related illnesses. The potential for 
under-reporting does need to be considered when interpreting the estimation results.
Table 4.I: Number o f Injuries and Illnesses Reported in WERS 04 (weighted)
Number of 
Injuries/Illnesses
Number of Workplaces 
Reporting Injuries
Number of Workplaces 
Reporting Illnesses
0 2084.91 1713.6
1 121.2 295.4
2 22.9 119.5
3 8.5 40.7
4 2 19.7
5 2.9 50.3
6 1.9 8.9
7 0.1 7.1
8 0.04 3.6
9 0.4 0.7
10 1.1 9.5
11 to 20 2.6 11.2
21 to 50 2.2 6.9
51 to 100 0.2 0.8
more than 100 0.4 1.1
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Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 show the distribution of responses to the injury and illness 
questions. The responses are skewed with many zero observations: 92.8 per cent of 
workplaces reported no injuries, and 74.9 per cent of workplaces reported no illnesses. 
As Fenn and Ashby found using WERS 98, workplace illnesses appear to now be 
more common than workplace injuries. Coupled with the potential for workplace 
illnesses to be under-reported, this difference may be even greater than estimated.
2500
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100
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Figure 4.1: Distribution o f Workplace Injuries and Illnesses (weighted)
Table 4.2 reports that there was an average of 0.189 injuries and 0.736 illnesses per 
British workplace in 2004, with t tests revealing the difference between the two is 
significant11. Weighted means are much smaller as the weights give greater 
importance to smaller workplaces, where there are fewer employees to sustain an 
injury or illness. Fenn and Ashby report weighted means of 1.040 injuries and 1.024
11 A test for equal variance shows the variances to be unequal. The t test is therefore a two-sample t test 
that controls for unequal variance.
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illnesses per workplace using WERS 98. T tests reveal means calculated using WERS
1 904 are significantly smaller to those calculated by Fenn and Ashby .
Table 4.2: Mean and Standard Deviation for Injury and Illness Variables (workplaces 
with 5 or more employees)
Variable No. of 
Firms
Mean Number per 
Workplace (unweighted)
Mean Number per 
Workplace (weighted)
Injuries 2248 1.009 0.189
(7.647) (2.755)
Illnesses 2094 7.258 0.736
(62.746) (7.179)
T test with unequal 4.5258*** 3.2696***
variance: t
***=significant at the 1% level
Table 4.3 Mean and Standard Deviation for Injury and Illness Variables (workplaces 
with 10 or more employees)
Variable No. of 
Obs
Mean Number per 
Workplace (unweighted)
Mean Number per 
Workplace (weighted)
Injuries 2015 1.122 0.308
(8.069) (3.660)
Illnesses 1862 8.132 1.118
(66.490) (9.560)
T test with unequal 4.5187*** 3.4311***
variance: t
***=significant at the 1% level
To compare results more directly to those obtained using WERS 98, means were also 
calculated for a sample that excluded workplaces with less than 10 employees (Table 
4.3). Excluding workplaces with less than 10 employees has the expected effect of 
increasing the mean number of injuries and illnesses. Results continue to show that
12 A test for equal variance shows the variances to be equal. Weighted injury rates are significantly 
different with a t statistic o f  10.223, and weighted illness rates are significantly different with a t 
statistic o f  13.732, both o f  which are significant at the 1 per cent level.
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workplace illnesses are significantly more common than injuries. T tests reveal the 
differences between the weighted number of injuries in WERS 98 as reported by Fenn
1 o
and Ashby, and WERS 04 as reported here, remains significantly smaller . There is 
no significant difference however, between the number of illnesses, despite the 
definition widening in the WERS 04 survey. Even though WERS 04 reports more 
illnesses the increase is insignificant. Overall, these initial results suggest workplace 
injuries are becoming significantly less common which supports the trends reported in 
chapter 2, with no statistically significant change in workplace illnesses which 
continue to be significantly more common within establishments.
Explanatory variables were constructed after consideration of the literature. In order 
to compare results directly with Fenn and Ashby, initially the model will be estimated 
using the same explanatory variables used in their estimation. Appendix 4.1 lists the 
variable definitions. Table 4.4 reports descriptive statistics of these variables for the 
WERS 04 sample.
As WERS 04 includes smaller workplaces, the number of employees variable has a 
weighted mean of 31.9 employees, compared to 62.1 in Fenn and Ashby. Twelve 
industry dummy variables14 and 9 occupation variables are derived15, corresponding 
to the proportion of employees in a particular occupation within an establishment’s 
workforce. Workplace union density is captured by a variable derived as the number 
of employees within an establishment that managers report as union members, divided 
by the total number of employees within an establishment. The unweighted mean
13 Weighted injury rates are significantly different with a t statistic o f  6.440 which is significant at the 1 
per cent significance level.
14 With manufacturing the control group.
15 With proportion o f  clerical workers the control group.
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indicates on average 26.2 per cent of workers within an establishment are union 
members, compared to the weighted mean 14.2 per cent. The sampling weight which 
places greater importance upon smaller workplaces, reduces the mean proportion of 
union members within workplaces, with smaller workplaces likely to have a smaller 
union presence.
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable No. of 
Obs
Min Max Unweighted
Mean
Weighted
Mean
Employees 2295 5 10006 414.048
(950.017)
31.936
(124.422)
Ln (Employees) 2295 1.61 9.211 4.457
(1.766)
2.689
(0.960)
Part-time 2295 0 1 0.271
(0.275)
0.329
(0.304)
Turnover 2096 0 1 0.185
(0.179)
0.202
(0.214)
Age21 2203 0 1 0.089
(0.153)
0.119
(0.188)
Age50 2207 0 1 0.211
(0.159)
0.217
(0.189)
Manufacturing 2295 0 1 0.135
(0.342)
0.111
(0.315)
Electricity 2295 0 1 0.092
(0.139)
0.001
(0.037)
Construction 2295 0 1 0.049
(0.216)
0.049
(0.216)
Wholesale 2295 0 1 0.139
(0.347)
0.249
(0.432)
Hotel 2295 0 1 0.048
(0.215)
0.089
(0.285)
Transport 2295 0 1 0.063
(0.243)
0.048
(0.213)
Financial 2295 0 1 0.057
(0.231)
0.052
(0.222)
Real estate 2295 0 1 0.122
(0.324)
0.149
(0.356)
Public admin 2295 0 1 0.059
(0.237)
0.022
(0.146)
Education 2295 0 1 0.091
(0.287)
0.049
(0.217)
Health 2295 0 1 0.154
(0.361)
0.116
(0.319)
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Community 2295 0 1 0.062
(0.242)
0.065
(0.25)
Managers 2279 0 1 0.108
(0.117)
0.149
(0.138)
Professional 2280 0 1 0.109
(0.191)
0.069
(0.159)
Technical 2282 0 1 0.113
(0.199)
0.068
(0.171)
Admin 2283 0 1 0.157
(0.212)
0.149
(0.218)
Skilled Trades 2279 0 1 0.070
(0.167)
0.082
(0.197)
Service 2283 0 1 0.082
(0.213)
0.076
(0.221)
Sales 2281 0 1 0.137
(0.272)
0.203
(0.326)
Machine Operatives 2281 0 1 0.087
(0.207)
0.078
(0.198)
Unskilled 2281 0 1 0.127
(0.247)
0.1249
(0.255)
Shifts 2295 0 1 0.479
(0.499)
0.2412
(0.428)
Overtime 2249 0 2.425
(1.79)
2.317
(2.092)
Union 1994 0 1 0.262
(0.329)
0.142
(0.282)
Committee 2287 0 1 0.370
(0.483)
0.110
(0.313)
Jointcomm 2295 0 1 0.062
(0.242)
0.030
(0172)
Specificcomm 2295 0 1 0.305
(0.461)
0.077
(0.266)
Pay (£’000) 1733 0 45241 17222.84
(7654.1)
14414.23
(7136.64)
Further variables are created to indicate the proportion of employees working shifts, 
and the proportion of part-time workers. In addition, variables are constructed to 
reflect whether there is a health and safety committee presence within the firm. The 
weighted mean shows 11 per cent of firms have a committee of some definition to 
deal with health and safety, with the majority of these established to deal solely with 
health and safety rather than a range of issues.
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4.3 Negative Binomial Regression Model
We wish to estimate the influences upon the number of accidents and illnesses 
occurring within a workplace during a 12 month period. The nature of the dependent 
variable is hence count data in form. The dependent variable takes on many other 
characteristics, with many zero observations and small values (as illustrated by Figure 
4.1) suggesting a least squares model is inappropriate.
Following Fenn and Ashby (p.469), we assume that for an employee in the ith 
workplace, data on the number of accidents or illnesses can be characterised by a 
Poisson process with a constant rate of occurrence fij. Therefore, where N j  refers to 
the number of employees within the ith workplace, if we assume \i\ to be equal and 
independent, the probability of an accident occurring within the ith workplace can be 
specified as Nj \i\. The number of accidents and illnesses (y\) follows a Poisson 
distribution (equation 1):
, « * * * - [i]
y,'-
The risk faced by workers in the ith establishment (pj) can further be denoted by 
equation 2:
= W (Xi.Pi) = ex,l3*c' [2]
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where Xj represents a vector of observed influences upon workplace safety, and p the 
vector of corresponding coefficients. The error term (8j) captures the impact of 
unobserved influences upon safety.
A weakness of the Poisson regression model is the assumption that the mean and 
variance are equal. Substituting equation 2 into equation 1 leads to over dispersion in 
that the variance will exceed the mean, violating the assumption of this model. 
However, if we assume a gamma distribution for Sj, a Negative Binomial distribution 
for yj is generated (equation 3):
F(yj; Ni,pi,aj) = T ( a- '+y , )
a f  \7  ^N iMi
r ( « " ' ) r o i + i) [a- '  + N lfi , ) [ N i f J t +a ' ' )
[3]
Where a refers to the one parameter distribution for £j. Assuming data for n 
establishments, the log likelihood function for [3] is shown by equation 4:
lnL(a,P)=
« y >-1
X  j X ln^ + a  ]) “ ln y> !-(T, +a~')  ln(l + aNjex >p) + y, In a  + y, ( x \ p  + In N , )  ^ [4]
,=1 I ,/= 0
Maximising [4] will give consistent estimates for p.
To test the effect that workplace size has upon injuries and illnesses, we cannot rely 
on the coefficient estimated for the Ln (Employees) variable as we would expect there 
to be a greater number of injuries and illnesses the greater the number of workers. To
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test whether workplace size has an independent effect upon workplace accidents and 
illnesses, Fenn and Ashby perform Wald tests. They reject the null in all cases with 
the coefficients estimated to be less than one, and so conclude workplaces with a 
greater number of employees have a smaller risk of reported workplace injuries and 
illnesses.
Negative Binomial Regression models are estimated with the WERS 04 sample that 
includes workplaces with 5 or more employees, and to enable comparison with Fenn 
and Ashby that use WERS 98, for a sample of workplaces with 10 or more 
employees. Results using the sampling weight are presented in Table 4.616.
In all regressions, In(employees) is positive and significant, as expected given there 
are likely to be more reported injuries and illnesses in workplaces with more workers. 
Results of the Wald tests, to test whether workplace size has a significant independent 
effect, are shown in the final two rows in Table 4.6, with the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient is equal to 1. Regression results enable the null hypothesis of no 
significant size effect to be rejected in the illness regression, where the coefficient is 
estimated to be less than 1. In the injury regression however, there is no significant 
independent effect. In the sample that includes smaller workplaces therefore, 
workplace size does have a significant independent effect upon illness but not upon 
injury. In the sample of workplaces with 10 or more employees however (the WERS 
98 sample), the null hypothesis is rejected in both regressions, although only at the 10 
per cent significance level. Larger workplaces are therefore significantly safer in
16 Standard errors are computed using the Huber-White Sandwich estimator and so are robust to sample 
structure and heteroscedasticity.
The overdispersion parameter is significant in all estimations, confirming the Negative Binomial 
Regression model is preferable to the Poisson model.
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terms of risk of injury and illness in this sample. The log-linear specification enables 
the coefficients to be estimated as elasticity’s. In the sample of firms with 10 or more 
employees, doubling the number of employees reduces the risk of reported injuries by 
21 per cent, and the risk of reported illnesses by 13 per cent17. The impact of 
workplace size upon workplace health and safety is therefore considerable.
Evidence has frequently shown large firms to be safer in terms of a reduction in the 
probability of experiencing a workplace injury, including studies by Reilly et al.
(1995), Nichols et al. (1995), Fenn and Ashby (2004) and Robinson and Smallman 
(2006). Explanations for these findings include the ability of large firms to exploit 
economies of scale in providing safe working conditions. Frick and Walters (1998) 
also list numerous potential reasons for small firms to have a poorer safety record, 
including poor knowledge of legal requirements and safe working practices, and 
limited management resources to devote to health and safety (p.367). It is also 
important to note that papers could be underestimating the number of accidents in 
small workplaces. Daniels and Marlow (2005) find under-reporting of accidents to be 
common in small firms, attributing “lack of awareness of legal reporting 
requirements” (p.4) and an increased relative burden of completing the necessary 
paperwork. This is particularly relevant given the nature of the WERS questions, with 
managers in small workplaces potentially not reporting all accidents and illnesses, and 
so the increased risk to workers employed in small businesses may be even greater 
than estimated.
17 Fenn and Ashby calculate doubling the number o f  workers would reduce the risk o f  reported injuries 
and illnesses by 33 per cent and 25 per cent.
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Table 4.6: Negative Binomial Regression Results 
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Dependent Variable: Injuries/Illnesses
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1357 1296
Wald Chi2 285.99 299.15
Log pseudo-likelihood -18.5805 57.5095
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.7083*** 1.3085 -6.66 -3.6031*** 0.6694 -5.38
Ln(Employees) 0.9338*** 0.1105 8.45 0.8021*** 0.0776 10.33
Part-time -0.7919 0.7196 -1.10 -0.3632 0.4216 -0.86
Turnover -0.7089 0.6753 -1.05 0.2119 0.6275 0.34
Age21 0.3363 0.6626 0.51 -1.2319** 0.5998 -2.05
Age50 -0.6862 0.7402 -0.93 0.2335 0.4542 0.51
Shifts 0.4100 0.3005 1.36 0.2674 0.2078 1.29
Overtime 0.0749 0.0792 0.95 0.1044*** 0.0399 2.62
Union 0.7975** 0.3362 2.37 0.6428** 0.2813 2.29
Committee 0.3044 0.2736 1.11 0.0229 0.1578 0.15
Pay 2.85e-05 2.32e-05 1.22 7.18e-05 1.77e-05 0.41
Electricity -0.0854 0.5689 -0.15 -0.7618 0.5131 -1.48
Construction -0.4702 0.5351 -0.88 -0.5867 0.3926 -1.49
Wholesale 0.3063 0.7013 0.44 0.0746 0.3244 0.23
Hotel -0.2334 0.6753 -0.35 -0.5923 0.4945 -1.20
Transport -1.7058*** 0.4999 -3.41 0.1766 0.3621 0.49
Financial -0.1387 0.9379 -0.15 0.3990 0.4873 0.82
Real estate 1.3135** 0.6074 2.16 0.0268 0.3636 0.07
Public admin 2.7396*** 0.6593 4.15 0.9830** 0.4352 2.26
Education 1.2086* 0.7134 1.69 0.1733 0.4416 0.39
Health 2.0065*** 0.6959 2.88 0.8476** 0.3805 2.23
Community 0.7776 0.5948 1.31 0.1588 0.3362 0.47
Skilled Trades 4.0782*** 1.1211 3.65 0.5125 0.6175 0.83
Managers 1.5246 1.7943 0.85 -0.5527 0.9905 -0.56
Machine Operatives 4.6762*** 1.1117 4.21 -0.2481 0.6515 -0.38
Professional 0.5508 1.2113 0.45 -0.4331 0.6434 -0.67
Service 0.7377 1.0271 0.72 -0.5624 0.4824 -1.17
Unskilled 3.5760*** 0.9298 3.85 0.4501 0.5313 0.85
Sales 3.4359*** 1.3411 2.56 0.4868 0.5480 0.89
Technical -0.4900 0.9153 -0.54 -0.6702 0.5596 -1.20
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2 0.36 6.50***
Prob>Chi2 0.5493 0.0100
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
Dependent Variable: Injuries/Illnesses
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1198 1138
Wald Chi2 233.38 363.34
Log pseudo-likelihood -15.0768 -39.6404
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -7.6245*** 1.3282 -5.74 -3.0580*** 0.6823 -4.48
Ln(Employees) 0.7942*** 0.1291 6.15 0.8663*** 0.0757 11.45
Part-time -1.1643 0.7426 -1.57 -0.1503 0.4256 -0.35
Turnover -1.3284* 0.7083 -1.88 -0.0080 0.4062 -0.02
Age21 0.7149 0.7875 0.91 -0.8185* 0.5046 -1.62
Age50 -0.3846 0.8524 -0.45 -0.6285 0.5121 -1.29
Shifts 0.6016** 0.2976 2.02 0.3361** 0.1680 2.00
Overtime 0.0913 0.0718 1.27 0.0842** 0.0376 2.24
Union 0.6774* 0.3649 1.86 0.4603* 0.2519 1.83
Committee 0.4915* 0.2738 1.80 0.0911 0.1603 0.57
Pay 8.39e-05 2.41e-05 0.35 1.48e-05 2.0e-05 0.74
Electricity 0.0810 0.5762 0.14 -0.7328 0.5343 -1.37
Construction -0.0732 0.4570 -0.16 -0.0392 0.4165 -0.09
Wholesale 0.4261 0.6037 0.71 -0.0979 0.3464 -0.28
Hotel -0.1400 0.6893 -0.20 -1.1555*** 0.4455 -2.59
Transport -1.5135*** 0.4844 -3.12 0.2927 0.3571 0.82
Financial 0.2390 0.8696 0.27 0.6525 0.5557 1.17
Real estate 1.3555*** 0.5401 2.51 -0.3791 0.3603 -1.05
Public admin 2.7277*** 0.6413 4.25 0.3904 0.4072 0.96
Education 1.1838* 0.6726 1.76 0.1132 0.4168 0.27
Health 1.9616*** 0.6571 2.99 0.5589 0.3972 1.41
Community 0.4273 0.5526 0.77 0.3881 0.3700 1.05
Skilled Trades 3.6046*** 1.1241 3.21 -0.6326 0.6386 -0.99
Managers 0.2229 2.1174 0.11 -2.4589*** 1.0015 -2.46
Machine Operatives 3.8231*** 1.0964 3.49 -1.3658** 0.6635 -2.06
Professional 0.6970 1.1655 0.60 -0.8720 0.6371 -1.37
Service 0.7254 1.0688 0.68 -0.9206* 0.5071 -1.82
Unskilled 3.4369*** 0.8731 3.94 -0.1894 0.5241 -0.36
Sales 3.2610*** 0.8788 3.71 0.0628 0.6357 0.10
Technical -0.3949 0.9283 -0.43 -0.7852 0.5820 -1.35
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2 2.54* 3.12*
Prob>Chi2 0.100 0.0773
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
The most dangerous industries are found to be Health and Social Work, and Public 
Administration and Defence, with Transport, Storage and Communication being a
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relatively low risk industry. Fenn and Ashby find the same results. Although these 
results may not have been as expected, they are likely to reflect the accepted belief 
that classifying risk in terms of injuries by industry is not as accurate as classifying it 
by occupation (Sandy et al., 2001, p.49). A workplace in a particular industry will 
employ workers in many occupations, each with a varying degree of risk. In terms of 
occupation, results are more in line with expectations, with a higher proportion of 
manual employees associated with a greater number of injuries. Conversely however, 
occupation variables are insignificant in the illness regressions. This immediately 
highlights the differences between incidences of workplace injuries and illnesses.
As the average age of an establishment’s workforce has been found to influence 
accident and illness rates, variables are included to indicate the proportion of 
employees under 21 and the proportion of employees over 50. In both samples, age21 
is significantly negative in the illness regressions, indicating workplaces with a 
younger workforce have fewer work-related illnesses. Age50 is insignificant in all 
estimations.
Work practices including overtime and shift work have all been shown to influence 
health and safety in the workplace. EC (2004) shows shift work to be associated with 
a higher risk of injury, with this being attributed to shift work reducing worker 
concentration. In all regressions, the variable shift is positive but is only significant in 
the sample of 10 or more employees. This is likely to be because smaller 
establishments have fewer employees working shifts to enable a significant effect to 
be estimated.
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In terms of overtime, logically we would expect an increase in hours to result in an 
increase in injury rates, and evidence from Dembe et al. (2005) suggests overtime 
increases the hazard rate itself, not just the number of injuries. The variable overtime 
is positive in all regressions and significantly so in the illness regressions in both 
samples. Overtime therefore, is at the very least associated with an increase in 
workplace illnesses. Note that this variable refers to overtime that is either paid or 
unpaid. It would be interesting to consider if there are separate effects upon workplace 
accidents and illnesses; for instance, paid overtime, which is most likely to be 
voluntary, may not have as great a positive impact upon a workplace’s health and 
safety record as unpaid overtime, which may not be voluntary. Unfortunately, the 
nature of the questions in WERS does not allow this to be tested. The impact that 
overtime has upon a workplace’s health and safety record will be considered in more 
detail in a later section.
The effect that trade unions have upon a workplace’s accident rate has been subject to 
wide debate, as discussed in chapter 3A.5. We may expect trade unions to have the 
effect of reducing accidents with collective bargaining resulting in an improvement in 
workplace safety (Freeman and Medoff 1984). However, there are arguments to 
suggest unionised workplaces will have a higher accident rate. Such arguments are 
largely attributed to improvements in reporting, with unions increasing workers’ 
knowledge of their rights and correct procedures for reporting accidents, and helping 
to ensure there is a clearly established accident reporting system within the workplace. 
Trade unions may be used as a channel to air grievances, but also as a means through 
which compensation can be recovered. Nichols et al. (1995) find evidence suggesting 
that industries with higher union density report higher injury rates in WIRS 90. Fenn 
and Ashby (2004) however, find no statistically significant relationship between union
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density and injury risk, but in terms of illness risk estimate a significantly positive 
relationship. Regression results here show a significantly positive impact of union 
density upon workplace injuries and illnesses in both samples, supporting these two 
previous studies. It should be emphasised that higher accident rates may be expected 
in the presence of trade unions because of the endogeneity of union membership. 
Workers in dangerous industries or occupations may choose to belong to unionised 
workplaces because of the potential safety benefits. The potential endogeneity of 
union membership will be tested in the next section.
In addition to considering the role of trade unions in occupational safety, studies have 
also investigated the role of safety representatives and health and safety committees. 
Under current legislation in the UK, firms are not obliged to appoint a safety 
representative and establish a health and safety committee. However, Reilly et al. 
(1995) comment that EU legislation may eventually require this; in France and 
Germany health and safety committees are mandatory for firms over a certain size. 
The UK government has already recognised their benefits, with the HSCER 1996 
making it possible for a group of employees not covered by a trade union to establish 
a health and safety committee. Reilly et al. find evidence that health and safety 
committees reduce workplace injuries (p.283). Fenn and Ashby caution that 
examining the impact of health and safety committees suffers from the same 
endogeneity problems as a trade union variable, as they are “more likely to emerge in 
establishments where workplace risk is higher” (p.464). They estimate a significantly 
positive relationship between injury risk and health and safety committees, attributing 
this to such committees improving accident reporting mechanisms. Results here show 
the presence of a health and safety committee has a significantly positive effect upon 
the number of injuries in the sample of workplaces with 10 or more employees but is
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insignificant in all other estimations. There is therefore no evidence here to suggest 
such committees improve health and safety in the workplace, although they may assist 
in the reporting of accidents.
For comparison, an unweighted model is also tested, with results reported in 
Appendix 4.2. Returning to the earlier discussion of the debate over whether to use 
weighted data (p. 133), it was recommended that weighted data be used and compared 
to an unweighted model. The main advantage of using unweighted data is the smaller 
standard errors that result “and so significant associations are more likely to be found” 
(Purdon and Pickering, 2001, p. 16). However, Purdon and Pickering recommend that 
“if the coefficients do differ by a non-negligible amount then the weighted model 
should be used” (p. 17).
Comparisons of weighted and unweighted models do suggest differences. For 
example, the union variable is not significant in the unweighted injury model, whereas 
it is positive and significant in the weighted model. Average pay variables are positive 
and significant in the unweighted injury models, but insignificant in the weighted 
models. The main difference however, relates to the firm size effect, with firm size 
much more likely to be significantly associated with lower injuries and illnesses in the 
unweighted model compared to the weighted model. Purdon and Pickering 
recommend that if differences arise “since the weights remove the selection biases in 
the survey data we would trust the conclusion from the weighted analysis rather than 
the unweighted” (p. 16). Weighted data will therefore be used for the rest of this 
analysis, which also enables comparison with Fenn and Ashby.
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4.3.1 Testing for Endogeneity
Union membership and the presence of a health and safety committee may be 
endogenous, in that workers in dangerous workplaces may choose to belong to a 
workplace where such institutions are present because of the potential safety benefits. 
In addition, exposure to workplace risk may be a choice variable. Individuals with 
higher incomes may be expected to choose jobs in a safe environment. A variable 
capturing a workplace’s average annual pay  is included in regressions, and as in Fenn 
and Ashby, is positive but insignificant in all estimations. The potential endogeneity 
of this variable is tested along with union and committee.
Table 4 .7: Descriptive Statistics for Instrumental Variables (5 or more employees)
Variable No. of 
Obs
Min Max Unweighted
Mean
Weighted
Mean
Female 2295 0 1 0.5076
(0.2950)
0.5437
(0.3205)
‘Unions help performance’ 
(4=strongly disagree)
813 0 4 2.0255
(1.0421)
2.2716
(0.9889)
‘No employee consultation’ 
(4=strongly disagree)
2295 0 4 2.7865
(0.9415)
2.6555
(0.9766)
Reduced form regressions are estimated with pay , union and committee as dependent 
variables. These regressions include all exogenous variables used in the injury and 
illness regressions, and instruments that are thought to be good predictors of the 
dependent variables. The same instruments used by Fenn and Ashby are used to 
enable comparison, namely the proportion of female employees in a workplace, and 
two variables indicating the extent at which unions help to improve performance and 
the extent to which managers agree that decisions are made without consulting
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employees (see Appendix 4.1 for formal definitions). The descriptive statistics for 
these three instrumental variables are reported in Table 4.7.
Reduced form regressions are estimated for the three potentially endogeneous 
variables and residuals saved. Full results for both samples are reported in Appendix 
4.3, with key results reported in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Key Reduced Form Regression Results
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
UNION DENSITY H&S COMMITTEE AVERAGE PAY
Obs 1747 1984 1523
Log Likelihood -693.7580 -901.6808
Psuedo R2 0.4261 0.3019 0.7159
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient t
Constant -2.6605***
(0.6221)
-4.28 -2.9755***
(0.5661)
-5.26 9.9089***
(0.0685)
144.6
Ln(Employees) 0.6077***
(0.0566)
10.7 0.6808***
(0.0477)
14.3 0.0477***
(0.0054)
8.77
Female 0.1470
0.4080
0.36 -0.1821
(0.3915)
-0.47 -0.2502***
(0.0431)
-5.80
Age21 -1.2707**
(0.5876)
-2.16 -0.1973
(0.5601)
-0.35 -0.3427***
(0.0616)
-5.57
Age50 1.2651***
(0.4423)
2.86 0.2698
(0.4212)
0.64 -0.0766
(0.0487)
-1.57
Shifts 0.3873**
(0.1666)
2.33 0.4337***
(0.1463)
2.97 -0.0307*
(0.0183)
-1.68
Overtime 0.0328
(0.0397)
0.83 -0.0484
(0.0358)
-1.35 0.0153***
(0.0041)
3.73
‘Unions help 
performance’
-0.5266***
(0.0706)
7.46 -1.7494*** 
(0.0604)
-2.90 -0.0053
(0.0071)
-0.74
‘No employee 
consultation’
0.3198***
(0.0729)
4.39 0.1203*
(0.0683)
1.76 0.0133*
(0.0079)
1.67
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
UNION DENSITY H&S COMMITTEE AVERAGE PAY
Obs 1533 1766 1361
Log Likelihood -603.1526 -846.4746
Psuedo R2 0.4245 0.2847 0.7341
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient t
Constant -3.3798***
(0.7010)
-4.82 -2.7947***
(0.5949)
-4.70 -9.9251***
(0.0705)
140.8
Ln(Employees) 0.6478***
(0.0649)
9.98 0.6833***
(0.0513)
13.3 0.0455***
(0.0056)
8.07
Female 0.3842
(0.4620)
0.83 -0.3014
(0.4119)
-0.73 -0.2741***
(0.0457)
-6.00
Age21 -1.4479**
(0.6585)
-2.20 -0.2818
(0.5896)
-0.48 -0.4353***
(0.0662)
-6.58
Age50 1.3802***
(0.5115)
2.70 0.3977
(0.4451)
0.89 -0.0757
(0.0513)
-1.48
Shifts 0.3722**
(0.1756)
2.12 0.4622***
(0.1501)
3.08 -0.0324*
(0.0181)
-1.79
Overtime 0.0522
(0.0443)
1.18 -0.0720*
(0.0375)
-1.92 0.0125***
(0.0043)
2.95
‘Unions help 
performance’
-0.5257***
(0.0754)
-6.97 -0.1945***
(0.0623)
-3.12 -0.0052
(0.0072)
-0.73
‘No employee 
consultation’
0.3756***
(0.0783)
4.80 0.1272*
(0.0703)
1.81 0.0112
(0.0080)
1.40
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5%  level; *=significant at the 10% level
The variable unions help improve performance, as the instrument used to predict 
union density, is significantly negative in the union density regressions, indicating 
union density is high in firms that believe unions help improve performance. For 
average pay, the instrument female is significantly negative, again as expected. The 
instruments used to predict the presence of a health and safety committee, decisions 
made without consulting employees is positive and significant, indicating health and 
safety committees are more likely to be present in firms who do not consult with 
employees. The instruments used in the reduced-form regressions therefore, all work 
in the expected way.
The residuals saved from these reduced-form regressions are used as additional 
variables in the injury and illness regressions to test for endogeneity. Full results are 
reported in Appendix 4.4 with key coefficients reported in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9: Key Negative Binomial Regression Results including Reduced-Form 
Residuals
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No o f Obs 1326 1267
Log pseudo likelihood -18.3857 -56.2324
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std. error z
Constant -8.8538*** 1.6365 -5.41 -3.5346*** 0.5091 0.79
Ln(Employees) 0.8965*** 0.1389 6.46 0.7818*** 0.0982 7.96
Overtime 0.0667 0.0803 0.83 0.1243*** 0.0422 2.94
Union 1.1636*** 0.3854 3.02 -0.1548 0.2964 -0.52
Committee 0.6103 0.7486 0.82 0.6492 0.4905 1.32
Pay 3.44e-05 5.9e-05 0.58 3.56e-06 4.05e-05 0.09
Runion -0.1865* 0.0011 -1.78 0.2840*** 0.0461 6.16
Rcomm -0.1186 0.1046 -0.43 -0.2511 0.1806 -1.39
Rpay -0.1435 1.0266 -0.14 0.1919 0.6102 0.31
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2 0.56 4.93**
Prob>Chi2 0.4563 0.0263
***=signiflcant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No o f  Obs 1168 1110
Log pseudo likelihood -14.8705 -39.2409
Coefficient Std. error z Coefficient Std. error z
Constant -8.5152*** 1.5926 -5.35 -2.3095*** 0.8791 -2.63
Ln(Employeess) 0.7318*** 0.1874 3.91 0.8491*** 0.1099 7.73
Overtime 0.0668 0.0723 0.92 0.1071*** 0.0395 2.71
Union 0.8569** 0.4033 2.12 0.0183 0.3002 0.06
Committee 0.6132 1.0838 0.57 0.5175 0.6436 0.80
Pay 6.4e-05 4.91e-05 1.30 -2.25e-05 3.77e-05 -0.60
Runion -0.1039 0.1076 -0.97 0.1926*** 0.0736 2.62
Rcomm -0.0559 0.4433 -0.13 -0.1730 0.2628 -0.66
Rpay -1.0341 0.7517 -1.38 0.6192 0.5731 1.08
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2 2.05 1.89
Prob>Chi2 0.1522 0.1697
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Estimates for the residuals from the average pay regression (rpay) and health and 
safety committee regression (rcomm) are insignificant in the injury and illness
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regressions in both samples. These results are also found by Fenn and Ashby, and 
imply pay and presence of a health and safety committee does not determine 
workplace risk. For union density however, the union residual runion is significant in 
three of the four regressions, suggesting union density is endogenously determined by 
a workplace’s risk of illness. Employees are therefore likely to join a unionised firm 
because they are concerned about being exposed to high illness risk, partly explaining 
the positive union density variable estimate in the illness regressions. Conversely, 
Fenn and Ashby found runion to be insignificant in all regressions.
4.4 New Workplace Variables
Chapter 3 A discussed the potential of many other factors to influence the occurrence 
of workplace injuries and illnesses. Therefore, additional explanatory variables to 
those used in Fenn and Ashby are created, again using data from the management 
questionnaire, for use in the estimations. Appendix 4.1 provides formal definitions, 
with descriptive statistics reported in Table 4.10.
WERS allows us to derive a variable to capture the proportion of employees that 
regularly work more than 48 hours per week. The effect working over 48 hours has 
upon the health and safety record of a workplace is particularly important given the 
EU Working Time Directive which limits working hours to 48 per week. The UK has 
adopted a schedule to enable employees to opt out of this directive. Fortyeighthrs 
indicates the proportion of non-managerial employees that regularly work in excess of 
48 hours, with a value of 6 indicating all employees regularly work over 48 hours. A 
weighted mean of 0.924 indicates approximately 15 per cent of non-managerial 
workers regularly work over 48 hours.
160
Table 4.10: Additional Explanatory Variables Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Min Max Unweighted
Mean
Weighted
Mean
Fixed 2228 0 1 0.062
(0.161)
0.052
(0.170)
Hstrain 2295 0 1 0.667
(0.472)
0.517
(0.499)
Resultspay 2294 0 1 0.221
(0.415)
0.255
(0.436)
Sickpay 2295 0 1 0.698
(0.459)
0.5277342
(0.499339)
Redundancy 2212 0 1000 6.354
(41.915)
0.903
(16.874)
Fortyeighthrs 2258 0 6 1.107
(1.454)
0.924
(1.625)
Apprais 2173 0 6 4.645
(2.278)
3.982
(2.724)
Discrete 2285 0 3 1.813
(0.870)
1.934
(0.863)
Control 2286 0 3 1.736
(0.882)
1.837
(0.894)
Team 2288 0 6 3.596
(1.963)
2.682
(2.335)
Flex 2295 0 1 0.431
(0.495)
0.346
(0.476)
Night 2295 0 1 0.288
(0.453)
0.110
(0.314)
Home 2295 0 1 0.396
(0.489)
0.247
(0.431)
These 13 new variables are added to the Negative binomial regressions. Full results 
are reported in Appendix 4.5, with key coefficients reported in Table 4.11.
The proportion working overtime in a workplace has already been found to have a 
positive effect upon injury and illness. Fortyeighthrs is positive in all estimations, but 
only significant in the injury regression for the sample of workplaces with 10 or more
|  o
employees . Therefore, although working over 48 hours regularly does have some
18 This variable was also tested excluding overtime because o f  the potential for collinearity. The 
significance o f  the fortyeighthrs variable remained the same, suggesting separate effects from working 
extensive overtime (where extensive is defined as over 48 hours).
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significant impact upon injuries in the workplace, results are not conclusive for all 
samples. This issue will be considered in more detail in a later section.
Table 4.11: Negative Binomial Regression Results with new Workplace-Level 
Variables
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1265 1209
Wald Chi2 408.39 413.80
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-16.528 -52.818
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.9821*** 1.2896 -6.96 -3.354*** 0.7090 -4.73
Ln(Employees) 0.8565*** 0.1306 6.56 0.8123*** 0.0784 10.4
Overtime 0.0911 0.0945 0.96 0.1161*** 0.0423 2.74
Union 0.8630*** 0.3863 2.50 0.5882** 0.2977 1.98
Committee 0.2765 0.2573 1.07 0.0271 0.1619 0.87
Fixed 0.5563 0.5832 0.34 -0.1973 0.4391 -0.45
H strain 0.3962 0.2918 1.36 -0.3490** 0.1554 -2.25
Resultspay -0.7654** 0.3260 -2.35 0.2126 0.2079 1.02
Sickpay -0.0009 0.2963 0.10 0.4392*** 0.1713 2.56
Redundancy -0.0114* 0.0067 -1.71 0.0010 0.0056 0.17
Fortyeighthrs 0.0330 0.0918 0.72 0.0272 0.0502 0.54
Apprais -0.1700*** 0.0534 -3.19 0.0322 0.0331 0.97
Discrete -0.1205 0.1630 0.46 -0.1837* 0.0984 -1.87
Control 0.0139 0.1870 0.07 0.0168 0.0910 0.18
Team 0.0421 0.0801 0.60 -0.0055 0.0391 -0.14
Flex -0.1868 0.2403 -0.78 -0.1134 0.1711 -0.66
Night 0.6146* 0.3317 1.85 0.3102 0.1984 1.56
Home -0.0864 0.4228 0.84 0.3248* 0.1739 1.87
*’•^sign ificant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1121 1066
Wald Chi2 268.29 368.87
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-13.098 -37.0765
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -7.8746*** 1.2596 -6.25 -3.0791*** 0.6775 -4.54
Ln(Employees) 0.8150*** 0.1313 6.21 0.8274*** 0.0831 9.95
Overtime 0.0471 0.0881 0.54 0.0707* 0.0414 1.71
Union 0.8076** 0.4012 2.01 0.5374* 0.2886 1.86
Committee 0.4839** 0.2406 2.01 0.1267 0.1674 0.76
Fixed 1.1495** 0.5186 2.22 0.0986 0.4409 0.22
H strain 0.5560** 0.2741 2.03 -0.2519* 0.1644 -1.66
Resultspay -0.3324 0.2858 -1.16 -0.0550 0.1845 -0.30
Sickpay -0.2683 0.3096 -0.87 0.1998 0.1744 1.15
Redundancy -0.0042 0.0079 -0.53 0.0027 0.0059 0.46
Fortyeighthrs 0.1397** 0.0762 1.83 0.0786 0.0508 1.55
Apprais -0.1680*** 0.0601 -2.80 0.0378 0.0348 1.09
Discrete -0.1120 0.1499 -0.75 -0.0053 0.0946 -0.06
Control 0.0920 0.1635 0.56 -0.0378 0.0905 -0.42
Team -0.0705 0.0611 -1.16 0.0178 0.0390 0.46
Flex -0.3502 0.2689 -1.30 -0.1949 0.1788 -1.09
Night 0.7309** 0.2892 2.53 0.2148 0.1793 1.20
Home -0.5383 0.3307 -1.63 0.5216*** 0.1796 2.90
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Considering temporary employment contracts, the effect they have upon workplace 
accidents is inconclusive in the literature. The variable fixed  indicates the proportion 
of workers who have fixed employment contracts, and is positive and significant in 
the injury regression for workplaces with 10 or more employees. A greater proportion 
of fixed contract employees is therefore associated with a greater number of injuries, 
and could be attributed to a lack of experience and awareness, and lack of motivation. 
Fixed is insignificant in the illness regressions, perhaps related to the long-term nature 
of workplace illnesses.
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Workplace policies can impact upon their health and safety record, and so a variable 
indicating whether employees have had health and safety training in the last 12 
months is included. This variable is negative and significant in the illness regressions 
in both samples, suggesting health and safety training has the effect of reducing 
illnesses, but not injuries. For the sample of workplaces with 5 or more employees, 
hstrain is positive and significant in the injury regression. Robinson and Smallman 
(2006) find health and safety training has the effect of increasing both reported 
injuries and illnesses. This is likely to be related to reporting, as health and safety 
training “prepares people to spot accident and illness potential, but also arms them 
with legal knowledge, which encourages them to report more incidents” (p.97). The 
fact that in this estimation training is found to have a significant impact upon reducing 
illnesses however, is an important result, as it highlights how workplaces’ can 
improve employee health in the workplace.
We may also expect the amount of sick pay an employee receives to have a positive 
effect upon the number of illness reported, and so sick pay indicates if workers are 
paid over the statutory sick pay requirement. Sick pay is insignificant in the sample of 
10 or more employees, but positive and significant in the illness regression in the 
sample of firms with 5 or more employees. This is likely to be due to reporting, with 
employees more likely to report an illness if they are going to receive above average 
sick pay.
Workplaces that operate a payment-by-results system may also have a higher injury 
rate as employees increase their work pace, sacrificing care and increasing the 
likelihood of an accident. Payment-by-results is insignificant in the sample of firms
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with 10 or more workers, but negative and significant in the injury regression in the 
sample of 5 or more workers. This is likely to be related to reporting, with workers 
less likely to report an injury to managers if there is a chance it will impact upon their 
pay.
The variable apprais captures whether non-managerial employees have regular 
appraisals. This variable is negative and significant in both injury regressions 
suggesting a workplace policy of regular appraisals is effective in promoting a low 
workplace injury rate. Regular appraisals may provide an opportunity for workers to 
voice any concerns regarding health and safety procedures, thus meaning that any 
problems are addressed before an accident occurs. Similarly, managers are presented 
with the opportunity to observe whether employees are working safely, giving a 
chance to correct any problems.
Redundancy denotes the number of employees that have been made redundant in a 
particular workplace in the last 12 months. The variable is negative and significant in 
the injury regression within the sample of firms with 5 or more workers. This is also 
likely to be due to reporting, with a high number of redundancies reducing the 
likelihood of accidents being reported to management, as employees fear this will 
increase their chance of also being made redundant during periods when colleagues 
have lost their jobs in this manner.
Employing workers to work night shifts significantly increases the number of injuries, 
probably due to a fatigue effect. Employing home workers is also associated with a 
greater number of workplace illnesses. There could be an element of endogeneity 
here, with workers with poor health choosing to work for a firm that allows work to
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be carried out at home. However, the question specifically relates to work-related 
illness, and so part of this may be reflecting stress and anxiety related illnesses 
associated with working alone. Given an increasing trend for working from home, 
with technological advances making this possible, this is an important result. 
Robinson and Smallman (2006) also estimate that home working is associated with a 
greater number of illnesses but fewer injuries in the service sector, concluding that 
working from home “offers a safer but potentially less healthy work environment” 
(p.99).
Variables depicting flexitime, the amount of control a workers has over pace, and 
working in formally designated teams has no significant impact upon injuries and 
illnesses. This is in contrast to the findings of Robinson and Smallman (2006) who 
find flexitime increases reported injuries in the service sector and illnesses in both the 
manufacturing and service sectors (p.98). Discretion is significantly negative in only 
one out of the four regressions, suggesting discretion over how tasks are carried out 
has some impact at reducing reported illnesses.
Endogeneity tests are carried out in the same way as before, with results reported in 
Appendix 4.6. Union is again found to be endogenous in both illness estimations. The 
presence of a health and safety committee is also now found to be endogenous in three 
out of the four regressions. Pay however, remains exogenous.
Given the relevance of considering the effect that working over 48 hours has upon a 
firm’s health and safety record, in addition to testing the effect that non-managerial 
employees working over 48 hours has upon safety {fortyeighthrs), a separate variable
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is constructed denoting the proportion of managerial employees working over 48 
hours in a workplace (fortyeightmgs). Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12: Descriptive Statistics for Fortyeighthrs and Fortyeightmangs
Variable No. of 
Obs
Min Max Unweighted
Mean
Weighted
Mean
Fortyeighthrs 2258 0 6 1.107
(1.454)
0.924
(1.625)
Fortyeighthrs
(10 or more employees)
2025 0 6 1.151
(1.433)
1.069
(1.641)
Fortyeightmgs 2236 0 6 2.459
(2.271)
2.493
(2.584)
Fortyeightmgs
(10 or more employees)
2005 0 6 2.460
(2.215)
2.572
(2.481)
Descriptive statistics confirm that managers are significantly more likely to work 48 
hours plus regularly: 42 per cent of managerial employees are likely to regularly work 
over 48 hours, compared to only 15 per cent of non-managerial employees19. 
Fortyeightmgs is added to the Negative Binomial regressions in addition to 
fortyeighthrs, with key results reported in Table 4.13 and full results reported in 
Appendix 4.7.
Results indicate separate effects, with fortyeightmgs significantly positive in the 
illness regressions of both samples. Fortyeighthrs is insignificant in the illness 
regressions but positive and significant in the injury regression for the sample of firms 
with 10 or more workers20. Thus, managers’ working over 48 hours regularly has a 
significant effect upon increasing workplace illnesses, whilst having a large 
proportion of non-managerial employees working over 48 hours regularly, increases
19 T tests with equal variance reveal the differences to be statistically significant, with t statistics o f  
24.391 for workplaces with 5 or more employees, and 22.703 for workplaces with 10 or more 
employees. Both are significant at the 1 per cent significance level.
20 Regressions were also estimated with both fortyeighthrs and fortyeightmangs but excluding overtime 
in case o f  collinearity. The significance o f  both variables in all models remained the same.
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the likelihood of workplace injuries. Overall, regularly working over 48 hours does 
appear to have a detrimental effect upon health and safety in the firm, suggesting the 
UK schedule that enables workers to opt out of the EU Working Time Directive has a 
negative effect upon health and safety in the workplace. This is particularly apparent 
with regards to managers working over 48 hours and workplace illness. Given the 
increased importance of workplace illness compared to workplace injury in terms of 
prevalence in firms, the impact of working excessive hours upon workplace illness 
needs to be considered.
Table 4.13: Key Negative Binomial Regression Results with Forty Eight Hours
Variables
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1251 1195
Wald Chi2 410.67 425.50
Log pseudo- 
likelihood
-16.0496 -51.8563
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -9.2887*** 1.3324 -6.97 -3.6106*** 0.7280 -4.96
Ln(Employees) 0.9671*** 0.1265 7.65 0.8240*** 0.0802 10.3
Hstrain 0.3522 0.2975 1.18 -0.3992** 0.1616 -2.47
Redundancy -0.0121* 0.0066 -1.84 0.0005 0.0052 0.10
Apprais -0.1590*** 0.0561 -2.83 0.0508 0.0340 1.49
Night 0.5879* 0.3333 1.76 0.3377* 0.1991 1.70
Home -0.0382 0.4040 -0.09 0.2786* 0.1691 1.65
Overtime 0.0781 0.1059 0.74 0.0946** 0.0440 2.15
Fortyeighthrs 0.0067 0.0913 0.07 -0.0206 0.0548 -0.38
Fortyeightmgs 0.1078* 0.0618 1.75 0.1192*** 0.0341 3.50
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1108 1053
Wald Chi2 294.00 401.95
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-12.6855 -36.3187
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.1302*** 1.3718 -5.93 -3.6105*** 0.7064 -5.11
Ln(Employees) 0.9607*** 0.1324 7.26 0.8764*** 0.0857 10.2
Hstrain 0.5217* 0.2826 1.85 -0.3096* 0.1622 -1.91
Redundancy -0.0047 0.0082 -0.57 0.0022 0.0057 0.39
Apprais -0.1645** 0.0661 -2.49 0.0642* 0.0346 1.85
Night 0.6935** 0.2937 2.36 0.1732 0.1785 0.97
Home -0.4339 0.3335 -1.30 0.5051*** 0.1784 2.83
Overtime 0.0469 0.0983 0.48 0.0599 0.0419 1.43
Fortyeighthrs 0.1601** 0.0773 2.07 0.0311 0.0546 0.57
Fortyeightmgs 0.0119 0.0584 0.20 0.1061*** 0.0346 3.07
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Union is positive but endogeneous in the injury and illness estimations. One reason 
suggested for the positive but endogenous union density effect is that unions work to 
provide compensation to workers for being exposed to hazardous working conditions. 
Workers may join a trade union if their job is risky in terms of health and safety to 
ensure gaining a risk premium for this exposure. A union-pay interaction variable 
would capture the union’s effect upon any risk premium, with a positive and 
significant coefficient suggesting unions have a role in ensuring risk premiums are 
paid. The coefficient estimated for union would then purely capture the union’s effort 
to influence safety through bargaining and reporting procedures.
Appendix 4.8 reports the main results from negative binomial regressions that include, 
in addition to the variables pay and union, an interaction variable union-pay. Union- 
pay is positive and significant at the 5 per cent level in the illness regression for the 
sample of workplaces with 5 or more employees, indicating unions do have a role in 
ensuring risk premiums are paid. Union-pay is positive but insignificant in all other
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regressions however, providing limited evidence for this hypothesis. The role of trade 
unions therefore, appears not to be primarily in ensuring a risk premium is paid. The 
positive and endogenous union density effect is most likely to be due to those exposed 
to high risk preferring to join a trade union because of the chance to air grievances, 
and the improved reporting mechanisms, rather than to recover risk premiums21.
4.5 Tobit and Alternative Models
There are potential alternatives to the Negative Binomial Regression model which 
also take account of the workplace accident Poisson probability distribution. The Zero 
Inflated Negative Binomial Regression model incorporates the Poisson distribution, 
but unlike the Negative Binomial Regression model, it assumes different probability 
models for the zero and non-zero counts. As accident records over a 12 month period 
are likely to be explained in the same manner for workplaces that have had no 
accidents and those that have had accidents, we may expect the Negative Binomial 
Regression model to be the most appropriate. As a further alternative, the Tobit model 
censors the zero counts and so would emphasise the effect workplace characteristics 
have in workplaces that have had at least one accident. As a test of the 
appropriateness of the Negative Binomial Regression model, and of the assumption 
that zero and non-zero accident workplaces face the same probability model, the 
estimation is repeated using the Tobit model. If the relationships are similar in the 
Negative Binomial Regression and Tobit models, the assumption that there is little 
difference between workplaces with a zero and a positive accident record can be 
considered justified.
21 Regressions were also estimated excluding sickpay and resultspay because o f  the potential for 
col linearity. The significance o f  union-pay remained the same.
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To estimate the Tobit model, a dependent variable that divides the number of injuries 
or illnesses in a workplace by the number of workers is constructed (injrisk and 
illrisk). This enables the effect that workplace size has upon the number of accidents 
and illnesses to be tested directly. Table 4.14 reports descriptive statistics for the new 
dependent variables.
Table 4.14: Descriptive Statistics for Injrisk and Illrisk
Variable Obs Mean rate per 
workplace (unweighted)
Mean rate per 
workplace (weighted)
Injrisk 2248 0.0057 0.0053
(0.0347) (0.0328)
Injrisk 2015 0.0059 0.0059
(10 or more employees) (0.0348) (0.0337)
Illrisk 2094 0.0261 0.0298
(0.0655) (0.0819)
Illrisk 1862 0.0249 0.0236
(10 or more employees) (0.0588) (0.0585)
As before, results show workplace illnesses to be more common than injuries22. Tobit 
models are estimated with the same variables as the Negative Binomial Regression 
estimations, only with the new dependent variables injrisk and illrisk. Results are 
presented in Table 4.15.
22 Differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level, with t statistics (with 
unequal variance) o f  12.6860 for workplaces with 5 or more employees, and 12.1241 for workplaces 
with 10 or more employees.
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Table 4 . 1 Tobit Estimates
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJRISK ILLRISK
N o .  o f  o b s 1 2 5 1 1 1 9 5
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d - 2 1 2 . 7 6 6 6 - 3 3 8 . 6 5 9 0
P s e u d o  R 2 0 . 3 6 9 2 0 . 2 4 7 1
Coefficient Std error t Coefficient Std error t
Constant -0.1813*** 0.0503 -3.60 0.0011 0.0396 0.03
Ln(Employees) -0.0236*** 0.0054 -4.36 -0.0296*** 0.0058 -5.13
Part-time -0.0103 0.0249 -0.41 -0.0376* 0.0228 -1.65
Turnover -0.0156 0.0239 -0.65 -0.0143 0.0246 -0.58
Age21 0.0523 0.0323 1.62 -0.0266 0.0336 -0.79
Age50 -0.0717** 0.0308 -2.33 0.0531** 0.0249 2.13
Shifts -0.0025 0.0122 -0.21 -0.0003 0.0133 -0.03
Overtime 0.0044* 0.0025 1.76 0.0078*** 0.0023 3.36
Union 0.0394** 0.0201 1.96 0.0621*** 0.0183 3.39
Committee 0.0120 0.0128 0.94 -4.99e-05 0.0142 -0.00
Pay 1,60e-06* 9,37e-07 1.71 -1.03e-06 9.55e-07 -1.08
Fixed 0.0271 0.0259 1.05 -0.0165 0.0298 -0.55
Ustrain 0.0121 0.0096 1.26 -0.0302*** 0.0095 -3.19
Resultspay -0.0299*** 0.01 15 -2.61 0.0176 0.0110 1.61
Sickpay 0.0023 0.0096 0.24 0.0346*** 0.0096 3.60
Redundancy -0.0009 0.0007 -1.26 0.0005 0.0010 0.45
Fortyeighthrs -0.0026 0.0032 -0.81 -0.0037 0.0031 -1.21
Fortyeightmangs 0.0041** 0.0020 2.03 0.0086*** 0.0019 4.43
Apprais -0.0051*** 0.0019 -2.70 0.0033* 0.0019 1.70
Discrete -0.0095* 0.0056 -1.70 -0.0180*** 0.0062 -2.91
Control -0.0001 0.0054 -0.03 0.0056 0.0058 0.97
Team 0.0035 0.0021 1.62 -0.0010 0.0021 -0.47
Flex -0.001 1 0.0100 -0.12 -0.0130 0.0098 -1.32
Night 0.0340** 0.0136 2.50 0.0419*** 0.0156 2.70
Home 0.01 19 0.01 17 1.02 0.0232** 0.01 12 2.07
Electricity -0.0760 0.0973 -0.78 -0.2533 0.1825 -1.39
Construction -0.0064 0.0253 -0.25 -0.0939*** 0.0315 -2.98
Wholesale 0.0368** 0.0180 2.04 -0.0155 0.0195 -0.80
Hotel 0.0119 0.0269 0.44 -0.0347 0.0287 -1.21
Transport -0.0883*** 0.0336 -2.63 0.0309 0.0248 1.24
Financial 0.0058 0.0352 0.16 -0.0338 0.0287 -1.18
Real estate 0.0609*** 0.0192 3.15 -0.0055 0.0199 -0.28
Public admin 0.0929*** 0.0348 2.67 0.0705** 0.0315 2.24
Education 0.0630* 0.0325 1.94 -0.0124 0.0308 -0.40
Health 0.0669** 0.0281 2.38 0.0461** 0.0232 1.98
Community 0.0498** 0.0208 2.39 -0.0075 0.0227 -0.33
Skilled Trades 0.2650*** 0.0439 4.18 0.0847** 0.0350 2.42
Managers 0.0966* 0.0564 1.71 0.0004 0.0439 0.01
Machine Operatives 0.2650*** 0.0429 6.18 -0.0119 0.0354 -0.33
Professional -0.0073 0.0539 -0.13 0.0201 0.0405 0.50
Service 0.0258 0.0459 0.56 -0.0106 0.0293 -0.36
Unskilled 0.1327*** 0.0411 3.23 0.0524* 0.0315 1.66
Sales 0.1531*** 0.0392 3.91 0.0554** 0.0280 1.98
Technical 0.0187 0.0457 0.41 -0.0325 0.0327 -0.99
* * * - s i g n i f i c a n t  at th e  1%  leve l;  * * = s ig n i f i c a n t  at th e  5 %  leve l ;  * = s ig n i f i c a n t  at th e  1 0%  leve l
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W o r k p l a c e s  w i t h  10 o r  m o r e  E m p l o y e e s
Variables INJRISK ILLRISK
N o .  o f  o b s 1 1 0 8 1 0 5 3
L o g  l i k e l i h o o d - 1 0 0 . 5 5 4 7 - 1 0 2 . 2 0 6 0
P s e u d o  R 2 0 . 5 1 3 1 0 . 4 1 4 3
Coefficient Std error t Coefficient Std error t
Constant -0.0493 0.0368 -1.34 0.0013 0.0396 0.03
Ln(Employees) -0.0138*** 0.0044 -3.16 -0.0149*** 0.0051 -2.91
Part-time -0.0310* 0.0186 -1.67 -0.0172 0.0190 -0.90
Turnover -0.0344* 0.0207 -1.66 -0.0003 0.0219 -0.01
Age21 0.0455* 0.0245 1.85 -0.0141 0.0281 -0.50
Age50 -0.0242 0.0228 -1.06 -0.0247 0.0232 -1.06
Shifts 0.01 10 0.0081 1.36 0.0099 0.0095 1.04
Overtime 0.0020 0.0020 1.00 0.0037* 0.0022 1.73
Union 0.0176 0.0140 1.26 0.0388*** 0.0146 2.66
Committee 0.0201** 0.0088 2.29 0.0070 0.0101 0.69
Pay -3.75e-07 7.50e-07 -0.50 -3.71 e-07 7.80e-07 -0.48
Fixed 0.068** 0.0165 2.23 -0.0079 0.0215 -0.37
1Istrain 0.0125* 0.0073 1.71 -0.0214*** 0.0076 -2.80
Resultspay -0.0064 0.0082 -0.78 -0.0087 0.0092 -0.95
Sickpay -0.0054 0.0074 -0.72 0.0091 0.0081 1.12
Redundancy -0.0003 0.0005 -0.73 0.0001 0.0007 0.21
Fortyeighthrs 0.0056** 0.0024 2.34 0.0003 0.0027 0.12
Fortyeightmangs -0.001 1 0.0016 -0.71 0.0067*** 0.0016 4.09
Apprais -0.0052*** 0.0014 -3.68 0.0034** 0.0016 2.06
Discrete -0.0073* 0.0040 -1.82 0.0006 0.0048 0.13
Control 0.0029 0.0040 0.73 -0.0001 0.0044 -0.03
Team -0.0019 0.0017 -1.13 0.0005 0.0018 0.29
Flex -0.0088 0.0075 -1.17 -0.0155* 0.0080 -1.93
Night 0.0250*** 0.0092 2.74 0.0092 0.01 14 0.81
1 lome -0.0106 0.0093 -1.14 0.0365*** 0.0090 4.07
Electricity -0.0268 0.0614 -0.44 -0.1612 0.1 154 -1.40
Construction -0.0014 0.0179 -0.08 -0.0298 0.0242 -1.23
Wholesale 0.0125 0.0133 0.94 -0.0030 0.0157 -0.19
1 lotel 0.0049 0.0191 0.26 -0.0576** 0.0234 -2.46
Transport -0.0591*** 0.0221 -2.67 0.0303 0.0190 1.59
Financial 0.0162 0.0242 0.67 0.0198 0.0222 0.89
Real estate 0.0392*** 0.0149 2.63 -0.0255 0.0164 -1.55
Public admin 0.0620** 0.0245 2.53 0.0154 0.0259 0.60
Education 0.0409* 0.0234 1.75 -0.0273 0.0238 -1.14
1 lealth 0.0415* 0.0215 1.92 0.0146 0.0193 0.76
Community -0.0012 0.0201 -0.06 0.0018 0.0197 0.09
Skilled Trades 0.0927*** 0.0316 2.94 -0.0163 0.0321 -0.51
Managers 0.0484 0.0466 1.04 -0.1632*** 0.0470 -3.47
Machine Operatives 0.1095*** 00302 -0.23 -0.0521* 0.0302 -1.72
Professional 0.0077 0.0365 0.21 -0.0254 0.0306 -0.83
Service -0.0068 0.0302 -0.23 -0.0319 0.0236 -1.35
Unskilled 0.0531* 0.0280 1.89 0.0201 0.0252 0.80
Sales 0.0843*** 0.0282 2.99 0.0148 0.0240 0.63
Technical 0.0198 0.0306 0.65 -0.0381 0.0258 -1.47
* * * - s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  th e  1%  leve l;  * * = s ig n i f i c a n t  at th e  5 %  leve l ;  * = s ig n i f i c a n t  at th e  10%  level
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As noted, the nature of the dependent variables enables the independent effect that 
workplace size has upon a workplace’s injury and illness risk to be directly observed. 
Results indicate larger workplaces have significantly lower injury and illness rates. 
This is the same result found by Fenn and Ashby, who strongly reject the null 
hypothesis with the coefficients estimated to be less than one. For the equivalent 
negative binomial regression model (using all the variables above and the same 
sample) however, an independent effect between workplace size and injury is found 
but not between workplace size and illness. All other variable coefficients are similar 
to that estimated using the alternative model. This model, therefore, supports the 
findings of other papers that larger firms are safer.
To ensure direct comparison with results from the Negative Binomial Regression 
models, endogeneity tests are conducted using the same method as previously. Results 
are reported in Appendix 4.9. As before, the union residual is significant in the illness 
regressions, and the health and safety committee residual is significant in one out of 
the four regressions, suggesting some endogeneity.
For comparison purposes, Tobit models are also repeated including a union-pay 
interaction variable. Results are presented in Appendix 4.10 and are the same as in the 
negative binomial regression model, with union-pay significant in only one of the four 
regressions.
Overall, results from the Tobit model reinforce earlier findings concerning the 
relationship between a workplace accident record and workplace characteristics. This 
suggests the assumption that there is little difference between workplaces with a zero
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and a positive accident record, is justified. The Negative Binomial Regression model 
that takes account of these zero counts is therefore the preferred model.
4.6 M anufacturing and Service Sectors
Prior to Fenn and Ashby (2004), analysis of the influences on workplace injuries 
tended to focus on the manufacturing sector. With the decline in manufacturing 
establishments, and with the addition of the availability of data on workplace illness 
in WERS, Fenn and Ashby argued the service sector should also be included in 
estimations. Robinson and Smallman (2006) however, conducted separate estimations 
for the manufacturing and service sectors, arguing there are likely to be many 
differences between how the two sectors deal with workplace health and safety. 
Furthermore, their estimation results did point to differences.
Descriptive statistics (Table 4.16) reveal workplace illnesses are more common than 
injuries in both sectors. T tests (with unequal variance) reveal there to be no 
significant difference between the mean number of injuries and illnesses between the 
two sectors. The influences upon the health and safety record in each sector however, 
may differ. To investigate this, Negative Binomial Regressions are estimated for each 
sector.
Table 4.16: Descriptive Statistics by Sector
INJURIES ILLNESSES
Manufacturing Service Manufacturing Service
Obs 463 1785 437 1657
Weighted Mean 
Standard Deviation
0.2907
(2.7305)
0.1688
(2.7603)
0.7536
(3.2343)
0.7329
(7.7152)
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The model is estimated separately for the manufacturing sector and the service sector 
and compared to the full model using a likelihood ratio test23. A test statistic of 34.37 
is estimated which is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. There are therefore 
differences between the two sectors and it is appropriate to divide the model.
Dividing the sample of establishments into manufacturing and service sectors does 
have an impact upon estimates (Table 4.17). Having a greater proportion of workers 
aged 21 or more employed within a workplace is still associated with fewer workplace 
illnesses, but they are also associated with a greater number of injuries in the 
manufacturing sector. This suggests manufacturing firms should monitor younger 
workers in terms of their safety practices. Overtime is again associated with more 
illnesses, but now also more manufacturing sector injuries. Regularly working over 48 
hours per week is only significant in the service sector regressions, where this is 
associated with more illnesses. Health and safety training is associated with fewer 
illnesses in both sectors, reinforcing earlier findings. Also supporting earlier 
conclusions, working from home is associated with more reported workplace illnesses 
in both sectors.
23 Manufacturing sector defined as: Manufacturing; Electricity gas and water; Construction. Service 
sector defined as: Wholesale and retail; Hotels and restaurants; Transport and communication; 
Financial services; Other business service; Public administration; Education; Health; Other 
community services.
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Table 4.17: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates
MANUFACTURING SECTOR
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 253 240
Wald Chi2 223.11 233.33
Log pseudo-likelihood -3.2658 -7.2030
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -7.7005*** 2.5321 -3.04 -2.4251 2.2394 -1.08
Ln(Employees) 0.6290*** 0.2252 2.79 0.6727*** 0.1190 5.65
Part-time 2.4635 2.2682 1.09 -1.0642 1.6843 -0.63
Turnover -2.7269 1.8579 -1.47 2.0891** 0.9552 2.19
Age21 5.3295*** 2.0115 2.65 -0.5364 2.0135 -0.27
Age50 -1.7692 1.4404 -1.23 0.6201 1.1817 0.52
Shifts -0.9306 0.5705 -1.63 0.5319 0.4085 1.30
Overtime 0.3382*** 0.1243 2.72 0.2344** 0.1023 2.29
Union 0.6045 0.8292 0.73 2.9996*** 0.6414 4.68
Committee 0.5176 0.4626 1.12 0.2291 0.3514 0.65
Pay 0.0001*** 4.95e-05 2.70 -5.1e-05* 2.87e-05 -1.78
Fixed -3.1288 2.0552 -1.52 -3.7417** 1.5304 -2.44
11 strain -0.2516 0.406 -0.62 -0.5745* 0.3454 -1.66
Resultspay 0.5286 0.5096 1.04 0.2121 0.2748 0.77
Sickpay 0.9046** 0.4185 2.16 0.0345 0.3380 0.10
Redundancy -0.0002 0.0095 -0.02 -0.0085 0.0053 -1.62
Fortyeighthrs -0.1109 0.1401 -0.79 -0.0211 0.1188 -0.18
Fortyeightmangs 0.0625 0.0960 0.65 0.0992 0.0764 1.30
Apprais -0.0840 0.0718 -1.17 0.0791 0.0509 1.55
Discrete -0.0317 0.2040 -0.16 0.3977** 0.1850 2.15
Control -0.1361 0.2196 -0.62 -0.2850** 0.1435 -1.99
Team -0.0186 0.1020 -0.18 -0.1492* 0.0772 -1.93
Flex 0.0958 0.4321 0.22 0.6394** 0.2949 2.17
Night 2.1314*** 0.4779 4.46 0.5858 0.3664 1.60
Home 1.3477*** 0.4277 3.15 0.5309** 0.2622 2.02
Skilled Trades 0.6104 2.3058 0.26 -1.2106 1.8311 -0.66
Managers -6.5454* 3.4671 -1.89 -6.3908** 2.5584 -2.50
Machine Operatives 2.6031 2.1596 1.21 -2.2648 1.9190 -1.18
Professional -1.1787 2.9941 -0.39 0.1206 2.2407 0.05
Service -9.8164 6.3178 -1.55 -10.1519 11.8567 -0.86
Unskilled 0.7316 2.4847 0.29 -0.8033 2.1392 -0.38
Sales -11.0291*** 3.4171 -3.23 -1.0243 2.4095 -0.43
Technical -4.4191 3.2914 -1.34 -0.1730 1.9941 -0.09
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2 2.71 7.56
Prob>Chi2 0.0995 0.0060
* * * - s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  1%  leve l;  * * = s ig n i f i c a n t  at th e  5 %  leve l ;  ^ ^ s ig n i f i c a n t  at  the  1 0%  level
177
SERVICE SECTOR
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
N o .  o f  O h  s 9 9 8 9 5 5
W a l d  C h i 2 2 6 7 . 4 3 2 9 1 . 1 9
L o g  p s e u d o - l  i k e  I i h o o d - 1 2 . 3 4 0 9 - 4 3 . 7 2 5 7
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.5701*** 1.3877 -6.18 -3.2775*** 0.6558 -5.00
En(Employees) 1.2642*** 0.1403 9.01 0.8504*** 0.0868 9.80
Part-time -0.8402 0.7451 -1.13 -0.3599 0.4219 -0.85
Turnover -0.3785 0.7236 -0.52 -0.2200 0.6784 -0.32
Age21 -03993 0.8903 -0.45 -1.0833* 0.6073 -1.78
Age50 0.0305 0.8277 0.04 0.8395* 0.4977 1.69
Shifts 0.4295 0.3544 1.21 0.0343 0.1936 0.18
Overtime 0.0254 0.1155 0.22 0.0969** 0.0463 2.09
Union 1.1361** 0.5179 2.19 0.5544** 0.2808 1.97
Committee 0.5527* 0.3003 1.84 0.1562 0.1882 0.83
Pay 3.29e-05 2.75e-05 1.20 -1.34e-05 1.9e-05 -0.71
Fixed 0.5616 0.5906 0.95 -0.3541 0.4146 -0.85
Hstrain 0.5935* 0.3156 1.88 -0.4284** 0.1846 -2.32
Resultspay -1.4790*** 0.4406 -3.36 0.0573 0.2376 0.24
Sickpay -0.3960 0.3261 -1.21 0.4739** 0.1913 2.48
Redundancy -0.0251*** 0.0095 -2.66 -0.0014 0.0087 -0.16
Fortyeighthrs 0.0012 0.1207 0.01 -0.0532 0.0603 -0.88
Forty eightmangs 0.0868 0.0739 1.17 0.1122*** 0.0373 3.01
Apprais -0.1409** 0.0609 -2.31 0.0639* 0.0396 1.70
Discrete -0.1612 0.2340 -0.69 -0.2396** 0.1140 -2.10
Control 0.1011 0.2273 0.44 -0.0084 0.1126 -0.07
Team 0.0795 0.0830 0.96 0.0329 0.0409 >0.80
Flex -0.2983 0.2800 -1.07 -0.2154 0.1936 -1.11
Night 0.3591 0.3662 0.98 0.4398* 0.2288 1.92
1 lome -0.4012 0.3682 -1.09 0.3211* 0.1944 1.65
Skilled Trades 2.5846* 1.3415 1.93 0.2159 0.7414 0.29
Managers 3.7178* 1.9084 1.95 -0.6567 0.9811 -0.67
Machine Operatives 4.0265*** 1.2667 3.18 -0.5810 0.6681 -0.87
Professional -0.5923 1.1808 -0.50 -0.7790 0.6491 -1.20
Service 0.2008 1.1137 0.18 -0.1792 0.4867 -0.37
Unskilled 1.9146* 1.1030 1.74 -0.3865 0.5279 -0.73
Sales 3.1069*** 1.1374 2.73 -0.0188 0.4680 -0.04
Technical 0.5327 1.0198 0.52 -0.5784 0.5379 -1.08
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2 3.55 2.97
Prob>Chi2 0.1597 0.0847
* * * -s ig n i f i c a n t  at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ^^significant at the 10% level
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Firm size is found to have a significant impact in the manufacturing sector. Doubling 
the number of workers is associated with a 37 per cent reduction in the risk of 
reported injuries, and a 33 per cent reduction in the risk of reported illnesses. This is 
much larger than the combined sector results of 2 1  per cent and 13 per cent. 
Confirming firm size is a greater determinant of workplace health and safety in 
manufacturing establishments, the number of employees has no significantly 
independent effect upon injuries in the service sector. Doubling the number of 
workers however, is associated with a 15 per cent reduction in service sector illness 
risk. This is important in terms of policy direction, with small manufacturing firms 
potentially benefiting the most from assistance with their health and safety policies.
There are many more significant impacts upon workplace injuries and illnesses in the 
manufacturing sector compared to the service sector. For instance, working in teams, 
which was previously insignificant, is associated with fewer workplace illnesses in 
manufacturing firms. Having more control over the pace at which tasks are carried out 
is also significantly negative in the manufacturing illness estimation. Flexitime 
however, is associated with more manufacturing illnesses, as is having more 
discretion over how tasks are carried out.
4.7 Worker Survey
So far, workplace level variables have been used to consider the influences upon the 
number of accidents and illnesses experienced within a workplace. WERS also 
randomly selects up to 25 employees from each workplace to complete a survey. The 
WERS data set enables workers’ responses to this questionnaire to be matched by 
workplace to other data resulting from the management questionnaire; we are
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therefore, able to consider both manager and employee views in one data set. As 
worker opinions and attitudes to their workplace could potentially have a significant 
effect upon an establishments’ health and safety record, variables from the worker 
survey are constructed and merged into the management questionnaire data set.
Worker survey responses are collated for each workplace and the following variables 
created based on average responses to questions for each workplace, and then 
matched into the management data set according to workplace code. Descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table 4.18.
Table 4.18: Worker Survey Variables Descriptive Statistics
Variable No. of Obs Min Max Unweighted
Mean
Weighted
Mean
Avforty 1733 0 4 1.0175
(0.7333)
0.9201
(0.8078)
Avskill 1733 1 4 2.6852
(0.3538)
2.6655
(0.4581)
Avsecurity 1733 0 4 2.5201
(0.5625)
2.6272
(0.6033)
Avrelations 1733 0 4 2.6135
(0.6046)
2.9085
(0.6875)
Avforty indicates how frequently employees have worked more than 48 hours in a 
week, with a value of 0 indicating they have never worked more than 48 hours per 
week and 4 indicating they do every week. This variable is included instead of the 48 
hour variables derived from management responses and we would expect it to give the 
same results found using the management survey data. Avskill refers to workers skills 
in relation to the skills required to do his or her job. A value of 4 indicates workers 
feel their skills are much higher than needed (overskilled) and a value of 1 indicates 
they are much lower than required (underskilled). Avsecurity indicates workers’
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satisfaction with job security, a value of 4 indicating they are very satisfied with this 
aspect of their employment. Finally, avrelations refers to manager-employee 
relations, and is equal to 4 if workers believe relations are very good.
Table 4.19: Key Negative Binomial Regression Results with Worker Survey Variables
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1268 1212
Wald Chi2 448.44 454.86
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-16.0381 -52.4740
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -11.4704*** 2.0724 -5.53 -2.6222*** 0.8729 -3.00
Ln(Employees) 1.0270*** 0.1278 8.04 0.7765*** 0.0810 9.59
Overtime 0.0433 0.0830 0.52 0.1052*** 0.0395 2.67
Union 0.8082** 0.4004 2.02 0.5581* 0.3044 1.83
Night 0.5996* 0.3361 1.78 0.3028 0.1953 1.55
Home 0.0353 0.4436 0.08 0.4043** 0.1767 2.29
Apprais -0.1424*** 0.0554 -2.57 0.0437 0.0324 1.35
Avskill 0.6682* 0.3604 1.85 0.0446 0.1782 0.25
Avrelations -0.0464 0.2478 -0.19 -0.3227** 0.1305 -2.47
Avsecurity -0.0913 0.2933 -0.31 0.0072 0.1348 0.05
Avforty 0.2510 0.2103 1.19 0.2815** 0.1243 2.26
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1124 1069
Wald Chi2 285.82 376.44
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-12.605 -37.0148
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -11.9317*** 1.5859 -7.52 -2.1377** 0.8689 -2.46
Ln(Employees) 1.1372*** 0.1323 8.60 0.8041*** 0.0828 9.72
Overtime 0.0097 0.0666 0.14 0.0882** 0.0387 2.28
Union 0.5193 0.4223 1.23 0.3753 0.2756 1.36
Night 0.8425*** 0.2596 3.25 0.2332 0.1730 1.35
Home -0.4956 0.3392 -1.46 0.5562*** 0.1769 3.14
Apprais -0.1262** 0.0548 -2.30 0.0439 0.0335 1.31
Avskill 1.1368*** 0.2872 3.96 -0.0315 0.1957 -0.16
Avrelations 0.1897 0.2202 0.86 -0.2500* 0.1311 -1.91
Avsecurity -1.1368*** 0.2872 -3.96 -0.1331 0.1414 -0.94
Avforty 0.3573** 0.1442 2.48 0.2317* 0.1237 1.87
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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The four worker survey variables are included in the negative binomial regression 
models for workplace injuries and illnesses. Full results are reported in Appendix 4.11 
and key results reported in Table 4.19.
The worker survey variables are more significant in the sample of workplace with 10 
or more employees, reflecting the fact that more worker surveys will have been 
completed in larger workplaces and so are probably the most reliable results. Avskill is 
positively significant in the injury regression, suggesting workplaces with overskilled 
workers are likely to have greater injuries. The opposite may have been expected, but 
may reflect carelessness resulting from boredom performing tasks workers feel they 
are too skilled to be doing. Avrelations is significantly negative in the illness 
regression suggesting good management-employee relations reduce workplace 
illnesses (or conversely poor relations increases workplace illnesses). This result is as 
expected, as illnesses include stress, depression and anxiety. Avsecurity is 
significantly negative in the injury regression, suggesting a workforce that is satisfied 
with their jobs security reduces workplace injuries. If workers are anxious about their 
job security, this could increase the level of carelessness hence increasing accidents. 
Finally Avforty is positive and significant, suggesting regularly working over 48 hours 
is associated with more injuries and illnesses. As this result was also found using 48 
hours variables constructed from management responses, this confirms that regularly 
working over 48 hours per week, as reported by both management and workers, 
increases the likelihood of workplace accidents and illnesses.
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These results show worker attitudes do play a role in determining a workplaces safety 
record, but regressions with just workplace-level variables yield more significant 
results and so are preferred.
4.8 Conclusions
This analysis using WERS 04 largely supports the findings of studies using earlier 
WERS data. Larger workplaces are still found to be safer, with this conclusion 
holding with this sample that includes smaller workplaces. This is an important 
finding in terms of policy implications, as it suggests more support in terms of health 
and safety should be directed towards smaller workplaces. Furthermore, when the 
sample is divided by manufacturing and service sector, the number of employees is 
found to have the greatest impact upon workplace safety in the manufacturing sector. 
This suggests small manufacturing workplaces may benefit the most from assistance 
with workplace health and safety policies. Union density has a significantly positive 
effect upon injuries and illnesses, which is also found in the previous UK literature. 
This union effect is found to be endogenous in some of the estimations, suggesting 
workers are likely to join a unionised workplace because of the potential safety 
benefits. In terms of the effect of health and safety committees, a significantly positive 
effect is found in the injury estimations, which does not support the suggestion that 
they help to improve workplace safety.
This analysis included additional variables compared to many other papers in the 
literature, which has enabled the effect that changes in the organisation of labour have 
upon a workplace’s safety record to be considered. In terms of policy, findings here 
could assist in informing what appears to be having a successful impact in improving
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occupational health and safety. For instance, health and safety training is found to 
significantly reduce reported illnesses. This result remains when workplaces are split 
by sector. Regular employee appraisals are also found to significantly reduce reported 
injuries. Specifically in the manufacturing sector, working in formally designated 
teams, and allowing workers to have more control over the pace at which tasks are 
carried out, are significantly associated with fewer workplace illnesses. In the service 
sector, giving workers discretion as to how tasks are carried out is associated with 
fewer reported workplace illnesses.
Many of the findings however, point to the detrimental impact that workplace policies 
can have upon safety. Whilst flexitime is found to have no significant impact in the 
combined estimations, it is associated with a greater number of reported illnesses in 
the manufacturing sector, possibly due to “the combination of a condensed working 
week, anti-social hours and sleep deprivation” (Robinson and Smallman, 2006, p.90). 
Working from home significantly increases reported work-related illnesses, which is 
likely to be due to stress and anxiety illnesses of working in isolation. Employing 
workers to work shifts increases both injuries and illnesses, and the use of fixed-term 
employees increases reported injuries.
The effect that working overtime, and specifically working over 48 hours per week 
regularly, has upon workplace injuries and illnesses is particularly interesting. In the 
combined sector estimations, results indicate that non-managerial employees regularly 
working a 48 hour week have more workplace injuries, likely as a consequence of 
fatigue. Conversely, managerial employees working over 48 hours have more 
workplace illnesses, possibly as a consequence of stress and anxiety. Evidence that
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regularly working over 48 hours has these two separate adverse effects upon both 
managerial and non-managerial employees, suggest the UK schedule enabling 
workers to opt out of the EU Working Time Directive may be counter productive. 
This is especially true given the high costs to UK society associated with incidences 
of workplace injuries and illnesses, as discussed in chapter 2.1. When the sectors are 
divided into manufacturing and services, this effect only holds in the service sector, 
implying the consequences of overtime policy should focus specifically upon this 
sector.
The potential for under-reporting also needs to be considered. Chapter 2.10 outlines 
the research that has found non-fatal accidents are often under-reported, and this is 
particularly relevant to the WERS 04 question that is directed at managers. The 
literature specifically highlights under-reporting to be common within small firms; if 
small firms’ under-reporting is inherent within the WERS data, this only reinforces 
the finding here that workers’ employed in small firms are more likely to have a 
workplace accident or illness. The fact that the government and HSE are aware of 
under-reporting and continue to commission research to investigate it also draws 
managers’ attention towards it, potentially reducing its occurrence.
In conclusion, there are many differences between the causes and influences upon the 
number of injuries compared to the number of illnesses within a workplace, with 
injury and illness estimations giving different results with respect to the significance 
of variables. In line with the literature, workplace illnesses are found to be more 
common within establishments compared to workplace injuries, and so it is
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particularly important that we understand what impacts upon a workplace’s illness 
record if we wish to reduce their occurrence.
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CHAPTER 5
COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS FOR EXPOSURE TO 
ACCIDENT RISK
5.1 Introduction and Background
Rosen (1986) states that the theory of compensating wage differentials can make 
“legitimate claim to be the fundamental (long-run) market equilibrium construct in 
labour economics” (p.641). It is therefore, not surprising that many papers have 
investigated the theory, especially with regard to whether workers receive a wage 
premium for being exposed to high accident risk. Such findings have a direct policy 
application; estimates of a risk premium can be used to calculate the VSL or VSI 
which can be used to evaluate many public policies as discussed in chapter 3B.2.
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982), in the first paper using British data from the OPCS 
Occupational Mortality Decennial Supplement 1970 to 1972, find evidence of a wage 
premium for exposure to fatal risk. Sandy and Elliott (1996) and Arabsheibani and 
Marin (2000) using similar data over the period 1979 to 1983, and Siebert and Wei
(1994) using HSE data for 1986 to 1988, all find evidence of a fatal risk premium. 
There are no papers that attempt to estimate the fatal accident risk premium using 
more recent British data.
Although most studies find evidence in support of a fatal premium, the existence of a 
wage premium for exposure to risk of non-fatal injury is less certain. Viscusi (1993) 
emphasises that “ideally one would like to distinguish the compensation for fatality
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risks from that for non-fatal risks” (p. 1931), as failing to do so could result in an 
upward bias of the fatal risk premium. Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) and Siebert 
and Wei (1994) include a non-fatal injury variable in their estimations, but fail to find 
evidence of its significance. Overall, no British study has found evidence of a non- 
fatal risk premium.
There are numerous issues raised in the compensating wage literature that require 
further investigation. First, the effect that trade unions have upon the risk premium is 
unclear. Theoretically trade unions could increase the risk premium, through 
advantages in information collection and collective bargaining, or reduce it, if unions 
are more concerned with reducing risk rather than increasing compensation for 
exposure to it. US studies tend to find that unions increase the premium, while British 
studies tend to find they reduce it, Siebert and Wei being the exception. Reilly et al.
(1995) observe that “the 1980’s witnessed legislative and macroeconomic changes 
that ultimately altered the face of industrial relations in the UK and led to a significant 
weakening of organised labour” (p.275). Under the Health and Safety at Work Act 
(1974) regulations were introduced to enable unions to appoint safety representatives 
and health and safety committees. Unions hence kept some of their power with regard 
to health and safety, although Reilly et al. emphasise that a certain “diminution of 
influence is inevitable” (p.275). With the HSCER 1996 enabling safety 
representatives to be appointed where there is no trade union presence within the firm, 
workplaces with health and safety committees are likely to increase.
Reilly et al. (1995) found evidence that health and safety committees significantly 
reduced workplace injuries in Britain. This paper has been extremely influential, with
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their findings widely cited in support of the beneficial effects that trade union and 
health and safety committees have upon workplace safety. In a replication of Reilly et 
al. (1995) however, Nichols et al. (2007) are unable to find evidence to support their 
conclusions. Although their results support the notion that health and safety should 
not be left to management alone, they find no evidence to support the more precise 
conclusions made by Reilly et al.24. Related to this, Fenn and Ashby (2004) find the 
presence of health and safety committees is associated with a higher number of 
injuries, a result which is mirrored using WERS 04 in chapter 4. Nichols et al. go on 
to conclude that “there is good cause to re-examine a whole number of issues and 
dynamics that may affect the determination of health and safety” (p.222). Litwin
(2 0 0 0 ) suggests that, given the decline in union strength and the emergence of health 
and safety institutions within the workplace, studies should “separate the effect of 
health and safety committees and joint consultative committees from the effects of the 
variables of workplace union strength” (p.5). Given the changes in general trade union 
power and with regard to health and safety since the 1980s, which is the main period 
from which all British papers have taken their data, the impact trade unions have upon 
the risk premium seems to require further investigation. In particular, the effect that 
the presence of health and safety committees may have upon the accident risk 
premium has not yet been investigated.
Problems of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity are of great concern to 
research in this area. Risk may be endogenously determined with wages; if safety is a 
normal good, we would expect those with greater earnings potential to choose safer
24 This refers specifically to Reilly et al.’s finding that establishments with joint consultative 
committees established exclusively for health and safety and with all employee representatives chosen 
by unions, have on average 5.7 fewer injuries per 1000 employees compared with establishments where 
the management deals with health and safety with no consultation (p.283).
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jobs. In addition, unobserved heterogeneity may influence the wage premium for job 
risk if some individuals possess unobserved qualities that affect their ability to work 
in risky jobs. There is a disagreement over the effect this will have upon risk 
estimates. While Hwang et al. (1992) find such measurement error leads to a 
downward bias in the risk premium, Shogren and Stamland’s (2002) analysis suggests 
the risk premium will be overestimated. Although Garen (1988) formulates a model to 
control for such bias, his method involves finding instrumental variables that proxy 
risk aversion, and this has proved problematic. Bound et al. (1995) suggest the use of 
weak instruments will lead to biased estimates close to the original OLS estimates. 
Consequently, Bell et al. (2004) describe controlling for unobserved heterogeneity as 
“the greatest challenge facing researchers in estimating compensating wage 
differentials for workplace risks” (p.l).
This chapter uses recent data to estimate whether workers receive a compensating 
wage differential for exposure to fatal accident risk in Britain. As no risk premium has 
been found for exposure to non-fatal accident risk using British data, this chapter also 
investigates this further using data which distinguishes major injuries from less severe 
accidents. In addition, the impact of trade unions and health and safety committees on 
the risk premium is considered. The latter is particularly important given the changing 
nature of industrial relations.
5.2 Methodology
A standard wage equation is estimated (equation 1) where Y j  denotes the earnings of 
the ith individual, X is a vector of other determinants of earnings, D j  is a measure of 
fatal and/or non-fatal risk in individual i’s occupation, the interaction term U j D ;
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denotes the trade union and/or health and safety committee impact on the risk 
premium, and £j is a random error term which has an expected value of zero and zero 
covariance.
Ln Y j  = Po + Pi X j  + p 2  D j  +  P 3  D j 2  +  p 4  U j  D j  +  £ j  [j]
A positive and significant p2 coefficient indicates a premium is received for exposure 
to risk. We are also interested in whether the wage-risk trade-off takes a linear, 
convex or concave form. To test this, D j 2 is often included in equation 1. A 
significantly negative coefficient estimated for p3 indicates the relationship is 
concave.
WERS 04 is used to provide data on worker and management characteristics, 
including the wage workers receive. As the wage question in WERS is structured in 
intervals, interval regression is used to estimate the model.
If positive and significant risk coefficients are estimated in the model, they can be 
used to calculate VSL and VSI estimates. Chapter 3B.2 discusses the potential 
inaccuracy of the VSL and VSI terms, and they should only be used as a guide for 
policy wishing to evaluate the benefits of reducing risk of death and injury by a small 
amount. Equation 2 depicts the VSL/I formula, assuming risk is measured per 1000 
workers.
VSL / 1 = (Average Annual Income) (Risk Parameter * 1000) [2]
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Viscusi and Aldy (2003) survey VSL and VSI estimates obtained through 
compensating wage differentials estimations, and report them in terms of US 2000 
dollars. A summary of the resultant UK and some key international estimates are 
reported in Appendix 5.1. To enable estimates to be compared with the literature, 
VSL estimates here are reported in 2004 pounds and also in US dollars in 2000 
prices25.
Several potential measurement error problems have been highlighted in the literature. 
With regard to the effect that trade unions have upon the risk premium, workers may 
select into unions or firms covered by trade unions. Hence union status may be a 
decision variable and therefore non-random. The Heckman Selectivity Correction 
(1979) is employed in the earlier literature to control for sample selectivity. A probit 
equation for union status is estimated with explanatory variables including variables 
that determine earnings, excluding union and risk variables, and a vector of 
instruments that determine union status but which are uncorrelated with earnings. 
Instrumental variables in the literature refer to worker and employer attitudes towards 
unions; the matched survey format of WERS allows such variables to be created. 
Results are used to calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio, as denoted by equation 3:
M t) = - f  (t) / F (t) [3]
where f  is the standard normal density function, F is the cumulated normal and t = y ’y 
calculated from the probit with y the explanatory variables. Lambda is included as an 
explanatory variable in the wage equation. As there is also the potential for the 
presence of a health and safety committee to be endogeneous within a firm, with
25 Estimates are converted into 2000 US dollars using Officer and Williamson (2006)
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employees in risky occupations choosing to join a firm where one is established, the 
same method is employed to control for selection into health and safety committees.
The previous literature has highlighted endogeneity of risk as being one of the greatest 
problems for research in this area. There are two problems: individuals with higher 
earnings potential are likely to choose safer jobs, and there is unobserved 
heterogeneity (for instance some individuals may possess a risk-handling skill) that 
affects productivity and therefore earnings in risky jobs. Consequently, there is a 
cross-equation correlation of disturbances in the wage and risk equations. Heckman’s 
method cannot be used here because risk is a continuous variable. Garen (1988) 
proposes an instrumental variables method for obtaining unbiased estimates of the 
compensating wage differential and this has been extensively used in the subsequent 
literature. Considering only fatal risk, the first stage involves estimating a fatal risk 
equation [4]:
D = 7io + 7iiX| + 712X 2 + 7E3Z + r| [4 ]
where X2 proxies risk aversion, Z is non-wage income, and r| is unobserved 
heterogeneity. The disturbance term may depend on the wage equation [1] 
disturbances as workers with unobservable characteristics that make them more 
productive in risky jobs will choose higher D. To estimate equation 4, a measure of 
risk aversion must be available; as risk aversion cannot be directly measured, a proxy 
must be used. Measures of the stability of an individual’s lifestyle are frequently used, 
assuming such measures are inversely correlated with the degree of aversion to risk. 
Such stability measures include household income other than wages, marital status,
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house value, and number of dependents. Instrumental variables, as Sandy et al. (2001) 
emphasise, must be “uncorrelated with unobserved ability while being correlated with 
the level of risk” (p.46).
The second stage, again considering only fatal risk, involves estimating equation 5, 
which uses the disturbances obtained through the risk estimation:
Y = Rfi + y ,r j+y2t}.D + ^  [5]
where t] = D -  X  n  and 7t the OLS estimate of % from equation 4. Garen shows 
estimating equation 5 will yield consistent estimates.
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data from the HSE are used to provide numbers of workers who have suffered a fatal, 
major or over 3 day injury for the years 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05. The risk data 
are therefore much more recent than those used by Siebert and Wei. The number of 
accidents over a three year period is utilised given that fatal accidents are rare events. 
Chapter 2.2.1 discusses RIDDOR 95 which requires employers to report to the HSE 
fatal accidents and certain non-fatal injuries that occurred at work. Risk is calculated 
across occupations following Sandy et al. (2001) who find this is superior to assigning 
risk by industry or by a mix of industry and occupation codes. The LFS is used to 
provide data on the number of workers employed in each occupation (weighted). The 
September-November quarters 2002, 2003 and 2004 are merged, with the 2002 and
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2003 data restricted to rotation group 5 to prevent over counting. Risk is calculated for 
each occupation as a rate per 1 0 0 0  workers, as shown by equation 6 :
Risk - Work Accidents 2002/03 - 2004/05 
Workers Employed in Occupation
x  1 0 0 0 [6]
Separate variables are created for Fatal, Major Injury, and Over 3-Day Injury risk. 
Risk is calculated for 3 digit (81) occupations26. The values of the risk variables for 
each occupation are reported and discussed in the Accident Variable Appendices.
WERS 04 is used to provide data on employees. As a matched employer-employee 
survey, WERS provides detailed information on employee personal characteristics, 
the nature of their work and their attitudes towards their job, but also provides 
manager reported workplace data. Risk variables are assigned to workers in WERS 
via their 3 digit SOC 2000 code.
Estimations are usually carried out for male manual workers as an accident premium 
is most likely to be found for samples of workers who are exposed to the most risk,
• 27  •and so the sample is divided into manual and non-manual occupations . This leaves 
33 three digit manual occupations. Regressions are estimated for 4 samples: all 
workers, all manual workers, male manual and non-manual workers, and male manual 
workers. Estimations are usually restricted to men only because of problems
26 4 digit rates are not calculated because o f  problems with the large number o f  zero deaths that are 
likely the finer the occupation breakdown.
27 The following occupations are classed as manual: 51 skilled agricultural trades, 52 skilled metal and 
electrical trades, 53 skilled construction and building trades, 54 textiles, printing and other skilled 
trades, 61 caring personal service occupations, 62 leisure and other personal service occupations, 81 
process, plant and machine operatives, 82 transport and mobile machine drivers and operatives, 91 
elementary trades, plant and storage related occupations, 92 elementary service occupations.
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measuring risk for women, who are less likely to be found in the more risky 
occupations. However, the risk data used are applicable to both men and women and 
so two samples that include women are tested. Those that work less than 30 hours per 
week are excluded as they may be exposed to less risk than that captured by the risk 
variable for their particular occupation and so again a premium is less likely to be 
estimated for these workers . Table 5.1 presents means and standard deviations for 
the three risk variables in each sample.
Table 5.1: Risk Variable Descriptive Statistics (per 1000 workers)
ALL MANUAL MALE MALE MANUAL
WORKERS WORKERS WORKERS WORKERS
Sample Size 17079 5580 9313 3956
Fatal 0.0132 0.0328 0 . 0 2 1 0 0.0412
(0.0270) (0.0382) (0.0326) (0.0399)
Major Injury 2.2907 5.0212 3.0685 5.6499
(3.0650) (3.8317) (3.5177) (3.8043)
Over 3-day 10.3204 24.5541 13.7651 26.6986
Injury (16.9963) (22.5883) (19.5778) (23.1427)
Male manual workers face an average fatal risk of 0.041 per 1000 workers. Overall, 
male manual workers are found to be exposed to a greater mean risk of injury than all
90manual workers, with this difference statistically significant .
In line with the literature, manual workers are much more likely to suffer an accident 
than samples that also include non-manual workers. Siebert and Wei (1994) calculate 
a mean fatal risk of 0.038 per 1000 male manual workers, and Sandy and Elliott
(1996) calculate a mean fatal risk of 0.044 per 1000 male manual workers. Derived 
fatal accident rates do not differ considerably from the earlier literature, with a t test
28 Estimations are also conducted separately for samples with workers that work 16 hours per week or 
more, with no major difference in the estimated coefficients.
29 T statistics, taking account o f  unequal variance, o f  10.301 for fatal, 7.927 for major injury, and 4.503  
for over 3-day injury, indicate means are significantly different at the 1 per cent significance level.
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revealing the difference between the male manual rates calculated for the sample here 
is not significantly different from that calculated by Sandy and Elliott with a t statistic 
of 0.749 calculated. However, the difference between fatal and that calculated by 
Siebert and Wei is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level with a t statistic of 
3.109. This difference is likely to be because Siebert and Wei calculate risk for 
industry by occupation cells, whereas for reasons discussed, risk here and by Sandy 
and Elliott is assigned by occupation.
In terms of the non-fatal risk variables, Siebert and Wei derive a variable that 
encompasses major and over 3-day injuries with a mean value of 14.246 per 1000 
workers for their male manual sample. For the equivalent sample, means of 5.65 per 
1000 workers for major injury and 26.70 per 1000 workers for over 3-day injury are 
calculated. Hence, major injury risk is found to be much lower than their variable 
which also encompassed less serious injuries, emphasising the difference between the 
two.
The 3 digit fatal risk rates include 33 out of the total 81 occupations that have been 
assigned a zero value, although only six of these are manual occupations. Sandy et al.
(2 0 0 1 ) suggest assigning the average value of this variable for a particular sample to 
each occupation30. They believe it unlikely these occupations have no accident risk, 
and suggest the zero rate occurs because of measurement error, with no accidents 
occurring over the time period taken. If the accident risk of an occupation is very 
small, there may only be a fatal accident, for instance, every six years. If data are 
collected over a three year period where no deaths have occurred, a zero death risk
30 Sandy and Elliott (1996) do this but Siebert and Wei (1994) do not.
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would be assigned to that occupation. A three year period however, is fairly extensive, 
and considered to result in a fairly accurate picture of the degree of riskiness of 
occupations. Sandy et al. acknowledge that assigning average risk to such occupations 
makes little difference, as this value is very close to zero. However, for comparison 
purposes this is considered with the resulting descriptive statistics presented in 
Appendix 5.2. Assigning average fatal risk to zero fatal risk occupations has the effect 
of increasing the male manual workers’ mean fatal risk rate from 0.041 per 1000 
workers to 0.042 per 1000 workers; t tests (with equal variance) reveal rates are not 
significantly different with a t statistic of 1.122 calculated. Although estimations will 
be carried out without assigning average risk to zero risk occupations, this will be 
considered for comparison purposes.
The dependent variable is based on WERS, which asks employees to consider their 
average weekly pay before tax and other deductions. Each worker has a choice of 14 
possible pay brackets, so interval regression must be used. Two wage variables are 
created; the first wpayl reflects the lower value of each pay bracket, with the second 
wpayh reflecting the higher value of the interval. Natural logs are taken (Inwpayl and 
Inwpayh) and both are used as dependent variables in the interval regression. To 
calculate VSL and VSI we need to know the average annual income for each sample. 
The same question used to formulate the dependent variables is used, only the mid 
point of the mean wage bracket is taken as the average income, and multiplied by 52 
to give a yearly figure. The resulting variables are wkincome and anincome.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation)
ALL
WORKERS
MANUAL
WORKERS
MALE
WORKERS
MALE
MANUAL
WORKERS
Sample Size 17079 5580 9313 3956
Wkincome 414.1386
(198.626)
314.4742
(136.1954)
457.4307
(205.9142)
347.3085
(134.2789)
Anincome 21535.210
(10328.55)
16352.66
(7082.163)
23786.40
(10707.54)
18060.04
(6982.503)
Wpayl 377.9078
(187.0436)
285.4982
(122.8716)
418.8498
(197.0543)
315.4544
(120.3039)
Wpayh 425.0142
(190.3483)
340.8521
(145.0228)
461.0082
(192.5238)
376.0072
(143.3464)
Educl 0.6696
(0.4704)
0.5070
(0.5000)
0.6342
(0.4817)
0.5038
(0.5000)
Educ2 0.3240
(0.4680)
0.1199
(0.3249)
0.3046
(0.4627)
0.1145
(0.3185)
Educ3 0.2979
(0.4574)
0.0914
(0.2882)
0.3033
(0.4597)
0.0897
(0.2858)
Educ4 0.1507
(0.3577)
0.3254
(0.4686)
0.1794
(0.3837)
0.3296
(0.4701)
Tenure 1 0.1524
(0.3594)
0.1407
(0.3477)
0.1403
(0.3474)
0.1322
(0.3388)
Tenure2 0.1235
(0.3291)
0.1095
(0.3123)
0.1125
(0.3160)
0.0996
(0.2995)
Tenure3 0.2659
(0.4418)
0.2344
(0.4237)
0.2578
(0.4375)
0.2265
(0.4186)
Tenure4 0.1864
(0.3894)
0.2022
(0.4016)
0.1899
(0.3923)
0.2030
(0.4023)
Tenure5 0.2701
(0.4440)
0.3115
(0.4631)
0.2979
(0.4573)
0.3375
(0.4729)
Overtime 4.1278
(6.4295)
4.4294
(7.0093)
4.7324
(6.8710)
4.9074
(7.2196)
Flexitime 0.3758
(0.4843)
0.2566
(0.4368)
0.3463
(0.4758)
0.2343
(0.4236)
Supervise 0.3921
(0.4882)
0.2482
(0.4320)
0.4097
(0.4918)
0.2492
(0.4326)
Permanent 0.9448
(0.2283)
0.9448
(0.2284)
0.9492
(0.2196)
0.9542
(0.2090)
Age 4.5254
(1.3145)
4.6405
(1.4130)
4.6219
(1.2992)
4.7037
(1.3837)
Nemps 433.2691
(897.3429)
360.8466
(730.4300)
409.9597
(781.3342)
365.4467
(683.7581)
Meritpay 0.2884
(0.4530)
0.2283
(0.4198)
0.3041
(0.4600)
0.2417
(0.4281)
Public 0.3000
(0.4583)
0.2129
(0.4089)
0.2297
(0.4206)
0.1663
(0.3724)
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Unioncov 0.5245 0.5256 0.5384 0.5609
(0.4994) (0.4994) (0.4986) (0.4963)
Runion 0.5574 0.5575 0.5525 0.5758
(0.4967) (0.4967) (0.4973) (0.4943)
HS1 0.0590 0.0441 0.0628 0.0513
(0.2357) (0.2053) (0.2426) (0.2207)
HS2 0.0187 0.0667 0.0178 0.0718
(0.1354) (0.2495) (0.1323) (0.2582)
HS3 0.2994 0.3520 0.3227 0.3744
(0.4580) (0.4776) (0.4675) (0.4840)
HS4 0 0 0 0
(0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
HS5 0 0 0 0
(0 ) (0 ) (0 ) (0 )
HS6 0.0683 0.0636 0.0699 0.0705
(0.2522) (0.2441) (0.2550) (0.2561)
HS7 0.2572 0.2443 0.2573 0.2475
(0.4371) (0.4297) (0.4372) (0.4316)
HS8 0.2974 0.2735 0.2695 0.2358
(0.4571) (0.4458) (0.4437) (0.4246)
Commspecific 0.3771 0.4186 0.4033 0.4462
(0.4847) (0.4934) (0.4906) (0.4972)
Commgen 0.0683 0.0636 0.0699 0.0705
(0.2522) (0.2441) (0.2550) (0.2561)
Emprep 0.2572 0.2443 0.2573 0.2475
(0.4371) (0.4299) (0.4372) (0.4732)
Nohsconsult 0.2974 0.2735 0.2695 0.2358
(0.4571) (0.4458) (0.4437) (0.4246)
WERS is used to construct explanatory variables similar to those used in the earlier 
literature. Appendix 5.3 defines the variables, which are taken from both the 
employee and management surveys. Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics. A 
comparison of descriptive statistics reveals many differences between the four 
samples. In terms of pay, all male workers earn much more than male manual workers 
(average weekly income of £457 compared to £347). Results also confirm that women 
earn less than men, with all workers earning less than all male workers (£414 
compared to £457).
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Analysis of the education dummy variables reveals that manual workers are more 
likely to have no academic qualifications. A further difference concerns the size of the 
workplaces. The variable nemps, which denotes the number of employees in each 
workplace, is larger for the samples of both manual and non manual workers. Manual 
workplaces on average therefore, have fewer employees.
The health and safety committee variables hsl-hs8 follow those derived by Reilly et 
al. (1995). However, some of the variables have very small means in the sample, with 
no manual firms having the structures described by hs4 and hs5. One of the criticisms 
made by Nichols et al. (2007) of the Reilly et al. study is that there are too many 
variables covering the organisation of the arrangement of health and safety 
committees. They highlight that hs4 and hs5 have very small means with each 
variable only applicable to 3 per cent (or 13 establishments) of Reilly et al.’s sample 
(p.9). Therefore, four variables are constructed by merging some of the Reilly et al. 
variables. Commspecific denotes a workplace that has a committee exclusively for 
health and safety (hsl, hs2 and hs3), whilst commgen denotes a workplace that has a 
committee that deals with a range of issues in addition to health and safety (hs4, hs5 
and hs6). Emprep denotes a workplace that has no such committee but has an 
employee representative for health and safety (hs7). Finally, nohsconsult reflects 
those that have no form of health and safety consultation mechanism (hs8). Whilst 
41.9 per cent of manual workplaces have a committee that deals specifically with 
health and safety issues, 27.4 per cent of manual workplaces do not consult with 
employees regarding health and safety matters.
Two trade union variables are constructed. Unioncov is derived from the employee 
survey and indicates whether the workplace has a union presence, regardless of
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whether the individual is a union member. Table 5.2 reports that for the sample of all 
workers, 52.5 per cent of workplaces do have a trade union presence compared to 56.1 
per cent in the male manual sample. A further trade union variable, runion, is a 
dummy drawn from the management survey, according to whether managers have 
reported recognising a union. Descriptive statistics reveal differences between the two 
variables, with runion having a greater mean in all four samples. Therefore, some 
workers do not realise their workplace is covered by union terms and conditions, 
although t tests reveal the mean difference between the two variables is statistically 
insignificant with a t statistic of 1.338 calculated. We would expect runion to be the 
most accurate in reflecting union presence, and so this is used in the estimation. 
However, as unioncov reflects employee beliefs about union presence, this may 
provide some indication of the extent of influence and strength of unions in 
workplaces, and so estimations will also be conducted using this variable.
5.4 Interval Regression Results
Interval regressions are first estimated with just the fatal risk variable, as many studies 
in the literature do not include a non-fatal injury variable. Table 3 presents the results. 
Standard errors, reported here and throughout this chapter, are robust, calculated using 
the Huber-White formula.
Considering first the X variable coefficients, variables have the expected impact upon 
wages. Education dummies are positive and significant in all samples, with estimates 
having a greater magnitude the higher the qualification, indicating more educated 
workers receive higher wages compared to those with no academic qualifications. The 
estimates for age and age2 indicate an inverted u relationship between age and wages.
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Tenure dummies are positive and significant, indicating employers that have worked 
for a firm for a significant period receive higher wages compared to those that have 
been employed there for one year or less. Working overtime, being a supervisor, and 
being a permanent employee are all associated with a greater wage. Working for a 
large firm is significantly associated with greater pay, with nemps2 negative and 
significant indicating a concave relationship. Working in the public sector is 
associated with lower wages. Runion is positive and significant, suggesting unions 
have a positive impact upon wages overall.
Table 5.3: Interval Regression Estimates (Fatal risk variable only)
Dependent varia )les: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL
WORKERS
MANUAL
WORKERS
MALE
WORKERS
MALE
MANUAL
WORKERS
Obs 16791 5474 9191 3897
Wald Chi2 12400.44 3092.41 6337.68 1263.89
Log pseudo 
likelihood
-34497.88 -10988.213 -18507.512 -7784.2315
Constant 4.7592***
(0.0322)
4.8388***
(0.0443)
4.5785***
(0.0512)
4.7005***
(0.0584)
Educl 0.1195***
(0.0073)
0.1270***
(0.0105)
0.1298***
(0.0097)
0.1224***
(0 .0 1 2 2 )
Educ2 0.1289***
(0.0075)
0.0466***
(0.0160)
0 .1 2 0 0 ***
(0.0106)
0.0400**
(0.0188)
Educ3 0.3030***
(0.0077)
0.2123***
(0.0188)
0.2756***
(0.0105)
0.2090***
(0.0215)
Tenure2 0 .0 2 1 0 *
(0.0118)
-0 . 0 0 0 2
(0.0190)
0.0294*
(0.0171)
-0 . 0 2 1 0
(0.0225)
Tenure3 0.0559***
(0 .0 1 0 1 )
0.0484***
(0.0157)
0.0877***
(0.0142)
0.0531***
(0.0183)
Tenure4 0.0407***
(0 .0 1 1 1 )
0.0484***
(0.0165)
0.0576***
(0.0152)
0.0608***
(0.0191)
Tenure5 0.1007***
(0.0109)
0.1430***
(0.0164)
0.1182***
(0.0150)
0.1422***
(0.0189)
Overtime 0.0092***
(0.0006)
0.0066***
(0.0008)
0.0094***
(0.0008)
0.0076***
(0 .0 0 1 0 )
Flexitime 0.0316***
(0.0064)
-0 . 0 0 0 2
(0.0109)
0.0352***
(0.0089)
-0.0018
(0.0129)
Supervise 0.2516*** 0.1336*** 0.2689*** 0.1255***
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(0.0067) (0.0119) (0.0092) (0.0138)
Runion 0.0269***
(0.0084)
0.0904***
(0.0144)
0.0632***
(0.0119)
0.0600***
(0.0177)
Commspecific 0 .0 2 0 2 ***
(0.0065)
0.0408***
(0.0103)
0.0250***
(0.0088)
0.0477***
(0.0119)
Permanent 0.0517***
(0.0151)
0.0668***
(0.0230)
0.0468**
(0.0218)
0.0696**
(0.0285)
Age 0.3046***
(0.0136)
0.2234***
(0.0171)
0.3672***
(0.0219)
0.2815***
(0.0223)
Age2 -0.0269***
(0.0015)
-0 .0 2 1 2 ***
(0.0019)
-0.0313***
(0.0023)
-0.0259***
(0.0024)
Nemps 5.84e-05***
(7.37e-06)
4.6e-05***
(1.33e-05)
7.32e-05***
(1.08e-05)
5.45e-05***
(1.57e-05)
Nemps2 -7.36e-09***
(1.21e-09)
-5.77e-09**
(2.50e-09)
-9.87e-09***
(2.02e-09)
-7.17e-09**
(3.22e-09)
Meritpay 0.1070***
(0.0070)
0.0545***
(0.0114)
0.1006***
(0.0094)
0.0481***
(0.0129)
Public 0.0051
(0.0076)
-0.0737***
(0.0123)
-0.0364***
(0.0104)
-0.1136***
(0.0145)
Female -0.2417***
(0.0067)
-0.3285***
(0.0115)
Fatal -1.7573***
(0.1575)
0.6456***
(0.1828)
-1.8077***
(0.1731)
0.5074**
(0.2028)
Fatal* Runion 0.9367***
(0 .2 1 0 2 )
-0.3789**
(0.3643)
1.1300***
(0.2380)
-0.1345
(0.2893)
Lnsigma -0.9678***
(0.0077)
-1.1052***
(0.0135)
-0.9647***
(0.0112)
-1.1363***
(0.0163)
Sigma 0.3799
(0.0029)
0.3311
(0.0045)
0.3811
(0.0043)
0.3210
(0.0052)
VSL(2004 £) £10,557,277 £9,163,644
VSL (2000 
US$)
$15,194,431 $13,188,691
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Manual workers and male manual workers receive a wage premium for being exposed 
to risk of death in the workplace, with a positive coefficient estimated for fatal which 
is significant at the 1 per cent and 5 per cent level. The all manual workers sample 
produces the greatest wage premium, with a VSL of £10.6 million compared to £9.2 
million for the male manual sample. The premium is likely to be larger in the all 
manual sample because of the inclusion of women, who are exposed to less risk and
204
are more averse to risk, and hence require a larger wage premium31. The union-risk
interaction variable fatal*runion is negative in the two samples where fatal is positive
and significant, but only significantly so in the all manual sample. This suggests trade
unions have the effect of reducing the risk of death premium, as found in most of the
UK literature, in the all manual sample only. Trade unions appear to have no
significant impact upon the risk premium in the male manual sample which is the
sample that most UK studies have focused upon. The estimation is repeated for the
two samples where fatal is positive and significant including fatal2. Results are
reported in Appendix 5.4. Fatal2 is significantly negative in both samples indicating
the relationship between wages and fatal risk is concave. Thus, an increase in risk
results in an increase in the wage that is less than proportional to any previous 
• • • • •increase in risk. This is consistent with findings in the earlier literature .
The estimation is repeated including in addition to the risk of death variable, the 
major injury variable. Table 5.4 reports.
A premium for exposure to risk of death still remains when major injury is included in 
the manual workers and male manual workers sample. Major injury however, is 
insignificant in both samples, suggesting no premium is received for exposure to non- 
fatal injury risk. This finding is similar to that found in other compensating wage 
differential studies using UK data
31 Chapter 6 specifically investigates the impact that gender has upon risk aversion.
32 As reported in the literature, the inclusion o ffa tal2 increases the fatal coefficient by an unrealistic 
magnitude. The preferred model therefore is to exclude fa ta l2.
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Table 5.4: Interval Regression Results (Fatal and Major Injury)
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL
WORKERS
MANUAL
WORKERS
MALE
WORKERS
MALE MANUAL 
WORKERS
Obs 16791 5474 9191 3897
Wald Chi2 12953.58 3119.68 6618.25 1301.19
Log pseudo 
likelihood
-34313.408 -1098.661 -18420.298 -7770.9375
Constant 4.8212***
(0.0321)
4.8544***
(0.0443)
46292***
(0.0511)
4.7244***
(0.0583)
Educl 0.1084***
(0.0072)
0.1251***
(0.0104)
0.1218***
(0.0095)
0.1197***
(0 .0 1 2 1 )
Educ2 0.1206***
(0.0074)
0.0460***
(0.0160)
0.1108***
(0.0105)
0.0398**
(0.0187)
Educ3 0.2877***
(0.0076)
0.2084***
(0.0187)
0.2592***
(0.0104)
0.2041***
(0.0214)
Tenure2 0.0206*
(0.0117)
1.31 e-05 
(0.0189)
0.0286*
(0.0169)
-0.0197
(0.0225)
Tenure3 0.0530***
(0 .0 1 0 0 )
0.0470***
(0.0157)
0.0829***
(0.0141)
0.0506***
(0.0183)
Tenure4 0.0426***
(0.0109)
0.0682***
(0.0164)
0.0584***
(0.0151)
0.0599***
(0.0190)
Tenure5 0.1035***
(0.0108)
0.1434***
(0.0163)
0.1193***
(0.0148)
0.1409***
(0.0189)
Overtime 0.0095***
(0.0006)
0.0066***
(0.0008)
0.0095***
(0.0008)
0.0076***
(0 .0 0 1 0 )
Flexitime 0.0209***
(0.0063)
-0.0018
(0.0109)
0.0242***
(0.0088)
-0.0047
(0.0128)
Supervise 0.2397***
(0.0067)
0.1321***
(0.0119)
0.2548***
(0.0092)
0.1227***
(0.0138)
Runion 0.0194**
(0.0083)
0.0921***
(0.0144)
0.0536***
(0.0118)
0.0622***
(0.0179)
Commspecific 0.0299***
(0.0064)
0.0447***
(0.0103)
0.0343***
(0.0087)
0.0523***
(0.0119)
Permanent 0.0517***
(0.0149)
0.0683***
(0.0229)
0.0480**
(0.0215)
0.0708**
(0.0283)
Age 0.3051***
(0.0136)
0.2263***
(0.0172)
0.3699***
(0 .0 2 2 1 )
0.2857***
(0.0225)
Age2 -0.0273***
(0.0015)
-0.0216***
(0.0019)
-0.0319***
(0.0024)
-0.0264***
(0.0024)
Nemps 5.59e-05***
(7.28e-06)
4.74e-05***
(1.34e-05)
7.15e-05***
(1.08e-05)
5.62e-05***
(1.62e-05)
Nemps2 -7.38e-09***
(1.20e-09)
-6.26e-09**
(2.56e-09)
-1.02e-08***
(2.08e-09)
-7.96e-09**
(3.50e-09)
Meritpay 0.1038***
(0.0069)
0.0547***
(0.0114)
0.0972***
(0.0093)
0.0481***
(0.0128)
Public 0.0035
(0.0076)
-0.0783***
(0.0124)
-0.0384***
(0.0104)
-0.1186***
(0.0145)
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Female -0.2511***
(0.0066)
-0.3298***
(0.0115)
Fatal 0.3400*
(0.2024)
1.0374***
(0.2160)
-0.3003
(0.2093)
0.9343***
(0.2309)
Major Injury -0.0281***
(0.0016)
-0.0066***
(0.0016)
-0 .0 2 2 1 ***
(0.0018)
-0.0085***
(0.0018)
Fatal* Runion 0 9 9 9 9 ***
(0.2321)
-0.3848**
(0.1520)
1.1570***
(0.2530)
-0.1191
(0.3006)
Lnsigma -0 9794*** 
(0.0078)
-1.1071***
(0.0136)
-0.9750***
(0.0113)
-1.1398***
(0.0165)
Sigma 0.3755
(0.0029)
0.3305
(0.0045)
0.3772
(0.0043)
0.3199
(0.0053)
VSL (2004 £) £7,321,971 £16,964,249 £16,873,495
VSL
(2000 US$)
$10,538,057 $24,415,587 $24,284,970
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
HSE data allows injuries to be divided by severity, and so a further non-fatal injury 
can be constructed in addition to major injury, defined as an injury that resulted in 
absence from work for three days or more33. Over 3-day injury is now included in the 
estimations, in addition to fatal and major injury. Estimates are reported in Appendix
5.5 and show as expected, a premium is not received for exposure to these minor non- 
fatal injuries.
Following Sandy et al. (2001), estimations are repeated assigning average risk to 
occupations that have a zero death rate. This analysis is restricted to manual workers 
and male manual workers, as the two samples that have shown significant wage 
premiums for risk. Taken from Table 5.1, occupations that have a zero value for fatal 
are assigned the mean value of 0.0328 for the manual sample and 0.0412 for the male 
manual sample. Interval regression estimates are reported in Appendix 5.6. Fatal 
remains positive and significant in both samples. The magnitude of fatal is slightly
33 This variable does not include major injuries which are encompassed by major injury. It therefore 
reflects only the less severe injuries, unlike the non-fatal injury variable used by Siebert and Wei which 
captures both major injuries and injuries that resulted in 3 or more days o f  absence.
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smaller when average values are assigned, which is reflected in smaller VSL 
estimates.
As we would expect estimates to be influenced by the degree that risk is classified, 
risk variables are also derived for each 2 digit occupation code. The risk coefficients 
and resultant VSL estimates are smaller with this broader classification of fatal risk. 
The very risky occupations, and hence the occupations that are most likely to result in 
a significant wage premium, are highlighted the finer the classification of risk. Fatal 
however, remains positive and significant, indicating the strength of the result. As it 
reflects occupational risk more accurately, 3 digit risk classification is to be preferred 
and hence the 2 digit results are not reported. However, the fact that wage premiums 
are still estimated with accident risk defined more broadly, gives strength to 
conclusions as to the existence of compensating wage differentials for risk.
5.5 Trade Unions
The role that trade unions have upon the risk premium is examined further here. The 
variable unioncov, taken from the employee questionnaire, is included in the 
estimation in replace of runion. Appendix 5.7 illustrates that fatal*unioncov is again 
only significantly negative in the all manual sample, and is insignificant in the male 
manual sample.
An alternative way to consider the effect that trade unions have upon the premium for 
injury risk is to split the sample of workers according to their union coverage status. 
Although the usual method in the literature is to use a risk* union interaction variable, 
Siebert and Wei use this sample splitting method, and Fairris (1992) argues that 
estimating separate equations by union status is the most appropriate method because
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of “important institutional differences between the union and non-union sectors” 
(p.266). Hence, the two samples are divided according to the variable runion; workers 
who are employed by a firm where managers have indicated they do recognise a 
union are assigned to the covered sector, those that do not are assigned to the 
uncovered sector. Descriptive statistics for pay and risk variables are reported in 
Appendix 5.8.
Workers covered by union terms and conditions receive higher pay in both samples. 
This is consistent with the positive coefficients estimated for runion in the wage 
regressions. As expected, covered workplaces are more likely to have a specific health 
and safety committee established. T tests (adjusting for unequal variance) reveal these 
differences to significantly different, with a t statistic of 23.460 for the male manual 
sample and 24.892 for the all manual sample calculated, which are both significant at 
the 1 per cent level. Workers in the covered sector are shown to face a lower risk of 
death. Again, t tests (adjusting for unequal variance) reveal this difference to be 
significant at the 1 per cent level in the all manual and male manual samples with t 
statistics of 3.869 and 5.281 calculated. This is consistent with the argument that 
unions are concerned with increasing safety in the workplace rather than increasing 
the compensation for risk; although chapter 4 did not find unions reduced workplace 
risk, this finding was likely to be due to endogeneity with reporting more likely in 
unionised firms. Siebert and Wei also find lower fatal injury rates for unionised 
workers, but go on to suggest they also receive a greater risk premium. However, 
these are two separate issues; any finding that unions are successful in reducing 
workplace risk does not mean it will translate into a greater compensating wage 
differential. Estimations using a fatal*union interaction variable have in fact 
suggested the opposite. Interval regressions are estimated separately for the covered
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and uncovered sectors and compared to the full model using a likelihood ratio test. 
Test statistics of 69.65 for the all manual sample and 51.08 for the male manual 
sample are estimated which are both statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
There are therefore differences between the covered and uncovered sectors and it is 
appropriate to divide the model Table 5.5 reports interval regression estimates.
Table 5.5: Interval Regression Results
Dependent Variab es: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE!VIANUAL
Covered Uncovered Covered Uncovered
Obs 3058 2416 2251 1646
Wald Chi2 1518.49 1342.14 698.28 523.08
Log pseudo 
likelihood
-6065.5404 -4890.8649 -4395.5211 -3363.5314
Constant 4.9403***
(0.0626)
4.8263***
(0.0612)
4.8590***
(0.0758)
4.6304***
(0.0829)
Educl 0.1199***
(0.0134)
0.1366***
(0.0165)
0.1129***
(0.0152)
0.1342***
(0.0199)
Educ2 0.0606***
(0.0194)
0.0303
(0.0271)
0.0556**
(0.0219)
0.0214
(0.0335)
Educ3 0.2119***
(0.0229)
0.2172***
(0.0311)
0.1976***
(0.0262)
0.2268***
(0.0362)
Tenure2 0.0477
(0.0291)
-0.0364
(0.0247)
-0.0114
(0.0338)
-0.0300
(0.0302)
Tenure3 0.0444*
(0.0227)
0.0565***
(0.0217)
0.0282
(0.0252)
0.0752***
(0.0261)
Tenure4 0.0877***
(0.0231)
0.0521**
(0.0236)
0.0577**
(0.0258)
0.0596**
(0.0285)
Tenure5 0.1677***
(0.0222)
0.1084***
(0.0256)
0.1429***
(0.0242)
0.1287***
(0.0312)
Overtime 0.0046***
(0.0010)
0.0092***
(0.0013)
0.0053***
(0.0011)
0.0108***
(0.0016)
Flexitime 0.0134
(0.0140)
-0.0174
(0.0171)
-0.0058
(0.0161)
0.0064
(0.0207)
Supervise 0.1266***
(0.0162)
0.1414***
(0.0176)
0.1286***
(0.0179)
0.1233***
(0.0217)
Commspecific 0.0345***
(0.0131)
0.0432**
(0.0174)
0.0409***
(0.0145)
0.0622***
(0.0214)
Permanent 0.0382
(0.0307)
0.0933***
(0.0339)
0.0165
(0.0337)
0.1110**
(0.0434)
Age 0.2271***
(0.0239)
0.2216***
(0.0235)
0.2754***
(0.0303)
0.2827***
(0.0315)
Age2 -0.0216*** -0.0210*** -0.0256*** -0.0257***
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(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0034)
Nemps 3.75e-05***
(1.38e-05)
0.0001
(8.58e-05)
5.1 le-05*** 
(1.63e-05)
-2.70e-06
(8.7e-05)
Nemps2 -4.46e-09*
(2.50e-09)
-1.19e-08
(7.55e-08)
-6.72e-09**
(3.32e-09)
6.27e-08 
(7.1 le-08)
Meritpay 0.0604***
(0.0139)
0.0370*
(0.0192)
0.0533***
(0.0159)
0.0391*
(0.0218)
Public -0.0869***
(0.0134)
-0.0149
(0.0384)
-0.1165***
(0.0154)
-0.0948
(0.0590)
Female -0.3017***
(0.0154)
-0.3589***
(0.0170)
Fatal 0.3564*
(0.1931)
0.5054***
(0.1906)
0.3489*
(0.2057)
0.4910**
(0.2054)
Lnsigma -1.1485***
(0.0202)
-1.0639***
(0.0181)
-1.1878***
(0.0247)
-1.0800***
(0.0212)
Sigma 0.3171
(0.0064)
0.3451
(0.0062)
0.3046
(0.0075)
0.3397
(0.0072)
VSL (2004 £) £5,828,088 £8,264,634 £6,301,148 £8,867,480
VSL (2000 US$) $8,388,004 $11,894,773 $9,068,850 $12,762,411
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Splitting the sample by union status suggests trade unions have a negative effect upon 
the fatal risk premium. The fatal coefficient is positive and significant in all samples, 
but is larger for uncovered workers. This reinforces earlier conclusions that trade 
unions reduce the fatal risk premium. As a lower average fatal risk is calculated for 
unionised workers, see Appendix 5.8, this further implies that unions may be more 
concerned with reducing risk rather than increasing the risk premium.
5.6 Health and Safety Arrangements
Trade unions appear to be associated with a lower risk premium. We now estimate the 
effect that the presence of safety representatives and committees may have upon the 
risk premium, regardless of whether there is a trade union presence. First, we consider 
the correlation between workplace presence of a trade union and a health and safety 
committee. Correlation coefficients are reported in Table 5.6. A positive correlation
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confirms expectations that committees are more likely in unionised firms with the 
correlation stronger for specific health and safety committees. The coefficients 
however are small and insignificant, and so the union and committee effects can be 
considered separately.
Table 5.6: Correlation Coefficients
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Commspecific Commgeneral Commspecific Commgeneral
Runion 0.3113 0.1243 0.3433 0.1425
Unioncov 0.3202 0.0873 0.3473 0.0965
Despite recent interest in the effect health and safety committees have upon injury 
rates, their impact on the compensating wage differential has not been investigated. 
The impact of specific health and safety committees is first considered compared to 
having no such committee, as we would expect an effect to be more likely in such 
workplaces. The interaction variable fatal^ commspecific is included as an explanatory 
variable in the wage estimations. See Table 5.7.
Table 5 .7: Interval Regression (Fatal, Commspecific)
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5474 3897
Wald Chi2 3108.04 1264.37
Log pseudo likelihood -10986.093 -7783.4355
Constant 4.8427*** 4.7042***
(0.0444) (0.0586)
Educl 0.1267*** 0.1224***
(0.0105) (0.0122)
Educ2 0.0461*** 0.0397**
(0.0160) (0.0189)
Educ3 0.2128*** 0.2090***
(0.0188) (0.0216)
Tenure2 0.0003 -0.0210
(0.0189) (0.0225)
Tenure3 0.0488*** 0.0531***
(0.0158) (0.0183)
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Tenure4 0.0687***
(0.0165)
0.0607***
(0.0191)
Tenure5 0.1433*** 0.1425***
(0.0164) (0.0190)
Overtime 0.0066*** 0.0076***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Flexitime 5.64e-05 -0.0019
(0.0109) (0.0129)
Supervise 0.1344*** 0.1259***
(0.0119) (0.0138)
Runion 0.0940*** 0.0634***
(0.0145) (0.0180)
Commspecific 0.0227* 0.0327*
(0.0138) (0.0173)
Permanent 0.0663*** 0.0690**
(0.0231) (0.0286)
Age 0.2231*** 0.2812***
(0.0171) (0.0223)
Age2 -0.0212*** -0.0259***
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Nemps 4.74e-05*** 5.55e-05***
(1.33e-05) (1.57e-06)
Nemps2 -5.88e-09** -7.25e-09**
(2.48e-09) (3.20e-09)
Meritpay 0.0551*** 0.0485***
(0.0114) (0.0129)
Public -0.0740*** -0.1139***
(0.0123) (0.0144)
Female -0.3288***
(0.0115)
Fatal 0.5492*** 0.4445**
(00.1921) (0.2124)
Fatal* Runion -0.5244* -0.2298
(0.2725) (0.3098)
Fatal * Commspecific 0.5582** 0.3876*
(0.2725) (0.2021)
Lnsigma -1.1056*** -1.1365***
(0.0134) (0.0163)
Sigma 0.3310 0.3210
(0.0045) (0.0052)
VSL (2004 £) £8,980,881 £8,027,688
VSL (2000 US$) $12,925,622 $11,553,751
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ^ sign ificant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
It appears that unions reduce the fatal wage premium in the all manual sample but 
have no impact in the male manual sample, as found earlier. However, health and
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safety committees appear to increase the fatal premium, with the variable 
fatal*commspecific significantly positive in both samples. The pure wage effect 
should also be noted with specific health and safety committees reinforcing the 
positive union wage impact. There is no theoretical justification for health and safety 
committees increasing wages directly. However, it may be that they are having an 
indirect effect upon wages, and consequently the wage premium for risk, by 
reinforcing the bargaining environment within firms.
Interval regressions are also estimated including in addition to the fatal *commspecific 
interaction variable, a fatal *commgeneral variable to capture the effect that 
committees that deal with a range of issues rather than specially health and safety 
have upon the risk premium. See Appendix 5.9. Whilst fatal*commspecific remains 
significantly positive in the all manual worker sample, fatal *commgeneral is 
insignificant. In terms of risk compensation therefore, it is only committees that deal 
specifically with health and safety that have an independent impact. A significantly 
positive coefficient estimated for commgeneral however, indicates a positive impact 
upon wages, again supporting the positive union wage effect34.
To consider this further, the samples are divided according to whether a specific 
health and safety committee is present in a workplace. Appendix 5.10 presents 
descriptive statistics of the wage and risk variables. Workers that are employed by a 
firm that does have a health and safety committee have lower mean fatal injury risk, 
with this difference statistically significant in the male manual sample35. Through 
descriptive statistical analysis only, health and safety committees do therefore appear
34 Regressions are also estimated with a fatal*emprep variable. No significant result is found, 
indicating workplaces with safety representative have no independent effect upon the premium.
35 A t statistic o f  5.328 that adjusts for unequal variance is calculated which is significant at the 1 per 
cent level.
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to be associated with fewer workplace accidents. This in part can be attributed to the 
fact that such committees are more likely in firms that are covered by union terms and 
conditions (although as shown by Table 5.6 the correlation coefficient is small and 
insignificant) as it has also been shown accidents are less likely in such firms. The 
finding that trade unions and health and safety committees have the same negative 
effect upon accident rates, but have a different effect upon the risk premium however, 
is particularly interesting. It could be that such committees have a positive impact 
upon the compensation bargaining environment as health and safety committees have 
no direct power to influence the wage rate. If committees work to highlight and 
disseminate information concerning the injury risk of certain occupations, they could 
strengthen the case for higher compensation.
Likelihood ratio tests are calculated, comparing the full model to a model that divides 
the sample according to health and safety committee presence. Test statistics of 41.68 
for the all manual sample and 32.95 for the male manual sample are significant at the 
1 per cent and 5 per cent level. It is therefore appropriate to divide the model. Table 
5.8 presents interval regression estimates.
Earlier conclusions are supported; higher fatal risk premiums are estimated for 
workers in the samples that are employed in firms where there is a specific health and 
safety committee compared to those where no such committee is present. For 
instance, in the male manual sample, a fatal premium of 0.3801 is estimated for 
workers with no health and safety committee, compared to 0.5232 for workers where 
there is one.
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Table 5.8: Interval Regression Results (split by Commspecific)
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Commspecific
Presence
No
Commspecific
Commspecific
Presence
No
Commspecific
Obs 2299 3175 1745 2152
Wald chi2 1349.84 1595.11 600.76 638.77
Log pseudo 
likelihood
-4532.1895 -6433.9152 -3403.9261 -4363.2703
Constant 4.9269***
(0.0615)
4.8277***
(0.0589)
4.8129***
(0.0704)
4.6770***
(0.0814)
Educl 0.1390***
(0.0155)
0.1154***
(0.0141)
0.1350***
(0.0174)
0.1116***
(0.0170)
Educ2 0.0384
(0.0254)
0.0552***
(0.0206)
0.0341
(0.0292)
0.0468*
(0.0245)
Educ3 0.2438***
(0.0273)
0.1892***
(0.0257)
0.2428***
(0.0304)
0.1807***
(0.0300)
Tenure2 -0.0219
(0.0322)
0.0086
(0.0233)
-0.0462
(0.0371)
-0.0066
(0.0281)
Tenure3 0.0192
(0.0265)
0.0628***
(0.0196)
0.0151
(0.0290)
0.0743***
(0.0235)
Tenure4 0.0505*
(0.0265)
0.0753***
(0.0211)
0.0331
(0.0294)
0.0729***
(0.0250)
Tenure5 0.1248***
(0.0260)
0.1496***
(0.0213)
0.1226***
(0.0287)
0.1527***
(0.0254)
Overtime 0.0077***
(0.0015)
0.0059***
(0.0010)
0.0073***
(0.0015)
0.0079***
(0.0012)
Flexitime 0.0237
(0.0167)
-0.0133
(0.0144)
0.0061
(0.0195)
-0.0040
(0.0172)
Supervise 0.1222***
(0.0178)
0.1426***
(0.0161)
0.1146***
(0.0199)
0.1319***
(0.0191)
Permanent 0.1102***
(0.0370)
0.0465
(0.0295)
0.1532***
(0.0406)
0.0266
(0.0388)
Age 0.1913***
(0.0244)
0.2368***
(0.0221)
0.2406***
(0.0283)
0.2995***
(0.0301)
Age2 -0.0179***
(0.0027)
-0.0227***
(0.0024)
-0.0225***
(0.0031)
-0.0273***
(0.0032)
Nemps 4.33e-05***
(1.67e-05)
6.44e-05***
(2.04e-05)
4.27e-05**
(1.94e-05)
8.56e-05***
(2.65e-05)
Nemps2 -6.52e-09**
(2.96e-09)
-6.18e-09*
(3.47e-09)
-5.69e-09
(3.82e-09)
-9.88e-09**
(5.02e-09)
Meritpay 0.0719***
(0.0157)
0.0467***
(0.0166)
0.0521***
(0.0176)
0.0445**
(0.0190)
Public -0.1030***
(0.0183)
-0.0544***
(0.0175)
-0.1135***
(0.0209)
-0.1206***
(0.0211)
Runion 0.0631***
(0.0235)
0.0957***
(0.0190)
0.0300
(0.0294)
0.0761***
(0.0232)
Female -0.3306*** -0.3261***
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(0.0183) (0.0147)
Fatal 0.6816*** 0.5179 0.5232** 0.3801
(0.2077) (0.3703) (0.2261) (0.4244)
Fatal* Runion -0.7605** 0.2248 -0.4417 0.3651
(0.3323) (0.4346) (0.30) (0.5023)
Lnsigma -1.1495*** -1.0804*** -1.1817*** -1.1076***
(0.0199) (0.0181) (0.0218) (0.0230)
Sigma 0.3168 0.3395 0.3068 0.3303
(0.0063) (0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0076)
VSL (2004£) £11,145,973 £9,449,013
VSL (2000$) $16,041,705 $13,599,376
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ^ sign ifican t at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Given the changing nature of industrial relations in Britain, the role of ensuring risk 
compensation in the form of a wage premium is received for exposure to danger of 
having a fatal accident, may be better investigated by examining the role of health and 
safety committees in addition to the union effect. As the impact must be indirect, 
health and safety committees may influence the bargaining environment, and so 
examining only the trade union impact potentially omits an important mechanism.
5.7 Heckman Selectivity Correction
The Heckman selection correction is employed to correct for potential endogeneity of 
union presence within a firm. Instruments typically reflect management and worker 
attitude towards trade unions, which are available in WERS. Descriptive statistics are 
reported in Appendix 5.11. Managers are most likely to report they are in favour of 
trade unions. There is clear disagreement however, between manager and worker 
reports of manager attitude. Only 17 per cent of workers report managers have a 
favourable attitude towards unions (variable wrkmgrf), compared to 35 per cent of 
managers reporting they have a favourable attitude (variable mgrf). Table 5.9 reports
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correlation coefficients. Variables are positively correlated but insignificantly so; both 
managers and worker reports can therefore be included in the probit.
Table 5. 9: Correlation Coefficients
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Wrkmgrf - Mgrf 0.23732 0.2899
Wrkmgrnf - Mgrnf 0.1426 0.1427
To ensure the selected variables are appropriate instruments, they are first included in 
the wage estimation. If they are significant, and hence correlated with wages, they are 
not appropriate instruments. Results are reported in Appendix 5.12. The instruments 
mgrf mgrnf and wrkmgrf and wrkagree are significant, indicating favourable manager 
attitudes towards unions are associated with higher wages. However, workers 
reporting management have a negative attitude towards unions {wrkmgrnf) and 
workers having an unfavourable attitude towards unions (wrkdis) are not significant 
(except in the male manual sample where wrkdis is only significant at the 10 per cent 
level). The union probit is therefore estimated with two instruments, wrkmgrnf and 
wrkdis. See Table 5.10.
Both instruments are significant. Wrkmgrnf is negative indicating workers reporting 
managers have an unfavourable attitude towards unions is associated with a 
management that is less likely to report recognising a union. Wrkdis is significantly 
positive indicating workers that report they are not in favour of trade unions are likely 
to work for a firm where managers recognise a union. This is likely because 
employees that have some experience of dealing with a trade union are most likely to 
have an opinion upon their effectiveness, whether positive or negative.
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Table 5.10: Union Probit Results
Dependent Variable: Runion
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5563 3953
LR chi2 2604.06 1817.43
Log likelihood -2516.7022 -1785.432
Pseudo R2 0.3410 0.3373
Constant -1.7817*** -1.9855***
(0.1626) (0.2018)
Educl 0.1520*** 0.1962***
(0.0464) (0.0551)
Educ2 0.0857 0.0862
(0.0673) (0.0817)
Educ3 0.0335 -0.0426
(0.0739) (0.0883)
Tenure2 0.0637 0.0127
(0.0797) (0.0962)
Tenure3 0.1373** 0.0646
(0.0683) (0.0812)
Tenure4 0.2704*** 0.1757**
(0.0717) (0.0847)
Tenure5 0.5920*** 0.5927***
(0.0712) (0.0834)
Overtime 0.0059** 0.0048
(0.0030) (0.0034)
Flexitime 0.0367 0.0102
(0.0472) (0.0575)
Supervise -0.2205*** -0.1859***
(0.0478) (0.0568)
Permanent 0.0768 0.2066*
(0.0916) (0.1172)
Age 0.2952*** 0.3102***
(0.0655) (0.0796)
Age2 -0.0247*** -0.0245***
(0.0075) (0.0089)
Nemps 0.0013*** 0.0012***
(9.17e-05) (0.0001)
Nemps2 -1.42e-07*** -1.32e-07***
(1.59e-08) (1.85e-08)
Meritpay 0.0983** 0.1672***
(0.0497) (0.0579)
Public 1.7102*** 1.8299***
(0.0675) (0.1021)
Commspecific 0.6844*** 0.7478***
(0.0445) (0.0527)
Female -0.3292***
(0.0473)
Wrkmgrnf -0.6849*** -0.6942***
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(0.0542) (0.0612)
Wrkdis 0.7766*** 0.8588***
(0.0729) (0.0848)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Lambda is calculated, according to equation 3, and included in the wage estimation 
(Table 5.11).
Table 5.11: Interval Regression Results with Union Selection term (Lambda)
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5251 3897
Wald chi2 3018.67 1269.21
Log pseudo- likelihood -10530.211 -7784.1298
Constant 4.9119*** 4.7206***
(0.0575) (0.0713)
Educl 0.1232*** 0.1214***
(0.0107) (0.0123)
Educ2 0.0420*** 0.0395**
(0.0162) (0.0189)
Educ3 0.2117*** 0.2090***
(0.0189) (0.0215)
Tenure2 -0.0019 -0.0210
(0.0194) (0.0225)
Tenure3 0.0443*** 0.0529***
(0.0161) (0.0183)
Tenure4 0.0648*** 0.0601**
(0.0170) (0.0192)
Tenure5 0.1319*** 0.1397***
(0.0174) (0.0194)
Overtime 0.0065*** 0.0076***
(0.0009) (0.0010)
Flexitime -0.0003 -0.0020
(0.0111) (0.0129)
Supervise 0.1381*** 0.1265***
(0.0122) (0.0139)
Permanent 0.0684*** 0.0684**
(0.0238) (0.0286)
Age 0.2192*** 0.2796***
(0.0179) (0.0226)
Age2 -0.0210*** -0.0257***
(0.0020) (0.0024)
Nemps 3.52e-05** 5.16e-05***
(1.43e-05) (1.67e-05)
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Nemps2 -4.40e-09*
(2.57e-09)
-6.78e-09**
(3.28e-09)
Meritpay 0.0518*** 0.0474***
(0.0116) (0.0129)
Public -0.0985*** -0.1197***
(0.0171) (0.0197)
Runion 0.0838*** 0.0577***
(0.0155) (0.0186)
Commspecific 0.0245* 0.0436***
(0.0128) (0.0147)
Female -0.3263***
(0.0117)
Fatal 0.6399*** 0.5059**
(0.1868) (0.2026)
Fatal* Runion -0.3560* -0.1323
(0.1396) (0.2892)
Lambda -0.0405** -0.0010
(0.0190) (0.0215)
Lnsigma -1.1069*** -1.1363***
(0.0139) (0.0163)
Sigma 0.3306 0.3210
(0.0046) (0.0052)
VSL (2004 £) £10,464,067 £9,136,574
VSL (2000 S) $15,060,280 $13,149,702
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Lambda is significant in the all manual sample suggesting a problem of union 
selection. Fatal however, remains significantly positive and fatal*runion significantly 
negative when lambda is included. Lambda is insignificant in the male manual 
sample, which may be related to the lack of appropriate instruments, as frequently 
found in the literature. Conclusions as to the union effect therefore, remain 
unchanged.
As with trade unions, the presence of a health and safety committee in a firm may be 
endogenous, with workers employed in risky occupations selecting into firms with 
such a committee . Instrumental variables that predict whether a respondent works
36 Specific health and safety committees only are considered here as they appear to have the greatest 
independent effect upon the risk premium.
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for a firm that has a specific health and safety committee are constructed. Instruments 
proxy management attitude towards health and safety consultation and 
communication. Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix 5.13 and illustrate that 
around 16 per cent of firms have had a health and safety grievance raised in the last 
year. Over 50 per cent of workplaces regularly discuss health and safety issues and 
have formal procedures in place to deal with grievances.
The instrumental variables are included in the wage estimations to check that they are 
uncorrelated with pay and therefore suitable instruments. See Appendix 5.14. All 
three instruments are insignificant in the male manual sample, indicating they are 
uncorrelated with wages. The instruments hsdisproc and hsgriev are however, positive 
and significant although only at the 10 per cent level, in the all manual sample. 
Instruments, although not ideal, are fairly satisfactory. Results from the health and 
safety committee probit estimation are reported in Table 5.12.
Table 5.12: Health and Safety Committee Probit Results
Dependent Variable: Commspecific
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5563 3953
LR chi2 1336.74 1007.38
Log likelihood -3113.9914 -2213.6439
Pseudo R2 0.1767 0.1854
Constant -1.1703*** -1.0878***
(0.1469) (0.1837)
Educl 0.0105 0.0579
(0.0417) (0.0496)
Educ2 -0.1873*** -0.2382***
(0.0616) (0.0742)
Educ3 0.0776 0.0685
(0.0676) (0.0805)
Tenure2 0.1008 0.0113
(0.0758) (0.0928)
Tenure3 0.1913*** 0.1285*
(0.0642) (0.0769)
222
Tenure4 0.1774***
(0.0673)
0.1127
(0.0799)
Tenure5 0.2575*** 0.2226***
(0.0660) (0.0773)
Overtime -0.0028 -0.0012
(0.0027) (0.0030)
Flexitime -0.0640 -0.0782
(0.0427) (0.0522)
Supervise 0.0179 -0.0162
(0.0437) (0.0521)
Permanent -0.1001 -0.0703
(0.0844) (0.1088)
Age 0.1187** 0.0725
(0.0588) (0.0725)
Age2 -0.0135** -0.0090
(0.0067) (0.0081)
Nemps 0.0012*** 0.0013***
(6.27e-05) (7.79e-05)
Nemps2 -1.74e-07*** -1.97e-07***
(1.18e-08) (1.58e-08)
Meritpay -0.0881* -0.1171**
(0.0455) (0.0531)
Public -0.7177*** -0.7415***
(0.0506) (0.0631)
Runion 0.7067*** 0.7721***
(0.0437) (0.0516)
Female -0.0601
(0.0425)
Hsmeet 0.0733* 0.1116**
(0.0383) (0.0454)
Hsdisproc 0.2062*** 0.2127***
(0.0388) (0.0473)
Hsgriev -0.0444 -0.2154***
(0.0500) (0.0593)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
The instrumental variables work well in the probit. Hsmeet indicates firms that have 
regular meetings between senior management and employees regarding health and 
safety are more likely to have a health and safety committee. Similarly, hsdisproc is 
positive and significant, indicating firms that have a formal procedure in place for 
dealing with health and safety issues are also more likely to have a health and safety 
committee. Hsdisproc is positive and significant indicating workplaces that have
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formal procedures for dealing with health and safety disputes are also more likely to 
have a health and safety committee. Hslambda is calculated, according to equation 3, 
and included in the wage estimations (Table 5.13).
Table 5.13: Interval Regression Results with Health and Safety Committee Selection 
term (Hslambda)
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5474 3897
Wald chi2 3106.55 1264.51
Log likelihood -10985.612 -7783.3734
Constant 4.9175*** 4.7300***
(0.0870) (0.0943)
Educl 0.1267*** 0.1217***
(0.0105) (0.0124)
Educ2 0.0527*** 0.0426**
(0.0173) (0.0203)
Educ3 0.2104*** 0.2082***
(0.0189) (0.0216)
Tenure2 -0.0029 -0.0210
(0.0192) (0.0225)
Tenure3 0.0426** 0.0518***
(0.0168) (0.0188)
Tenure4 0.0630*** 0.0596***
(0.0172) (0.0194)
Tenure5 0.1353*** 0.1402***
(0.0178) (0.0199)
Overtime 0.0067*** 0.0076***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Flexitime 0.0021 -0.0009
(0.0112) (0.0132)
Supervise 0.1339*** 0.1261***
(0.0120) (0.0138)
Permanent 0.0689*** 0.0695**
(0.0231) (0.0287)
Age 0.2189*** 0.2803***
(0.0175) (0.0226)
Age2 -0.0207*** -0.0257***
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Nemps 1.55e-05 4.36e-05
(3.32e-05) (3.57e-05)
Nemps2 -9.56e-10 -5.14e-09
(5.32e-09) (6.49e-09)
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Meritpay 0.0575***
(0.0116)
0.0497***
(0.0132)
Public -0.0531** -0.1069***
(0.0233) (0.0241)
Runion 0.0695** 0.0540*
(0.0286) (0.0321)
Commspecific 0.0212 0.0320*
(0.0139) (0.0176)
Female -0.3268***
(0.0116)
Fatal 0.5523*** 0.4444**
(0.1921) (0.2125)
Fatal*Runion -0.5374** -0.2345
(0.2725) (0.3103)
Fatal * Commspecific 0.5634** 0.3799
(0.2784) (0.3174)
Hslambda -0.0485 -0.0171
(0.0476) (0.0484)
Lnsigma -1.1057*** -1.1365***
(0.0134) (0.0163)
Sigma 0.3310 0.3209
(0.0044) (0.0052)
VSL (2004 £) £9,031,574 £8,025,881
VSL (2000 $) $12,998,582 $11,551,151
***=significant at the 1% level; **^significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
The Heckman selectivity correction term hslambda is insignificant in both samples 
suggesting there is not a problem here with workers with risky jobs selecting into 
firms with a health and safety committee.
5.8 Risk Endogeneity
Garen’s method is employed to control for the potential endogeneity of risk, as 
highlighted in the methodology (section 5.2). A regression with risk as the dependent 
variable is estimated, with explanatory variables including variables for non-labour 
income, and proxies for a workers’ degree of risk aversion. Garen acknowledges 
“finding proxies for the degree of risk aversion is a difficult task” (p. 12). Measures of 
the stability of an individual’s lifestyle are frequently used, assuming they are
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inversely correlated with the degree of aversion to risk. These include household 
income other than wages, marital status, house value and number of dependents. 
Some variables that are often used in the risk estimation are not in WERS, including 
whether the respondent is a house owner, partners’ schooling, and whether their 
partner works. Essentially therefore, there is a lack of variables to give an indication 
of non-labour income. The WERS management survey does include however, 
questions for the largest occupational group on access to an employer pension 
scheme, company car or car allowance, and private health insurance. These non­
monetary variables may provide some approximation to workers’ non-wage wealth. 
Industry dummies are also included in the risk estimations, following the literature37.
Table 5.14: Risk Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Fatal
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Number o f obs 5563 3809
F 51.79 22.78
R2 0.2575 0.1786
A djR 2 0.2526 0.1707
Constant 0.0332*** 0.0338***
(0.0039) (0.0053)
Educl -0.0027*** -0.0036***
(0.0010) (0.0014)
Educ2 -0.0057*** -0.0082***
(0.0015) (0.0020)
Educ3 -0.0027 -0.0026
(0.0017) (0.0022)
Tenure2 0.0015 0.0010
(0.0018) (0.0025)
Tenure3 0.0008 0.0015
(0.0015) (0.0021)
Tenure4 0.0016 0.0016
(0.0016) (0.0022)
Tenure5 0.0022 0.0018
(0.0016) (0.0021)
Overtime 1.22e-05 1.14e-05
37 Although there may be some argument for including industry dummies in the wage regressions, they 
are often excluded, as the risk coefficients can be sensitive to their inclusion.
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(6.54e-05) (8.33e-05)
Flexitime -0.0009 -0.0019
(0.0010) (0.0014)
Supervise 0.0035*** 0.0029**
(0.0011) (0.0014)
Permanent 0.0011 0.0023
(0.0020) (0.0029)
Age 0.0029** 0.0034*
(0.0015) (0.0020)
Age2 -0.0003* -0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Nemps -1.66e-06 -2.83e-06
(1.41e-06) (1.89e-06)
Nemps2 9.74e-ll 1.82e-10
(2.73e-10) (3.83e-10)
Meritpay 0.0024** 0.0027*
(0.0011) (0.0015)
Public -0.0054*** -0.0061***
(0.0015) (0.0021)
Runion -0.0008 6.84e-05
(0.0012) (0.0016)
Commspecific 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0011) (0.0014)
Female -0.0184***
(0.0012)
Married -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0010) (0.0015)
Children 0.0023 0.0027
(0.0378) (0.0411)
Disability 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0013) (0.0017)
Pension -0.0039*** -0.0055***
(0.0012) (0.0017)
Car 0.0062*** 0.0081***
(0.0015) (0.0020)
Healthins -0.0040*** -0.0037**
(0.0014) (0.0018)
Indl 0.0009 -0.0016
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Ind2 0.0036 0.0031
(0.0037) (0.0044)
Ind3 0.0424*** 0.0427***
(0.0024) (0.0028)
Ind5 -0.0112*** -0.0125***
(0.0029) (0.0043)
Ind6 -0.0049** -0.0061**
(0.0022) (0.0027)
Ind7 0.0009 -4.92e-06
(0.0076) (0.0104)
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Ind8 -0.0024 -0.0034
(0.0024) (0.0030)
Ind9 0.0103*** 0.0112**
(0.0040) (0.0052)
IndlO -0.0087*** -0.0044
(0.0029) (0.0045)
Indll -0.0131*** -0.0147***
(0.0023) (0.0035)
Indl2 0.0153*** 0.0235***
(0.0025) (0.0033)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Appendix 5.15 lists the instrumental variables and descriptive statistics. The mean 
values indicate 66.8 per cent of the all manual workers sample and 69 per cent of the 
male manual workers sample are married or cohabiting, with 37.4 per cent and 42 per 
cent having dependent children. Approximately 14 percent of the manual workers 
sample consider themselves to have long-term health problems or a disability, with 
roughly the same percentage entitled to private health insurance. Over 77 per cent are 
entitled to an employee pension scheme, and around 12 per cent have a company car 
or car allowance. Instrumental variables are included in fatal risk regressions (Table 
5.14).
The R2 of the fatal injury regressions are around 25 and 17 per cent which although
■>o
small, are similar to those reported in the literature . In terms of the instruments, 
married is negative but insignificant as commonly reported. The variables children 
and disability are also insignificant. Pension and health insurance are both 
significantly negative and may provide some proxy for risk aversion.
38 For example Sandy and Elliott report R2 o f  17 per cent for their fatal estimation.
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5.8.1 HausmanTest
To see if risk endogeneity is a problem, Hausman tests are conducted. Wage 
regressions are estimated including the residuals from the risk estimations. If the 
residual is significant, the null of exogeneity is rejected. See Table 5.15.
Table 5.15: Hausman Tests
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5474 3754
Wald chi2 3280.91 1333.09
Log likelihood -10933.072 -7445.318
Constant 4.7015*** 4.5624***
(0.0462) (0.0612)
Educl 0.1372*** 0.1337***
(0.0104) (0.0121)
Educ2 0.0701*** 0.0744***
(0.0161) (0.0195)
Educ3 0.2253*** 0.2190***
(0.0188) (0.0217)
Tenure2 -0.0029 -0.0167
(0.0188) (0.0223)
Tenure3 0.0452*** 0.0487***
(0.0155) (0.0183)
Tenure4 0.0604*** 0.0553***
(0.0162) (0.0191)
Tenure5 0.1334*** 0.1363***
(0.0161) (0.0190)
Overtime 0.0067*** 0.0076***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Flexitime 0.0039 0.0050
(0.0108) (0.0128)
Supervise 0.1167*** 0.1103***
(0.0120) (0.0140)
Permanent 0.0698*** 0.0776***
(0.0228) (0.0289)
Age 0.2176*** 0.2779***
(0.0172) (0.0230)
Age2 -0.0205*** -0.0254***
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Nemps 5.29e-05*** 6.71e-05***
(1.31e-05) (1.6e-05)
Nemps2 -5.59e-09** -7.88e-09**
(2.44e-09) (3.36e-09)
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Meritpay 0.0488***
(0.0113)
0.0396***
(0.0131)
Public -0.0542*** -0.1028***
(0.0124) (0.0147)
Runion 0.0998*** 0.0748***
(0.0144) (0.0181)
Commspecific 0.0162 0.0298*
(0.0137) (0.0174)
Female -0.2335***
(0.0147)
Fatal 3.7743*** -0.2224
(0.3509) (0.3057)
Fatal* Runion -0.4613* -0.2224
(0.2618) (0.3057)
Fatal * Commspecific 1.0162*** 0.8371***
(0.2791) (0.3258)
Resid -3.9312*** -3.6312***
(0.3822) (0.3910)
Lnsigma -1.1158*** -1.1511
(0.0135) (0.0612)
Sigma 0.3277 0.3163
(0.0044) (0.0052)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; ^significant at the 10% level
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Risk endogeneity is a problem, with the residual variable resid significant in both 
estimations.
5.8.2 Controlling for Endogeneity
Following Garen, residuals from the risk estimations are included in the wage 
regressions. Residuals are multiplied by the risk variable with this also included as an 
explanatory variable. Results are reported in Table 5.16.
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Table 5.16: Interval Regression Results Controlling fo r  Endogeneity
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5474 3754
Wald chi2 3300.18 1357.32
Log likelihood -10922.264 -7434.2351
Constant 4.7012*** 4.5606***
(0.0463) (0.0613)
Educl 0.1367*** 0.1330***
(0.0104) (0.0121)
Educ2 0.0712*** 0.0744***
(0.0161) (0.0194)
Educ3 0.2254*** 0.2195***
(0.0188) (0.0216)
Tenure2 -0.0034 -0.0178
(0.0187) (0.0222)
Tenure3 0.0447*** 0.0484***
(0.0154) (0.0182)
Tenure4 0.0604*** 0.0554***
(0.0162) (0.0190)
Tenure5 0.1332*** 0.1358***
(0.0161) (0.0189)
Overtime 0.0067*** 0.0075***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Flexitime 0.0049 0.0068
(0.0108) (0.0128)
Supervise 0.1215*** 0.1166***
(0.0120) (0.0141)
Permanent 0.0688*** 0.0770***
(0.0229) (0.0290)
Age 0.2164*** 0.2761***
(0.0172) (0.0230)
Age2 -0.0204*** -0.0253***
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Nemps 5.13e-05*** 6.48e-05***
(1.31e-05) (1.58e-05)
Nemps2 -5.37e-09** -7.47e-09**
(2.43e-09) (3.26e-09)
Meritpay 0.0486*** 0.0390***
(0.0113) (0.0131)
Public -0.0439*** -0.0863***
(0.0126) (0.0150)
Runion 0.0950*** 0.0702***
(0.0142) (0.0178)
Commspecific 0.0215 0.0384**
(0.0135) (0.0171)
Female -0.2326***
(0.0147)
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Fatal 2.8489*** 2.2658***
(0.3621) (0.3762)
Fatal* Runion -0.4164* -0.0952
(0.2523) (0.2933)
Fatal * Commspecific 0.8009*** 0.5638*
(0.2692) (0.3170)
Resid -3.2124*** -2.8076***
(0.4152) (0.4421)
Fatal* Resid -9.2013*** -10.2950***
(2.0702) (2.4620)
Lnsigma -1.1178*** -1.1541***
(0.0135) (0.0162)
Sigma 0.3270 0.3153
(0.0044) (0.0051)
VSL (2004£) £46,587,093 £40,920,438
VSL (2000 USS) $67,049,902 $58,894,238
**^ sign ifican t at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
When we control for endogeneity, fatal remains positive and significant, with the 
magnitude of the coefficients much larger. This is reflected in the considerably higher 
VSL estimates. This is consistent with the literature; OLS estimates that do not 
control for endogeneity appear to be biased downwards. Sandy and Elliott (1996) 
observe this is consistent with the argument that safety is a normal good, as “workers 
with high unobserved earnings capacity are willing to pay for occupations with more 
safety” (p.300). The fact the fatal*resid is significantly negative is also consistent 
with the literature, implying “workers with unusually high risk have low values of 
unobserved earnings ability in the presence of risk” (p.300). Other key conclusions 
remain once risk endogeneity is controlled for, with health and safety committees 
having a positive effect and unions having a negative impact upon the risk premium.
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5.8.3 Instrument Tests
The instruments selected to proxy risk aversion are included in the wage estimation to 
ensure they are appropriate (Table 5.17).
Table 5.17: Instrument Test
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5474 3754
Wald chi2 4134.53 1936.64
Log likelihood -10715.402 -7260.1018
Constant 4.7939*** 4.6941***
(0.0470) (0.0619)
Educl 0.1120*** 0.1028***
(0.0100) (0.0116)
Educ2 0.0526*** 0.0549***
(0.0152) (0.0179)
Educ3 0.1974*** 0.1794***
(0.0179) (0.0202)
Tenure2 0.0063 -0.0077
(0.0180) (0.0209)
Tenure3 0.0406*** 0.0402**
(0.0149) (0.0173)
Tenure4 0.0584*** 0.0482***
(0.0155) (0.0181)
Tenure5 0.1253*** 0.1216***
(0.0156) (0.0183)
Overtime 0.0060*** 0.0067***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Flexitime 0.0045 0.0015
(0.0105) (0.0122)
Supervise 0.1413*** 0.1273***
(0.0115) (0.0133)
Permanent 0.0634*** 0.0780***
(0.0223) (0.0275)
Age 0.1878*** 0.2311***
(0.0179) (0.0239)
Age2 -0.0181*** -0.0215***
(0.0020) (0.0025)
Nemps 3.35e-05*** 4.58e-05***
(1.24e-05) (1.41e-05)
Nemps2 -1.18e-09 -2.86e-09
(2.21e-09) (2.64e-09)
Meritpay 0.0415*** 0.0339***
(0.0109) (0.0126)
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Public -0.0394***
(0.0141)
-0.0699***
(0.0168)
Runion 0.0435*** 0.0170
(0.0149) (0.0187)
Commspecific 0.0110 0.0266
(0.0134) (0.0169)
Female -0.2546***
(0.0124)
Fatal -0.2249 -0.4010*
(0.1926) (0.2195)
Fatal* Runion -0.2517 0.0126
(0.2565) (0.2949)
Fatal* Commspecific 0.8875*** 0.7668**
(0.2708) (0.3094)
Married 0.0679*** 0.0804***
(0.0101) (0.0123)
Children 0.0202** 0.0348***
(0.0098) (0.0114)
Disability -0.0129 -0.0158
(0.0122) (0.0141)
Pension 0.0368*** 0.0287*
(0.0126) (0.0148)
Car 0.0754*** 0.0716***
(0.0145) (0.0171)
Heal thins 0.0650*** 0.0874***
(0.0135) (0.0150)
Indl 0.1127*** 0.0967***
(0.0194) (0.0209)
Ind2 0.3516*** 0.3235***
(0.0359) (0.0381)
Ind3 0.2543*** 0.2461***
(0.0251) (0.0261)
Ind5 -0.1336*** -0.1804***
(0.0283) (0.0368)
Ind6 0.1634*** 0.1281***
(0.0221) (0.0241)
Ind7 0.1849*** 0.1389
(0.0699) (0.1051)
Ind8 0.1563*** 0.1439***
(0.0258) (0.0272)
Ind9 0.1333*** 0.1339***
(0.0393) (0.0446)
IndlO -0.0366 -0.0248
(0.0295) (0.0406)
Indl 1 -0.0296 -0.0766**
(0.0236) (0.0335)
Indl 2 0.0271 0.0305
(0.0285) (0.0321)
Lnsigma -1.1568*** -1.2021***
234
(0.0140) (0.0169)
Sigma 0.3145 0.3006
(0.0044) (0.0051)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Most of the instruments are significant in the wage estimations in both samples (with 
the exception of disability and some of the industry dummies, and disability is never 
significant in the risk estimation) indicating they are not appropriate instruments. The 
problems encountered in the literature when attempting to control for risk endogeneity 
are so large, that Bound et al. (1995) have suggested using weak instruments results in 
coefficients that are biased towards the original OLS estimates. To test if the 
instruments are weak, F tests are conducted. See Table 5.18.
Table 5.18: F Tests
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Married 0.11 0.06
Prob>F (0.7446) (0.8088)
Children 5.49** 5.91**
Prob>F (0.0191) (0.0151)
Disability 0.03 0.04
Prob>F (0.8552) (0.8433)
Pension 21.33*** 22.01***
Prob>F (0.0000) (0.0000)
Car 37.18*** 35.30***
Prob>F (0.0000) (0.0000)
Healthins 13 79*** 11 07***
Prob>F (0.0002) (0.0009)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level
Staiger and Stock (1997) recommend that when testing the strength of an instrument, 
the F statistic must take the value of at least 10. Similarly, Stock, Wright, and Yogo 
(2002) found that an F statistic of 9 or above is needed for an appropriate instrument. 
Table 18 reports married, children and disability are weak instruments in this case. 
Pension, car and healthins however, appear to be strongly correlated with a workers’
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occupational risk. However, each of these three instruments were all significant in the 
wage estimations.
Controlling for risk endogeneity may not be as essential to studies of compensating 
wage differentials as some imply. Lalive and Ruf (2006) use Austrian longitudinal 
data to estimate compensating wage differential for risk of injury. Their data therefore 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity. They estimate a risk premium that is roughly 
equal to the one obtained in a standard cross-sectional wage regression and hence 
“find no evidence for a bias of the compensating differential obtained from a standard 
cross-sectional hedonic wage function that can be attributed to unobserved worker 
productivity” (p.4). Their results therefore “suggest that the bias of the compensating 
differential obtained from a standard cross-sectional hedonic wage function that is due 
to unobserved productivity of workers or unobserved ability to cope with risks is 
smaH”(p.l9). This paper had access to very detailed data upon work accidents and 
individual employment over time and so replication using other international data may 
be difficult. It does however, suggest that risk premium estimates obtained from cross 
sectional data with risk exogenous, may not be misleading. Furthermore, although 
endogeneity may impact upon the magnitude of the risk premium, the effect that 
institutions such as trade unions and health and safety committees have upon the 
premium are unlikely to be altered by such potential bias.
5.9 Value of Statistical Life and Injury
VSL estimates are reported throughout, and provide a useful means of comparing 
estimates between studies. A summary of some estimates from the literature are 
reported in Appendix 5.1, and vary widely. This is due to the many variations between
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studies, including differences in method and in the variables included, and also 
because, as Viscusi and Aldy (2003) highlight, a calculated VSL “reflects the 
preferences of workers in a given sample” (p. 18). Bell et al. comment that “the 
variation in published estimates is so wide that there is no sense that they converge on 
a range that could guide public policy” (p.9). The Accident Variable Appendices 
highlight differences in the risk variables depending upon the method and occupation 
data used. Therefore, interval regression estimations are repeated using alternative 
risk rates, and the corresponding VSL estimates compared. Table 5.19 summarises.
Table 5.19: VSL Estimates
SAMPLE OCCUPATION
DATA
ENDOGENEITY
CONTROL?
VSL 
(2004 £)
VSL
(2000 US$)
All manual LFS 2002-2004 No £10,557,277 $15,194,431
Male manual LFS 2002-2004 No £9,163,644 $13,188,691
All manual LFS 2004 No £12,643,446 $18,196,925
Male manual LFS 2004 No £12,350,972 $17,775,985
All manual ASHE 2004 No £12,656,959 $18,216,373
Male Manual ASHE 2004 No £12,064,107 $17,363,118
All manual LFS 2002-2004 Yes £46,587,093 $67,049,902
Male manual LFS 2002-2004 Yes £40,920,937 $58,894,238
Consistent with the literature, VSL estimates obtained throughout this chapter are 
extremely wide ranging, from $13 million to $67 million, depending upon whether 
endogeneity is controlled for. When endogeneity is not controlled for, VSL estimates 
for the male manual sample range from $13 million to $17 million. Estimates using 
occupation data from ASHE rather than LFS raise the estimate slightly, as the 
Accident Variable Appendices discusses, the use of ASHE data results in slightly 
higher accident rates. Sandy and Elliott (1996) VSL estimates range from $5.2 million 
to $69.4 million, and Sandy et al. (2001) estimates range from $5.7 million to $74.1
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million . Estimates calculated here fit within such ranges. Estimates are greater than 
most estimated using US data; Viscusi and Aldy (2003) comment upon this common 
finding which is particularly puzzling given “the mortality risk is lower than in many 
US studies” (p.29). They suggest larger UK estimates “may reflect correlation 
between the risk measure and other unobservables that yield substantial returns to the 
worker” (p.29).
5.10 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted that manual workers do appear to receive a wage 
premium for being exposed to risk of death in British workplaces. Given that the only 
other UK cross sectional studies use data from the 1980s, this is an important finding. 
VSL estimates are calculated which enables the size of risk premiums to be compared 
with other studies. For the sample of male manual workers, a VSL of approximately 
$13 million (in 2000 US$) is estimated, which is larger than those typically estimated 
in the US. As with most studies using cross-sectional data, estimates suffer from 
potential risk endogeneity. Although attempts to control for this bias are adopted, here 
and in other papers, the problem of finding appropriate instruments to proxy risk 
aversion limits the effectiveness of Garen’s method. Recent papers however, have 
suggested the bias may not be as great as first thought.
Trade unions are found to have a negative effect upon the risk premium although this 
effect is not always significant, unlike that reported in most studies using UK data. In 
most specifications however, they have no impact upon the risk premium in the male 
manual sample. The negative union impact is found in most UK literature, and is
39 As converted by Viscusi and Aldy (2003).
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often explained by the suggestion that unions are more concerned with increasing 
safety in the workplace rather than bargaining for compensation for accidents. This 
explanation is supported by the finding that firms that recognise a trade union have a 
smaller average risk rate. Results here however, suggest the trade union impact may 
not be very significant in influencing the risk premium.
The role of other health and safety institutions was considered, given that their role 
may be increasing in importance in the workplace with the decline in the presence of 
trade unions. Having a committee that deals specifically with health and safety had a 
positive impact upon the risk premium in the manual workers sample, with the union 
effect, when significant, remaining negative. As health and safety committees have no 
role in directly influencing wages, results could be reflecting an indirect effect. For 
instance, if we assume health and safety committees have a positive impact upon the 
workplace bargaining environment, they could influence wages and consequently the 
risk premium. This suggests that health and safety committees have a significant role 
in influencing risk compensation and that they operate differently and independently 
from trade unions in terms of health and safety. It should be noted that having a 
general committee that deals with a range of issues or a safety representative with no 
committee had no impact upon the risk premium. This suggests health and safety 
committees have a positive impact upon the environment in which bargaining takes 
place. In conclusion, these findings support Litwin’s (2000) suggestion that the health 
and safety committee effect should be separated from the union effect.
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CHAPTER 6
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE AND SORTING BY ACCIDENT RISK
6.1 Introduction
The compensating wage differentials theory assumes that workers choose amongst 
occupations according to many attributes, one of which is the risk of death and/or 
injury. Workers will have differing degrees of risk aversion, and so it is also 
interesting to consider how individual preferences influence this initial occupation 
choice. DeLeire and Levy (2004) show using US data that preferences for accident 
risk vary by gender and family structure, with this translating into occupation sorting. 
They further show that differences in risk across occupations contribute to 
occupational gender segregation. The proposition that gender and family structure 
influences preferences for risky work is investigated here using UK data.
Central to the theory of compensating wage differentials, discussed in chapters 3 and 
5, is the recognition that firms and workers are heterogeneous. In relation to safety in 
the workplace, firms differ in their ability to provide safety. Workers also vary in their 
willingness to accept a hazardous job, with preference for safety captured by their 
utility function, with the wage and desirable job characteristics entering positively. 
Risk of death will enter the utility function negatively, the magnitude of which 
depends upon the preferences of each worker. Each worker therefore has a set of 
indifference curves reflecting the trade-off each worker is willing to make between 
wages and risk. A market offer curve maps out points of equilibrium in the labour 
market (see Figure 3B.1). The most risk averse workers, those who place the highest
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value on safety, are matched with firms that find it relatively easy to provide a safe 
working environment.
The preferences that workers have for risk, and more precisely how they vary, is 
considered in this chapter. Dohmen et al. (2005) emphasise the importance of 
understanding individual attitudes towards risk as it is “intimately linked to the goal of 
predicting economic behaviour” (p.l). The recognition that workers preferences do 
vary is an essential component of the compensating wage differentials theory, with 
workers sorting into occupations according to these preferences. Here, the proposition 
that men and women have different preferences for risk, which translates into 
occupation sorting, is investigated. Furthermore, following DeLeire and Levy (2004), 
the idea that these preferences vary by family structure within gender is examined.
Numerous tests outside labour economics have illustrated that women are more risk 
averse. For instance, Dee and Evans (2001) show men to be riskier drivers. Using US 
life insurance data, Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) estimate Pratt-Arrow coefficients for 
relative risk aversions. Results show women to be more risk averse concluding that 
“purely demographic variables such as age, gender and race affects an individual’s 
degree of risk aversion” (p.22). Furthermore, they find a significant relationship 
between marriage and risk aversion, but conclude that the direction of the relationship 
remains uncertain. Brown and Taylor (2005) also show that men are more likely than 
women to invest in risky assets such as shares and unit trusts. Within the labour 
economics literature, Ekeland et al. (2004) use psychometric data from a cohort of 
Finns to show that men are less risk averse than women, with this making them 
significantly more likely to become self employed than women. Reed and Dahlquist 
(1994) find for their sample of US workers that women are more likely to be
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employed in safer jobs than men. Dohmen et al. (2005) consider how risk preferences 
vary using a survey of German individuals, and find considerable heterogeneity in risk 
attitudes across individuals. Specifically, they conclude “willingness to take risks is 
negatively related to age and being female and positively related to height and 
parental education” (p.34). Within the UK, using the British Social Attitudes Survey 
(2001) the HSE (2002) reports substantial differences between men and women 
regarding their attitudes towards health and safety in the workplace, with men 
significantly less likely to say that not enough attention was paid to protecting 
workers from risk of injury. Men were also significantly less likely to wear protective 
clothing at work when required to do so. DeLeire and Levy (2004) summarise that “it 
seems fairly well established that men are less risk averse than women on a number of 
different dimensions” (p.928).
Having established that preferences for risk do appear to vary by gender, and possibly 
by family structure, consider if this could translate into occupational sorting according 
to risk. The persistence of occupational gender segregation has been well documented. 
Miller et al. (2004) find “many occupational sectors and jobs in the UK remain 
strongly gender segregated” (p.l). Specifically, Thewlis et al. (2004) find evidence 
that in the UK and other European countries, men are concentrated within agriculture, 
manufacturing, financial services, IT and technology occupations. Women are 
dominant in service sector occupations, including health, social work and education. 
As Thewlis et al. comment, occupations which have a large concentration of women 
are “predominantly stereotyped as female” (p.91). Of particular interest however, 
concerns what is causing this occupational gender segregation.
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Numerous theories exist that fall in to two categories: those that imply segregation is 
due to labour demand factors, and those that suggest it is due to labour supply. In 
terms of labour demand, men and women could have different skills which cause 
employers to demand a specific gender of worker, or employers could simply 
discriminate and choose one gender over another for a variety of reasons. England 
(1982, 1985) argues that it is labour demand factors which drive occupational gender 
segregation, attributing social and cultural factors as influencing employers’ demand 
for labour towards a specific sex. In contrast, occupations could be gender segregated 
because of labour supply factors; men and women could have different preferences 
for specific occupations, and hence segregation is the result of individual choice. For 
example, Polacheck (1981) proposes that women anticipate having time out of the 
labour market to have children, and so choose an occupation for which the penalties 
for time-out are minimal. Men and women could also have different preferences for a 
variety of occupational attributes, such as working conditions, and the degree of 
manual labour involved. One occupational trait that men and women also have 
different preferences for and could cause selection into specific occupations by gender 
concerns the risk of fatality due to an accident at work. DeLeire and Levy (2004) 
focus upon this. DeLeire and Levy recognise that whilst there is evidence that 
preferences for risk vary by gender, “there is a general disagreement about whether 
these preferences are expressed in their choices of occupation” (p.929). It would be of 
interest to see if these differences in preferences for this specific occupational 
attribute contribute, and to what extent, to occupational gender segregation.
DeLeire and Levy (2004) test their hypothesis that workers select into a particular 
occupation dependent upon the risk of fatality and injury associated with it, using US 
data. As preferences for risk cannot be measured directly, they use gender and family
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structure as proxies for preferences, hypothesising that following the literature 
discussed, preferences for risk will vary according to gender and family structure. The 
distinction by family structure is made because, as they consider, the fact that women 
choose safer jobs than men may not be due to just differences in preferences, but it 
could also be due to discrimination. They decompose their sample according to family 
structure within gender, as family structure will not correlate so obviously with 
discrimination. There is still the possibility of this however, if employers adopt 
paternalistic attitudes and prefer not to employ parents in the most dangerous 
occupations. They hypothesise that single parents should be most risk averse, with 
the presence of children resulting in greater preferences for safety for all family 
groups. They find evidence to support this proposition. Their results confirm that 
single parents are the most averse to risk and, regardless of family structure, that men 
are less risk averse than women. Consequently “single parents choose jobs with lower 
risk of death than their married or childless counterparts” (p.940). Overall, they 
conclude that workers sort into occupations based on their aversion to risk with results 
offering “strong empirical support for the hypothesis that workers sort into jobs on the 
basis of their preferences” (p.946).
The findings of DeLeire and Levy have many important implications. Their results 
suggest that preferences for risk will vary by gender and family structure, with this 
resulting in occupational sorting. For example, single mothers, the most averse to risk, 
will require a higher wage at all levels of risk than other groups. It therefore highlights 
the importance of worker heterogeneity when considering the wage premium required 
for risk. It would therefore be of interest to see if the conclusions reached are relevant 
to the UK.
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6.2 Methodology
In order to test empirically the effect that accident risk has upon occupational choice 
between groups of workers in the UK , the same method as used by DeLeire and Levy 
(2004) is employed. Following Greene (2003), it is assumed that individuals choose 
an occupation consistent with a random utility model. Individual i’s choice of 
occupation (j from J occupations) results in utility Uy as illustrated by equation 1.
U ^ z ' Z . + s ,  [1]
The exogenous variable Zy can be divided into variables that depend only on the 
individual (Wj) such as education, and those that vary across the occupation choices 
(Xj) such as risk of death. Hence:
Z y = f  (W j, X  j) [2]
If the individual chooses occupation j, we assume that the resulting utility Uy is the 
maximum among the J utilities. The probability that choice j is made can therefore be 
illustrated by equation 3:
Pr(LL > Uik) for all other k^j [3]
If the disturbances are independent and identically distributed with an extreme value 
distribution, McFadden (1973) shows that the observed occupation choice of
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individual i (Yj) can be denoted by the conditional logit model, as shown by equation 
4:
P r tf  = j )  =
,(zu
PZ,J
[4]
Substituting in Wj and Xj for Zjj we derive the following:
P X j  a]w,
Pr (X, = J) = v  [5]
V  ef x ‘e°lr‘
Terms that do not vary across alternatives (Wj) and are specific to the individual fall 
out of the probability and we are unable to estimate the effect of individual 
characteristics upon occupational choice (a), which are invariant to the choice. 
However, we can estimate p and therefore the effect that occupational characteristics 
have upon occupational choice, as in McFadden’s (1973) fixed effects model.
The conditional logit model makes the assumption that the error terms independently 
and identically follow an extreme value distribution. The assumption that the error 
terms are independent across irrelevant alternatives needs to be considered. This 
assumes, in this case, that the choice between two occupations is independent from 
the choice of other alternatives (occupations). If we were to add a further occupation 
into the choice that was irrelevant in terms of the choice between two specific 
occupations, the relative probability between these two occupations would not 
change. Hausman and McFadden (1984) formulate a specification test to enable the 
validity of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption to be tested. 
They argue that if omitting a choice does not significantly change parameter 
estimates, then the assumption holds, and choices are independent from irrelevant
246
alternatives. Two models must be estimated: the first, denoted by subscript 1, the 
model with a full-set of choices, and the second, denoted by subscript d, the model 
with restricted choice omitting a possible occupational choice from the model. The 
resultant parameter estimates (p) and covariance matrices (Q) are recorded and the 
test statistic, which follows a chi-square distribution, calculated as in equation 6:
z^CPd-POXnd-noypa-p,) [6]
If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, alternative choices are irrelevant and the IIA 
assumption is valid. If it can be rejected, alternative choices are relevant and the 
assumption of IIA does not hold.
6.3 Data and Sample
Three data sets are used in the estimation: LFS employment data, HSE data on fatal 
and major injuries, and Skills Survey data on occupational characteristics.
6.3.1 Sample
DeLeire and Levy restrict their analysis to full-time workers on the grounds that part- 
time workers will allocate some time to household production, for which risk data are 
unavailable. The estimation here is conducted for full-time and part-time workers for 
several reasons. The risk measures created refer to occupations from which all 
workers, regardless of the number of hours they choose to work in an occupation, 
should be aware. The risk measures do include part-time workers, and so are 
applicable to them. Although full-time workers are exposed to a greater risk because 
of the increased number of hours supplied, part-time workers in certain occupations
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are still more exposed to risk than in other occupations. Once an occupation has been 
chosen, an individual could change the number of hours supplied throughout their 
working life. Hence, current part-time workers in an occupation could have once been 
full-time workers in the same occupation. We are particularly interested in the 
occupation choice of part-time workers, as we would expect family group to be an 
important determinant of whether an individual works part-time or full-time. To 
exclude them from the estimation would result in a disproportionate elimination of 
parents from the analysis. To enable comparison however, conditional logit models 
are also estimated for a sample of full-time workers.
DeLeire and Levy also restrict their estimation to workers aged 25 to 34, arguing that 
current risk measures are not an accurate measure for older workers, who have 
accumulated occupation-specific knowledge. However, current risk rates do reflect 
these older workers, and so control for the fact that older, more experienced workers 
may be less accident prone. It would therefore bias the sample to leave them out of the 
estimation. Risk rates reflect workers of all ages, and so it would be inaccurate to 
restrict the sample to a specific age group, especially given that proneness to accidents 
may vary with age. Also, as we are considering occupational choice and how this may 
vary by family structure, we may expect to see variation in choice as family 
circumstances change. Older workers may have initially based their occupation 
decision on their current family circumstances. As these circumstances changed, it is 
likely that they may have revised this decision within some possible margin. The 
estimation is therefore conducted for workers of all ages. Again for comparison
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purposes, the estimation is also performed for 25-34 year olds only and compared to 
the sample of workers of all ages40.
6.3.2 Accident and Employment Data
Data on occupational risk of fatal and non-fatal injury are provided by the HSE, who 
compile the data from reports made to them under RIDDOR 1995, as discussed at 
length in chapter 2.
As the Accident Variable Appendices discusses, there are many important issues to 
consider when trying to accurately capture the risk of fatality and injury a worker 
faces. Risk rates are typically calculated by industry or occupation, and then matched 
into another data set using industry or occupation codes. DeLeire and Levy measure 
risk by occupation, and Sandy et al. (2001) find this to be the most accurate method. 
The way occupations are classified also needs to be considered. Risk is more finely 
distinguished the greater the number of occupations, but “if the categories are too fine 
compared to the number of workers in the economy and the accidental death rate, 
most of the occupations will have zero recorded deaths” (Sandy et al., 2001, p.55). In 
addition, fatalities at work are rare, and so in order to capture accurately the true risk 
of a particular occupation, it is important to use data that spans over a longer period 
than may be the case when constructing other variables. Therefore, numbers of 
fatalities and major injuries from RIDDOR reports for 2002/03, 2003/04, and 2004/05 
measured according to occupation SOC 2000 are compiled.
40 Self-employed workers are excluded from the estimation. RIDDOR does not require injuries to the 
self-employed that occurred at their own premises to be reported, and so their inclusion would bias the 
results.
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LFS September-November quarter data for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 are merged 
to provide data on the number of workers employed in each occupation. With a large 
sample size that includes detailed information on occupation, marital status, and 
number of children, this enables workers to be divided according to family group.
Table 6.1: Men and Women in Employment (2004) and Average number o f Fatal and 
Major Injuries at Work (2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05)
Numbers
EMPLOYMENT
Men 12338061
Women 11937856
Fraction Men 0.508
FATAL INJURIES
Men 207.3
Women 8.3
Fraction Men 0.962
MAJOR INJURIES
Men 22006.7
Women 7912.3
Fraction Men 0.736
Source: LFS (2004); LFS (2002-2004); HSE (2002/03, 2003/04, 2004/05)
Table 6.1 compares the number of workers in employment in 2004 to the average 
number of fatalities and major injuries between 2002/03-2004/05. Men are shown to 
have made up 50.8 per cent of full time and part time employment. However, 96.2 per 
cent of fatal injuries and 73.6 per cent of major injuries at work were to men, which is 
disproportionate to the percentage of male employees. This confirms that men are 
more likely to have an accident at work than women.
The LFS is used to convert the occupational fatality and injury numbers into rates. 
Given the measurement issues regarding risk previously discussed, risk rates are
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calculated according to 2 digit SOC 2000, giving a total of 25 occupations to 
minimise the number of zero accident rates41. Non-gender-specific rates are 
calculated42, but male-specific measures are later considered. A fatal rate per 100 full­
time and part-time workers and a major injury rate per 100 full-time and part-time 
workers are calculated for each occupation43. In addition, the fraction of female 
workers employed in each occupation (full-time and part-time) is also calculated44. 
The appropriate fatal and major injury rates are then assigned to each worker in the 
LFS sample according to their 2 digit occupation. Table 6.2 reports the rates for each 
occupation in order of the highest fatal accident rate. This reveals that 4 of the 25 
occupations have a zero fatal rate, compared to DeLeire and Levy’s analysis where 2 
of their 44 occupations have a zero death rate. Sandy et al. suggest assigning the 
average risk in a sample to occupations with a zero death rate. However, they find that 
this does not make a substantial difference to estimates as average risk is usually very 
close to zero. We therefore proceed assigning zero risk to these occupations, as in 
DeLeire and Levy.
41 Estimations are also conducted using 3 digit SOC for comparison, discussed in the occupational 
gender segregation section.
42 It is not possible to split accurately the number o f  accidents by gender and family composition. As 
DeLeire and Levy comment “there are too few fatalities and too few women in the occupations with 
the most fatalities to calculate reliable gender-specific risks o f  death” (p.942). The same applies to 
family structure. We are therefore overstating the risk women face and understating the risk men face.
43 Death rate per 100 workers=(total fatal injuries/total workers)* 100 
Major injury rate per 100 workers=(total major injuries/total workers)* 100
44 Fraction female=female workers/total workers
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Table 6.2: Occupational Fatal and Major Injury Rates per 100 Workers and Fraction 
o f Female Workers
SOC 2000 Fatal Rate 
per 100 
Workers
Major Injury 
Rate per 100 
Workers
Fraction
Female
51 Skilled Agricultural Trades 0.01886 0.30009 0.07952
91 Elementary Trades, Plant & Storage 
Related Occupations
0.00716 0.74740 0.14773
81 Process Plant & Machine Operatives 0.00636 0.92697 0.21928
53 Skilled Construction & Building 
Trades
0.00631 0.50353 0.00715
82 Transport & Mobile Machine 
Drivers & Operatives
0.00568 0.60828 0.03602
52 Skilled Metal &Electrical Trades 0.00333 0.38961 0.01313
33 Protective Service Occupations 0.00265 0.70791 0.17359
12 Managers & Proprietors in 
Agriculture & Services
0.00208 0.16311 0.37585
21 Service & Technology Professionals 0.00156 0.17985 0.13367
92 Elementary Admin & Service 
Occupations
0.00120 0.29944 0.48224
31 Science & Technology Associate 
Professionals
0.00088 0.17179 0.20944
62 Leisure & other Personal Service 
Occupations
0.00073 0.18632 0.61903
11 Corporate Managers 0.00052 0.06802 0.29954
54 Textiles, Printing & Other Skilled 
Trades
0.00051 0.20847 0.30554
34 Culture, Media & Sports 
Occupations
0.00027 0.70791 0.39251
61 Caring Personal Service Occupations 0.00023 0.22486 0.89811
71 Sales Occupations 0.00020 0.19486 0.64019
24 Business & Public Service 
Professionals
0.00018 0.04831 0.34594
42 Secretarial & related Occupations 0.00008 0.05014 0.97174
41 Administrative Occupations 0.00005 0.06233 0.71360
35 Business & Public Service Associate 
Professionals
0.00005 0.03538 0.42006
72 Customer Service Occupations 0 0.13093 0.66393
32 Health & Social Welfare Associate 
Professionals
0 0.11504 0.80230
23 Teaching & Research Professionals 0 0.11211 0.61981
22 Health Professionals 0 0.04648 0.39934
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The two occupations with the greatest fatal rate are Skilled Agricultural Trades (8 per 
cent of workers are female), and Elementary Trades, Plant and Storage Related 
Occupations (15 per cent of workers are female). The occupations with the least risk 
are Health Professionals (40 per cent female) and Teaching and Research 
Professionals (62 per cent female). The UK death rate is lower than that calculated by 
DeLeire and Levy for the US. Their greatest death rate is calculated as 0.0872 per 100 
workers compared to 0.0189 per 100 workers here. However, rates here include part- 
time workers and so we would expect the risk to be slightly lower. Also, the overall 
fatality rate at work is slightly greater in the US compared to the UK, where there are 
several differences in the enforcement policies of health and safety legislation, as 
discussed in chapter 2.2.2.
The correlation between the fatal rate per 100 workers for each occupation, and the 
fraction of female workers employed in each occupation is reported in Table 6.3 and 
shown in Figure 6.1. The correlation is significantly negative, indicating that 
occupations with the highest death rates are associated with fewer female employees.
Table 6.3: Correlation between Log Fatal and Fraction Female
Fraction of 
Female Workers
Log Fatal
Log Fatal Pearson
Correlation
-0.767** 1
Log Major Injury Pearson
Correlation
-0.522** 0.757**
** Correlation is significant at the 5% level
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Table 6.3 and Figure 6.2 show the correlation between the major injury rate and the 
fraction of female workers is also significantly negative. As expected, the correlation 
is slightly lower than the correlation between the fatal rate and the fraction of female 
workers which may be due to a stronger aversion to risk of fatality.
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To check the accuracy of the occupational risk estimates, Table 6.3 shows there is a 
significant positive correlation between the fatal rate and major injury rate. This 
confirms that occupations with a high fatal rate are also likely to have a high major 
injury rate. The fact that the correlation is strong but not perfect means the effect of 
both an occupations fatal and major injury rate can be estimated separately.
6.3.3 Occupational Characteristics
In order to estimate the effects risk of death and injury have upon occupational choice, 
other characteristics associated with each occupation must be controlled for. This is 
particularly important when comparing what influences occupational choice between 
different groups of workers as specific groups may have particular preferences. For 
example, men may be more likely to work in physically demanding occupations, and
women in occupations requiring more caring skills45. In addition, employers may have 
different demands such as requiring workers to have a certain amount of strength and 
stamina in physically demanding jobs. By including controls for occupational 
attributes, in addition to the risk of fatal and major injury rates, we are able to 
consider their effect upon occupational choice and how this varies between groups.
Occupational attribute variables are created using the Skills Survey 2001, which 
surveyed 4470 individuals aged 20-64 in Great Britain. The questions utilised here 
asked workers how important a particular skill or attribute was to their work. Table
6.4 lists the variables and definitions to be used in the estimation.
Table 6.4: Occupational Attributes Variables
Variable Name Occupational Attribute
STRENGTH Physical strength
STAMINA Physical stamina
HANDS Skill or accuracy in using hands or fingers
TOOLS Knowledge of how to use or operate tools
WRITELG Writing long documents
CALCA Adding, subtracting, multiplying or dividing numbers
STATS Calculations using advanced mathematical or statistical procedures
CARING Counselling, advising or caring of customers or clients
SPECIAL Specialist knowledge or understanding
ANALYSE Analysing complex problems in depth
MYTIME Organising own time
USEPC Using a PC or other computerised equipment
SPEECH Making speeches or presentations
PERSUADE Using persuasion
LISTEN Listening to customers or clients
MOTIVATE Motivating staff
FUTURE Making decisions that affect the future of the company
PERCENTC Percentage of workers covered by union terms and conditions
Variables created from the Skills Survey 2001
Each variable takes a value from 0-4, with 4 defined as essential to the work, and 0 
defined as not at all important. The mean of each attribute for each occupation is then 
calculated using 2 digit SOC 2000. The means are reported in Appendix 6.1. In
45 Thewlis et al. (2004) discuss this.
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addition, the percentage covered by union terms and conditions has been calculated 
for each occupation using the LFS.
All skills variable means are as would be expected. In terms of the physical variables 
for instance, low means for strength, stamina, hands and tools are calculated for 
Corporate Managers (11), Administrative Occupations (41), and Business and Public 
Service Associate Professionals (35), indicating these skills are relatively unimportant 
for these occupations. In contrast, they are very important for working in Skilled 
Agricultural Trades (51), Skilled Metal and Electrical Trades (52), and Skilled 
Construction and Building Trades (53).
Appendix 6.2 reports correlations between all skills variables, fatal and major injury 
rate variables, and the fraction female in each occupation. Fatal and major injury are 
positively and significantly associated with strength, stamina, hands and tools. As 
would be expected, occupations that require physical skills are associated with a 
higher fatal and major injury rate. In contrast, usepc and persuade are negatively 
associated with both fatal and major injury rates. Fraction female is significantly 
positively correlated with caring and listen skills, indicating that women are more 
likely to work in occupations that require these attributes. Also, it should be noted 
that there are no perfect correlations between variables, which allows the effect of 
each variable to be estimated separately.
Standardised scores (z statistics) are calculated for each of the occupational attributes 
variables to check the significance of their variation between the 25 occupations, as 
shown by equation 7:
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aWhere X is the calculated value for each occupation (as listed in Appendix 6.1), X  is 
the mean value, and a  the standard deviation. A Z statistic of 1.96 (plus or minus) 
indicates significant variation at the 5 per cent level. Appendix 6.3 lists the calculated 
Z statistics for each attribute for each occupation. Results show there to be no 
significant variation between occupations for variables writelong, stats, special, 
usepc, and future. Therefore, in addition to a model with all attribute variables 
included, the model is also estimated excluding these five variables to ensure it does 
not affect the pattern of results46.
6.3.4 Family Variables
The finding that risk has a greater negative impact upon occupational choice for 
women could be due to direct discrimination by employers, which forces women to 
work in safer jobs regardless of their preferences. It could also take the form of 
indirect discrimination, for instance with schools portraying stereotypical womens’ 
jobs, which are relatively less hazardous occupations. As it is less likely, although 
possible, that this type of discrimination occurs according to family structure, the 
model is estimated also by family structure. This enables us to determine whether 
workers sort into occupations according to preferences for risk, which are likely to 
vary according to whether a person is married and/or has children.
46 It was decided it was appropriate to estimate the model including all attribute variables as each is 
significant in the estimations, as results will later show.
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Separate samples of workers are created according to gender, marital status, and 
whether a worker has children47, using data from the LFS. Table 6.5 describes the 
groups created, and the fraction of the whole sample to which each contributes. The 
groups with the greatest number in the sample are those married with children and 
married with no children. By contrast, separated, divorced or widowed men with 
children make up the smallest fraction of the sample. The mean fatal and major injury 
risk for each family composition group is reported.
Men face an average risk of 0.0027 per 100 workers, compared to an average of 
0.0007 per 100 workers for women. As predicted, women work in safer occupations. 
There is no significant difference in risk rates between family groups however, in this 
purely descriptive analysis.
47 Where a child is defined as a dependent under the age o f  19.
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6.4 Conditional Logit Estimation Results
The conditional logit model is utilised as outlined in chapter 6.2. As we are interested 
in how the effect of occupation-specific variables upon occupation choice varies 
between specific groups of workers, the model is estimated separately by gender and 
family structure (the groups listed in Table 6.5). The complete results from the 
conditional logit estimation for full-time and part-time workers of all ages are 
presented in Appendix 6.4. Table 6.6 presents the estimated coefficients for fatal and 
major injury from the fourteen estimations.
First, consider the occupational attributes variables. Overall, as expected, strength has 
a greater positive effect upon occupational choice for men than for women. Women 
are more likely to choose an occupation that requires hands skills, with the coefficient 
significantly negative for men (-1.526) and significantly positive for women (2.778). 
A further significant difference in the estimated coefficients between the male and 
female samples concerns the variable listen, with the effect upon occupational choice 
significantly negative for men (-2.311), but significantly positive for women (2.928). 
F tests reveal occupational attributes are highly jointly significant in all estimations.
In terms of the risk variables, risk of death has a greater negative effect upon women’s 
occupational choice compared to men’s. For men, fatal has a coefficient of -165.4, 
whilst for women a coefficient of -216.3 is found, both of which are significant at the 
1 per cent level.
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Considering the within-gender family composition estimations results, in the male 
samples, having children is always associated with a greater negative fatal coefficient. 
The least risk averse group are single men with no children, with a significant 
coefficient of -87.7 estimated. As predicted, single men with children are the male 
group most likely to work in the safest occupations, with a significant fatal coefficient 
of -201.8 estimated. For the female estimations, the presence of children increases 
aversion to risk at work for all groups except single women, where the coefficients are 
similar in magnitude. Results are in line with expectations.
To interpret the relative magnitudes of the between group coefficients, simulations 
similar to those carried out by DeLeire and Levy are conducted. First, as generally 
single parents are found to be the most averse to risky work, the reduction in risk each 
of the other family groups would face if their preferences were the same as that of a 
single parent is calculated. Predicted probabilities, Pj, are calculated for each group 
using the conditional logit estimates. Average predicted risk for each group is then 
calculated according to equation 8 where rj refers to the actual risk associated with 
each occupation.
Average predicted risk= ^  rs Pj [8]
For men, the coefficient on fatal risk is set equal to that estimated for single men with 
children, and a new set of predicted probabilities calculated for each occupation. The 
average predicted risk each group would face if they had the same preferences as 
single fathers can then be calculated. The process is repeated for women.
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Single men without children would face a 37 per cent lower risk of death if 
preferences towards risk were the same as those of single men with children. Married 
men with children would work in occupations that were 6 per cent safer, and married 
men with no children in occupations that were 19 per cent safer. Risk would be 14 per 
cent lower for SDW men with no children, and 1 per cent lower for those with 
children. Married women with no children would face a 22 per cent lower risk of 
death at work if their preferences were the same as single mothers. For married 
women with children, risk would be 9 per cent lower.
As a further way of assessing whether the differences in risk coefficients between 
family groups is significant, a further model was tested for a pooled sample of male 
and female workers. Family group dummy variables were derived and multiplied by 
the fatal risk rate to create a set of interaction variables. Each family interaction 
variable was then included in the conditional logit model, excluding the single men 
with no children variable. In addition, a female*fatal variable was derived and 
included. Table 6.7 presents results. A significant coefficient of -233.33 was estimated 
for female *fatal indicating women have a significant greater aversion to risk at work 
compared to men. Other results follow the same pattern estimated in the original 
model, with single and married women with children the most averse to risk 
compared to single men with no children, with both interaction coefficients 
significantly negative.
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Table 6.7: Conditional Logit Estimates: Pooled Sample
POOLED SAMPLE
No Obs 90530
Log likelihood -272021.92
Pseudo R2 0.0632
Strength 2.976***
(0.050)
Stamina -3 729*** 
(0.077)
Handskill -0.189***
(0.034)
Tools -0.109***
(0.041)
Writelong -0.607***
(0.047)
Calca -0.231***
(0.035)
Stats 0.545***
(0.043)
Caring 0.070***
(0.019)
Special -0.029
(0.058)
Analyse -0.814***
(0.034)
Mytime 1 2 7 2 *** 
(0.055)
Usepc -0.185***
(0 .0 2 2 )
Speech 0.488***
(0.056)
Persuade -0.547***
(0.062)
Listen -0.055
(0.048)
Motivate 0.098**
(0.049)
Future 0  9 7 7 *** 
(0.050)
Percentc 0.008***
(0 .0 0 1 )
Fatal -138.666***
(4.152)
Major Injury 2.105***
(0.063)
Female*Fatal
WOMEN
-233.334*** 
(50..551)
Singmch* Fatal -7.604
SINGLE MEN WITH CHILDREN (4.883)
Marm*Fatal 3.352
MARRIED MEN (3.561)
Marmch* Fatal -3.461
MARRIED MEN WITH CHILDREN (3.533)
Sdwm* Fatal 15.829***
SDW MEN (5.109)
Sdwmch* Fatal 26.179***
SDW MEN WITH CHILDREN (8.337)
Singf* Fatal -75.940
SINGLE WOMEN (51.184)
Singfch* Fatal -115.291**
SINGLE WOMEN WITH CHILDREN (51.644)
Marf* Fatal -47.308
MARRIED WOMEN (50.897)
Marfch* Fatal -107.560**
MARRIED WOMEN WITH (51.057)
CHILDREN
Sdwf* Fatal -62.042
SDW WOMEN (51.728)
Sdwfch* Fatal -54.620
SDW WOMEN WITH CHILDREN (52.354)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
Major injury estimates are positive in all of the male sample regressions. For women, 
a negative but insignificant coefficient is found for married women. DeLeire and Levy 
also find a positive coefficient for their non-fatal injury variable in all of their 
regressions. As reported earlier, the fatal and major injury variables are collinear with 
a significant correlation coefficient if 0.757, possibly explaining the positive sign 
when both variables are included in the model. Therefore, the estimation is repeated 
for each family group, first with just fatal, and then with just major injury. The 
estimated coefficients are reported in Appendix 6.5.
The effect of excluding the major injury variable has little impact upon the estimated 
fatal coefficients. For men, groups with children are still the most averse to risk with 
greater negative coefficients estimated for fatal compared to childless groups. This is 
especially true for men with no partner. Single men with no children are found to be
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the least averse to risk. For women, those married with children remain the most 
averse to risk.
Now consider the effect of excluding fatal from the model. Major injury remains 
either insignificant or positive for male groups except for single men with children 
where the coefficient is negative but insignificant. For women however, major injury 
is significantly negative for all estimations. Furthermore, the magnitude of the 
coefficient follows the predicted pattern, with groups with children having a greater 
negative major injury estimate. The role of the major injury variable therefore, 
appears to be relatively more important for female occupational choice compared to 
male occupational choice.
To enable direct comparison with DeLeire and Levy, the estimations are repeated for 
a sample of full-time workers aged 25-34. The estimated coefficients for fatal and 
major injury are reported in Appendix 6.6. Again, women are more risk averse than 
men, with the fatal coefficient estimated as -158.041 for women and -83.229 for men. 
For the male family groups, having children increases the aversion to risk, as before. 
For women however, fatal is insignificant for single women with children. This is 
likely to reflect the small sample size of only 490 for this group, as there are few 
single mothers in this age bracket working full-time. For married women, the 
coefficients are significantly negative for those with and without children and similar 
in magnitude.
Following the results of the standardised score in which the variation of the 
occupational attributes variables between occupations was considered, the conditional 
logit model is re-estimated excluding the five variables with no significant variation
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(writelong, stats, special, usepc and future). The death and major injury estimates are 
reported in Appendix 6.7. Excluding these five explanatory variables has no effect 
upon the pattern of results between groups for the death variable. The only difference 
in the results concerns the major injury variable. Whereas in the previous estimation 
with all variables included the major injury variable was never significantly negative, 
when the five variables are excluded, major injury is significantly negative for all of 
the female estimations. Furthermore, the major injury coefficient follows the pattern 
expected, being greater for all groups with children. It may therefore be that the five 
excluded variables were correlated with major injury and hence affected the 
coefficient when included.
Overall, results indicate women are more averse to risk than men in terms of their 
occupational choice. This could be due to women preferring safer work, or due to 
labour demand factors. Within gender, risk has different effects upon occupational 
choice according to family structure in the predicted way. This may partly be 
attributed to paternalistic attitudes in the part of the employer, although this would 
imply that employers distinguish between applicants on the basis of the presence of 
children in the family. Legislation in the UK does not allow interviewers to ask 
potential employees questions related to their marital or family status. This result 
therefore, suggests that preferences for risk do affect occupational choice in the UK.
6.4.1 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
As discussed in chapter 6.2, the conditional logit model assumes the error terms are 
independent across irrelevant alternatives. In this case, this requires the choice 
between two occupations to be independent from the choice between other
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occupations. If the IIA assumption does not hold, this could lead to inconsistent 
estimates. Hausman and McFadden (1984) formulate a method to enable the IIA 
assumption to be tested. Two models must be estimated: the first, denoted by 
subscript f, the model with a full-set of choices, and the second, denoted by subscript 
r, the model with restricted choice (omitting an occupation choice from the model). 
The resultant parameter estimates (P) and covariance matrices (Q) are recorded and 
the test statistic (equation 5), which follows a chi-square distribution, calculated.
The calculated test statistic is compared to the relevant value from the %2 distribution. 
If the test statistic is significantly greater, given by the probability value (p value), 
then the estimates are significantly different and the null hypothesis, and therefore the 
IIA assumption, is rejected. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, alternative 
choices are irrelevant and the IIA assumption is valid.
DeLeire and Levy conduct Hausman and McFadden tests for the validity of the IIA 
assumption, although they do not report the full results. They do however, note that 
“we reject that the coefficients are the same, which is equivalent in this case to 
rejecting the IIA property of the conditional logit model” (p.942). The choice of one 
occupation over another is therefore influenced by the existence of other occupations. 
The IIA assumption may therefore be quite difficult to satisfy in a model of 
occupation choice. DeLeire and Levy do not discuss the implications of this result for 
the estimates of their model. This could be because they are solely interested in 
comparing the estimates (especially the risk estimates) between models rather than the 
effect of each estimate upon occupational choice. They may have therefore concluded 
that the failure of the model to satisfy the IIA assumption does not affect the main
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conclusion of their paper: that preference for risk vary by gender and family structure 
with this translating into differences in occupation choice.
Table 6.8: IIA Test Results
Omitted
Occupation
MEN WOMEN
SOC 2000 (2 digit) Test Statistic P value Test Statistic P value
11 1708.88 0.0000 2.86 0.9993
12 1837.43 0.0000 208.34 0.0000
21 2022.86 0.0000 337.94 0.0000
22 1.14 1.0000 182.60 0.0000
23 1211.88 0.0000 34.34 0.0114
24 72.13 0.0000 30.33 0.0477
31 490.04 0.0000 82.46 0.0000
32 582.82 0.0000 356.99 0.0000
33 665.34 0.0000 926.99 0.0000
34 555.87 0.0000 637.70 0.0000
35 1167.14 0.0000 329.66 0.0000
41 1041.09 0.0000 367.52 0.0000
42 1473.91 0.0000 105.14 0.0000
51 26.31 0.0033 879.03 0.0000
52 663.76 0.0000 73.09 0.0000
53 32.81 0.0253 245.28 0.0000
54 1606.76 0.0000 106.08 0.0000
61 20.56 0.3023 250.78 0.0000
62 148.93 0.0000 4.39 0.9995
71 85.38 0.0000 126.83 0.0000
72 76.51 0.0000 293.90 0.0000
81 49.54 0.0002 865.50 0.0000
82 1136.13 0.0000 191.15 0.0000
91 444.96 0.0000 627.42 0.0000
92 147.62 0.0000 11.95 0.5315
To test whether the IIA assumption holds in the model here, Hausman and McFadden 
tests are conducted. Separate tests are conducted for men and women. In total, 25 tests 
are conducted separately for men and women, omitting each occupation in turn. The 
results are presented in Table 6 .8 .
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Most of the tests resulted in large test statistics, which are significantly greater than 
the critical %2 value. In these cases (where the p value is equal to 0.0000) the null 
hypothesis that differences in estimates are not significant is rejected, and the IIA 
assumption does not hold. The IIA assumption does hold however, for men when 
occupations 22 and 61 are omitted, and for women when occupations 11, 62 and 92 
are omitted.
As an alternative to the conditional logit model, a nested logit model can be used if 
the IIA test fails. To confirm the reliability of the estimates given that the model fails 
the IIA assumption therefore, a nested logit is estimated. The 25 occupations are 
grouped into manual and non-manual occupations48 and the model estimated by 
family group49. Appendix 6 .8  reports the estimated coefficients for fatal for each 
family group. The pattern of results is the same as in the conditional logit model. 
Women are more averse to fatal in occupational choice. Children and marriage also 
increase aversion to risk. This confirms that failure to satisfy the IIA assumption in 
the conditional logit model does not affect the pattern of results. The conclusions 
reached remain unaffected.
6.5 Further Tests
The conditional logit estimates suggest that workers have different preferences for 
risky work according to gender and family structure, and this in turn leads to a degree 
of occupation sorting. However, to be sure that the estimation results are confirming
48 In SOC 2000 codes, manual occupations are 51,52, 53, 54, 61, 62, 81, 82, 91, 92 and non-manual 
occupations are 11, 12, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 71, 72.
49 The nested logit model is estimated with fewer variables than the conditional logit model because o f  
problems with collinearity. Strength was dropped and a variable strong created for manual and also 
non-manual occupations (the variables therefore has only 2 values). It was not possible to estimate the 
model with more manual and non-manual specific variables. Major injury was also dropped from the 
model.
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this hypothesis, it is necessary to consider a number of other possibilities that may be 
causing or biasing the results.
As a persons’ occupation itself may influence whether they get married and/or have 
children, family structure may be endogeneous. For instance, as DeLeire and Levy 
speculate, “individuals who choose dangerous occupations may have difficulty 
attracting a spouse” (p.941). The extent at which workers sort into occupations based 
on preferences determined by their family composition may hence be over-estimated. 
Other results therefore, rely on the assumption that family structure is exogenous.
6.5.1 Gender-Specific Variables
A further issue relates to the occupational risk variables. DeLeire and Levy consider 
the possibility that within a given occupation, men are less careful than women. 
Therefore, “for a given occupation the risk of death facing women would be lower 
than the risk of death facing men if it were possible to measure these separately” 
(p.942). Indeed, as shown in Table 6.1, in the UK men were the victims of 96.2 per 
cent of fatal accidents between 2002-04. By using the average risk in an occupation 
therefore, we are overstating the risk women face and understating the risk men face. 
However, as DeLeire and Levy emphasise, “there are too few fatalities and too few 
women in the occupations with the most fatalities to calculate reliable gender-specific 
risks of death” (p.942). For instance, taking the previously calculated average death 
risk variables, the two riskiest occupations are Skilled Agricultural Trades and Skilled 
Construction and Building Trades, where only 8  per cent and 15 per cent of 
employees are female50. In order to calculate a female-specific rate, the number of 
female fatalities between 2002-05 would be divided by the number of female workers.
50 See Table 6.2
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But with so few female employees within these two occupations, the likelihood of 
there being any fatalities during this time period, as a relatively rare event, would be 
very small. Female risk measures would fail to reflect the true risk of fatality in 
occupations where there are few female employees. If, as results here suggest, women 
prefer to work in safer occupations, there is a degree of endogeneity; women are not 
employed in risky occupations because they are more averse to dangerous conditions, 
and so death rates for women will not reflect the true risk.
Male-specific measures are however, derived and reported in the Accident Variable 
Appendices. T tests show there are significant differences between the male-specific 
and collective means. The order of risky occupations however, remains the same.
6.5.2 Demographic Characteristics
It is important to ensure that the observed results between family groups are not due to 
the correlation between family structure and other demographics. For example, 
education could be correlated with family group, which in turn could determine 
aversion to risk and consequently occupation choice. Therefore, following DeLeire 
and Levy, we need to ensure that the pattern of results is due to family group and not 
due to differences in education, race and union status.
Three sets of dummy variables are created using the LFS data. First, education 
variables denote if an individual’s highest qualification is a degree, A level, GCSE, or 
whether the individual has no qualifications. Second, race variable dummies denote if 
a respondent is white or non-white. Finally, union dummies denote whether a 
respondent is a member of a trade union or not. Appendix 6.9 reports the mean and 
standard deviation of each of these dummy variables for each family group. As their
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main observation of the differences between family groups, DeLeire and Levy find 
that single parents have lower levels of education than any other group. It is also 
shown here that single men and women with children are much less likely to have a 
degree, compared to other groups, with it most likely that their highest qualification is 
a GCSE.
Three sets of models are estimated, separately for each of the family groups, including 
all variables as before except for the death rate variable. Fatal is interacted with the 
four education dummies in the first model, and these four interaction variables are 
added to the model. The same method is applied to a model for race and a model for 
union status. The estimated interaction coefficients from the 3 models are shown in 
Appendix 6.10.
Consider the model with the education interaction variables. As expected, individuals 
with more education place a greater negative weight on risk of death when making 
their occupation choice. For all family groups, having a degree results in the greatest 
risk aversion, whilst having no qualifications results in the least aversion to risk. 
However, the pattern of aversion remains the same as before between family groups. 
For example, taking the variable fatal*degree, a greater negative coefficient is 
observed for women (-630.069) compared to men (-525.004). Within family groups, 
having children still results in a greater negative coefficient for all education 
interaction variables. Those that are married are the most averse, whereas the original 
estimation found that single parents were the most averse to risk. It appears that this
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result was being driven by differences in education between the groups51. The overall 
pattern of risk aversion however, remains unchanged.
For race, the fatal *white variable again shows women to be the most averse to risk. 
For men and women, having children increases the aversion, with single parents, and 
separated, divorced or widowed men with children remaining the most averse. For 
women, as before, separated, divorced or widowed women with no children and 
married women with children are the most averse. The same pattern of results is 
shown for the union status model.
Overall, estimating the model with race and union interaction variables makes no 
difference to the pattern of results. The inclusion of education interaction variables 
however, shows the single parents result is driven by differences in education, with 
married parents shown to be the most averse to risk. Overall however, in terms of 
occupation choice in the UK, family structure and gender are driving the aversion to 
risk in the occupation decision, rather than the differences in other demographics 
between the groups.
6.5.3 Occupations Requiring Absences from Home
DeLeire and Levy consider the possibility that risky occupations may also require 
absences from home, resulting in certain groups of workers avoiding them for this 
reason, not just because they are averse to the high fatality rate. That is, fatal risk 
could be correlated with absences from home. They re-estimate the model dropping 
occupations they believe are most likely to involve frequent absences from home:
51 DeLeire and Levy also find this (p.940)
275
motor vehicle operators, other transportation, farm workers and forestry and fishing. 
They find no change in the pattern of results when these occupations are omitted.
To repeat this analysis, consider the occupations that are most likely to require 
absences from home. Transport and Mobile Machine Drivers and Operatives (82) are 
likely to require lots of travel (likely to be outside normal office hours). Skilled 
Agricultural Trades (51) is probably the nearest occupation to what DeLeire and Levy 
define as farm workers. There may be other occupations however that require frequent 
absences from home, which would deter, for example, single parents from being 
employed in such an occupation.
To find out precisely which occupations involve the most working away from home, 
data from the Skills Survey 2001 is used. The survey asks respondents where their job 
requires them to mainly work, to which they can answer at home, same grounds as 
home, at a fixed workplace, at a variety of places or working on the move. Table 6.9 
shows for each occupation, the percentage of responses for each option.
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Table 6.9: Main Place o f  Work by Occupation (Full-Time and Part-Time Workers o f
all Agesj 2001
SOC 2000 At
Home
Same grounds 
as home
Fixed
workplace
Variety of 
Places
Working on 
the Move
11 5.00 1.60 73.40 18.40 1.60
1 2 4.00 5.60 73.60 12.80 4.00
21 3.64 1 .2 1 73.33 21.82 0 .0 0
2 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 81.40 18.60 0 .0 0
23 2.41 4.02 80.32 12.85 0.40
24 12.93 0 .8 6 56.03 30.17 0 .0 0
31 5.21 2.08 79.17 13.54 0 .0 0
32 1.05 0.53 71.05 26.84 0.53
33 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 64.00 30.00 6 .0 0
34 16.67 1 .1 1 57.78 23.33 1 .1 1
35 4.06 0 .0 0 67.16 21.77 7.01
41 2.81 0.43 92.21 4.11 0.43
42 4.65 0.58 93.60 1.16 0 .0 0
51 0 .0 0 10.34 37.93 48.28 3.45
52 0 .0 0 0.78 72.55 24.71 1.96
53 0 .0 0 1.37 20.55 77.40 0 .6 8
54 3.03 2 .0 2 83.84 11.11 0 .0 0
61 5.80 1.79 70.09 19.64 2 .6 8
62 3.36 0.96 73.42 20.39 1.87
71 0.80 0.40 89.96 5.62 3.21
72 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 95.24 4.76 0 .0 0
81 0.83 0.83 84.17 14.17 0 .0 0
82 0 .0 0 0.59 30.18 5.92 63.31
91 1.23 2.45 77.30 19.02 0 .0 0
92 0.34 1.03 80.69 1 0 .0 0 7.59
Data: Skills Survey 2001
The majority of occupations involve mainly working at a fixed workplace. As 
predicted, Transport and Mobile Machine Drivers and Operatives (82) involve lots of 
working on the move, with 63 per cent saying their work involves doing mainly this; 
no other occupation comes close to this in terms of working on the move. There are 
occupations however, that have a high percentage of respondents saying they work in 
a variety of places and on the move; for example, for Skilled Agricultural Trades (51) 
48 per cent work in a variety of places. However, for this occupation, working in a 
variety of places is most likely to be defined as working in a variety of fields, within
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the local vicinity. Skilled Agricultural workers are unlikely to work great distances 
from home on a regular basis that requires overnight stays. This occupation is 
therefore unlikely to be avoided because of a dislike for work-related absences from 
home, and therefore unlikely to deter single parents for this reason alone. For Skilled 
Construction and Building Trades (53), 77 per cent work in a variety of places. 
Although this would not always involve working from home, construction workers 
could regularly be sent out on temporary contracts away from home that would 
involve spending a certain number of days away. This may deter certain family 
groups (especially parents) from choosing this occupation.
Following the results of the above analysis, the model is repeated omitting two 
occupations that involve the most work away from home, and hence the most likely to 
be avoided by certain family groups. These are Transport and Mobile Machine 
Drivers and Operatives (82), and Skilled Construction and Building Trades (53). 
These occupations also have some of the highest death rates (4th and 5th). There could 
therefore be a correlation between fatality rates and frequent absences from home.
The fatal and major injury parameter estimates from the conditional logit model 
omitting the two occupations are reported in Appendix 6.11. We are interested in 
whether the pattern of results observed before, in terms of the magnitude of the risk 
coefficients, changes when the two occupations are omitted. Overall, women remain 
more averse to risky work than men. For both men and women, having children 
continues to increase aversion to risky work for all groups.
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Overall, there are no major differences between this and the previous estimation, 
indicating that the omission of an absence from home variable is not driving the 
observed occupation choice pattern between family groups.
6.5.4 Number of Children
In order to consider if the number of children a worker has influences their aversion to 
occupation risk, the model is re-estimated splitting the family groups further. For each 
marital status group, a further group for workers with two of more children is created.
Table 6.10: Conditional Logit Estimates: Families with Two or More Children
Single Men M arried Men SDW Men
No. o f  obs 1664 8439 452
Log Likelihood -4461.846 -24043.214 -1307.148
Fatal
Coefficient -260.406*** -187.396*** -186.492***
Standard error (31.674) (10.662) (47.407)
M ajor Injury
Coefficient 2.948*** 4.648*** 3.907***
Standard error (0.599) (0.182) (0.781)
Single Women M arried Women SDW Women
No. o f obs 1924 6448 1211
Log Likelihood -4319.771 -17251.990 -3235.752
Fatal
Coefficient -279.018*** -220.488*** -287.704***
Standard error (66.239) (21.063) (56.343)
M ajor Injury
Coefficient -0.437 -0.510 0.944
Standard error (1.062) (0.409) (0.979)
Data: LFS 2002-2004, Skills Survey 2001, HSE 2002/03-2004/05.
Other variables included in estimation: Strength, Stamina, Hands, Tools, Writelg, Calc, Stat, Caring, 
Special, Analyse, Mytime, Usepc, Speech, Persuade, Listen, Motiv, Future and Percentc 
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Table 6.10 illustrates that the presence of more than one child increases aversion to 
fatal risk for all groups, compared to the estimation results reported in Table 6 .6 . This
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suggests that the greater the number of dependents, the least likely a worker is likely 
to be employed in an occupation with a high risk of death.
6.6 Occupational Gender Segregation
Having established that gender does appear to influence the effect that risk has upon 
occupational choice, it would be interesting to calculate the contribution of this to 
occupational gender segregation. Regardless of whether the observed differences in 
occupation risk are due to preferences or discrimination, it is still possible to 
determine how much less occupational gender segregation there would be if all jobs 
had equal risk rates.
The Duncan and Duncan (1955) Index of Dissimilarity is calculated as shown by 
equation 9:
D4£i/,-m,i pi
Z  7=1
where mj and fj refer to the predicted number of men and women in occupation j.
Conditional logit models are estimated separately for men and women, and the 
predicted probabilities used to calculate the Duncan index. To consider whether 
occupational gender segregation would be less if all occupations had equal risk, risk is 
counterfactually set equal to the same level in all occupations and a new set of 
predicted probabilities calculated. In addition to the sample used here, indices are also
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calculated for full-time workers aged 25-34 years to enable comparison with DeLeire 
and Levy’s US estimates.
Table 6.11: Index o f Segregation
All Workers Full Time Aged 25-34
Index with Actual Risk 50.4% 44.7%
Index with Equal Risk 48.7% 40.4%
Percentage fall in index 3.3% 9.6%
To achieve an identical distribution of men and women across occupations, 50.4 per 
cent of women would have to change jobs. However, if risk were equal across 
occupations, 48.7 per cent of women would have to change occupations. Thus, 
occupational gender segregation would fall by 3.3 per cent if risk were equal across 
all occupations. For the full time aged 25-34 sample, occupational gender segregation 
would fall by 9.6 per cent if risk were equal across occupations. This is still smaller 
than the effect calculated for the US by DeLeire and Levy, who calculate a large fall 
in the index from 42.5 per cent to 24.2 per cent. However, there are generally higher 
risk rates for occupations in the US than in the UK. For instance, the most risky 
occupation found by DeLeire and Levy (Forestry and Fishing Occupations) has a 
death rate per 100 workers of 0.0872, whereas for the equivalent sample, the 
occupation with the highest death rate in the UK (Skilled Agricultural Trades) has a 
death rate of 0.0223 per 100 workers. We therefore expect risk to contribute less to 
occupational gender segregation in the UK.
The fineness of the occupation classification will affect the calculated risk rates. 
Consequently, this breakdown will affect the calculated index of segregation. DeLeire 
and Levy do not discuss how their breakdown of occupations affects results. For 
instance, their model is estimated for 44 occupations. If there were fewer occupations,
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we may expect occupations to be less gender segregated. On the other hand, if they 
were to increase the number of occupations, gender segregation would rise. Dolton 
and Kidd (1994) highlight this as being important when considering gender 
segregation, as “the more detailed the occupation breakdown, the greater the 
contribution of gender differences in occupation distribution to the overall gender 
wage differential” (p.461). Therefore, the model is estimated and indices of 
segregation calculated for 3 digit (81 occupations) occupations according to SOC 
2000.
Table 6.12: Index o f Segregation with 3 Digit Occupational Classification (81 
Occupations)
All Workers Full Time Aged 25-34
Index with Actual Risk 46.2% 42.7%
Index with Equal Risk 37.6% 37.9%
Percentage fall in index 18.6% 1 1 .2 %
The results using the 3 digit breakdown show that occupational gender segregation 
falls by 18.6 per cent for all workers and by 1 1 . 2  per cent for full time workers when 
risk is equal between 3 digit occupations. As predicted, the contribution of injury risk 
to gender segregation is more pronounced the finer the classification. This highlights 
the importance of considering the breakdown of occupations when calculating this 
index.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted how worker preferences for hazardous work translate 
into occupation sorting. Using gender and family composition to proxy risk aversion, 
tests have supported the hypothesis that women prefer safer work. The analysis
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further shows that within gender, occupation sorting occurs by family structure, with 
evidence that single parents select into occupations with low accident risk. Workers 
therefore, do appear to have different preferences for risky work, highlighting the 
importance of worker heterogeneity. Furthermore, differences in accident risk 
between occupations contribute to occupational gender segregation, with the degree of 
segregation falling slightly if there were no differences in accident rates between 
occupations. The analysis also highlights the importance of measuring risk, with the 
aggregation of occupations affecting results.
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CHAPTER 7
RISK PREFERENCES AND SMOKING BEHAVIOUR
7.1 Introduction
The compensating wage differentials theory centres around the observation that jobs 
differ in their degree of risk, and workers differ in their willingness to accept such 
risks with some requiring higher wage premiums than others. Risk aversion therefore 
varies between individuals, and chapter 6  examines whether we can use gender and 
family composition to predict how averse a person will be to accident risk. Hersch and 
Viscusi (1990) however, comment upon the lack of such research, as “the literature 
has not addressed the differences in wage-risk tradeoffs in great detail” (p.203). Bonin 
et al. (2006) summarize that in fact “very little is known empirically about how 
individual attitudes towards risk affect sorting into occupations” (p.2 ) because in 
practice risk preferences are difficult to measure. There are likely to be many other 
personal characteristics in addition to gender and family composition that may help us 
to recognise which workers will select into relatively more risky occupations.
Evans and Montgomery (1994) consider a person’s health, observing that the decision 
to lead a healthy lifestyle “is not randomly distributed in the population” (p.l). If 
health habits are revealing a person’s value of the future, they could potentially be 
used to proxy risk aversion. For instance, if a person smokes cigarettes even though 
they are aware of the health risks, they could be revealing a lower level of risk
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aversion compared to a non-smoker. This chapter seeks to investigate if there is a 
relationship between smoking and occupation-specific accident risk.
7.2 Background
The number of smokers in Great Britain has followed a downward trend since the 
1970s. Using data from the GHS 2005, the ONS reports that 45 per cent of adults 
smoked in 1979 which fell to 35 per cent by 1982. It has since declined gradually to 
28 per cent in 1998/99 to 25 per cent in 2004/05 (ONS, 2006, p. 10). During this 
period of decline, many medical studies have highlighted the health consequences of 
smoking. ONS (2006) summarises the key findings. Highlighting the detrimental 
effect smoking has upon health, 6  per cent (or 560,000) of all hospital admissions of 
adults aged 35 or over in England in 2004/05 were estimated to be attributable to 
smoking. Illnesses included cancer, respiratory disease, circulatory disease and 
digestive system disorders. Lung cancer is the disease most associated with smoking, 
with 85 per cent of all lung cancer hospital admissions estimated to be due to 
smoking52 (ONS, 2006, p. 100). In terms of smoking-related deaths, the same report 
states that in England and Wales in 2004, 18 per cent of deaths amongst adults aged 
35 or over were caused by smoking (p. 101).
ONS (2006) also reports relative risks of a smoker aged 35 or over dying from various 
diseases compared to a person who has never smoked . Key relative risk statistics are 
reported in Table 7.1, with a value greater than one indicating an increased risk of 
death. As illustrated, smokers face a much greater risk of death from a number of
52 Including passive smoking.
53 These figures are derived from Health Education Authority (1998).
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diseases because of their smoking compared to someone who has never smoked. The 
figures for ex-smokers also illustrate how quitting smoking can have a positive 
impact, with risk of death significantly lower compared to current smokers54.
Table 7.1: Relative Risks for Fatal Diseases for Current and Ex Smokers by Gender
Male Smoker Female Smokers
Disease caused by 
Smoking
Current
Smokers
Ex Smokers Current
Smokers
Ex Smokers
Lung Cancer 26.6 8.2 13.6 4.1
Oesophagus Cancer 5.3 4.0 9.3 3.1
Chronic Obstructive 
lung disease
14.1 8.4 14.0 8.6
Stomach Ulcer 4.5 1.6 6.4 1.4
Aortic Aneurysm 5.3 2.6 8.2 1.6
Source: ONS (2006) Table B.3 p. 133
We need to consider whether people are aware of these large health risks. 
Government campaigns over recent years have sought to ensure the public are well 
informed about the dangers of smoking. The Department of Health published white 
papers in 199855 and 200456 which set out targets and strategies for reducing the 
number of smokers. One such strategy was to end tobacco advertisements, and to 
encourage and help smokers to quit. The campaign has since culminated with a ban on 
smoking in public places, which since 1st July 2007 has been in place in all parts of 
the UK. ONS (2005) reports that the public are in favour of the ban, with 91 per cent 
in favour of it in restaurants, 8 6  per cent in favour of it in work, and 65 per cent in 
favour of it in public houses. Given the public support for the ban it seems reasonable 
to conclude that the vast majority are aware of the health risks of cigarette smoke, 
both first and second hand.
54 Although these figures refer to all ex-smokers and do not consider how risk changes with the number 
o f  years a person has not smoked, or how heavy a smoker a person was.
55 Smoking Kills -  A White Paper on Tobacco
56 Choosing Health: Making Healthier Choices Easier
286
Compensating wage differential research involves estimating a standard wage 
equation as depicted by equation 1 in chapter 5. As discussed in chapter 3B.1, long- 
run points of equilibrium trace out a wage-risk market offer curve; firms locate along 
it according to their ability to provide job safety, and workers locate according to their 
preferences. The p estimate obtained through regression analysis is the point of 
tangency between a firm’s wage offer curve and a worker’s indifference curve. 
Individuals select a point on the market offer curve, choosing a particular combination 
of risk and its equivalent wage premium, based on their attitude towards risk. Workers 
who are more willing to accept risk will select employment with a relatively large 
hazard rate and receive a wage premium for this exposure.
Long-run equilibrium in the labour market depends upon both labour supply, in terms 
of worker preferences for risk and risk compensation, but also upon firms’ labour 
demand for a particular type of worker. Considering first labour supply, Hersch and 
Viscusi (1990) comment, “there have been only a few attempts to distinguish 
differences in willingness to bear job risk” (p.203). Levine et al. (1997) comment that 
“since the pleasures associated with smoking occur today, while the adverse health 
consequences are largely concentrated in the future, the decision to smoke may reflect 
a high rate of time preference” (p.494). Smokers could also smoke cigarettes because 
they value their health less, and so smoking behaviour is simply reflecting a person’s 
preference towards risk. Alternatively, smokers could undervalue the losses they will 
suffer. Given recent government campaigns designed to increase awareness of the 
health consequences of smoking, it seems reasonable to conclude smokers have some 
knowledge of the effects upon their health.
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Firms’ labour demand could also potentially vary according to workers smoking 
behaviour, for many reasons. Levine et al. (1997) notes how “mild public intolerance 
of smoking has developed into fairly widespread hostility” (p.493) which they 
hypothesise could result in discrimination against smokers that reduces both their 
wages and employment prospects. They discuss numerous reasons through which 
smoking could affect worker productivity. The detrimental effect upon a person’s 
health may mean smoking interferes with the ability to carry out manual tasks. 
Through a similar argument, smokers are likely to have higher absence rates, with 
Bertera (1991) estimating that smokers miss an average of one additional work day 
per year due to illness compared to non-smokers. Levine et al. (1997) also cite 
negative effects on staff morale as a potential reason for smokers to impact upon an 
entire workforce’s productivity. Although Levine et al. (1997) find smokers earn 4-8 
per cent less than non-smokers controlling for differences between the groups, they 
find no evidence that smokers have lower productivity. Viscusi and Hersch (2001) 
find that smokers are more hazard prone on the job and in their personal actions, and 
are hence “less efficient in the production of safety” (p.279) with this affecting labour 
demand for smokers. The argument that smokers have different market opportunities 
than non-smokers rests upon the assumption that firms are aware of workers’ smoking 
behaviour. As Viscusi and Hersch (2001) emphasise, “firms must either observe 
smoking status directly or observe other characteristics correlated with smoking 
status” (p.270). They acknowledge that if this is not observed, labour supply factors 
alone will determine how smokers, as a proxy for risk preferences, sort into 
occupations with varying hazard rates.
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Hersch and Viscusi (1990) examine the labour supply side of the market, in terms of 
how smoking behaviour as a proxy for risk aversion influences the risk premium 
smokers require. The theory predicts that smokers, as relatively less risk averse, 
should sort into riskier jobs and receive a greater total risk premium than non-smokers 
for doing so. Smokers however, should require a smaller premium per unit of risk 
than non-smokers. This proposition is tested using US data. They modify the hedonic 
wage equation to include a Risk*Smoker variable, as denoted by equation 1:
LnYj = |3o + PiXj + P2R, + PsRj * Smoker + ej [ 1 ]
As predicted, Hersch and Viscusi (1990) estimate a negative P3 coefficient, indicating 
that smokers receive a smaller risk premium per unit of increased risk compared to 
non-smokers.
As an alternative way of investigating the relationship between smoking and risk 
premiums, Viscusi and Hersch (2001) develop a model that enables them to consider 
both demand and supply sides of the market. Whereas Hersch and Viscusi (1990) 
showed that smokers are more willing to work in risky jobs and require a smaller risk 
premium per unit of risk, Viscusi and Hersch (2001) consider the possibility that 
smokers also face different market opportunities to non-smokers. If smokers do 
indeed face different market opportunities, smokers may face a separate offer curve 
and the econometric model given by equation 1 would not be appropriate. Instead, 
separate wage regressions would need to be estimated for smokers and non-smokers. 
Their results indicate that smokers work in occupations with greater hazard rates. Also 
as predicted, the magnitude of the risk premium is greater in the non-smoker 
estimation than the smoker estimation, suggesting non-smokers are more risk averse
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and hence require a larger premium as compensation per unit of risk. However, as 
smokers are exposed to greater job risk, the theory predicts that total risk payments 
should be greater for smokers, as they select a point further along the market offer 
curve. Results show the opposite however, with smokers receiving considerably less 
total risk compensation than non-smokers. As they comment “such a finding is 
inconsistent with smokers and non-smokers facing the same wage offer curve” 
(p.269). Relating back to the arguments for smokers potentially having lower 
productivity, they suggest that smokers face a lower wage offer curve than non- 
smokers, with smokers less efficient in the production of safety. As a consequence of 
such labour demand factors, firms will offer lower wage compensation for smokers. 
Such a phenomenon however, assumes they observe smoking status.
To summarise, smoking is shown in these two US papers to be a significant predictor 
of a worker’s preferences for risky work with smokers selecting riskier jobs and 
requiring lower premiums per unit of risk. The relationship between smoking and risk 
is however, shown to also be influenced by labour demand factors, with firms who 
observe smoking status offering smaller risk compensation for smokers, possibly 
because they believe them to be less productive and more hazard prone. Viscusi and 
Hersch (2001) summarize that “an economically interesting aspect of this 
heterogeneity is that the pattern of influences suggests that both the supply and 
demand components of the hedonic market equilibrium vary with smoking status” 
(p.279). The relationship between cigarette smoking, work-related risk and risk 
premiums will be investigated using UK data.
As highlighted in chapters 3 and 5, research in the compensating wage differential 
literature has been plagued by problems of unobserved heterogeneity. Garen (1988)
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proposes an instrumental variables method for obtaining unbiased estimates of the 
compensating wage differential. The first stage involves estimating the fatal risk 
equation [2]:
f  = 7io + tciXi + 712X2 + 713Z + r| [2 ]
where X2 proxies risk aversion, Z is non-wage income, and r) is unobserved 
heterogeneity. The disturbance term may depend on the wage equation (equation 1) 
disturbances as workers with unobservable characteristics that make them more 
productive in risky jobs, will choose higher f. The second stage of the estimation 
involves estimating equation 3, which uses the disturbances obtained through the risk 
estimation:
Y = Rfi + y,T)+y2j j . f  + </> [3]
where 7 = f ~ X n  and n  the OLS estimate of 7i from equation 2. The challenge
facing researchers is to find a suitable measure of risk aversion to enable estimation of 
equation 2. A suitable instrument must be correlated with risk but uncorrelated with 
the observed determinants of earnings. Instruments are frequently found to be 
unsatisfactory, and were largely insignificant in risk regressions in chapter 5.
The problem of finding suitable instruments in two-stage estimation is not a problem 
restricted to compensating wage differentials research. In the returns to education 
literature for instance, OLS estimates are considered biased because individuals with 
greater ability will acquire more schooling and thus have greater earnings. To correct 
for such bias, an instrument that is correlated with schooling but not with ability needs 
to be found. Evans and Montgomery (1994) using US data test whether a person
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smoked at 18 is a suitable instrument to use in their estimation of the returns to 
education. They argue smoking is probably the most suitable health habit to use as an 
instrument, as “many health habits, such as heavy drinking, may directly effect a 
worker’s current productivity and hence his wage” (p.8). However, subsequent 
research has shown smokers receive lower wages (Levine et al. 1997) and may also 
have lower productivity (Viscusi and Hersch 2001). Whether a person smoked at 18 
rather than whether they currently smoke however, is unlikely to have an impact upon 
their current wages or productivity. Using a similar argument to Evans and 
Montgomery, smoking behaviour, current or past, could be used as an instrument to 
proxy risk aversion in the compensating wage differential research. If smoking is 
correlated with risk and uncorrelated with ability, it may be a valid instrument.
This chapter will investigate if there is a relationship between smoking and the injury 
risk of a person’s chosen occupation. If there is a relationship, the appropriateness of 
using smoking behaviour as an instrument to proxy risk aversion will be considered. 
Finally, in an analysis similar to Hersch and Viscusi (1990) and Viscusi and Hersch 
(2001), the premiums that smokers and non-smokers receive for exposure to risk of 
injury at work will be compared.
7.3 Data and Sample
The BHPS is a nationally representative survey with a stratified clustered sample. In 
the first wave (1991), approximately 5 000 households were included in the sample, 
resulting in around 10 000 individual interviews. Individuals are re-interviewed 
annually, with any new household members also added to the sample. Wave 14 
(2004) is the most recent data available, and so this is used as the base data set to
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provide information on individuals and their current occupation. In each wave the 
survey asks respondents if they smoke, and so in addition to current smoking 
behaviour, the BHPS allows variables to be derived relating to if they have classed 
themselves to be a smoker at any time between 1991 and 2004. In addition, wave 9 
asks respondents the age at which they began to smoke. This information can be used 
to construct variables relating to whether a respondent smoked at age 16 and/or 18, as 
in Evans and Montgomery (1994).
The sample constructed for this analysis consists of full time workers with 
respondents from Northern Ireland, the self-employed57, and those who work less than 
30 hours per week excluded58. Tests are usually restricted to samples of men as 
historically men have had higher smoking rates, with the male smoking rate declining 
in the 1960s and the female rate increasing in the 1960s and then declining in the late 
1970s (Evans and Montgomery, 1994, p.29). Farrell and Fuchs (1982) argue that the 
male rate declined because of an increase in health risk knowledge, but “female 
smoking trends were confounded by other broader social trends” (p.226). Supporting 
this view, in using smoking behaviour as an instrument for ability in education 
estimations, Evans and Montgomery find the negative correlation between smoking 
and education to be much weaker among women than among men. In total, three 
samples are constructed; one for men and women, and also for men and women 
separately.
The average occupational injury rates are constructed using data from the HSE, as 
described and reported in the Accident Risk Appendices. Three variables denoting an
57 Due to the fact that the occupation-specific death and injury variables do not relate to Northern 
Ireland or the self-employed.
58 As part-time workers will be exposed to a smaller injury risk than the occupation-specific variable 
captures.
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occupations Fatal, Major Injury, and Over 3-day Injury risk are matched into the 
BHPS data set using respondents’ current occupation coded at the 3 digit SOC 2000. 
In addition, the BHPS asks whether a respondent has had any kind of accident that 
resulted in a visit to a doctor or hospital in the last 12 months. Such accidents will 
include, amongst others, work accidents. This variable should capture a degree of 
individual-specific accident risk in addition to the average occupation risk captured by 
the HSE derived variables.
7.4 Descriptive Statistics
If smoking is to be used as a proxy for risk aversion, in that we expect smokers to 
engage in riskier behaviour than non-smokers, then we may expect smokers and non- 
smokers to differ in many ways. A descriptive analysis is conducted to consider if 
there are significant differences between smokers and non-smokers in terms of 
personal and work characteristics.
A series of variables are constructed from the BHPS, with the full list reported in 
Appendix 7.1. Several smoking dummy variables are derived. Smoker indicates if the 
respondent currently smokes. As the amount of cigarettes a person smokes may be 
important, lightsmoke indicates those that smoke between 1 and 15 cigarettes per day 
and modsmoke denotes those that smoke 16 or more per day. As previous smoking 
behaviour may be related to current occupational choice, evsmoke denotes whether the 
respondent has reported themselves as being a smoker in any of the BHPS waves. 
Whether a person smoked at age 16 or 18 may be the most appropriate measure to 
use; given the addictive nature of smoking some smokers may want to give up but are 
unable to. Supporting this, ONS (2006) reports that 72 per cent of smokers said they
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wanted to give up in 2005 with 80 per cent of smokers reporting attempting to give up 
at some point in the past (p.59). By using a variable denoting whether they smoked at 
a specific age, we are capturing risk aversion at a particular point in a respondent’s 
life. Smoke 16 and smoke 18 identify those individuals who smoked at age 16 and 18 
respectively. Table 7.2 reports descriptive statistics for a whole sample and a male and 
female sample.
Approximately 26 per cent of all full-time workers in the sample currently smoke, 
with a greater percentage of men smoking compared to women. This is in line with 
the ONS estimate that 25 per cent of adults currently smoke. The majority of these 
smokers are light smokers with just 9 per cent of the whole sample reporting smoking 
16 cigarettes or more per day. The percentage of the sample that has ever smoked is 
much higher than the percentage of current smokers however, with 37 per cent 
reporting they were smokers at some point between 1991 and 2004.
Table 7.2: Smoking Variables: Mean and Standard Deviation
WHOLE SAMPLE MALE SAMPLE FEMALE SAMPLE
Smoker 0.2622 0.2767 0.2410
(0.4399) (0.4475) (0.4278)
Lightsmoke 0.1549 0.1563 0.1530
(0.3619) (0.3632) (0.3601)
Modsmoke 0.0912 0.1124 0.0623
(0.2880) (0.3159) (0.2417)
Evsmoke 0.3715 0.3895 0.3470
(0.4833) (0.4877) (0.4761)
Smoke 16 0.2313 0.1737 0.2300
(0.4217) (0.3789) (0.4210)
Smoke 18 0.2616 0.2252 0.1564
(0.4396) (0.4178) (0.3633)
Means and standard deviations for all derived variables for the whole sample of men 
and women are reported in Table 7.3. The sample is also split by current smoking
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behaviour (using the dummy variable smoker) to enable means to be compared. T 
tests are reported to enable us to consider if any differences between smokers and 
non-smokers are statistically significant59.
Table 7.3: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, Standard Deviation and T Test)
VARIABLES WHOLE
SAMPLE
SMOKERS NON-
SMOKERS
T TEST
Obs 4844 1270 3574
Fatal 0.0169
(0.0343)
0.0235
(0.0405)
0.0150
(0.0320)
6.7664***
Major Injury 2.4311
(3.0133)
3.1392
(3.3709)
2.2094
(2.8420)
8.7830***
Over 3-day 
Injury
10.0356
(15.3638)
13.0789
(16.9708)
9.0341
(14.5852)
7.5594***
Accident 0.1076
(0.3099)
0.1307
(0.3372)
0.0993
(0.2991)
2.9337***
Noaccident 0.1161
(0.3606)
0.1488
(0.4153)
0.1088
(0.3448)
3.0763***
Age 38.5965
(12.0886)
36.5394
(12.0860)
39.2918
(12.0107)
7.0033***
Racew 0.8941
(0.3077)
0.8740
(0.3320)
0.9032
(0.2957)
2.7684***
Raceb 0.0070
(0.0836)
0.0087
(0.0927)
0.0062
(0.0782)
0.8586
Raceo 0.0173
(0.1303)
0.0110
(0.1045)
0.0199
(0.1396)
2.3743**
EducO 0.1553
(0.3622)
0.1984
(0.3990)
0.1086
(0.3111)
7.2733***
Educl 0.2029
(0.4022)
0.1053
(0.3070)
0.2451
(0.4302)
12.4546***
Educ2 0.3134
(0.4639)
0.2943
(0.4559)
0.3319
(0.4710)
2.4641**
Educ3 0.3270
(0.4692)
0.3995
(0.4900)
0.3136
(0.4640)
5.4405***
Married 0.5118
(0.4999)
0.3819
(0.4860)
0.5560
(0.4969)
10.7867***
Cohabmarr 0.7030
(0.4570)
0.6449
(0.4787)
0.7224
(0.4479)
5.0388***
SDW 0.0816
(0.2737)
0.0984
(0.2980)
0.0758
(0.2648)
2.3883**
Nevermarr 0.2154
(0.4111)
0.2567
(0.4370)
0.2017
(0.4014)
3.9341***
Disabled 0.0213 0.0228 0.0210 0.3727
59 Equal variance tests are also conducted. T tests therefore adjust for unequal variance when 
appropriate.
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(0.1444) (0.1494) (0.1434)
Childlive 0.5288
(0.8773)
0.5157
(0.8944)
0.5411
(0.8782)
0.8811
Health 3.0121
(0.8090)
2.8684
(0.8250)
3.0588
(0.8013)
7.2170***
Workhealth 0.0818
(0.2740)
0.0898
(0.2860)
0.0789
(0.2697)
1.1840
Permanent 0.9686
(0.1744)
0.9606
(0.1946)
0.9715
(0.1665)
1.7782*
Supervise 0.4115
(0.4922)
0.3668
(0.4821)
0.4300
(0.4951)
3.9343***
Public 0.2796
(0.4488)
0.1960
(0.3972)
0.3031
(0.4597)
7.9094***
Noemps 2.7289
(1.7006)
2.5900
(1.6529)
2.7757
(1.7168)
3.3432***
Nohrs 38.4717
(6.3315)
39.1524
(7.2919)
38.2456
(5.9680)
3.9830***
Paidover 2.0824
(4.8214)
3.1094
(6.1230)
1.7949
(4.2941)
7.0587***
Overtime 4.1951
(6.2183)
4.5921
(6.7547)
4.2101
(6.0774)
1.7761
Wkgrosspay 438.2054
(432.0232)
373.4915
(221.0807)
461.0372
(482.9920)
8.5946***
Bonus 0.3141
(0.4642)
0.2955
(0.4564)
0.3207
(0.4668)
1.6621*
Perfpay 0.1582
(0.3649)
0.1264
(0.3324)
0.1695
(0.3752)
3.8337***
Presunion 0.5284
(0.4992)
0.4636
(0.4989)
0.5512
(0.4974)
5.3868***
Unionmemb 0.6289
(0.4832)
0.5839
(0.4933)
0.6423
(0.4795)
3.7000***
Flexitime 0.1493
(0.3564)
0.1142
(0.3181)
0.1673
(0.3733)
4.8475
Scotland 0.2116
(0.4085)
0.2354
(0.4244)
0.2026
(0.4020)
2.3983**
Wales 0.1776
(0.3822)
0.1764
(0.3813)
0.1752
(0.3802)
0.0965
Northeast 0.0436
(0.2042)
0.0362
(0.1869)
0.0464
(0.2105)
1.6147
Northwest 0.0778
(0.2678)
0.0787
(0.2694)
0.0769
(0.2665)
0.2062
Yorkshire 0.0641
(0.2449)
0.0669
(0.2500)
0.0644
(0.2454)
0.3103
Eastmids 0.0591
(0.2358)
0.0583
(0.2343)
0.0613
(0.2399)
0.3851
Westmids 0.0549
(0.2277)
0.0472
(0.2122)
0.0562
(0.2304)
1.2689
Easteng 0.0277
(0.1642)
0.0339
(0.1809)
0.0255
(0.1575)
1.4688
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Southwest 0.0591
(0.2358)
0.0543
(0.2268)
0.0624
(0.2419)
1.0740
London 0.0595
(0.2365)
0.0575
(0.2328)
0.0588
(0.2352)
0.1705
Southeast 0.1310
(0.3374)
0.1323
(0.3389)
0.1312
(0.3377)
0.0996
Ownhouse 0.4957
(0.4033)
0.7000
(0.4584)
0.8548
(0.3524)
10.9404***
Newemp 0.2590
(0.4381)
0.3189
(0.4662)
0.2473
(0.4315)
4.7922***
Female 0.4227
(0.4940)
0.4334
(0.4957)
0.4394
(0.4964)
0.3701
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5%  level; *=significant at the 10% level
There are many significant differences between the two samples. Smokers are 
significantly younger, have fewer academic qualifications, have poorer health, and are 
less likely to be married or cohabiting or to own a house. Smokers are significantly 
more likely to work in occupations with higher average fatal and non-fatal injury 
rates. They are also more likely individually to have an accident of some type 
compared to non-smokers (indicated by the variable accident). Although smokers 
have significantly poorer health, they are not more likely to report that health 
problems mean performing work activities is difficult. There is therefore no evidence 
from this descriptive analysis that because of their poorer health, smokers have lower 
productivity. This variable does however, rely on self-reporting, and employers may 
disagree with some of the smoker’s responses. Non-smokers earn significantly more 
which is to be expected given that smokers are found to have fewer qualifications. 
However, smokers on average work more hours, both usual and overtime. A similar 
analysis is carried out separately for samples of male and female samples, with results 
reported in Appendix 7.2.
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The correlation between smoking and accident variables is considered, with 
correlation coefficients reported in Table 7.4. All correlation coefficients are positive, 
indicating current smokers are more likely to be employed in an occupation with a 
high fatal, major and over 3-day injury rate, and also more likely to have an 
individual-specific accident. However, the coefficients are statistically insignificant.
Table 7.4: Correlation Coefficients
Smoker
Fatal 0.1070
Major Injury 01356
Over 3-day Injury 0.1159
Accident 0.0419
Most compensating wage differential studies are conducted for samples of manual 
workers only; as they face the greatest injury risk at work, a significant risk premium 
is most likely to be found for this group of workers, as found in chapter 5. Therefore, 
the descriptive analysis is repeated for a sample that excludes non-manual workers60. 
Table 7.5 reports the means and standard deviations of the smoking variables.
Compared to the sample of all workers, a much greater percentage of manual workers 
currently smoke (37 per cent compared to 26 per cent). Similarly, a greater percentage 
of manual workers have reported smoking at least once in the panel. In fact, all 
smoking variables have greater means in the manual workers sample.
60 The following occupations are classed as manual: 51 skilled agricultural trades, 52 skilled metal and 
electrical trades, 53 skilled construction and building trades, 54 textiles, printing and other skilled 
trades, 61 caring personal service occupations, 62 leisure and other personal service occupations, 81 
process, plant and machine operatives, 82 transport and mobile machine drivers and operatives, 91 
elementary trades, plant and storage related occupations, 92 elementary service occupations.
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Table 7.5: Smoking Variable Means and Standard Deviations
MANUAL SAMPLE
Obs 1839
Smoker 0.3665
(0.4820)
Lightsmoke 0.2015
(0.4012)
Modhsmoke 0.1509
(0.3580)
Evsmoke 0.4717
(0.4993)
Smoke 16 0.2825
(0.4503)
Smoke 18 0.3236
(0.4680)
Dividing the manual sample into smokers and non-smokers, the differences between 
the accident risk variables are considered61. Results are reported in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6: Descriptive Statistics Manual Workers (Mean and Standard Deviation)
VARIABLES WHOLE
SAMPLE
SMOKERS NON-
SMOKERS
T TEST
Obs 1818 660 1123
Fatal 0.0388
(0.0477)
0.0409
(0.0019)
0.0384
(0.0014)
29.4321***
Major Injury 4.8314
(3.5926)
5.0247
(0.1396)
4.7516
(0.1061)
43.4249***
Over 3-day 
Injury
21.0302
(19.5703)
21.5593
(0.7423)
20.7081
(0.5868)
25.1940***
Accident 0.1311
(0.3375)
0.1558
(0.3629)
0.1167
(0.3212)
2.3487**
Noaccident 0.1429
(0.3971)
0.1766
(0.4528)
0.1279
(0.3660)
2.3487**
Wkgrosspay 343.0775
(171.9595)
331.3345
(170.8087)
349.8355
(172.3392)
2.1960**
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
T tests adjust for unequal variance when appropriate.
61 Differences between the other variables are very similar as to the previous sample and so results are 
not reported.
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The significant difference between the occupation-specific accident variables for 
smokers and non-smokers remains when workers are divided into manual and non- 
manual occupations. The individual-specific variable accident is also significant, 
indicating that smokers are more likely to have a personal accident, whether at home 
or at work.
7.5 Smoking as an Instrument
Efforts to control for risk endogeneity have been plagued by problems of finding 
suitable instruments to use in the risk estimation (equation 2). As outlined, a suitable 
instrument must be correlated with risk but uncorrelated with the observed 
determinants of earnings. Smoking behaviour could be used as an instrument to proxy 
risk aversion in the compensating wage differential research.
A risk regression is estimated using, in addition to the variables described in the 
descriptive section, a dummy variable denoting smoking behaviour. Several smoking 
dummy variables are tested reflecting current smoking behaviour, the amount of 
cigarettes smoked, whether the respondent has classed themselves as a smoker in any 
of the BHPS waves, and whether they smoked at age 16 and 18. Three sets of 
regressions are estimated by OLS using fatal, major injury and over 3-day injury as 
dependent variables. Following the literature, a set of industry dummy variables are 
included in the estimation as explanatory variables. Descriptive statistics for these 
industry dummies are reported in Appendix 7.3. Estimated coefficients for the 
smoking variables are reported in Table 7.7 with full results presented in Appendix 
7.4.
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Table 7.7: Risk Regression Smoking Estimates (Male and Female Workers Sample)
FATAL MAJOR
INJURY
OVER 3-DAY 
INJURY
No. Obs 4478 4478 4478
R2 0.2668 0.2543 0.2191
A d jR 2 0.2617 0.2491 0.2066
SMOKER 0.0040***
(0 .0 0 1 0 )
0.4010***
(0.0918)
1.5379***
(0.4844)
R2 0.2674 0.2545 0.2122
A d jR 2 0.2622 0.2492 0.2066
LIGHTSMOKE 0.0035***
(0 .0 0 1 2 )
0.4121***
(0.1103)
1.7633***
(0.5818)
MODSMOKE 0.0058***
(0.0016)
0.4358***
(0.1398)
1.2835*
(0.7376)
R2 0.2657 0.2540 0.2122
A d jR 2 0.2606 0.2488 0.2067
EVSMOKE 0.0027***
(0.0009)
0.3416***
(0.0824)
1.4223***
(0.4348)
R2 0.2644 0.2519 0.2112
AdjR2 0.2592 0.2467 0.2057
SMOKE 16 0.0004
(0 .0 0 1 1 )
0.2065**
(0.0935)
1.1027**
(0.4929)
R2 0.2645 0.2521 0.2112
A d jR 2 0.2594 0.2469 0.2057
SMOKE 18 0 . 0 0 1 1
(0 .0 0 1 0 )
0.2196**
(0.0893)
1.0297**
(0.4710)
Other variables included but not reported: married childlive disabled indl ind2 ind3 ind4 ind6 ind7 
ind8 ind9 indlO indl 1 in d l2 in d l3 educl educ2 educ3 newemp overtime permanent age age2 noemps 
noemps2 supervise public presunion flexitime nohrs
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
As found in chapters 3 and 5, there are few variables significantly related to 
occupation-specific risk with the potential instruments married, children and 
disability all insignificant. There does however, appear to be a relationship between 
occupation-specific risk and smoking even after controlling for industry and 
education. Current smokers work in occupations with higher fatal and major injury 
rates, as predicted. The two variables reflecting whether a respondent is a light or
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moderate smoker are also working in the expected way, with modsmoke more 
significant and having a greater magnitude in all estimations. Whether the respondent 
has classed themselves as a smoker in any of the waves (evsmoke) is also significantly 
positive in all three estimations. Smoke 16 and smoke 18 are also tested to capture 
smoking behaviour at a common age for all respondents. Although insignificant in the 
fatal estimations, they are both significantly positive in the non-fatal injury 
regressions.
The above estimations are also tested separately for a sample of male workers and 
female workers. The smoking coefficient estimates are reported in Appendix 7.5. 
Results are similar to those reported for the whole sample.
7.5.1 Tests
Many papers have highlighted how using weak instruments will lead to biased results 
of the risk premium, and so to consider if smoking variables are appropriate 
instruments, a number of tests need to be conducted. F tests are conducted after each 
risk regression. Bound et al. (1995) acknowledge that very often potential instruments 
are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable (p.443) and show that using 
weak instruments will result in estimates that are biased towards the original OLS 
estimation. Staiger and Stock (1997) recommend that when testing the strength of an 
instrument, the F statistic must take the value of at least 10. Similarly, Stock, Wright, 
and Yogo (2002) found that an F statistic of 9 or above is needed for an appropriate 
instrument. F statistics are reported for all smoking coefficients from all of the risk 
estimations (Table 7.8).
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Table 7.8: F  Tests
FATAL MAJOR INJURY OVER 3-DAY INJURY
SMOKER 15.04 19.09 10.08
Prob>F (0 .0 0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0.0015)
LIGHTSMOKE 7.95 13.97 9.18
Prob>F (0.0048) (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0.0025)
MODSMOKE 13.81 9.72 3.03
Prob>F (0 .0 0 0 2 ) (0.0018) (0.0819)
EVSMOKE 8.32 17.17 10.70
Prob>F (0.0039) (0 .0 0 0 0 ) (0 .0 0 1 1 )
SMOKE 16 0.14 4.88 5.01
Prob>F (0.7048) (0.0273) (0.0253)
SMOKE 18 1 .1 0 6.04 4.78
Prob>F (0.2943) (0.0140) (0.0289)
***=sjgnificant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
For the fatal risk regressions, the F statistic for smoking is greater than 10 for the 
smoker and modsmoke variables. For the major injury and over 3-day injury 
estimations both current smoking behaviour and evsmoke have large F statistics that 
are greater than 10 suggesting a strong correlation. The variables smoke 16 and 
smoke 18 however, have F statistics that do not satisfy the criteria laid out by Bound et 
al. (1995) for appropriate instruments. However, comparing these results to the F 
statistics obtained for the instruments in chapter 5 suggests smoking behaviour 
variables are much stronger instruments. For example, F statistics for disability and 
marriage were less than one.
We also need to consider if smoking behaviour has an independent impact upon 
wages. If smoking and wages are correlated, it will not be an appropriate instrument. 
Each smoking variable is used an explanatory variable in separate OLS wage 
regressions. Smoking coefficients are reported in Table 7.9.
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Table 7.9: Wage Regression Smoking Estimates
LNWAGE
SMOKER -0.0561***
(0.0144)
LIGHTSMOKE
MODSMOKE
-0.0549***
(0.0174)
-0.0587***
(0.0219)
EVSMOKE -0.0355***
(0.0129)
SMOKE 16 -0.0206
(0.0150)
SMOKE 18 -0.0192
(0.0142)
Other variables: educl educ2 educ3 racew disabled presunion age age2 permanent supervise public 
newemp noemps noemps2 perfpay flexitime nohrs overtime fatal major female.
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Results indicate that current smokers have significantly lower wages, even after 
controlling for personal characteristics such as education. Evsmoke has a similar 
magnitude. The impact upon wages is greatest for those who smoke more (indicated 
by modsmoke). However, whether a respondent smoked at age 16 or 18 has an 
insignificant impact upon wages, as may have been expected. Smoke 16 or smoke 18 
therefore, would appear to be the most appropriate instruments as they uncorrelated 
with wages. Unfortunately, smoke 16 and smoke 18 are only weakly correlated with 
risk, as shown by the F statistics in Table 7.8. These tests suggest smoking variables 
may not be appropriate instruments, and results need to be interpreted with this in 
mind. The fact that few studies have investigated this issue however, means that this 
result is still of interest.
Most compensating wage differential estimates are restricted to manual workers as 
they face the highest risk of injury at work and so it is most likely that a significant 
premium will be estimated for this group. In chapter 5, significant risk premiums are
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only found for manual workers. Therefore, if smoking behaviour is to be used as an 
instrument for risk aversion in the compensating wage differential research, we need 
to test if it is significant in a sample of manual workers. All variables included in the 
previous regression are included, with smoking coefficients reported in Table 7.10.
Table 7.10: Risk Regression Smoking Estimates
Dependent variable FATAL MAJOR
INJURY
OVER 3-DAY 
INJURY
No. Obs 1615 1615 1615
R2 0.2821 0.1763 0.1490
A d jR 2 0.2680 0.1602 0.1324
SMOKER 0.0017
(0 .0 0 2 2 )
0.1488
(0.1750)
0.1592
(0.9767)
R2 0.2823 0.1774 0.1499
Adj R2 0.2678 0.1607 0.1327
LIGHTSMOKE 0.0028
(0.0026)
0.3265
(0.2123)
1.0615
(1.1847)
MODSMOKE 0.0013
(0.0030)
-0.0571
(0.2419)
-0.8562
(1.3503)
R2 0.2819 0.1767 0.1492
A d jR 2 0.2679 0.1605 0.1325
EVSMOKE 0.0013
(0 .0 0 2 1 )
0.1947
(0.1667)
0.5385
(0.9303)
R2 0.2820 0.1760 0.1493
AdjR2 0.2680 0.1599 0.1326
SMOKE 16 -0.0017
(0.0023)
0.0596
(0.1837)
0.6786
(1.0248)
R2 0.2819 0.1759 0.1491
Adj R2 0.2679 0.1598 0.1324
SMOKE18 -0.0013
(0 .0 0 2 2 )
0.0053
(0.1762)
0 . 2 1 1 0
(0.9831)
Other variables included but not reported: married childlive disabled indl ind2 ind3 ind4 ind6 ind7 
ind8 ind9 indlO indl 1 in d l2 in d l3 educl educ2 educ3 newemp overtime permanent age age2 noemps 
noemps2 supervise public presunion flexitime nohrs.
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
The smoking variables are never significant in the manual workers sample. This could 
be for several reasons. The manual workers sample is small, with only 660
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respondents who currently smoke. Given that accident risk is small, the compensating 
wage differential research requires a large sample size in order for a significant effect 
to be estimated. Alternatively, the relationship between smoking and risk may not be 
as strong for male manual workers as it is for all workers.
Results of the above tests suggest that although there is a relationship between 
smoking behaviour and occupation-specific risk, smoking may not be a good 
instrument for risk aversion in compensating wage differential estimations.
7.6 Tests for Compensating Wage Differentials
To consider if wage premiums are found for exposure to risk in this BHPS sample, 
wage regressions are estimated. In chapter 5, positive wage premiums were found for 
exposure to fatal accident risk in the manual workers and male manual workers 
sample. Results are reported in Table 7.11.
Fatal is either negative or insignificant in all regressions, that is, there is no evidence 
of a wage premium for exposure to risk of death in any sample, unlike that found in 
the previous chapter. This is likely to be because of the smaller sample sizes here. For 
instance, for male manual workers, there was a sample of 3897 workers in chapter 5, 
compared to only 1064 here. This is likely to affect fatal in particular, due to the fact 
that there are some workers who work in an occupation with a zero value for this 
variable. Frequency tables reported in Appendix 7.6 show 8 per cent of the all manual 
sample have a zero value for fatal. Furthermore, there are few workers in the most 
dangerous occupations, with less than 1 per cent of the sample assigned the highest 
fatal value. For this reason, and because fatal risk is very small, a large sample size is
307
particularly important. In the two samples where positive fatal premiums are found in 
the WERS chapter (the manual workers and male manual workers samples) major 
injury is positive and significant. Major injury is highly correlated with fatal and there 
are no zero values. As fatal risk is so small in this sample therefore, we rely on major 
injury to reflect occupational accident risk.
Table 7.11: Wage Regression Risk Coefficients
Dependent variable: Lnwpay
ALL MANUAL MALE MALE MANUAL
WORKERS WORKERS WORKERS WORKERS
Obs 4017 1427 2366 1064
R2 0.4792 0.4581 0.4617 0.3910
A djR 2 0.4766 0.4504 0.4573 0.3800
FATAL -0.6820*** -0.0504 -0.8220*** -0.2021
(0.1999) (0.2095) (0.2095) (0.2165)
R2 0.4797 0.4620 0.4619 0.3932
Adj R2 0.4770 0.4540 0.4573 0.3816
FATAL -0.3587 -0.4771* -0.6683** -0.4663*
(0.2594) (0.0033) (0.2710) (0.2551)
MAJOR -0.0059* 0.0105*** -0.0030 0.0069**
INJURY (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0024)
R2 0.4795 0.4606 0.4605 0.3913
Adj R2 0.4769 0.4529 0.4561 0.3802
MAJOR -0.0086*** 0.0071*** -0.0082*** 0.0135*
INJURY (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0030)
Other variables: educl educ2 educ3 racew disabled presunion age age2 permanent supervise public 
newemp noemps noemps2 perfpay flexitime nohrs overtime (and female dummy for all workers 
sample)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
Following Hersch and Viscusi (1990) we first consider if smoking behaviour is a 
suitable proxy for risk preferences. Equation 1 is estimated by OLS. If smokers are 
relatively less risk averse compared to non-smokers, we would expect a significantly 
negative P3 estimate, as smokers demand a smaller wage premium per unit of risk 
exposed to compared to non-smokers. Smoking behaviour variables are each
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interacted with major injury and included as regressors in separate estimations. Table 
7.12 reports.
Table 7.12: Wage Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: Lnwage
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 1427 1067
R2 0.4607 0.3921
Adj R2 0.4526 0.3804
MAJOR INJURY 0.0076** 0.0057*
(0.0030) (0.0032)
MAJOR* SMOKER -0.0013 -0.0039
(0.0032) (0.0034)
R2 0.4609 0.3919
Adj R2 0.4528 0.3803
MAJOR INJURY 0.0067** 0.0029
(0.0028) (0.0030)
MAJOR*MODSMOKE 0.0036 0.0046
(0.0043) (0.0045)
R2 0.4607 0.3927
A d jR 2 0.4527 0.3811
MAJOR INJURY 0.0080*** 0.0057*
(0.0031) (0.0033)
MAJOR*EV SMOKE -0.0019 -0.0050
(0.0031) (0.0033)
R2 0.4609 0.3913
Adj R2 0.4529 0.3797
MAJOR INJURY 0.0061** 0.0037
(0.0030) (0.0031)
MAJOR* SMOKE 16 0.0033 -0 . 0 0 1 1
(0.0035) (0.0038)
R2 0.4610 0.3913
A d jR 2 0.4530 0.3796
MAJOR INJURY 0.0060** 0.0035
(0.0030) (0.0031)
MAJOR* SMOKE 18 0.0035 -0 . 0 0 0 2
(0.0033) (0.0036)
Other variables included in the estimation: educl educ2 educ3 racew disabled presunion age age2 
permanent supervise public newemp noemps noemps2 perfpay flexitime nohrs overtime female (for all 
manual sample)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Major injury is significantly positive in all the manual worker estimations, reflecting a 
positive wage premium is received by workers for exposure to major injury risk. 
However, the major *smoke variables are all insignificant. Smoking behaviour does 
not, therefore, appear to be related to the wage premium workers receive for working 
in hazardous jobs.
As smoking behaviour has been found in some studies to have an adverse impact 
upon wages, the above estimations are repeated including a separate smoking 
explanatory variable. Results are reported in Appendix 7.7. The major*smoke 
interaction variables remain insignificant, although the separate smoker variables are 
often significantly negative. Overall therefore, although smokers are employed in 
more hazardous occupations, even after controlling for personal characteristics, wage 
compensation does not significantly vary by smoking behaviour.
Following Viscusi and Hersch (2001), labour demand and supply factors are 
examined together. Wage regressions (equation 1) are estimated separately for 
samples of smokers and non-smokers. The sample is first split according to current 
smoker status {smoker) with estimated risk coefficients reported in Table 7.13. It 
should be noted that splitting the samples according to smoking behaviour results in 
very small sample sizes, particularly male manual smokers, with just 391 
observations.
The model is estimated separately for smokers and non-smokers and compared to the 
full model using a likelihood ratio test. A test statistic of 43.93 which is significant at 
the 1 per cent level is calculated. It is therefore appropriate to divide the model by
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smoking status. Results indicate significant injury premiums for smokers in both 
samples, with major injury insignificant in the non-smoker samples. Given that 
smokers face the highest risk, it is most likely that significant premiums will be 
estimated for this group of workers (the same argument applies here as to why 
significant premiums are observed for manual workers but not non-manual workers).
Table 7.13: Wage Estimation Risk Estimates (Split according to Smoker)
Dependent variable: Lnwpay
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
SMOKER NON SMOKER SMOKER NON SMOKER
Obs 518 909 391 673
R2 0.4739 0.4732 0.4264 0.3938
A d jR 2 0.4527 0.4613 0.3970 0.3762
MAJOR 0.0127*** 0.0042 0.0128* 0.0024
INJURY (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0038)
R2 0.4784 0.4732 0.4338 0.3940
A d jR 2 0.463 0.4607 0.4032 0.3754
MAJOR 0.0126*** 0.0042 0 .0 1 0 1 * 0.0026
INJURY (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0038)
ACCIDENT 0.0830** 0.0017 0.1005** -0.0191
(0.0404) (0.0371) (0.0458) (0.0414)
Other variables included in the estimation: educl educ2 educ3 racew disabled presunion age age2 
permanent supervise public newemp noemps noemps2 perfpay flexitime nohrs overtime (and female 
dummy for all workers)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
For comparison, estimations are repeated splitting the sample according to the other 
smoking variables. Results splitting the sample according to evsmoke are reported in 
Appendix 7.8. Results splitting the sample according to smoke 16 are reported in Table 
7.1462.
Likelihood ratio tests are performed splitting the model by smokeI6 and evsmoke. Test statistics o f  
38.40 for smoke 16 and 36.10 for evsmoke are estimated, both o f  which are significant at the 1 per cent 
level. Dividing the model by these variables is therefore appropriate.
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Significant risk premiums are estimated in most of the estimations. However, the 
same pattern that is observed in Viscusi and Hersch (2001) is not shown here. 
Workers that smoked at age 16 are shown in many of the regressions to receive 
greater risk premiums than those that did not. The major injury premium is however 
often insignificant in the non-smoker samples. Risk premium estimates appear to be 
much stronger in the samples of smokers. Risk premiums are more likely to be 
estimated for smokers who work in relatively riskier jobs, and it is likely that this is 
driving the results given the small sample size.
Table 7.14: Wage Estimation Risk Estimates (Split according to Smoke 16)
Dependent variable: Lnwpay
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
SMOKED NON SMOKER SMOKED NON SMOKER
AT 16 AT 16 AT 16 AT 16
Obs 401 1026 253 811
R2 0.4700 0.4754 0.3747 0.4179
Adj R2 0.4421 0.4649 0.3238 0.4039
MAJOR 0.0160*** 0.0038 0.0082 0.0028
INJURY (0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0063) (0.0034)
R2 0.4747 0.4755 0.3829 0.4181
A djR 2 0.4456 0.4646 0.3297 0.4033
MAJOR 0.0152*** 0.0037 0.0077 0.0027
INJURY (0.0049) (0.0033) (0.0062) (0.0034)
ACCIDENT 0.0899* 0.0180 0.1066* 0.0154
(0.0488) (0.0332) (0.0609) (0.0357)
Other variables included in estimation: educl educ2 educ3 racew disabled presunion age age2 
permanent supervise public newemp noemps noemps2 perfpay flexitime nohrs overtime female (for all 
manual sample)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
7.7 Conclusion
Descriptive analysis alone reveals that smokers are more likely to work in hazardous 
occupations. This suggests there is potential to use smoking behaviour as an
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instrument in compensating wage differential studies to proxy risk aversion. After 
exploring the relationship, this chapter has highlighted many problems with this. 
Although F tests reveal a strong relationship between risk and smoking behaviour in a 
sample of all workers, when the sample is restricted to male manual workers, the 
sample most commonly used in the compensating wage differential literature, the 
relationship is weak. Furthermore, smoking is significantly related to wages. Smoking 
variables therefore appear to be unsuitable instmments for use in this area of research.
In an attempt to replicate the US studies Hersch and Viscusi (1990) and Viscusi and 
Hersch (2002) the relationship between smoking and the risk premium is explored. 
Unlike these two papers, no significant relationship is found. One potential reason for 
this is small sample size, which is particularly important given that accident risk is 
very small.
This chapter has highlighted problems with finding and using a relationship between 
smoking and risk aversion. The issues raised here could, however, be explored 
further using a data set with a greater number of manual workers respondents who 
have higher accident rates.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Workplace health and safety remains a priority for government, with chapter 2 
outlining numerous strategies that are directed at reducing hazards at both the UK and 
EU level. The nature of workplace hazards is continually changing as the labour 
market evolves, for instance with an increase in stress related illnesses and the 
movement away from the more physical injuries, and so it is essential policy also 
evolves to reflect such changes. The large literature reviewed in chapter 3 reflects the 
need for continuous research to inform policy.
Labour market changes also have an indirect impact upon workplace safety. For 
example, the decline in trade union membership, the emergence of new industrial 
relations institutions, increases in female participation, and the increase in flexible 
hours, will all potentially present new health risks whilst removing others. Chapter 4 
investigates how such changes impact upon injuries and illnesses at the workplace 
level. Many workplace policies are found to have a potentially detrimental effect upon 
health and safety, such as night work, home work, working over 48 hours per week, 
and flexitime. However, there are also many positive points, with health and safety 
training found to reduce reported illnesses, and regular employee appraisals associated 
with fewer workplace injuries. Overall, this chapter highlights that even though 
deindustrialisation has seen an overall reduction in workplace accidents at the UK 
level, with the number of fatalities resulting from a workplace accident currently the
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lowest in Europe, the modem day labour market presents many new challenges for 
occupational health and safety.
Whereas chapter 4 is concerned with investigating how policy may be directed 
towards improving workplace health and safety, chapter 5 investigates if the market 
compensates workers for exposure to accident risk in the form of a wage premium. 
Chapter 3 discusses the large literature that examines this theory, although few UK 
papers have done so using recent data. Evidence that male manual workers receive a 
wage premium for exposure to risk of fatality is presented. Given the changing nature 
of industrial relations, in addition to considering the impact that trade unions have 
upon the risk premium, the health and safety committee impact is also considered. 
The trade union effect is negative, following the literature, although not always 
significant. A separate positive health and safety committee impact is found, and 
given that such institutions have no direct power to influence wages, this result 
suggests such committees have a positive impact upon the bargaining environment. 
Overall, this chapter points to the need to examine the impact that such institutions 
may have in addition to the trade union effect, which is especially important given the 
decline in union density. Research in this area would benefit from a closer 
examination into how health and safety committees operate, in order to have a clearer 
understanding of how they may influence the risk premium. The measurement error 
issues in this literature have been highlighted throughout, as two-stage estimation to 
control for the endogeneity of risk and unobserved heterogeneity suffers from a lack 
of appropriate instruments to proxy risk aversion. This problem can only be resolved 
with panel data that controls for heterogeneity, or with further research into how to
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proxy risk aversion which would require data with a wealth of information and 
manual worker respondents.
Variation in aversion to risk amongst workers is examined in the final two empirical 
chapters. Chapter 6  presents evidence that gender and family composition serve as 
proxies for risk aversion, with the hypothesis that women and single parents have a 
preference for occupations with lower accident rates supported. This finding is 
important and has many potential applications throughout the economic literature. In 
terms of the labour economics literature, this selection into occupations according to 
accident rates between men and women contributes to occupational gender 
segregation. There is also potential for the findings in chapter 6  to be applied to two- 
stage estimation with family composition a potential instrument to proxy risk aversion 
Chapter 7 then illustrates a relationship between smoking behaviour and risky work, 
although problems with this relationship are highlighted.. Both of these chapters 
however, highlight how workers appear to have different preferences for risky work, 
and demonstrate that personal characteristics and observed behaviour can be used to 
predict risk aversion, and consequently enable us to build a profile of workers that are 
likely to sort into hazardous occupations. Further work may try to apply this to two- 
stage estimation and examine other possible predictors of risk aversion.
It is essential that accurate data are available relating to accident rates of different 
occupations, and the Accident Risk Appendices discuss the many issues that need to 
be overcome to provide this. Both compensating wage differentials and risk 
preference research rely on the assumption that workers are aware of the hazards 
associated with their occupation relative to others. If workers are unaware of the risks,
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they are unable to sort themselves correctly into their preferred occupation. Given that 
chapter 4 highlighted the many factors that have an impact upon occupational health 
and safety, policy needs to be directed towards ensuring up to date statistics are 
available and communicated to firms and workers.
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ACCIDENT VARIABLE APPENDICES
Introduction
The literature chapter highlighted that how risk is measured in empirical tests of the 
theory of compensating wage differentials is extremely important, as it can 
“significantly influence the magnitude of the risk premium estimated” (Viscusi and 
Aldy, 2003, p. 10). Sandy et al. (2001) comment that “measurement error may be as 
important as the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in the presence of risk, which has 
received much more attention” (p.49). Therefore, different measures need to be 
compared and tested to ensure the risk of a worker having a fatal and non-fatal 
accident is accurately captured before conducting empirical estimations. Although the 
major issues involved in measuring risk will not be discussed in detail (see chapter 3B 
for a discussion of this), here we discuss how risk variables are constructed in the UK 
literature, discussing the advantages and disadvantages of each. Fatal and non-fatal 
accident variables are then constructed for each occupation.
Calculation of Fatal Accident Risk in UK Studies
The risk variables calculated for UK estimations use data either from the OPCS 
Occupational Mortality Decennial Supplement, or from the HSE. The majority have 
used OPCS data, with only Siebert and Wei (1994) calculating risk from HSE data. 
However, OPCS risk data are unavailable after 1983, and as chapter 2 has highlighted, 
workplace risks have changed considerably since then, with there being a general 
downward trend in the rate of fatal injury at work as reported under RIDDOR.
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Consider first the calculation of risk of work-related fatality variables using OPCS 
data. Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) were the first to test empirically the theory of 
compensating wage differentials using UK data, and constructed two variables using 
OPCS data. The OPCS data used is based on detailed records of deaths broken down 
into 223 occupations between 1970 and 1972. Note that data for a three-year period is 
superior to data for a single year “because deaths in occupations with few workers can 
be rare events” (Sandy et al., 2001, p.42). The first variable genrisk is defined as the 
extra risk of dying in each occupational group and is calculated as shown by equation 
1:
Genrisk -  ^ eat^s  ^ ^ " Expected Deaths 1970 - 12)13
Workers
Genrisk is therefore the actual death rate minus the death rate that could have been 
expected given the age and social class structure of workers in each occupational 
group. Genrisk is converted into a rate per 1000 workers per year by multiplying the 
entire measure by 1000. The authors acknowledge “Genrisk is subject to measurement 
error” (p.831). Specifically, there is the potential for accidents to be included that do 
not require compensation because they are not labour-market specific. There is also 
the possibility that people may contract a fatal disease in one occupation, and then 
move to another occupation before dying. Therefore “the estimate of the coefficient of 
Genrisk would be biased downward” (p.831).The second variable, accrisk is 
calculated as shown by equation 2:
Accrisk -  ^ ata  ^acc^ ents at workl 970 -  72 -  Expected Fatal accidents at workl 970 -  72) / 3
Workers
[2]
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Accrisk reflects the increase or decrease in the probability of a fatal accident at work 
for workers in a particular occupation, relative to the probability of a fatal accident at 
work for workers employed in all occupations. Accrisk is more labour-market-specific 
than genrisk as it specifically considers deaths at work. As this method of calculating 
the risk of death takes into account the average accidental workplace death rate in all 
occupations, the variable can have a positive or negative value. Occupations that have 
zero accidental deaths at work were assigned the population-wide death at work 
probability which is age adjusted. The expected number of fatal accidents at work for 
each occupation takes account of the occupational age structure, further strengthening 
this variable. As expected, in the empirical estimations “the more labour-market- 
specific measure of risk, Accrisk gives stronger results than Genrisk” (Marin and 
Psacharopoulos, 1982, p.834). This refers to a sample of all male workers, as female 
measures are considered inaccurate as discussed in chapter 3. When the sample is 
broken down to test for the presence of a wage premium separately for male-manual 
and male-non-manual workers, the manual sample produces significant results 
whereas the non-manual sample does not.
Sandy and Elliott (1996) construct similar variables, accrisk and genrisk, to Marin and 
Psacharopoulos (1982). They use later OPCS data, referring to 1979-83, and are able 
to break this down into 280 different occupations. After assigning fatal risk variables 
by occupation codes into the SCELI data set, they divide their data into separate 
samples for workers covered by union terms and conditions (covered workers) and 
those that are not (uncovered workers). A positive and significant compensating wage 
differential for male manual workers is estimated, with the regressions using accrisk 
giving stronger results (p.298). Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) also use OPCS 1979-
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83 data to calculate genrisk and accrisk in a paper to test if Marin and 
Psacharopoulos’s results are still relevant using later data. They conclude that “we 
should place little reliance on Genrisk” (p. 13) but find evidence of a wage premium 
using accrisk, which is larger than that estimated by Marin and Psacharopoulos.
Siebert and Wei (1994) use accident records that are reported by law to the HSE 
between 1986 and 1988. The average number of accidents is taken for the three year 
period; as in other studies this increases the likelihood of capturing an occupation’s 
true risk. Data is cross-classified by industry and occupation, with variables calculated 
for 50 occupation-industry cells. The denominator of the variable is the number of 
employees in each industry and occupation cell, with the numerator the number of 
reported fatal accidents.
Sandy et al. (2001) compare the calculation of risk measures using OPCS data in 
Sandy and Elliott (1996) and HSE data in Siebert and Wei (1994). A major difference 
between the two studies’ calculation of risk concerns zero deaths in certain 
occupations with 42 per cent of Siebert and Wei’s industry-occupation cells assigned 
a value of zero. By contrast, Sandy and Elliott assign the average accidental death rate 
for all occupations to occupations with zero deaths, emphasising that “these 
occupations generally had too few workers to be confident of the true risk and it was 
implausible that the risk was actually zero” (Sandy et al., 2001, p.42). This does, 
however, depend upon how finely risk is distinguished by occupation. The finer the 
occupation categories then the more relevant is Sandy et al.’s justification for 
assigning average risk, as there would be few workers in certain occupations. They 
take the SCELI data set that is used for labour market variables in their estimation,
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match the risk variables according to occupation, and then calculate the mean of the 
risk variable for that particular sample. They then take this value and substitute it for 
Fatal Accidents at Work in the accrisk formula (equation 2). Accrisk for that 
particular occupation is then calculated as before, enabling the variable to be adjusted 
for the age composition of the workforce in the same way as occupations that did not 
have zero deaths. The average risk assigned to occupations with zero deaths was 0.6 
per 100 000 workers, calculated from the SCELI sample. Note that the age adjustment 
means “only a small number of the occupations which initially had zero at-work- 
deaths are ultimately set to the same risk value” (p.42). However, Sandy et al. (2001) 
note that this major difference in risk assignment does not cause a large difference 
because the average of 0.6 deaths per 100 000 workers is close to zero (p.42). A 
further advantage of the risk variable calculated by Sandy and Elliott concerns the 
greater number of risk categories (371 compared to 50 in Siebert and Wei) which 
allows risk to be more finely distinguished. However, Sandy et al. caution that 
categories that are too fine can be a disadvantage: “if the categories are too fine 
compared to the number of workers in the economy and the accidental death rate, 
most of the occupations will have zero recorded deaths” (p.55). Therefore, when 
deciding upon the appropriate occupation classification, the number of zero deaths 
should be considered.
To compare the risk variables calculated in the two studies, Sandy et al. assign the 
industry-occupation HSE measure used by Siebert and Wei to the SCELI data set that 
is used by Sandy and Elliott. They conclude that assigning risk by fine occupation 
codes is superior to assigning by industry or a mixture of industry and occupation 
codes (p.49). They comment that “workers in the same occupation have more similar
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levels of risk than do workers in the same industry” (p.49) and so assignment by 
occupation codes is to be preferred.
Overall, as this section has illustrated, “creating a reliable measure of fatal workplace 
risks remains a difficult task” (Sandy et al., 2001, p.49). When assigning fatality risk 
therefore, it is important to consider several alternatives.
Calculation of Non-Fatal Accident Risk in UK Studies
Few UK studies include a non-fatal injury risk variable in their estimations1. The two 
studies that do, Siebert and Wei (1994) and Arabsheibani and Marin (2001), both fail 
to find a significant wage premium for non-fatal risk. Siebert and Wei (1994) use the 
same data used to construct their fatality risk variable from the HSE. Their variable 
relates to injuries that result in the employee being absent from work for 3 or more 
days, with the average taken between 1986-88. They note the variable is not very 
satisfactory, “since serious accidents are lumped together with non-serious” (p.66). 
They include the variable however, “so as to provide a benchmark for future research 
using different injury measures” (p.66). Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) construct 
their non-fatal injury variable from the GHS 1987-89, and this relates to accidents 
during hours of work that resulted in a visit to a doctor or a hospital. The variable is 
calculated in the same way as their fatality variable (depicted by equation 2), and can 
be defined as the observed number of injuries minus the number of injuries expected 
given the number of employees, divided by the total in employment, as a rate per 
1000 workers. The variable is calculated for 161 occupations. They comment that 
their failure to find a positive a significant wage premium for non-fatal injury risk “is
1 Chapter 3B.5.2 discusses the reasons for this.
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puzzling and remains to be investigated with data which distinguish non-fatal 
accidents by their degree of severity” (p.264).
Variable Calculations
Fatal risk is calculated here by occupation, following the findings of Sandy et al. 
(2001) that this is superior to assigning risk by industry or by a mix of industry and 
occupation codes. Data are provided by the HSE for the years 2002/03, 2003/04 and 
2004/05. The risk data is therefore much more recent than that used by Siebert and 
Wei (1994). The LFS is used to provide data on the number of workers employed in 
each occupation (weighted). For comparison, data from the Annual Survey of Hours 
and Earnings (ASHE) is also considered. Rates can be calculated in two ways. Given 
the accident data runs from 2002-2004, we can calculate the average annual number 
of fatalities and divide that by the number employed in each occupation for a 
particular year. This is the method used by Siebert and Wei (equation 3):
Fatal Risk (Work Fatalities 2002 / 03 -  2004 / 05) / 3 
Workers employed in occupation 2004
1000 [3]
Alternatively, we can use total number of accidents over the three year period and 
divide this by the total number of workers employed in each occupation over this 
same period (equation 4). Both methods are considered.
Fatal Risk = Work Fatalities 2002/03 -  2004/05
Wokers employed in occupation 2002 - 2004
1000 [4]
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Following Siebert and Wei and Sandy and Elliott, risk is calculated for the whole 
sample of male and female full-time and part-time workers as the HSE accident data 
is applicable to all such groups. For comparison, rates for just full time workers are 
also calculated. Risk is calculated for 3 digit (81 occupations), and 2 digit occupations 
(25 occupations). A 4 digit variable is not calculated because of the large number of 
zero deaths that are likely for many occupations. We would however, expect risk to be 
more accurately defined the finer the occupation breakdown, and so the 3 digit rate is 
preferred to the 2 digit rate.
Variables reflecting non-fatal injury accident risk are also constructed using HSE 
data. Under RIDDOR 95 employers have a responsibility to report major injuries at 
work and injuries that resulted in absence from work for 3 or more days to the HSE, 
as discussed in chapter 2. Siebert and Wei’s non-fatal variable refers to both major 
injuries and injuries that resulted in 3 or more days off work; both serious and non- 
serious injuries are therefore considered together in their one non-fatal injury variable. 
The available data allows two separate variables to be created: one referring to major 
injuries, and another referring to injuries resulting in 3 or more days off work . The 
variables created here therefore, split Siebert and Wei’s one non-fatal injury variable 
into two and hence distinguish between severities of injury; no other study using UK 
data has been able to do this. The variables are constructed in the same way as the 
fatality variable, with the average number of injuries taken from 2002/03, 2003/04 
and 2004/05. The variables created here therefore, refer to a much more recent risk 
that faces workers compared to other studies that have tested the effect of a non-fatal
2 Injuries that resulted in 3 or more days o ff  work but are included in the major injuries list are included 
as a major injury only, and not as an over 3-day injury.
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injury variable. Table 1 presents the calculated variables using accident and LFS data 
for 2002-2004 for full and part time workers (equation 4).
Table 1: Accident Rates using LFS 2002-2004 Occupation Data: per 1000 Full Time 
and Part Time Workers
3 Digit SOC 2000
SOC 2000 Fatal Major
Injury
Over 3-Day 
Injury
111 Corporate managers and senior officials 0.0524 1.3178 1.5079
112 Production managers 0.0085 0.8517 1.5360
113 Functional managers 0.0012 0.1429 0.2967
114 Quality and customer care managers 0 0.4130 0.8135
115 Financial institution and office managers 0.0019 0.2618 0.5141
116 Managers in distribution, storage and retailing 0.0039 1.5233 4.0141
117 Protective service officers 0.0209 2.7965 9.3742
118 Health and social service managers 0 0.8889 2.9757
121 Managers in farming, horticulture, forestry 
and fishing
0.1468 2.0924 2.2759
122 Managers and proprietors in hospitality and 
leisure services
0.0111 1.4169 3.0384
123 Managers and proprietors in other service 
industries
0.0164 1.6557 3.311313
211 Science professionals 0 0.2487 0.8043
212 Engineering professionals 0.0348 3.8834 12.4210
213 Information and communication technology 
professionals
0 0.0528 0.1473
221 Health professionals 0 0.4492 1.2056
231 Teaching professionals 0 1.1256 2.1346
232 Research professionals 0 0.6316 1.6931
241 Legal professionals 0 0.2076 0.3789
242 Business and statistical professionals 0 0.1106 0.2082
243 Architects, town planners and surveyors 0.0046 0.3634 0.7957
244 Public service professionals 0.0042 1.3659 6.0184
245 Librarians and related professionals 0 0.6325 2.0971
311 Science and engineering technicians 0.0149 3.0919 12.4569
312 Draught persons and building inspectors 0.0104 0.4048 0.7474
313 IT service delivery occupations 0 0.3392 1.4229
321 Health associate professionals 0 0.2855 2.9799
322 Therapists 0 0.6027 2.8438
323 Social welfare associate professionals 0 0.6101 2.0419
331 Protective service occupations 0.0253 6.7604 37.4950
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341 Artistic and literary occupations 0.0092 0.5178 0.5732
342 Design associate professionals 0 0.1114 0.1592
343 Media associate professionals 0 0.2834 0.8263
344 Sports and fitness occupations 0 1.7369 2.1030
351 Transport associate professionals 0.0125 0.5604 2.3413
352 Legal associate professionals 0 0.0853 0.3926
353 Business and finance associate professionals 0 0.2874 0.7406
354 Sales and related associate professionals 0 0.2517 0.7165
355 Conservation associate professionals 0 1.3888 5.2615
356 Public service and other associate 
professionals
0 0.4406 1.7625
411 Administrative occupations: government and 
related
0 0.4993 1.7216
412 Administrative occupations: finance 0 0.3985 1.0291
413 Administrative occupations: records 0 0.3745 1.4510
414 Administrative occupations: communications 0 0.8607 2.7362
415 Administrative occupations: general 0.0022 1.1780 3.6647
421 Secretarial and related occupations 0.0008 0.5025 1.1817
511 Agricultural trades 0.1817 2.8902 10.6713
521 Metal forming, welding and related trades 0.0530 6.8276 20.6949
522 Metal machining, fitting and instrument 
making trades
0.0242 3.2852 12.6186
523 Vehicle trades 0.0358 3.6377 13.0455
524 Electrical trades 0.0309 3.3670 10.1769
531 Construction trades 0.0637 5.3196 13.686
532 Building trades 0.0531 3.4329 6.6801
541 Textiles and garments trades 0 1.0614 4.9446
542 Printing trades 0 2.8425 14.3406
543 Food preparation trades 0.0068 2.4155 11.9852
549 Skilled trades NEC 0.0057 0.9098 3.3645
611 Healthcare and related personal services 0.0017 2.7545 19.2341
612 Childcare and related personal services 0 0.9309 2.6618
613 Animal care services 0.0426 9.9718 11.7874
621 Leisure and travel service occupations 0.0042 1.6052 3.8979
622 Hairdressers and related occupations 0 0.1514 0.4790
623 Housekeeping occupations 0.0173 4.5611 16.3762
629 Personal service occupations NEC 0.0400 2.6412 10.7247
711 Sales assistants and retail cashiers 0.0013 1.8974 7.4001
712 Sales related occupations 0.0072 2.0845 7.7398
721 Customer service occupations 0 1.3005 5.3926
811 Process operatives 0.0710 16.0361 89.0381
812 Plant and machine operatives 0.0579 8.4679 34.4322
813 Assemblers and routine operatives 0.0079 1.9195 10.0258
814 Construction operatives 0.1948 11.9587 30.0048
821 Transport drivers and operatives 0.0532 6.0703 26.3449
822 Mobile machine drivers and operatives 0.0624 4.5739 14.3013
911 Elementary agricultural occupations 0.2523 5.8854 7.4809
912 Elementary construction occupations 0.1357 9.6719 20.3221
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913 Elementary process plant occupations 0.0101 2.5480 11.5818
914 Elementary goods storage occupations 0.0369 9.7315 58.7631
921 Elementary administration occupations 0.0029 5.1498 56.9138
922 Elementary personal service occupations 0.0026 2.1826 9.6139
923 Elementary cleaning occupations 0.0272 3.3977 15.3837
924 Elementary security occupations 0.0147 3.1556 9.4620
925 Elementary sales occupations 0 1.0540 5.3810
2 Digit SOC 2000
SOC 2000 Fatal Major
Injury
Over 3-Day 
Injury
11 Corporate Managers 0.0052 0.6802 1.5874
12 Managers & Proprietors in Agriculture & 
Services 0.0208 1.6311 3.1663
21 Service & Technology Professionals 0.0156 1.7985 5.6126
22 Health Professionals 0 0.4648 1.2056
23 Teaching & Research Professionals 0 1.1211 2.1068
24 Business & Public Service Professionals 0.0018 0.4831 1.6250
31 Science & Technology Associate Professionals 0.0088 1.7179 6.7135
32 Health & Social Welfare Associate 
Professionals 0 1.1504 2.7446
33 Protective Service Occupations 0.0265 7.0791 37.4950
34 Culture, Media & Sports Occupations 0.0027 7.0791 0.8052
35 Business & Public Service Associate 
Professionals 0.0005 0.3538 1.1778
41 Administrative Occupations 0.0005 0.6233 1.9500
42 Secretarial & related Occupations 0.0008 0.5014 1.1817
51 Skilled Agricultural Trades 0.1886 3.0009 10.6713
52 Skilled Metal &Electrical Trades 0.0333 3.8961 12.7661
53 Skilled Construction & Building Trades 0.0631 5.0353 12.1029
54 Textiles, Printing & Other Skilled Trades 0.0051 2.0847 9.8001
61 Caring Personal Service Occupations 0.0023 2.2486 11.8924
62 Leisure & other Personal Service Occupations 0.0073 1.8632 5.7897
71 Sales Occupations 0.0020 1.9486 7.4376
72 Customer Service Occupations 0 1.3093 5.3926
81 Process Plant & Machine Operatives 0.0636 9.2697 43.2908
82 Transport & Mobile Machine Drivers & 
Operatives 0.0568 6.0828 24.5239
91 Elementary Trades, Plant & Storage Related 
Occupations 0.0716 7.474 32.3521
92 Elementary Admin & Service Occupations 0.0120 2.9944 16.2937
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The 3 digit classification highlights the occupations with the highest fatality rate to be 
911 Elementary agricultural occupations (0.2523 per 1000 workers), 814 Construction 
operatives (0.1948 per 1000 workers), and 511 Agricultural Trades (0.1817 per 1000 
workers). Similar occupations are highlighted as the most dangerous in the 2 digit 
classification, with 51 Skilled Agricultural Trades having the greatest fatality rate 
(0.1886 per 1000 workers), followed by 91 Elementary Trades, Storage and Related 
Occupations (0.0716 per 1000 workers). The differences in magnitude of the 3 digit 
and 2 digit variables should be noted, with the 3 digit classification producing the 
higher rates, as the finer classification highlights the very risky occupations. 
Similarly, the 3 digit breakdown highlights the very safe occupations, with 32 
occupations with a zero death rate (out of 81) compared to 4 in the 2 digit breakdown 
(out of 25).
Correlations between the fatal and non-fatal variables are considered. Fatal and major 
injury are positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.587 for the 3 digit breakdown 
which is significant at the 1 per cent level (0.446 for the 2 digit breakdown). The 
correlation is insignificant between fatal and over 3-day injury (0.300 for the 3 digit 
breakdown) indicating potential measurement problems with this variable that 
includes less severe injuries. This variable may be much more dependent upon the 
individual as to whether the injury is reported compared to more major injuries. Table 
2 presents the derived variables for full-time workers only.
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Table 2: Accident Rates using LFS 2002-2004 Occupation Data: per 1000 Full Time 
Workers
3 Digit SOC 2000
SOC 2000 Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
111 0.0608 1.5284 1.7489
112 0.0087 0.8736 1.5754
113 0.0012 0.1523 0.3164
114 0 0.4419 0.8705
115 0.0021 0.2928 0.5749
116 0.0042 1.6317 4.2998
117 0.0225 3.0012 10.0603
118 0 1.0020 3.3548
121 0.1569 2.2364 2.4326
122 0.0126 1.6009 3.4330
123 0.0194 1.9551 3.9102
211 0 0.2764 0.8938
212 0.0367 4.1012 13.1175
213 0 0.0552 0.1542
221 0 0.5760 1.5457
231 0 1.5042 2.8527
232 0 0.7543 2.0220
241 0 0.2331 0.4253
242 0 0.1294 0.2435
243 0.0051 0.4040 0.8847
244 0.0052 1.6807 7.4054
245 0 0.8183 2.7132
311 0.0160 3.3250 13.3958
312 0.0111 0.4337 0.8006
313 0 0.3771 1.5821
321 0 0.4362 4.5526
322 0 1.1284 5.3239
323 0 1.0014 3.3516
331 0.0262 7.0099 38.8791
341 0.0130 0.7279 0.8059
342 0 0.1254 0.1792
343 0 0.3439 1.0027
344 0 3.0503 3.6932
351 0.0127 0.5697 2.3799
352 0 0.1011 0.4648
353 0 0.3226 0.8314
354 0 0.2895 0.8239
355 0 1.5239 5.7731
356 0 0.5368 2.1472
411 0 0.6750 2.3275
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412 0 0.6097 1.5745
413 0 0.5224 2.0241
414 0 1.2441 3.9551
415 0.0035 1.8462 5.7435
421 0.0014 0.9154 2.1525
511 0.2231 3.5491 13.1039
521 0.0538 6.9261 20.9934
522 0.0249 3.3707 12.9470
523 0.0369 3.7447 13.4293
524 0.0318 3.4673 10.4798
531 0.0661 5.5183 14.1977
532 0.0568 3.6727 7.1467
541 0 1.3537 6.3064
542 0 3.2338 16.3148
543 0.0094 3.3468 16.6056
549 0.0072 1.1392 4.2130
611 0.0031 5.0444 35.2242
612 0 1.9476 5.5690
613 0.0582 13.6330 16.1153
621 0.0067 2.5594 6.2147
622 0 0.2501 0.7911
623 0.0293 7.7362 27.7759
629 0.0518 3.4181 13.8795
711 0.0042 5.9414 23.1723
712 0.0102 2.9818 11.0716
721 0 1.8836 7.8106
811 0.0793 17.8983 99.3776
812 0.0591 8.6528 35.1840
813 0.0090 2.1920 11.4491
814 0.1987 12.1974 30.6036
821 0.0596 6.7998 29.5111
822 0.0632 4.6292 14.4743
911 0.3101 7.2330 9.1938
912 0.1564 11.1515 23.4309
913 0.0121 3.0242 13.7461
914 0.0426 11.2492 67.9276
921 0.0039 7.0275 77.6646
922 0.0082 6.9579 30.6476
923 0.0827 10.3100 46.6797
924 0.0262 5.6202 16.8520
925 0 3.2357 16.5189
17
2 Digit SOC 2000
SOC 2000 Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
11 0.0055 0.7180 1.7011
12 0.0234 1.8366 3.6619
21 0.0161 1.8621 5.9477
22 0 0.5760 1.5457
23 0 1.4518 2.7946
24 0.0020 0.5324 1.8977
31 0.0095 1.8408 7.3047
32 0 0.6407 4.3690
33 0.0262 7.0099 38.8791
34 0.0033 0.7106 1.0501
35 0.0006 0.4017 1.3599
41 0.0008 0.9019 2.8564
42 0.0014 0.9154 2.1525
51 0.2231 3.5491 13.1039
52 0.0334 3.9066 13.1076
53 0.0641 5.1110 12.6417
54 0.0064 2.6396 12.7789
61 0.0044 4.2173 22.7461
62 0.0113 2.8954 9.4198
71 0.0055 5.3099 20.5902
72 0 1.8836 7.8106
81 0.0683 9.9645 47.2808
82 0.0602 6.4423 27.0347
91 0.0826 8.6173 37.8490
92 0.0294 7.3556 40.9522
The accident rates are slightly higher when part time workers are excluded from the 
denominator, as would be expected. The same three occupations (SOC 511,814 and 
911) are found to have the highest risk of having a fatal accident. The above rates will 
be used in estimations for comparison purposes.
An alternative method of deriving the accident variables is to take the average number 
of accidents over the 3 year period and use the number of workers employed in each 
occupation for just one particular year (equation 3). Table 3 presents the calculated 
variables.
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Table 3: Accident Rates using LFS 2004 Occupation Data: per 1000 Full Time and
Part Time Workers
3 Digit SOC 2000
SOC 2000 Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
111 0.0245 0.6159 0.7047
112 0.0044 0.4414 0.7960
113 0.0006 0.0706 0.1465
114 0 0.2018 0.3976
115 0.0009 0.1233 0.2421
116 0.0021 0.8276 2.1810
117 0.0094 1.2522 4.1974
118 0 0.3995 1.3375
121 0.1131 1.6115 1.7528
122 0.0074 0.9477 2.0323
123 0.0156 1.5699 3.1398
211 0 0.1157 0.3740
212 0.0184 2.0500 6.5567
213 0 0.0275 0.0768
221 0 0.2977 0.7989
231 0 0.5318 1.0086
232 0 0.2991 0.8017
241 0 0.1564 0.2854
242 0 0.0648 0.1220
243 0.0027 0.2147 0.4702
244 0.0019 0.6472 2.8297
245 0 0.2961 0.9818
311 0.0078 1.6157 6.5093
312 0.0055 0.2142 0.3955
313 0 0.1570 0.6589
321 0 0.6623 5.4417
322 0 0.4287 2.0225
323 0 0.2766 0.9258
331 0.0116 3.1025 17.2074
341 0.0136 0.7598 0.8412
342 0 0.0820 0.1171
343 0 0.1923 0.5607
344 0 1.1303 1.3685
351 0.0059 0.2642 1.1037
352 0 0.0467 0.2146
353 0 0.1596 0.4113
354 0 0.1354 0.3852
355 0 0.6628 2.5109
356 0 0.2102 0.8406
411 0 0.2332 0.8043
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412
413
414
415
421
511
521
522
523
524
531
532
541
542
543
549
611
612
613
621
622
623
629
711
712
721
811
812
813
814
821
822
911
912
913
914
921
922
923
924
925
0.2004 0.5174
0.1760 0.6821
0 0.4234 1.3461
0.0011 0.5682 1.7676
0.0004 0.2455 0.5772
0.2124 3.3791 12.4762
0.0295 3.8040 11.5303
0.0123 1.6699 6.4144
0.0215 2.1845 7.8340
0.0182 1.9792 5.9822
0.0651 5.4369 13.9884
0.0745 4.8170 9.3733
0 0.7677 3.5765
0 1.4502 7.3163
0.0036 1.2675 6.2890
0.0043 0.6782 2.5082
0.0008 1.2870 8.9869
0 0.4688 1.3405
0.0246 5.7710 6.8218
0 0.2347 0.8384
0 0.1187 0.3754
0.0082 2.1685 7.7856
0.0239 1.5777 6.4066
0.0006 0.8843 3.4489
0.0045 1.3098 4.8632
0 0.5946 2.4656
0.0343 7.7370 42.9584
0.0265 3.8770 15.7649
0.0039 0.9538 4.9820
0.1195 7.3343 18.4021
0.0324 3.6917 16.0222
0.0312 2.2873 7.1518
0.1603 3.7384 4.7519
0.0827 5.8980 12.3926
0.0050 1.2581 5.7187
0.0162 4.2884 25.8956
0.0014 2.5212 27.8638
0.0012 1.0303 4.5382
0.0149 1.8547 8.3974
0.0066 1.4231 4.2671
0 0.4845 2.4735
20
2 Digit SOC 2000
SOC 2000 Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
11 0.0025 0.3337 0.7907
12 0.0165 1.2957 2.5834
21 0.0078 0.9053 2.8915
22 0 0.2977 0.7989
23 0 0.5172 0.9956
24 0.0010 0.2658 0.9483
31 0.0043 0.8451 3.3536
32 0 0.5465 4.0251
33 0.0116 3.1025 17.2074
34 0.0021 0.4401 0.6504
35 0.0003 0.1805 0.6112
41 0.0003 0.2971 0.9408
42 0.0004 0.2455 0.5772
51 0.2124 3.3791 12.4762
52 0.0182 2.1324 7.1546
53 0.0668 5.3282 13.1789
54 0.0028 1.1618 5.6246
61 0.0011 1.0700 5.7709
62 0.0032 0.8024 2.8893
71 0.0009 0.9201 3.5680
72 0 0.5946 2.4656
81 0.0311 4.5278 21.4842
82 0.0322 3.4417 14.4427
91 0.0353 3.6870 16.1941
92 0.0057 1.4363 7.9965
Compared to the variables derived using the three year period rather than the average, 
the same three occupations have the highest accident rates.
Table 4: T Tests
3 Digit SOC 2000
Fatal Major Injury Over 3-1lay Injury
LFS
2004
LFS
2002-2004
LFS
2004
LFS
2002-2004
LFS
2004
LFS
2002-2004
Mean 0.0159 0.0232 1.4190 2.4654 5.0697 9.2736
Std error 0.0040 0.0159 0.1916 0.3347 0.7896 1.5931
Std dev 19.708 44.49
t 3.6000*** 6.3238*** 4.9989***
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2 Digit SOC 2000
Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
LFS LFS LFS LFS LFS LFS
2004 2002-2004 2004 2002-2004 2004 2002-2004
Mean 0.0183 0.0236 1.5102 2.8757 5.9848 10.3874
Std error 0.0087 0.0083 0.2993 0.5201 1.2364 2.3760
t 2.1989** 3.9813*** 3.4418***
♦♦♦^significant at 1% level; * ^ sign ificant at 5% level. 
T tests adjust for unequal variance.
To see if there are any significant differences between the two methods of calculating 
the rates, Table 4 compares means and reports results of t tests. These tests show there 
to be significant differences between the mean accident rates. The order of 
occupations in terms of riskiness however, remains largely unchanged. Both methods 
however, may need to be considered in empirical estimations.
Risk variables calculated so far have been for both men and women collectively. As 
we would expect women to choose safer jobs, we are therefore overstating the risk 
women face and understating the risk men face. Within the majority of the UK 
literature, gender-specific risk measures have not been used because of problems of 
measurement error. A female-specific risk measure would fail to capture the true risk 
women face at work; as DeLeire and Levy (2004) emphasise “there are too few 
fatalities and too few women in the occupations with the most fatalities” (p.942) to 
calculate reliable measures. Several studies in the US however, have attempted to 
estimate a wage premium for females, including Barry (1985), Filer (1985), Hersch 
(1998) and Leeth and Ruser (2003), with mixed results.
The HSE data does enable accidents to be split by gender. As predicted, female- 
specific rates are very inaccurate, due to the lack of female employees in the most
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risky occupations. Male-specific measures however, may give a better indication of 
the accident risk male workers face. Table 5 reports.
Table 5: Accident Rates using LFS 2002-2004 Occupation Data: per 1000 Male Full 
Time and Part Time Workers
3 Digit SOC 2000
SOC
2000
Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
111 0.0658 1.2826 1.0359
112 0.0198 1.0828 1.6994
113 0.0008 0.1062 0.1964
114 0 0.3435 0.5889
115 0 0.1477 0.4126
116 0.0055 1.1896 3.1309
117 0.0235 2.6298 9.0046
118 0 0.7401 3.0473
121 0.1932 2.3670 2.6327
122 0.0212 1.3695 2.5907
123 0.0259 1.6617 3.0647
211 0 0.2214 0.6021
212 0.0368 4.0229 12.7835
213 0 0.0405 0.1195
221 0 0.3312 0.7486
231 0 0.7484 1.5469
232 0 0.6072 1.5919
241 0 0.0828 0.1324
242 0 0.0946 0.1261
243 0.0053 0.3640 0.8545
244 0 1.0171 4.1681
245 0 0.3972 1.4753
311 0.0191 3.3935 13.7534
312 0.0120 0.4324 0.8168
313 0 0.3165 1.4614
321 0 1.7870 20.1257
322 0 0.4639 2.1540
323 0 0.8529 2.6589
331 0.0309 6.8423 38.7532
341 0.0080 0.5421 0.5501
342 0 0.1230 0.1493
343 0 0.3482 1.0075
344 0 1.6478 1.8929
351 0.0134 0.5221 2.2892
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352
353
354
355
356
411
412
413
414
415
421
511
521
522
523
524
531
532
541
542
543
549
611
612
613
621
622
623
629
711
712
721
811
812
813
814
821
822
911
912
913
914
921
922
923
924
925
0.0419 0.4612
0.1992 0.4590
0.2557 0.7002
1.7551 6.4355
0.6150 2.4989
0.4653 1.9902
0.3645 1.0116
0.4190 1.7814
0.7976 2.9727
1.1059 3.9971
0 1.2440 2.9135
0.1914 3.0437 11.3058
0.0541 6.8986 20.8137
0.0247 3.3041 12.6557
0.0359 3.6103 12.9469
0.0313 3.3606 10.1007
0.0641 5.3325 13.6891
0.0541 3.4806 6.7148
0 1.6525 7.4015
0 3.1045 15.6809
0.0077 2.6293 13.1192
0.0080 1.1355 4.2302
0.0131 4.6213 32.0155
0 2.2489 8.3038
0.2524 34.8352 41.1460
0 1.9012 4.8943
0 0.0739 0.2587
0.0326 5.9419 19.9331
0.0495 2.6210 11.1271
0.0016 2.2343 9.0964
0.0140 2.4265 8.5206
0 1.3065 5.7103
0.0912 18.6427 100.3125
0.0597 8.7819 34.6702
0.0129 2.6227 13.2422
0.1953 11.9251 29.8894
0.0549 6.1395 26.4293
0.0636 4.5822 14.3421
0.3075 6.6629 8.4567
0.1364 9.6738 20.3026
0.0150 2.9693 12.3240
0.0429 10.3054 60.7739
0 5.2234 61.8539
0.0027 2.4490 12.2101
0.0902 6.5511 34.0154
0.0251 4.2812 12.4039
0 0.9155 4.9493
24
2 Digit SOC 2000
SOC 2000 Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
11 0.0094 0.6757 1.4462
12 0.0337 1.6081 2.8898
21 0.0178 1.9833 6.2884
22 0 0.3312 0.7486
23 0 0.7350 1.5512
24 0.0013 0.2924 0.8880
31 0.0112 1.8419 7.3826
32 0 1.3185 12.2024
33 0.0309 6.8423 38.7532
34 0.0022 0.5584 0.8064
35 0.0009 0.3655 1.2587
41 0 0.5443 2.0450
42 0 1.2440 2.9135
51 0.1914 3.0437 11.3058
52 0.0330 3.8085 12.7359
53 0.0619 4.9180 12.1280
54 0.0058 2.2768 10.9812
61 0.0205 5.4254 28.1764
62 0.0163 3.2738 10.5339
71 0.0039 2.2698 8.9898
72 0 1.3065 5.7103
81 0.0798 10.7208 48.6839
82 0.0563 5.8984 24.5584
91 0.0839 8.1584 34.4438
92 0.0246 4.0568 26.2709
Table 6 presents t tests to examine whether the male-specific measures are 
significantly different to the variables presented in Table 1. Male-specific accident 
variables, both fatal and non-fatal, are greater than the collective male and female 
measures, and t tests show this difference to be significant. Again however, the order 
of occupations in terms of their accident risk remains largely unchanged.
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Table 6: T Tests
3 Digit SOC 2000
Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
LFS 
2002-04 
Male Specific
LFS
2002-04
LFS 
2002-04 
Male Specific
LFS
2002-04
LFS
2002-04 
Male Specific
LFS
2002-04
Mean 0.0298 0.0232 2.9984 2.4654 10.8423 9.2736
Std error 0.0065 0.0051 0.5297 0.3347 1.8052 1.5931
t 2.3306** 1.7138* 3.0399***
2 Digit SOC 2000
Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
LFS 
2002-04 
Male Specific
LFS
2002-04
LFS 
2002-04 
Male Specific
LFS
2002-04
LFS 
2002-04 
Male Specific
LFS
2002-04
Mean 0.0274 0.0236 2.9399 2.8757 12.5477 10.3874
Std error 0.0085 0.0083 0.5458 0.5201 2.6657 2.3760
t 3.2302*** 0.2044 2.6313**
***=significant at 1% level; ^^significant at 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
T tests adjust for unequal variance.
ASHE Occupation Data
The ASHE is also considered for data on the number of workers employed in each 
occupation. There are a number of differences between the ASHE and the LFS. The 
ASHE is a 1 per cent sample of the population, resulting in approximately 140 000 
records per year. Data are provided by the employer through the use of employee 
records. Conversely, the LFS is a quarterly sample survey of about 60 000 
households. Information about the household is provided by one member, and proxy 
respondents are often used. In an investigation into the use of both data sets, Ormerod 
and Ritchie (2007) note that the ASHE is thought to be more reliable for earnings 
data, due to the use of employee records, with the LFS more useful for breaking down 
data in terms of a range of personal characteristics (p.25). However, in their analysis 
that attempted to link both data sets in order to compare them, they found “against
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expectations, the major data sets are more consistent than thought” (p.30), concluding 
“researchers are justified in their continuing use of the LFS data where ASHE is not 
available or appropriate” (p.30). As just a small difference in the occupation numbers 
may make a difference to the risk variables, accident rates are also calculated using 
ASHE data, with the measures reported in Table 7.
Table 7: Accident Rates using ASHE 2004 Occupation Data: per 1000 Full Time and 
Part Time Workers
3 Digit SOC 2000
SOC 2000 Fatal Major In jury Over 3-Day Injury
1 1 1 0.0259 0.6505 0.7443
1 1 2 0.0048 0.4795 0.8648
113 0.0006 0.0767 0.1594
114 0 0.2588 0.5098
115 0.0007 0.0982 0.1928
116 0.0024 0.9561 2.5195
117 0.0155 2.0698 6.9380
118 0 0.6306 2 . 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 0.1333 1.9000 2.0667
1 2 2 0.0089 1.1294 2.4220
123 0.0119 1.2050 2.4100
2 1 1 0 0.1632 0.5278
2 1 2 0.0186 2.0782 6.6471
213 0 0.0294 0.0821
2 2 1 0 0.2837 0.7612
231 0 0.5333 1.0114
232 0 0.2667 0.7148
241 0 0.1449 0.2645
242 0 0.0854 0.1608
243 0.0030 0.2394 0.5242
244 0.0023 0.7320 3.2252
245 0 0.4368 1.4483
311 0.0064 1.3232 5.3308
312 0.0055 0.2131 0.3934
313 0 0.1638 0.6874
321 0 0.1186 1.2382
322 0 0.5093 2.4028
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323 0 0.2768 0.9266
331 0.0104 2.7822 15.4309
341 0.0180 1.0090 1.1171
342 0 0.1273 0.1818
343 0 0.2465 0.7188
344 0 1.6519 2 . 0 0 0 0
351 0.0069 0.3125 1.3056
352 0 0.0595 0.2738
353 0 0.2306 0.5942
354 0 0.1330 0.3785
355 0 0.7879 2.9848
356 0 0.2849 1.1398
411 0 0.2492 0.8594
412 0 0.2180 0.5630
413 0 0.2303 0.8923
414 0 0.4653 1.4792
415 0.0008 0.4362 1.3571
421 0.0005 0.3496 0.8220
511 0.2342 3.7267 13.7598
521 0.0353 4.5417 13.7660
522 0.0105 1.4290 5.4891
523 0.0303 3.0758 11.0303
524 0.0226 2.4621 7.4418
531 0.0931 7.7686 19.9874
532 0 . 1 0 0 0 6.4667 12.5833
541 0 0.8283 3.8586
542 0 1.9474 9.8246
543 0.0046 1.6361 8.1177
549 0.0057 0.8983 3.3220
611 0.0008 1.2852 8.9744
612 0 0.6327 1.8091
613 0.0556 13.0185 15.3889
621 0.0018 0.6827 1.6578
622 0 0.2606 0.8242
623 0.0098 2.5850 9.2810
629 0.0333 2 . 2 0 0 0 8.9333
711 0.0008 1.0886 4.2457
712 0.0059 1.7168 6.3746
721 0 0.6238 2.5867
811 0.0343 7.7556 43.0616
812 0.0319 4.6727 19.0000
813 0.0039 0.9522 4.9737
814 0 . 1 2 2 1 7.4951 18.8052
821 0.0392 4.4702 19.4006
822 0.0614 4.5000 14.0702
911 0.1914 4.4630 5.6728
912 0.1291 9.2042 19.3393
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913 0.0049 1.2247 5.5665
914 0.0177 4.6776 28.2456
921 0.0013 2.4123 26.6600
922 0.0016 1.3375 5.8915
923 0.0150 1.8680 8.4576
924 0.0079 1.6943 5.0804
925 0 0.9534 4.8674
2 Digit SOC 2000
Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
11 0.0028 0.3614 0.8563
1 2 0.0153 1.2044 2.4015
2 1 0.0085 0.9825 3.1384
2 2 0 0.2837 0.7612
23 0 0.5143 0.9899
24 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.3074 1.0957
31 0.0040 0.7773 3.0847
32 0 0.1833 1.2496
33 0.0104 2.7822 15.4309
34 0.0029 0.6109 0.9027
35 0.0003 0 . 2 2 1 2 0.7487
41 0.0003 0.3023 0.9574
42 0.0005 0.3496 0.8220
51 0.2342 3.7267 13.7598
52 0 . 0 2 0 1 2.3465 7.8730
53 0.0947 7.5514 18.6780
54 0.0036 1.4973 7.2486
61 0.0013 1.2175 6.5667
62 0.0047 1.2115 3.9415
71 0 . 0 0 1 2 1.1385 4.4149
72 0 0.6238 2.5867
81 0.0323 4.7096 22.3468
82 0.0418 4.4737 18.7735
91 0.0396 4.1303 18.1411
92 0.0067 0.0017 9.4030
Occupations 511, 911 and 814 remain the most risky in terms of high fatality rates. 
Variables created using ASHE data give slightly larger estimates than those created 
using the LFS. For instance, occupation 511 has a fatality rate of 0.212 per 1000 
workers using LFS data, compared to 0.234 per 1000 workers using ASHE data. In
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other words, the estimates of the number employed in each occupation are slightly 
smaller in ASHE.
Table 8: T Tests
3 Digit SOC 2000
Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
ASHE LFS ASHE LFS ASHE LFS
2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
Mean 0.0195 0.0159 1.7677 1.4190 5.8979 5.0697
Std error 0.0047 0.0040 0.2644 0.1916 0.8585 0.7896
t 3.6049*** 3.2603*** 4.0260***
2 Digit SOC 2000
Fatal Major Injury Over 3-Day Injury
ASHE LFS ASHE LFS ASHE LFS
2004 2004 2004 2004 2004 2004
Mean 0 . 0 2 1 1 0.0183 1.6604 1.5102 6.6469 5.9848
Std error 0.0098 0.0087 0.3778 0.2993 1.3986 1.2364
t 1.9919* 1.2585 2.0430*
♦ ♦♦^significant at 1% level; **=significant at 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
T tests adjust for unequal variance.
Table 8  reports means and t tests to see if this has a significant difference upon the 
rates. Results reveal differences between the two sets of accident rates are statistically 
significant, although again the order of occupations in terms of their accident risk 
remains very similar. In estimations where the magnitude of the variables is particular 
important however, such as when calculating VSL from compensating wage 
differential estimates, both ASHE and LFS variables will be considered.
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CHAPTER 4 APPENDICES
Appendix 4.1: Variable Definitions
VARIABLE DEFINITION
INJURIES Number of injuries employees in the establishment have sustained 
during working hours in the last 1 2  months.
ILLNESSES Number of illnesses employees in the establishment have 
sustained during working hours in the last 1 2  months.
EMPLOYEES Total number of employees in the workplace.
PART-TIME Proportion of all workers that are part-time employees.
TURNOVER Labour turnover rate (proportion of total employees that have left 
in the past 1 2  months).
AGE21 Proportion of workers that are aged 21 or younger.
AGE50 Proportion of workers that are aged 50 or over.
SHIFTS Dummy variable equal to 1 if some employees work shifts.
OVERTIME Proportion of largest occupational group that regularly work 
overtime, whether paid or unpaid. Where: 0=none, 1=1-19%, 
2=20-39%, 3=40-59%, 4=60-79%, 5=80-99%, 6 =all.
UNION Proportion of workers that belong to a trade union (value as a 
fraction).
COMMITTEE Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a committee within the 
workplace that deals either with a range of issues or specifically 
health and safety.
JOINTCOMM Dummy variable equal to 1 if above committee deals with a range 
of issues in addition to health and safety.
SPECIFICCOMM Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a committee that deals only 
with health and safety issues.
PAY Average annual pay per employee (£ 000)
INDUSTRY DUMMY 
VARIABLES
Correspond to SIC 2003: Manufacturing (excluded in 
estimations); Electricity gas and water; Construction; Wholesale 
and retail; Hotels and restaurants; Transport and communication; 
Financial services; Other business service; Public administration; 
Education; Health; Other community services.
OCCUPATION
VARIABLES
Correspond to SOC 2000. Variables calculated as a proportion of 
entire workforce: Managers and senior officials; Professional; 
Associate professional and technical; Administrative and 
secretarial (excluded in estimations); Skilled trades; Caring, 
leisure and personal service; Sales and customer service; Process, 
plant and machine operatives; Routine unskilled.
FEMALE Proportion of workforce that is female.
‘UNIONS HELP
IMPROVE
PERFORMANCE’
Value of 0-4 where 4=strongly disagree, and 0=strongly agree.
‘NO EMPLOYEE 
CONSULTATION’
Value of 0-4 where 4=strongly disagree, and 0=strongly agree.
HSTRAIN Dummy variable equal to 1 if largest occupational group had 
training that covered health and safety in the last 1 2  months.
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RESULTSPAY Dummy variable equal to 1 if there are some workers in the 
establishment that get paid by results.
SICKPAY Dummy variable equal to 1 if largest occupational group is entitled 
to sick pay in excess of statutory requirements.
REDUNDANCY Number of workers made redundant in the last 12 months.
FORTYEIGHTHRS Proportion of non-managerial employees that, over the past 12 
months have regularly worked in excess of 48 hours per week, 
where: 0=none, 1=1-19%, 2=20-39%, 3=40-59%, 4=60-79%, 
5=80-99%, 6 =all.
FORTYEIGHTMANGS Proportion of managerial employees that, over the past 12 months 
have regularly worked in excess of 48 hours per week, where: 
0=none, 1=1-19%, 2=20-39%, 3=40-59%, 4=60-79%, 5=80-99%, 
6 =all.
APPRAIS Proportion of non-managerial employees that have their 
performance formally appraised, where: 0=none, 1=1-19%, 2=20- 
39%, 3=40-59%, 4=60-79%, 5=80-99%, 6 =all.
DISCRETE Extent to which individuals gave discretion over how they do their 
work, where: 0=none and 3=a lot.
CONTROL Extent to which individuals have control over the pace at which 
they work, where: 0=none and 3=a lot.
TEAM Proportion of largest occupational group that work in formally 
designated teams, where: 0=none, 1=1-19%, 2=20-39%, 3=40- 
59%, 4=60-79%, 5=80-99%, 6 =all.
FLEX Dummy variable equal to 1 if some workers are able to work 
flexitime.
NIGHT Dummy variable equal to 1 if some employees work nights.
HOME Dummy variable equal to 1 if some workers are able to work from 
home.
Appendix 4.2: Unweighted Negative Binomial Regression Results
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1357 1296
LR chi2 400.6 814.45
Log Pseudo­
likelihood
-1047.1432 -2241.0065
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.5592*** 0.8343 -10.3 -2.9141*** 0.4679 -6.23
Ln(Employees) 0.8075*** 0.7373 1 1 . 0 0.8713*** 0.0433 2 0 . 1 0
Part-time -0.4565 0.5388 -0.85 -0.2906 0.3170 -0.92
Turnover -0.9266 0.6008 -1.54 0.1957 0.3519 0.56
Age21 1.9016*** 0.4714 2.56 -0.5851 0.4778 - 1 . 2 2
Age50 -0.0619 0.6427 -0 . 1 0 -0.4684 0.3628 -1.29
Shifts 0.0484 0.2082 0.23 0.0860 0.1345 0.64
Overtime 0.0962* 0.0545 1.77 0.0988*** 0.0319 3.10
Union 0.4680 0.3274 1.43 0.5413*** 0.1948 2.78
Committee 0.5010** 0.2029 2.47 0.0734 0.1273 0.58
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Pay 3.85e-05** 1.91e-05 2 . 0 2 -1.53e-05 1.24e-05 -1.23
Electricity -0.2281 0.5920 -0.39 -0.1524 0.4235 -0.36
Construction 1.1556*** 0.4141 2.79 0.2451 0.2766 0.89
Wholesale 0.4822 0.4497 1.07 0.4683* 0.2433 1.92
Hotel -0.0246 0.5325 -0.05 -0.6747* 0.3757 -1.80
Transport -0.5605 0.3872 -1.45 0.2357 0.2611 0.90
Financial 0.5022 0.5777 0.87 0.6226* 0.3315 1 .8 8
Real estate 1.1009*** 0.3589 3.07 -0.1608 0.2467 -0.65
Public admin 2.8137*** 0.4545 6.19 0.8600*** 0.3120 2.76
Education 0.5854 0.4966 1.18 -0.0086 0.3208 -0.03
Health 0.9837** 0.4600 2.14 0.8046*** 0.2754 2.92
Community 1 .0 1 2 1 *** 0.4136 2.45 0.2754 0.2776 0.99
Skilled Trades 3.8015*** 0.7369 5.16 -0.5093 0.4444 1.15
Managers 0.5974 1.3734 0.43 -1.8454*** 0.6544 -2.82
Machine Operatives 3.6038*** 0.7245 4.97 -0.5388 0.4084 -1.32
Professional 1.3130 0.8097 1.62 -0.3311 0.4349 -0.76
Service 2.3303*** 0.7641 3.05 -07206** 0.3722 -1.94
Unskilled 3.6068*** 0.6143 5.87 -0.0836 0.3564 -0.23
Sales 2.9738*** 0.6434 4.62 0.3212 0.3458 -0.93
Technical 0.5320 0.6865 0.77 -0.6524* 0.3614 -1.81
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2(l) 6.81 8.81
Prob>chi2 0.0090 0.0030
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1198 1138
LR chi2 345.08 708.75
Log Pseudo­
likelihood
-1027.5227 -2142.777
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.3531*** 0.8600 -9.71 -2.8761*** 0.5031 -5.72
Ln(Employees) 0.7856*** 0.0769 1 0 .2 0.8878*** 0.0466 19.06
Part-time -0.4984 0.5516 -0.90 -0.1970 0.3330 -0.59
Turnover -1.0007 0.6167 -1.62 0.2123 0.3738 0.57
Age21 2.0483*** 0.7872 2.60 -0.4448 0.5170 -0 . 8 6
Age50 -0.0055 0.6642 -0 .0 1 -0.7685* 0.3986 -1.93
Shifts 0.0857 0.2109 0.41 0.0811 0.1397 0.58
Overtime 0.0938 0.0563 1 .6 6 0.0899*** 0.0341 2.64
Union 0.4505 0.3296 1.37 0.5771*** 0 . 2 0 2 1 2 . 8 6
Committee 0.5233*** 0.2033 2.57 0.0870 0.1293 0.67
Pay 3.52e-06* 1.96e-05 1.80 -1.36e-05 1.32e-05 -1.03
Electricity -0.2660 0.5932 -0.45 -0.1604 0.4277 -0.37
Construction 1.1800*** 0.4225 2.79 0.2802 0.2857 0.98
Wholesale 0.4514 0.4627 0.98 0.4509* 0.2538 1.78
Hotel -0.4971 0.5452 -0.09 -0.8001** 0.3898 -2.05
Transport -0.5674 0.3862 -1.47 0.2266 0.2655 0.85
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Financial 0.5441 0.5787 0.94 0.6344* 0.3443 1.84
Real estate 1.0432*** 0.3644 2 . 8 6 -0.2531 0.2538 -1 . 0 0
Public admin 2.7531*** 0.4669 5.90 0.7659** 0.3209 2.39
Education 0.5356 0.5032 1.06 -0.0485 0.3334 -0.15
Health 0.9101** 0.4693 1.94 0.7077** 0.2887 2.45
Community 0.8815** 0.4413 2 . 0 0 0.3218 0.2938 1 . 1 0
Skilled Trades 3.8319*** 0.7594 5.05 -0.6348 0.4692 -1.35
Managers 0.4698 1.4615 0.32 -2.3546*** 0.7189 -3.28
Machine Operatives 3.4036*** 0.7518 4.53 -0.6493 0.4323 -1.50
Professional 1.3512 0.8232 1.64 -0.3493 0.4487 -0.78
Service 2.3936*** 0.7835 3.05 -0.7125* 0.3922 -1.82
Unskilled 3.5806*** 0.6261 5.72 -0.1645 0.3733 -0.44
Sales 2.9639*** 0.6550 4.53 -0.4090 0.3642 -1 . 1 2
Technical 0.6036 0.6986 0 . 8 6 -0.6412* 0.3744 -1.71
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2(l) 7.77 5.81
Prob>chi2 0.0053 0.0160
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Appendix 4.3: Reduced Form Regressions
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
UNION DENSITY H&S COMMITTEE AVERAGE PAY
Obs 1747 1984 1523
Log Likelihood -693.7580 -901.6808
Psuedo R2 0.4261 0.3019 0.7159
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient t
Constant -2.6605***
(0.6221)
-4.28 -2.9755***
(0.5661)
-5.26 9.9089***
(0.0685)
144.63
Ln(Employees) 0.6077***
(0.0566)
10.7 0.6808***
(0.0477)
14.3 0.0477***
(0.0054)
8.77
Female 0.1470
(0.4080)
0.36 -0.1821
(0.3915)
-0.47 -0.2502***
(0.0431)
-5.80
Part-time 0.6117*
(0.3622)
1.69 -0.5394
(0.3647)
-1.48 -0.8381***
(0.0409)
-20.48
Turnover -1.5578***
(0.4338)
-3.59 0.1571
(0.3957)
0.40 -0.1141***
(0.0454)
-2.51
Age21 -1.2707**
(0.5876)
-2.16 -0.1973
(0.5601)
-0.35 -0.3427***
(0.0616)
-5.57
Age50 1.2651***
(0.4423)
2 . 8 6 0.2698
(0.4212)
0.64 -0.0766
(0.0487)
-1.57
Shifts 0.3873**
(0.1666)
2.33 0.4337***
(0.1463)
2.97 -0.0307*
(0.0183)
- 1 .6 8
Overtime 0.0328
(0.0397)
0.83 -0.0484
(0.0358)
-1.35 0.0153***
(0.0041)
3.73
‘Unions help 
performance’
-0.5266***
(0.0706)
7.46 -1.7494***
(0.0604)
-2.90 -0.0053
(0.0071)
-0.74
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‘No employee 
consultation’
0.3198***
(0.0729)
4.39 0.1203*
(0.0683)
1.76 0.0133*
(0.0079)
1.67
Electricity -0.2667
(0.3850)
-0.69 0.1975***
(0.0614)
3.22
Construction 0.1070
(0.3263)
0.33 -0.9847***
(0.3217)
-3.06 0.0395
(0.0404)
0.98
Wholesale -0 .6 8 8 8 **
(0.2942)
-2.34 -1.1614***
(0.2863)
-4.06 -0.0885***
(0.0347)
-2.55
Hotel -1.6627***
(0.4664)
-3.57 -0.9614**
(0.4060)
-2.37 -0.0810*
(0.0495)
-1.64
Transport 1.0488***
(0.3269)
3.21 -0.5535**
(0.2723)
-2.03 0.0992***
(0.0364)
2.73
Financial 1.1469***
(0.3729)
3.08 -1.9167***
(0.3726)
-5.14 0.0573
(0.0430)
1.33
Real estate -1.2357***
(0.2995)
-4.13 -1.3061***
(0.2758)
-4.74 -0.0843
(0.0334)
-0.25
Public admin 4.2657***
(1.0535)
4.05 0.4417
(0.3464)
1.28 -0.0720*
(0.0424)
-1.70
Education 2.8597***
(0.4948)
5.78 0.3657
(0.3454)
1.06 0.0805*
(0.0422)
1.91
Health 0.8411**
(0.3531)
2.38 -0.4000
(0.3218)
-1.24 -0.0322
(0.0387)
-0.83
Community 0.5933*
(0.3191)
1 . 8 6 -0.4183
(0.3075)
-1.36 -0.0465
(0.0379)
-1.23
Skilled Trades 0.4566
(0.5918)
0.77 -0.1299
(0.5568)
-0.23 -0.3107***
(0.0660)
-4.71
Managers -2.2775***
(0.7999)
-2.85 0.5039
(0.7226)
0.70 0.2674***
(0.0808)
3.31
Machine
Operatives
0.6911
(0.5486)
1 .1 1 0.2226
(0.4971)
0.45 -0.4348***
(0.0601)
-7.24
Professional -0.0789
(0.6179)
-0.13 -0.0971
(0.5065)
-0.19 0.3041***
(0.0605)
5.02
Service -0.2900
(0.4536)
-0.64 -0.5032
(0.4323)
-1.16 -0.2537***
(0.0495)
-5.12
Unskilled 0.5613
(0.4647)
1 .2 1 -0.2781
(0.4251)
-0.65 -0.4354***
(0.0503)
-8 . 6 6
Sales 0.5840
(0.4479)
1.30 -0.2648
(0.4421)
-0.60 -0.2500***
(0.0487)
-5.13
Technical -0.1409
(0.4375)
-0.26 -0.5919
(0.4396)
-1.35 0.1872***
(0.0511)
3.67
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
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Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
UNION DENSITY H&S COMMITTEE AVERAGE PAY
Obs 1533 1766 1361
Log Likelihood -603.1526 -846.4746
Psuedo R2 0.4245 0.2847 0.7341
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient t
Constant -3.3798***
(0.7010)
-4.82 -2.7947***
(0.5949)
-4.70 -9.9251***
(0.0705)
140.84
Ln(Employees) 0.6478***
(0.0649)
9.98 0.6833***
(0.0513)
13.3 0.0455***
(0.0056)
8.07
Female 0.3842
(0.4620)
0.83 -0.3014
(0.4119)
-0.73 -0.2741***
(0.0457)
-6 . 0 0
Part-time 0.3908
(0.4066)
0.96 -0.6762*
(0.3826)
-1.77 -0.7938***
(0.0424)
-18.73
Turnover -1.7982***
(0.4705)
-3.82 0.0982
(0.4145)
0.24 -0.1782***
(0.0474)
-3.76
Age21 -1.4480**
(0.6585)
-2 . 2 0 -0.2818
(0.5896)
-0.48 -0.4353***
(0.0662)
-6.58
Age50 1.3802***
(0.5115)
2.70 0.3977
(0.4451)
0.89 -0.0757
(0.0513)
-1.48
Shifts 0.3722**
(0.1756)
2 . 1 2 0.4622***
(0.1501)
3.08 -0.0324*
(0.0181)
-1.79
Overtime 0.0522
(0.0443)
1.18 -0.0720*
(0.0375)
-1.92 0.0125***
(0.0043)
2.95
‘Unions help 
performance’
-0.5257**
(0.0754)
-6.97 -0.1945***
(0.0623)
-3.12 -0.0052
(0.0072)
-0.73
‘No employee 
consultation’
0.3756***
(0.0783)
4.80 0.1272*
(0.0703)
1.81 0 . 0 1 1 2
(0.0080)
1.40
Electricity -0.2398
(0.3967)
-0.60 0.2042***
(0.0580)
3.52
Construction 0.0603
(0.3452)
0.17 -0.9698***
(0.3290)
-2.95 0.0402
(0.0402)
1 . 0 0
Wholesale -0.5020
(0.3130)
-1.60 -1.1274***
(0.2958)
-3.81 -0.0978***
(0.0353)
-2.77
Hotel -1.5679***
(0.5021)
-3.12 -0.7990*
(0.4167)
-1.92 -0.0604
(0.0503)
-1 . 2 0
Transport 0.9969***
(0.3400)
2.93 -0.5788**
(0.2777)
-2.08 0.0941***
(0.0350)
2.69
Financial 0.8051**
(0.3997)
2 . 0 1 -2.0092***
(0.3829)
-5.25 0.0556
(0.0425)
1.31
Real estate -1.3076***
(0.3179)
-4.11 -1.3497***
(0.2844)
-4.75 0.0077
(0.0332)
0.23
Public admin 4.1268***
(1.0592)
3.90 0.3801
(0.3545)
1.07 -0.0707*
(0.0412)
-1.72
Education 3.0128***
(0.5516)
5.46 0.4431
(0.3562)
1.24 0.0694*
(0.0416)
1.67
Health 1.0062***
(0.3879)
2.59 -0.3716
(0.3313)
-1 .1 2 -0.0405
(0.0386)
-1.05
Community 0.6262* 1.79 -0.4014 -1.25 -0.0297 -0.78
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(0.3503) (0.3214) (0.0383)
Skilled Trades 1.0071
(0.6643)
1.52 -0.2898
(0.5807)
-0.50 -0.3266***
(0.0679)
-4.81
Managers -2.0568**
(0.9261)
-2 . 2 2 0.8299
(0.7753)
1.07 0.4348***
(0.0908)
4.79
Machine
Operatives
0.8421
(0.6034)
1.40 0.1301
(0.5164)
0.25 -0.4150***
(0.0606)
-6.85
Professional 0.3357
(0.6706)
0.50 -0.1328
(0.5206)
-0.26 0.3176***
(0.0596)
5.33
Service -0.2266
(0.5101)
-0.44 -0.6685
(0.4526)
-1.48 -0.2371***
(0.0502)
-4.73
Unskilled 1.0292**
(0.5205)
1.98 -0.3378
(0.4403)
-0.77 -0.4084***
(0.0503)
-8 . 1 2
Sales 0.9457*
(0.5145)
1.84 -0.4135
(0.4595)
-0.90 -0.2159***
(0.0501)
-4.31
Technical 0.2450
(0.5865)
0.42 -0.7854*
(0.4559)
-1.72 0 .2 1 2 0 ***
(0.0514)
4.12
♦♦♦^significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Appendix 4.4: Negative Binomial Regressions Results with Residuals
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1326 1267
Log pseudo- 
likelihood.
-18.3857 -56.2324
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.8538*** 1.1636 -5.41 -3.5346*** 0.5091 0.79
Ln(Employees) 0.8965*** 0.1389 6.46 0.7818*** 0.0982 7.96
Part-time -0.6719 0.9052 -0.74 -0.3357 0.5923 -0.57
Turnover -0.6591 0.7050 -0.93 -0.5135 0.4241 -1 .2 1
Age21 0.4351 0.7401 0.59 -1.1088* 0.5949 -1 .8 6
Age50 -0.6557 0.7310 -0.90 0.2762 0.4398 0.63
Shifts 0.3444 0.3163 1.09 0.3063 0.1895 1.62
Overtime 0.0667 0.0803 0.83 0.1243*** 0.0422 2.94
Union 1.1636*** 0.3854 3.02 -0.1548 0.2964 -0.52
Committee 0.6103 0.7849 0.82 0.6493 0.4905 1.32
Pay 3.44e-05 5.9e-05 0.58 3.56e-06 4.05e-05 0.09
Construction -0.5042 0.5642 -0.89 -0.4656 0.4095 -1.14
Wholesale 0.3749 0.7150 0.52 0.2303 0.3366 0 . 6 8
Hotel -0.2565 0.6972 -0.37 -0.5970 0.5091 -1.17
Transport -1.7981*** 0.5275 -3.41 0.2895 0.3690 0.78
Financial -0.1572 0.9401 -0.17 0.7882 0.4961 1.59
Real estate 1.4307** 0.6484 2 .2 1 -0.2976 0.3650 -0.82
Public admin 2.5618*** 0.6939 3.69 1.2168*** 0.4457 2.73
Education 1.0335 0.7344 1.41 0.2811 0.4394 0.64
Health 1.9942*** 0.7266 2.74 0.9003** 0.3775 2.38
Community 0.8518 0.6078 1.40 0.2749 0.3458 0.79
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Skilled Trades 4.1229*** 1.1515 3.58 0.5626 0.6136 0.92
Managers 1.5615 1.8515 0.84 -0.8486 1.0166 -0.83
Machine Operatives 4.7102*** 1.1574 4.07 -0.2740 0.6464 -0.42
Professional 0.5320 1.2619 0.42 -0.1727 0.7401 -0.23
Service 0.7922 1.0301 0.77 -0.4025 0.4721 -0.85
Unskilled 3.6125*** 0.9882 3.66 0.6758 0.5487 1.23
Sales 3.4307*** 1.3586 2.53 0.3998 0.5091 0.79
Technical -0.5904 0.9553 -0.62 -0.3992 0.5783 -0 . 6 8
Runion -0.1865* 0.0107 -1.78 0.2840*** 0.0461 6.16
Rcomm -0.1186 0.1046 -0.43 -0.2511 0.1806 -1.39
Rpay -0.1435 1.0266 -0.14 0.1919 0.6102 0.31
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2(l) 0.56 4.93
Prob>chi2 0.4563 0.0263
♦♦♦^significant at the 1% level; * ^ sign ificant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1168 1110
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-14.8705 -39.2409
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.5152*** 0.1593 -5.35 -2.3095*** 0.8791 -2.63
Ln(Employees) 0.7318*** 0.1875 3.91 0.8491*** 0.1099 7.73
Part-time -0.4975 0.9041 -0.55 -0.5672 0.5899 -0.96
Turnover -1.3241* 0.7037 - 1 .8 8 -0.2432 0.4211 -0.58
Age21 1.0208 0.8190 1.25 -0.9491* 0.5269 -1.80
Age50 -0.2741 0.8682 -0.32 -0.6485 0.5182 -1.25
Shifts 0.5666* 0.3044 1 . 8 6 0.3618** 0.1789 2 . 0 2
Overtime 0.0668 0.0723 0.92 0.1071*** 0.0395 2.71
Union 0.8569** 0.4033 2 . 1 2 0.0183 0.3002 0.06
Committee 0.6132 1.0838 0.57 0.5175 0.6436 0.80
Pay 6.4e-05 4.91e-05 1.30 -2.25e-05 3.77e-05 -0.60
Construction -0.1953 0.4748 -0.41 0.0610 0.4332 0.14
Wholesale 0.4577 0.6326 0.72 -0.0573 0.3773 -0.15
Hotel -0.2350 0.7073 -0.33 -1.1504*** 0.4590 -2.51
Transport -1.6525*** 0.4998 -3.31 0.3865 0.3691 1.05
Financial 0.2753 0.9116 0.30 0.7491 0.5780 1.30
Real estate 1.3648** 0.5843 2.34 -0.5041 0.3833 -1.32
Public admin 2.7275*** 0.7055 3.87 0.3681 0.4247 0.87
Education 1.2052* 0.7115 1.69 0.0613 0.4121 0.15
Health 2.0652*** 0.7016 2.94 0.4071 0.3897 1.04
Community 0.4730 0.5579 0.85 0.3745 0.3780 0.99
Skilled Trades 3.7872*** 1 . 1 2 1 0 3.38 -0.7554 0.6550 -1.15
Managers -0.3153 2.1998 -0.14 -2.2560** 1.0340 -2.18
Machine Operatives 4.0443*** 1.1263 3.59 -1.6401** 0.7013 -2.34
Professional 0.2124 1.2403 0.18 -0.4358 0.6817 -0.64
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Service 0.7890 1.0541 0.75 -0.8500* 0.5177 -1.64
Unskilled 3.7288*** 0.8900 4.19 -0.3191 0.5569 -0.57
Sales 3.3594*** 0.8734 3.85 -0.1354 0.5990 -0.23
Technical -0.7897 0.9658 -0.82 -0.4567 0.6172 -0.74
Runion -0.1039 0.1076 -0.97 0.1926*** 0.0736 2.62
Rcomm -0.0559 0.4433 -0.13 -0.1730 0.2628 -0 . 6 6
Rpay -1.0341 0.7517 -1.38 0.6192 0.5731 1.08
TEST LNEMPS=1
Chi2(l) 2.05 1.89
Prob>chi2 0.1522 0.1697
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Appendix 4.5: Negative Binomial Regression Results with New Workplace-Level 
Variables
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1265 1209
Wald chi2 408.39 413.80
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-16.5279 -52.8138
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.9821*** 1.2896 -6.96 -3.354*** 0.7090 -4.73
Ln(Employees) 0.8565*** 0.1306 6.56 0.8123*** 0.0784 10.4
Part-time -0.9315 0.6635 -1.40 -0.3890 0.4189 -0.93
Turnover -0.6924 0.6512 -1.06 0.0307 0.6159 0.05
Age21 1.4320* 0.7446 1.92 -1.0286* 0.5982 -1.72
Age50 -1.0819 0.8316 -1.30 0.4287 0.4880 0 . 8 8
Shifts 0.2274 0.3251 0.70 0.1017 0.1774 0.57
Overtime 0.0911 0.0945 0.96 0.1161*** 0.0423 2.74
Union 0.8630** 0.3863 2.23 0.5882** 0.2977 1.98
Committee 0.2765 0.2573 1.07 0.0271 0.1619 0.17
Pay 4.52e-05* 2.59e-05 1.74 -0.124e-05 1.67e-05 -0.74
Fixed 0.5563 0.5832 0.34 -0.1973 0.4391 -0.45
Hstrain 0.3962 0.2918 1.36 -0.3490** 0.1554 -2.25
Resultspay -0.7654** 0.3260 -2.35 0.2126 0.2079 1 . 0 2
Sickpay -0.0009 0.2963 0 . 1 0 0.4392*** 0.1713 2.56
Redundancy -0.0114* 0.0067 -1.71 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0056 0.17
Forty eighthrs 0.0330 0.0918 0.72 0.0272 0.0502 0.54
Apprais -0.1700*** 0.0534 -3.19 0.0322 0.0331 0.97
Discrete -0.1205 0.1630 0.46 -0.1837* 0.0984 -1.87
Control 0.0139 0.1870 0.07 0.0168 0.0910 0.18
Team 0.0421 0.0801 0.60 -0.0055 0.0391 -0.14
Flex -0.1868 0.2403 -0.78 -0.1134 0.1711 -0 . 6 6
Night 0.6146* 0.3317 1.85 0.3102 0.1984 1.56
Home -0.0864 0.4228 0.84 0.3248* 0.1739 1.87
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Electricity -0.2132 0.7515 -0.28 -0.7101 0.6476 -1 . 1 0
Construction -0.2903 0.5913 -0.49 -0.4911 0.4338 -1.13
Wholesale 0.6083 0.6690 0.91 -0.0918 0.3494 -0.26
Hotel 0.1894 0.7282 0.26 -0.5937 0.5098 -1.16
Transport -2.3129 0.5522 -4.19 0.3435 0.3976 0 . 8 6
Financial 0.6595 0.9945 0 . 6 6 0.0909 0.5103 0.18
Real estate 1.5751*** 0.5707 2.76 -0.0366 0.3602 -0 . 1 0
Public admin 3.0409*** 0.7413 4.10 0.8445* 0.4528 1.87
Education 1.6027** 0.7600 2 .1 1 0.3102 0.4879 0.64
Health 2.1606*** 0.6780 3.19 0.7889** 0.3995 1.97
Community 1.2272* 0.6567 1.87 0.0950 0.3618 0.26
Skilled Trades 3.6064*** 1.1507 3.13 0.5937 0.6299 0.94
Managers 2.3782 1.7619 1.35 -0.2594 0.9467 -0.27
Machine Operatives 4.7524*** 0.9628 4.94 -0.5022 0.6269 -0.80
Professional -0.0908 1.0417 -0.09 -0.5194 0.6601 -0.79
Service 0.2097 1.0714 0 . 2 0 -0.4343 0.4949 -0 . 8 8
Unskilled 2.8307*** 0.8990 3.15 0.2332 0.5349 0.44
Sales 3.4136*** 1.1583 2.95 0.4606 0.5220 0 . 8 8
Technical -0.5876 0.8419 -0.70 -.5147 0.5301 -0.97
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1121 1066
Wald chi2 268.29 368.87
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-13.098 -37.0765
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -7.8746*** 1.2596 -6.25 -3.0791*** 0.6775 -4.54
Ln(Employees) 0.8150*** 0.1313 6 . 2 1 0.8274*** 0.0831 9.95
Part-time -1.365** 0.6781 -2 . 0 1 -0.0532 0.4283 -0 . 1 2
Turnover -1.4148** 0.7136 -1.98 -0.1666 0.4383 -0.38
Age21 1.6546* 0.9518 1.74 -0.8041 0.5222 -1.54
Age50 -0.5185 0.8929 -0.58 -0.3829 0.5451 -0 . 6 8
Shifts 0.3588 0.2996 1 .2 0 0.2450 0.1715 1.43
Overtime 0.0471 0.0881 0.54 0.0707* 0.0414 1.71
Union 0.8076** 0.4012 2 .0 1 0.5374* 0.2886 1 . 8 6
Committee 0.4839** 0.2406 2 . 0 1 0.1267 0.1674 0.76
Pay 2.23e-05 2.46e-05 0.91 2.18e-06 1.94e-05 0 . 1 1
Fixed 1.1495** 0.5186 2 . 2 2 0.0986 0.4409 0 . 2 2
Hstrain 0.5560** 0.2741 2.03 -0.2519 0.1612 -1.56
Resultspay -0.3324 0.2858 -1.16 -0.0550 0.1845 -0.30
Sickpay -0.2683 0.3096 -0.87 0.1998 0.1744 1.15
Redundancy -0.0042 0.0079 -0.53 0.0027 0.0059 0.46
Fortyeighthrs 0.1397** 0.0762 1.83 0.0786 0.0508 1.55
Apprais -0.1680*** 0.0601 -2.80 0.0378 0.0348 1.09
Discrete -0 . 1 1 2 0 0.1499 -0.75 -0.0053 0.0946 -0.06
Control 0.0920 0.1635 0.56 -0.0378 0.0905 -0.42
Team -0.0705 0.0611 -1.16 0.0178 0.0390 0.46
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Flex -0.3502 0.2689 -1.30 -0.1949 0.1788 -1.09
Night 0.7309** 0.2892 2.53 0.2148 0.1793 1 . 2 0
Home -0.5383 0.3307 -1.63 0.5216*** 0.1796 2.90
Electricity 0.5362 0.7505 0.71 -0.7248 0.5821 -1.25
Construction 0.0048 0.5258 0 . 0 1 -0.0496 0.4317 -0 . 1 1
Wholesale 0.4548 0.5852 0.78 -0.0032 0.3487 -0 . 0 1
Hotel 0.1488 0.6952 0 . 2 1 -1.1316** 0.4593 -2.46
Transport -2.2898*** 0.5518 -4.15 0.3187 0.3815 0.84
Financial 0.9065 0.8506 1.07 0.6133 0.5615 1.09
Real estate 1.3156*** 0.4832 2.72 -0.4547 0.3350 -1.36
Public admin 3.1095*** 0.7454 4.17 0.4060 0.4227 0.96
Education 1.3758* 0.7770 1.77 -0.0340 0.4543 -0.07
Health 2.1080*** 0.7066 2.98 0.4288 0.3889 1 . 1 0
Community 0.7397 0.5805 1.27 0.1933 0.3635 0.53
Skilled Trades 2.3143** 1.1039 2 . 1 0 -0.6167 0.6615 -0.93
Managers 0.9003 1.8975 0.47 -2.5873** 1.0343 -2.50
Machine Operatives 3.1099*** 1.1605 2 . 6 8 -1.2824** 0.6528 -1.96
Professional 0.0793 1.1040 0.07 -0.9650 0.6365 -1.52
Service -0.5301 1.2378 -0.43 -0.6777 0.5159 -1.31
Unskilled 2.2118** 0.9941 2 . 2 2 -0.1368 0.5107 -0.27
Sales 2.7840*** 0.8785 3.17 0.0753 0.5544 0.14
Technical -0.4855 1.003 -0.48 -0.7174 0.5579 -1.29
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Appendix 4.6: Endogeneity Test Results Including New Variables
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees: Reduced Form Regression
UNION DENSITY H&S COMMITTEE AVERAGE PAY
Obs 1625 1845 1422
Log Likelihood -614.5630 -820.5871
Psuedo R2/Adj 
R2
0.4536 0.3156 0.7185
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient t
Constant -3.0079***
(0.7514)
-4.00 -3.4800***
(0.6853)
-5.08 9.7640***
(0.0779)
125.40
Ln(Employees) 0.5487***
(0.0678)
8.09 0.6116***
(0.0547)
11.17 0.0379***
(0.0064)
5.90
Female 0.3952
(0.4483)
0 . 8 8 -0.0330
(0.4182)
-0.08 -0.2730***
(0.0451)
5.90
Part-time 0.5915
(0.3928)
1.51 -0.5003
(0.3891)
-1.29 -0.7923***
(0.0421)
-18.82
Turnover -1.7701***
(0.4748)
-4.73 0.0499
(0.4273)
0 . 1 2 -0.1292***
(0.0471)
-2.74
Age21 -1 .1 0 0 0 *
(0.6364)
-1.73 -0.0893
(0.6049)
-0.15 -0.3643***
(0.0649)
-5.61
Age50 1.2705***
(0.4758)
2.67 0.1866
(0.4472)
0.42 -0.0641
(0.0500)
-1.28
Shifts 0.2104 1.09 0.2480 1.53 -0.0430** -2.13
41
(0.1926) (0.1624) 0 .0 2 0 2 )
Overtime 0.0527
(0.0453)
1.16 -0.0293
(0.0405)
-0.72 0.0131***
(0.0045)
2 . 8 8
‘Unions help 
performance’
-0.4958***
(0.0763)
-6.50 -0.1256**
(0.0638)
-1.97 -0.0024
(0.0074)
-0.33
‘No employee 
consultation’
0.2939***
(0.0801)
3.67 0.0128
(0.0738)
0.17 0.0092
(0.0084)
1 . 1 0
Fixed 0.1107
(0.4456)
0.25 -0.4026
(0.4704)
-0 . 8 6 -0 . 0 0 0 2
(0.0476)
-0 . 0 0
Hstrain 0.1454
(0.1667)
0.87 0.4842***
(0.1480)
3.27 -0.0375**
(0.0167)
-2.25
Resultspay -0.2697
(0.1814)
-1.49 0.1546
(0.1588)
0.97 0.0145
(0.0185)
0.78
Sickpay 0.8965***
(0.1786)
5.02 0 . 2 0 2 0
(0.1589)
1.27 0.0534***
(0.0181)
2.95
Redundancy 0.0043
(0.0047)
0.91 0.0019
(0.0033)
0.58 1.86e-05
(0.0004)
0.04
Fortyeighthrs -0.0588
(0.0584)
-1 .0 1 0.0080
(0.0481)
0.17 0.0064
(0.0059)
1.08
Apprais 0.0808**
(0.0356)
2.27 0.0660**
(0.0333)
1.98 0.0013***
(0.0036)
3.13
Discrete -0.2706***
(0.0959)
-2.82 -0.3047***
(0.0860)
-3.54 0.0024
(0 .0 1 0 0 )
0.24
Control -0 .2 2 0 1 ***
(0.0844)
-2.61 -0.0690
(0.0804)
-0 . 8 6 0.0205**
(0.0091)
2.25
Team -0.0160
(0.0393)
-0.41 0.0889**
(0.0400)
2 . 2 2 0.0108***
(0.0041)
2.62
Flex 0.4253***
(0.1579)
2.69 0.3939***
(0.1394)
2.83 -0.0218
(0.0163)
-1.33
Night 0.4253**
(0.2064)
2.06 0.2282
(0.1655)
1.38 0.0064
(0.0206)
0.31
Home -0.7471***
(0.1847)
-4.04 -0.1099
(0.1478)
-0.74 0.0589***
(0.0174)
3.40
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
♦♦♦^significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Workplaces with 10 or more Employees: Reduced Form Regression
UNION DENSITY H&S COMMITTEE AVERAGE PAY
Obs 1427 1643 1274
Log Likelihood -535.2560 -768.6940
Psuedo R2 0.4525 0.3005 0.7333
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient t
Constant -3.9419***
(0.8518)
-4.63 -3.4785***
(0.7245)
-4.80 9.8097***
(0.0806)
121.70
Ln(Employees) 0.5999***
(0.0779)
7.70 0.6196***
(0.0590)
10.50 0.0378***
(0.0067)
5.66
Female 0.6751 1.33 -0.1954 -0.44 -0.2860*** -6 . 0 0
42
(0.5081) (0.4416) (0.0477)
Part-time 0.2973
(0.4446)
0.67 -0.6519
(0.4112)
-1.59 -0.7462***
(0.0438)
-17.04
Turnover -1.9761***
(0.5195)
-3.80 -0.0066
(0.4510)
-0 .0 1 -0.1874***
(0.0492)
-3.81
Age21 -1.1057
(0.7114)
-1.55 -01944
(0.6381)
-0.30 -0.4486***
(0.0689)
-6.51
Age50 1.2684**
(0.5460)
2.32 0.2383
(0.4720)
0.50 -0.0614
(0.0527)
-1.16
Shifts 0.2185
(0 .2 0 2 0 )
1.08 0.2716
(0.1667)
1.63 -0.0466**
(0.0197)
-2.36
Overtime 0.0840*
(0.0507)
1 .6 6 -0.0502
(0.0423)
-1.19 0.0086*
(0.0047)
1.81
‘Unions help 
performance’
-0.4894***
(0.0820)
-5.97 -0.1456**
(0.0659)
2 .2 1 -0.0040
(0.0074)
-0.54
‘No employee 
consultation’
-0.4894***
(0.0863)
4.05 0.0208
(0.0760)
0.27 0.0073
(0.0084)
0.87
Fixed 0.2103
(0.4870)
0.43 -0.3914
(0.4888)
-0.80 0 . 0 2 0 0
(0.0475)
0.42
H strain 0.1417
(0.1805)
0.78 0.5351***
(0.1533)
3.49 -0.0525***
(0.0168)
-3.13
Resultspay -0.3432*
(0.1918)
-1.79 0.1391
(0.1633)
0.85 0.0156
(0.0186)
0.84
Sickpay 0.8199***
(0.1968)
4.17 0.1541
(0.1650)
0.93) 0.0520***
(0.0186)
2.79
Redundancy 0.0041
(0.0047)
0 . 8 6 0.0018
(0.0034)
0.53) 0 . 0 0 0 1
(0.0004)
0.29
Fortyeighthrs -0.0696
(0.0632)
-1 . 1 0 0.0032
(0.0498)
0.06 0.0103*
(0.0060)
1.73
Apprais 0.0580
(0.0388)
1.50 0.0602*
(0.0346)
1.74 0.0091**
(0.0037)
2.45
Discrete -0.227**
(0.1053)
-2.16 -0.2782***
(0.0896)
-3.10 0.0090
(0 .0 1 0 1 )
0.89
Control -0.1965**
(0.0987)
-1.99 0 . 0 0 2 0
(0.0866)
0 . 0 2 0.0146
(0.0096)
1.51
Team 0.0094
(0.0435)
0 . 2 2 0.1035**
(0.0425)
2.44 0.0067
(0.0043)
1.56
Flex 0.4605***
(0.1698)
2.71 0.3888***
(0.1438)
2.71 -0.0275*
(0.0163)
-1.69
Night 0.3578*
(0.2132)
1 .6 8 0.2546
(0.1694)
1.50 0.0159
(0 .0 2 0 0 )
0.79
Home -0.6817***
(0 .2 0 0 0 )
-3.41 -0.1213
(0.1524)
-0.80 0.0478***
(0.0173)
2.76
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
***=significant at the 1% level; ’•^sign ificant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
43
Negative Binomial Regression with Residuals: Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1237 1183
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-16.3145 -51.7408
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant _9 2 7 7 9 *** 2.6922 -3.45 -3.5420*** 0.8350 -4.24
Ln(Employees) 0.8730*** 0.1804 4.84 0.7746*** 0.0967 8 .0 1
Part-time -0.4213 1.9420 -0 . 2 2 -0.2620 0.5842 -0.45
Turnover -0.6316 0.7768 -0.81 -0.6820 0.4422 -1.54
Age21 1.7047 1.1030 1.55 -0.8541 0.5881 -1.45
Age50 -1.0480 0.8161 -1.28 0.4825 0.4746 1 . 0 2
Shifts 0.1269 0.3626 0.35 0.1627 0.1773 0.92
Overtime 0.0816 0.0899 0.91 0.1232*** 0.0440 2.80
Union 1.0713** 0.4469 2.40 -0.1502 0.3211 0.47
Committee 1.9789** 0.8768 2.26 0.6134 0.4750 1.29
Pay 7.66e-05 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.48 -7.82e-06 3.97e-05 -0 . 2 0
Fixed 0.6079 0.5732 1.06 -0.2448 0.3897 -0.63
Hstrain 0.3091 0.2933 1.05 -0.3413** 0.1534 -2.23
Resultspay -0.7802** 0.3630 -2.15 0.1140 0.1940 0.59
Sickpay -0.0800 0.3098 -0.26 0.5730*** 0.1646 3.48
Redundancy -0 .0 1 2 1 * 0.0069 -1.76 0.0019 0.0054 0.36
Forty eighthrs 0.0195 0.0994 0 . 2 0 0.0441 0.0515 0 . 8 6
Apprais -0.1848*** 0.0578 -3.20 0.0311 0.0336 0.93
Discrete -0.0372 0.1737 -0 .2 1 -0.1412 0.0952 -1.48
Control -0.0148 0.1911 -0.08 0.0207 0.0881 0.23
Team 0.0141 0.0845 0.17 0.0044 0.0397 0 . 1 1
Flex -0.2746 0.2695 - 1 . 0 2 -0.1899 0.1697 -1 . 1 2
Night 0.6214* 0.3321 1.87 0.2577 0.1956 1.32
Home -0.0714 0.4113 -0.17 0.3396* 0.1742 1.95
Runion -0.1656 0.1233 -1.34 0.2712*** 0.0503 5.39
Rcomm -0.7499** 0.3362 -2.23 -0.2412 0.1731 -1.39
Rpay -3.47e-05 0 . 0 0 0 2 -0 .2 1 0.0098 0.6149 0 . 0 2
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Negative Binomial Regression: Workplaces with 10 or more employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f Obs 1094 1041
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-12.8826 -36.6907
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.4830*** 1.5444 -5.49 -2.3656*** 0.8250 -2.87
Ln(Employees) 0.9416*** 0.1611 5.85 0.7472*** 0.1103 6.77
Part-time -0.6227 0.8689 -0.72 -0.4067 0.5356 -0.72
Turnover -1.4143** 0.7008 -2 . 0 2 -0.3691 0.4503 -0.82
Age21 2.0142** 1.0071 2 . 0 0 -0.9634* 0.5613 -1.72
44
Age50 -0.4903 0.8833 -0.56 -0.3590 0.5539 -0.65
Shifts 0.2554 0.2817 0.91 0.2516 0.1740 1.45
Overtime 0.0302 0.0881 0.34 0.0932** 0.0423 2 . 2 1
Union 0.8947* 0.4627 1.93 0.146 0.3357 0.43
Committee 1.9584** 0.8952 2.19 1.2742** 0.6239 2.04
Pay 7.21e-05 5.66e-05 1.27 -3.49e-05 3.66e-05 -0.95
Fixed 1.1589** 0.5104 2.27 0.0525 0.1004 0.52
Hstrain 0.4700 0.2910 1.61 -0.3365** 0.1673 -2 . 0 1
Resultspay -0.3286 0.2770 -1.19 -0.0837 0.1874 -0.45
Sickpay -0.3290 0.3018 -1.09 0.1987 0.1740 1.14
Redundancy -0.0046 0.0082 -0.57 0 . 0 0 2 2 0.0059 0.38
Fortyeighthrs 0.1299 0.0803 1.62 0.0837 0.0511 1.64
Apprais -0.1868*** 0.0594 -3.15 0.0366 0.0353 1.04
Discrete -0.0706 0.1605 -0.44 0.0525 0.1004 0.52
Control 0.0994 0.1666 0.60 -0.0443 0.0872 -0.51
Team -0.0975 0.0606 -1.61 0.0095 0.0403 0.24
Flex -0.4130 0.2806 -1.47 -0.2803 0.1820 -1.54
Night O.7 4 4 9 *** 0.2787 2.67 0.1330 0.1859 0.72
Home -0.5653* 0.3367 - 1 .6 8 0.5631*** 0.1803 3.12
Runion -0.1348 0.1373 -0.98 0.1661** 0.0785 2 . 1 1
Rcomm -0.6643* 0.3637 -1.83 -0.4793* 0.2518 -1.90
Rpay -0.9204 0.9599 -0.96 0.6603 0.5576 1.18
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Appendix 4.7: Negative Binomial Regression Results includingFortveighthrs and 
Fortveightmangs
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1251 1195
Wald chi2 410.67 425.50
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-16.0496 -51.8563
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -9.2887*** 1.3324 -6.97 -3.6106*** 0.7280 -4.96
Ln(Employees) 0.9671*** 0.1265 7.65 0.8240*** 0.0802 10.28
Part-time -0.6433 0.6753 -0.95 -0.2314 0.4183 -0.55
Turnover -0.8279 0.6556 -1.26 -0.0771 0.5756 -0.13
Age21 1.3629* 0.7792 1.75 -1.0249* 0.6030 -1.70
Age50 -1.2911 0.8454 -1.53 0.4385 0.5035 0.87
Shifts 0.1265 0.3366 0.38 0.0187 0.1762 0 .1 1
Overtime 0.0781 0.1059 0.74 0.0946** 0.0440 2.15
Union 0.9346** 0.4021 2.32 0.6978** 0.3153 2 . 2 1
Pay 4.87e-05* 2.6e-05 1.87 -9.12e-06 1.68e-05 -0.54
Resultspay -0.7712** 0.3287 -2.35 0.2007 0.2080 0.96
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Sickpay -0.0736 0.2963 -0.25 0.4578*** 0.1709 2 . 6 8
Fixed 0.5450 0.5891 0.93 -0.2756 0.4213 -0.65
Hstrain 0.3522 0.2975 1.18 -0.3992** 0.1617 -2.47
Committee 0.3632 0.2507 1.45 0.0312 0.1623 0.19
Redundancy 0 .0 1 2 1 * 0.0066 -1.84 0.0005 0.0052 0 . 1 0
Fortyeighthrs 0.0067 0.0913 0.07 -0.0206 0.0548 -0.38
Fortyeightmangs 0.1078* 0.0618 1.75 0.1192*** 0.0341 3.50
Apprais -0.1590*** 0.0561 -2.83 0.0508 0.0340 1.49
Discrete -0.1686 0.1673 - 1 .0 1 -0.1693* 0.0999 -1.69
Control 0.0724 0.1795 0.40 0.0289 0.0906 0.32
Team 0.0362 0.0773 0.47 0.0066 0.0400 0.17
Flex -0.1816 0.2453 -0.74 -0.1234 0.1673 -0.74
Night 0.5879* 0.3333 1.76 0.3377* 0.1991 1.70
Home -0.0382 0.4040 -0.09 0.2786* 0.1691 1.65
Electricity -0.0927 0.7677 -0 . 1 2 -0.6690 0.6737 -0.99
Construction -0.3044 0.5933 -0.51 -0.5534 0.4171 -1.33
Wholesale 0.7288 0.6503 1 . 1 2 0.0065 0.3448 0 . 0 2
Hotel 0.1148 0.7244 0.16 -0.5965 0.4882 - 1 . 2 2
Transport -2.3571*** 0.5573 -4.23 0.2772 0.4125 0.67
Financial 0.5576 1.0448 0.53 -0.1069 0.5115 -0 . 2 1
Real estate 1.4485*** 0.5534 2.62 -0.1099 0.3585 -0.31
Public admin 2.7490*** 0.7427 3.70 0.7242 0.4767 1.52
Education 1.3544* 0.7877 1.72 -0.0697 0.5036 -0.14
Health 1.9215*** 0.7065 2.72 0.6610 0.4169 1.59
Community 1.1252* 0.6418 1.75 0.0670 0.3807 0.18
Skilled Trades 3.5132*** 1.1481 3.06 0.4689 0.6535 0.72
Managers 2.3480 1.6338 1.44 -0.8837 0.9357 -0.94
Machine Operatives 4.6513*** 0.9798 4.75 -0.6499 0.6268 -1.04
Professional -0.7117 1.1091 -0.64 -0.5527 0.6993 -0.79
Service 0.4408 1.2315 0.36 -0.4559 0.5075 -0.90
Unskilled 2.8241*** 0.9826 2.87 0.0947 0.5360 0.18
Sales 3.2659*** 1.1547 2.83 0.2945 0.5212 0.57
Technical -0.4036 0.8747 -0.46 -0.6178 0.5412 -1.14
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1108 1053
Wald chi2 294.00 401.95
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-12.6855 -36.3187
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -8.1302*** 1.3718 -5.93 -3.6105*** 0.7064 -5.11
Ln(Employees) 0.9607*** 0.1324 7.26 0.8764*** 0.0857 10.23
Part-time -1.2554* 0.6756 -1.9 0.1539 0.4253 0.36
Turnover -1.5184** 0.7353 -2.07 -0.2347 0.4236 -0.55
Age21 1.7306* 0.9631 1.80 -0.7005 0.5028 -1.39
Age50 -0.3824 0.8738 -0.44 -0.3319 0.5542 -0.60
Shifts 0.3334 0.3063 1.09 0.1507 0.1735 0.87
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Overtime 0.0469 0.0983 0.48 0.0599 0.0419 1.43
Union 0.8398** 0.4169 2 . 0 1 0.4959* 0.2919 1.70
Pay 1.61 e-05 2.49e-05 0.64 7.51e-06 1.93e-05 0.39
Resultspay -0.3139 0.2885 -1.09 -0.1042 0.1781 -0.59
Sickpay -0.3438 0.3226 -1.07 0.1944 0.1757 1 .1 1
Fixed 1.1870** 0.5341 2 . 2 2 -0.0459 0.4222 -0 .1 1
Hstrain 0.5217* 0.2826 1.85 -0.3096* 0.1622 -1.91
Committee 0.5306** 0.2488 2.13 0.1067 0.1671 0.64
Redundancy -0.0047 0.0082 -0.57 0 . 0 0 2 2 0.0057 0.39
Fortyeighthrs 0.1601** 0.0773 2.07 0.0311 0.0546 0.57
Fortyeightmangs 0.0119 0.0584 0 . 2 0 0.1061*** 0.0346 3.07
Apprais -0.1645** 0.0661 -2.49 0.0642* 0.0346 1.85
Discrete -0.1573 0.1537 -1 .0 2 -0.0042 0.0954 -0.04
Control 0.1103 0.1747 0.63 -0.0239 0.0915 -0.26
Team -0.0754 0.0632 -1.19 0.0332 0.0393 0.85
Flex -0.3057 0.2803 -1.09 -0.1797 0.1749 -1.03
Night 0.6935** 0.2937 2.36 0.1732 0.1785 0.997
Home -0.4339 0.3335 -1.30 0.5051*** 0.1784 2.83
Electricity 0.6103 0.7874 0.78 -0.6117 0.5663 -1.08
Construction 0.0392 0.5397 0.07 -0.0503 0.4177 -0 . 1 2
Wholesale 0.5242 0.6079 0 . 8 6 0 . 1 0 0 1 0.3234 0.31
Hotel 0.0927 0.7011 0.13 -1.0769** 0.4449 -2.42
Transport -2.3181*** 0.5710 -4.06 0.3995 0.4109 0.97
Financial 0.9837 0.8597 1.14 0.4757 0.5458 0.87
Real estate 1.2183** 0.4901 2.49 -0.4652 0.3317 -1.40
Public admin 2.9408*** 0.7701 3.82 0.3653 0.4318 0.85
Education 1.3971* 0.8108 1.72 -0.1881 0.4662 -0.40
Health 1.8837** 0.7843 2.40 0.4342 0.4018 1.08
Community 0.7453 0.5763 1.29 0.2311 0.3837 0.60
Skilled Trades 2.5070** 1.1626 2.16 -0.7120 0.6784 -1.05
Managers 1.2979 1.9160 0 . 6 8 -2.9293*** 1.0314 -2.84
Machine Operatives 3.2472*** 1.2322 2.64 -1.1745* 0.6798 -1.73
Professional -0.1316 1.1051 -0 . 1 2 -1.1604* 0.6531 -1.78
Service -0.2186 1.4258 -0.15 -0.7857 0.5291 -1.48
Unskilled 2.3501** 1.0694 2 . 2 0 -0.1811 0.5423 -0.33
Sales 2.8155*** 0.9207 3.06 -0.0938 0.5578 -0.17
Technical -0.0930 1.0273 -0.09 -0.8398 0.5669 -1.48
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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Appendix 4.8: Negative Binomial Regressions Results with UnionPay Variable
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1251 1195
Wald chi2 411.35 428.28
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-16.0274 -51.7144
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -9.0347*** 1.3120 -6.89 -3.3109*** 0.7289 -4.54
Ln(Employees) 1.0932*** 0.1278 8.55 0.8282*** 0.0796 10.41
Part-time -0.6571 0.6878 -0.96 -0.2647 0.4178 -0.63
Turnover -0.8426 0.6562 -1.28 -0.0786 0.5681 -0.14
Age21 1.2379 0.7804 1.59 -1.1757** 0.5988 -1.96
Age50 -1.2585 0.8405 -1.50 0.4186 0.5019 0.83
Shifts 0.0979 0.3336 0.29 -0.0271 0.1760 -0.15
Overtime 0.0803 0.1058 0.76 0.1006** 0.0437 2.30
Union -0.2349 1.2384 -0.19 -0.7107 0.7598 -0.94
Union-pay 6.61e-05 6.40e-05 1.03 8.26e-05** 3.82e-05 2.17
Pay 3.09e-05 3.02e-05 1.03 -2.49e-05 2.04e-05 - 1 . 2 2
Resultspay -0.7459** 0.3299 -2.26 0 . 2 1 0 0 0.2050 1 . 0 2
Sickpay -0.0335 0.3001 -0 .1 1 0.4843*** 0.1715 2.82
Fixed 0.5204 0.5833 0.89 -0.2543 0.4137 -0.61
Hstrain 0.3478 0.2958 1.18 -0.4094** 0.1602 -2.56
Committee 0.3609 0.2506 1.44 0.0203 0.1634 0 . 1 2
Redundancy -0.0116* 0.0070 - 1 .6 6 0.0018 0.0058 0.30
Fortyeighthrs 0 .0 0 0 1 0.0927 0 . 0 0 -0.0235 0.0546 -0.43
Fortyeightmangs 0.1092* 0.0623 1.75 0.1192*** 0.0341 3.49
Apprais -0.1591*** 0.0558 -2.85 0.0563 0.0344 1.64
Discrete -0.1696 0.1667 -1 .0 2 -0.1750* 0.0992 -1.76
Control 0.0814 0.1792 0.45 0.0336 0.0912 0.37
Team 0.0359 0.0760 0.47 0.0068 0.0393 0.17
Flex -0.1741 0.2416 -0.72 -0.1386 0.1669 -0.83
Night 0.6134* 0.3286 1.87 0.3602* 0.1975 1.82
Home -0.0331 0.3993 -0.08 0.2857* 0.1698 1 .6 8
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1108 1053
Wald chi2 291.85 400.44
Log pseudo­
likelihood
-12.6780 -36.2977
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -7.9453*** 1.3779 -5.77 -3.4531*** 0.7044 -4.90
Ln(Employees) 1.1573*** 0.1333 8 . 6 8 0.8753*** 0.0858 1 0 . 2 0
Part-time -1.2796* 0.6841 -1.87 0.1485 0.4306 0.34
Turnover -1.5450** 0.7238 -2.13 -0.2391 0.4195 -0.57
Age21 1.6416* 0.9611 1.71 -0.8010 0.4952 -1.62
Age50 -0.3730 0 . 8 6 8 8 -0.43 -0.3534 0.5506 -0.64
Shifts 0.3062 0.2981 1.03 0.1283 0.1731 0.74
Overtime 0.0463 0.0994 0.47 0.0607 0.0418 1.45
Union 0.1092 0.9242 0.91 -0.1880 0.8037 0.815
Union-pay 4.14e-05 4.81e-05 0 . 8 6 3.94e-05 4.22e-05 0.35
Pay 2.37e-06 2.91e-05 0.08 -9.17e-07 2.17e-05 0.966
Resultspay -0.2984 0.2897 -1.03 -0.0995 0.1777 -0.56
Sickpay -0.3125 0.3144 -0.99 0.2116 0.1750 1 .2 1
Fixed 1.1419** 0.5323 2.15 -0.0443 0.4197 -0 .1 1
Hstrain 0.5105* 0.2833 1.80 -0.3156* 0.1620 -1.95
Committee 0.5356** 0.2506 2.14 0.1009 0.1660 0.61
Redundancy -0.0041 0.0084 -0.48 0.0029 0.0060 0.48
Forty eighthrs 0.1579** 0.0784 2 .0 1 0.0307 0.0547 0.56
Fortyeightmangs 0.0144 0.0588 0.24 0.1072*** 0.0349 3.07
Apprais -0.1637** 0.0659 -2.49 0.0666* 0.0349 1.91
Discrete -0.1580 0.1541 -1.03 -0.0040 0.0946 -0.04
Control 0.1176 0.1771 0 . 6 6 -0.062 0.0918 -0.29
Team -0.0735 0.0631 -1.16 0.0354 0.0393 0.90
Flex -0.2989 0.2785 -1.07 -0.1838 0.1737 -1.06
Night 0.7047** 0.2912 2.42 0.1867 0.1786 1.05
Home -0.4311 0.3332 -1.29 0.5078*** 0.1786 2.84
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
♦♦♦^significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Appendix 4.9: Endogeneity Tests: Tobit Model
Tobit Model with Residuals: Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
INJRISK ILLRISK
No. o f Obs 1224 1170
Log likelihood -205.7827 -302.9364
Psuedo R2 0.3730 0.3038
Coefficient Std error t Coefficient Std error t
Constant -0.1751*** 0.0594 -2.95 -0.0072 0.0469 -0.015
Ln(Employees) -0.0292*** 0.0071 -4.12 -0.0315*** 0.0067 -4.69
Part-time -0.0063 0.0311 -0 . 2 0 -0.0267 0.0284 -0.94
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Turnover -0.0138 0.0261 -0.53 -0.0488* 0.0261 -1.87
Age21 0.0544 0.0337 1.61 -0.0227 0.0342 -0.67
Age50 -0.0734** 0.0321 -2.29 0.0559** 0.0244 2.29
Shifts -0.0057 0.0130 -0.44 0.0073 0.0133 0.55
Overtime 0.0043* 0.0026 1.65 0.0077*** 0.0024 3.28
Union 0.0537** 0.0248 2.16 -0.0028 0.0203 -0.14
Committee 0.0593 0.0413 1.44 0.0309 0.0370 0.84
Pay 1.58e-06 1.98e-06 0.80 -2.61e-07 1.91e-06 -0.14
Fixed 0.0271 0.0273 0.99 -0 . 0 2 1 2 0.0296 -0.72
Hstrain 0.0079 0.0103 0.77 -0.0296*** 0.0098 -3.02
Resultspay -0.0292** 0 . 0 1 2 0 -2.43 0 . 0 1 0 1 0 . 0 1 1 0 0.92
Sickpay -0.0019 0 . 0 1 0 2 -0.18 0.0473*** 0.0098 4.84
Redundancy -0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0008 -1.27 0.0005 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.48
Fortyeighthrs -0.0024 0.0033 -0.71 -0 . 0 0 2 2 0.0031 -0.71
F orty ei ghtmangs 0.0041** 0 . 0 0 2 1 1.97 0.0090*** 0.0019 4.64
Apprais -0.0054*** 0 . 0 0 2 0 -2.72 0.0035* 0.0019 1.85
Discrete -0.0079 0.0060 -1.35 -0.0165*** 0.0063 -2.61
Control -0 . 0 0 1 2 0.0057 -0 . 2 0 0.0061 0.0057 1.06
Team 0.0029 0.0023 1.25 -0.0004 0 . 0 0 2 1 -0.17
Flex -0.0028 0.0105 -0.27 -0.0178* 0.0099 -1.80
Night 0.0335** 0.0146 2.30 0.0351** 0.0153 2.30
Home 0.0143 0.0124 1.15 0.0206* 0.0114 1.81
Runion -0.0076 0.0063 - 1 .2 1 0.0231*** 0.0034 6.72
Rcomm -0.0185 0.0163 -1.14 -0.0123 0 . 0 1 2 2 - 1 . 0 0
Rpay -0.0030 0.0282 -0 . 1 1 -0.0068 0.02824 -0.24
s.e 0.0704 0.0037 0.1093 0.0036
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Tobit Model with Residuals: Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
INJRISK ILLRISK
No. o f Obs 1082 1029
Log likelihood -97.2839 -89.7343
Psue do R2 0.5204 0.4599
Coefficient Std error t Coefficient Std error t
Constant -0.0647 0.0436 -1.48 0.0625 0.0419 1.49
Ln(Employees) -0.0178*** 0.0056 -3.19 -0.0209*** 0.0063 -3.34
Part-time -0.0138 0.0231 -0.60 -0.0316 0.0244 -1.29
Turnover -0.0332 0.0219 -1.52 -0.0069 0.0224 -0.31
Age21 0.0575** 0.0266 2.16 -0.0227 0.0293 -0.78
Age50 -0.0247 0.0237 -1.04 -0.0236 0.0235 - 1 . 0 0
Shifts 0.0086 0.0086 0.99 0.0097 0.0097 1 . 0 0
Overtime 0.0017 0 . 0 0 2 1 0.80 0.0048** 0 . 0 0 2 2 2.19
Union 0.0265 0.0174 1.53 0.0199 0.0166 1 . 2 0
Committee 0.0509 0.0311 1.64 0.0831** 0.0334 2.49
Pay 9.31e-07 1.52e-06 0.61 -2.12e-06 1.61e-06 -1.32
Fixed 0.0365** 0.0173 2 .1 1 -0.0066 0.0218 -0.30
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Hstrain 0.0098 0.0079 1.24 -0.0279*** 0.0082 -3.41
Resultspay -0.0058 0.0085 -0 . 6 8 -0.0124 0.0093 -1.33
Sickpay -0.0076 0.0077 -0.98 0.0097 0.0083 1.16
Redundancy -0.0004 0.0005 -0.77 8.52e-05 0.0007 0.13
Forty eighthrs 0.0058** 0.0025 2.29 0.0006 0.0028 0 . 2 0
Forty eightmangs -0.0009 0.0016 -0.55 0.0071*** 0.0017 4.25
Apprais -0.0056*** 0.0015 -3.84 0.0035** 0.0017 2 . 1 2
Discrete -0.0066 0.0044 -1.50 0.0051 0.0051 0.99
Control 0.0031 0.0042 0.75 -0.0007 0.0045 -0.16
Team -0.0026 0.0018 -1.44 -0.0004 0.0019 -0.19
Flex -0.0108 0.0079 -1.37 -0.0207** 0.0083 -2.50
Night 0.0249*** 0.0097 2.58 0.0033 0.0116 0.28
Home -0.0117 0.0097 -1.15 0.0378*** 0.0092 4.10
Runion -0.0060 0.0052 -1.15 0.0078** 0.0035 2.26
Rcomm -0.0129 0.0129 1 .0 0 -0.0306** 0.0130 -2.36
Rpay -0.0231 0.0218 1.06 0.0325 0.0260 1.25
s.e 0.0547 0.0029 0.0882 0.0030
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Appendix 4.10: Tobit Results Including Union-Pay
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
INJRISK ILLRISK
No. o f  Obs 1251 1195
Log likelihood -212.7141 -333.5110
Psuedo R2 0.3694 0.2586
Coefficient Std error t Coefficient Std error t
Constant -0.1794*** 0.0506 -3.55 0.0229 0.0401 0.57
Ln(Employees) -0.0235*** 0.0054 -4.32 -0.0289*** 0.0057 -5.03
Part-time -0.0103 0.0248 -0.42 -0.0409* 0.0226 -1.81
Turnover -0.0157 0.0239 -0 . 6 6 -0.0166 0.0245 -0 . 6 8
Age21 0.0508 0.0325 1.56 -0.0412 0.0339 -1 . 2 2
Age50 -0.0714** 0.0308 -2.32 0.0505** 0.0248 2.03
Shifts -0.0030 0.0123 -0.24 -0.0039 0.0134 -0.29
Overtime 0.0044* 0.0123 -0.24 0.0085*** 0.0023 3.63
Union 0.0271 0.0431 0.63 -0.05556 0.0413 -1.35
Committee 0.0118 0.0128 0.92 -0.0013 0.0141 -0.09
Pay 1.42e-06 1.08e-06 1.31 -2.51e-06** 1.06e-06 -2.37
Fixed 0.0270 0.0259 1.04 -0.0142 0.0296 -0.48
Hstrain 0 . 0 1 2 0 0.0096 1.25 -0.0307*** 0.0095 -3.24
Resultspay -0.0295** 0.0115 -2.56 0.0197* 0.0109 1.81
Sickpay 0.0027 0.0097 0.27 0.0371*** 0.0096 3.85
Redundancy -0.0009 0.0007 -1.26 0.0004 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.43
Fortyeighthrs -0.0026 0.0032 -0.82 -0.0042 0.0031 -1.35
Fortyeightmangs 0.0040** 0 . 0 0 2 0 2 . 0 2 0.0087*** 0.0019 4.50
Apprais -0.0051*** 0.0019 -2.71 0.0037** 0.0019 1.95
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Discrete -0.0095* 0.0055 -1.71 -0.0189*** 0.0062 -3.06
Control -3.79e-05 0.0054 -0 .0 1 0.0071 0.0058 1.23
Team 0.0035 0 . 0 0 2 1 1.62 -0.0009 0 . 0 0 2 1 -0.41
Flex -0 . 0 0 1 2 0.0099 -0 . 1 2 -0.0135 0.0098 -1.38
Night 0.0344** 0.0136 2.52 0.0449*** 0.0155 2.89
Home 0 . 0 1 2 0 0.0117 1.03 0.0227** 0 . 0 1 1 2 2.03
Unionpay 7.45e-07 2.3e-06 0.32 7.12e-06*** 2.2e-06 3.20
s.e 0.0696 0.0035 0.1123 0.0037
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
INJRISK ILLRISK
No. o f  Obs 1108 1053
Log likelihood -100.5519 -101.0767
Psuedo R2 0.5131 0.4208
Coefficient Std error t Coefficient Std error t
Constant -0.0489 0.0371 -1.32 0.0355 0.0351 1 .0 1
Ln(Employees) -0.0138*** 0.0044 -3.15 -0.0145*** 0.0051 -2.84
Part-time -0.0310* 0.0186 -1 . 6 6 -0.0175 0.0190 -0.92
Turnover -0.0344* 0.0207 - 1 . 6 6 -0 . 0 0 2 0 0.0219 -0.09
Age21 0.0452* 0.0247 1.83 -0.0218 0.0285 -0.77
Age50 -0.0242 0.0228 -1.06 -0.0259 0.0232 -1 .11
Shifts 0.0109 0.0082 1.33 0.0082 0.0096 0.85
Overtime 0 . 0 0 2 0 0 . 0 0 2 0 0.99 0.0038* 0 . 0 0 2 2 1.76
Union 0.0157 0.0298 0.53 -0.0052 0.0328 -0.16
Committee 0 .0 2 0 1 ** 0.0088 2.29 0.0066 0 . 0 1 0 2 0.65
Pay -4.10e-07 8.83e-07 -0.46 -1.06e-06 9.05e-07 -1.17
Fixed 0.0367** 0.0166 2 . 2 2 -0.0081 0.0214 -0.38
Hstrain 0.0125* 0.0073 1.71 -0 .0 2 2 1 *** 0.0077 -2 . 8 8
Resultspay -0.0063 0.0082 -0.77 -0.0080 0.0092 -0 . 8 8
Sickpay -0.0053 0.0075 -0.71 0.0107 0.0082 1.31
Redundancy -0.0003 0.0005 -0.73 0 . 0 0 0 1 0.0007 0 . 2 2
Forty eighthrs 0.0056** 0.0024 2.34 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.0027 0.06
Fortyeightmangs -0 . 0 0 1 1 0.0016 -0.71 0.0068*** 0.0016 4.16
Apprais -0.0052*** 0.0014 -3.68 0.0035** 0.0016 2.17
Discrete -0.0073* 0.0040 -1.82 0.0006 0.0048 0 . 1 2
Control 0.0029 0.0040 0.73 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.0044 0.04
Team -0.0019 0.0017 -1.13 0.0008 0.0018 0.43
Flex -0.0087 0.0075 -1.17 -0.0154* 0.0080 -1.92
Night 0.0250*** 0.0092 2.73 0.0106 0.0114 0.93
Home -0.0106 0.0093 -1.14 0.0361*** 0.0090 4.03
Unionpay 1.22e-07 1.6e-06 0.07 2.55e-06 1.70e-06 1.50
s.e 0.0538 0.0028 0.0883 0.0030
Other variables included in estimation: Electricity, Construction, Wholesale, Hotel, Transport, 
Financial, Real estate, Public admin, Education, Health, Community, Skilled Trades, Managers, 
Machine Operatives, Professional, Service, Unskilled, Sales, Technical 
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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Appendix 4.11: Negative Binomial Regresion Results including Worker Survey
Variables
Workplaces with 5 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1268 1212
Wald chi2 448.44 454.86
Log pseudo-likelihood -16.0381 -52.4740
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -11.4704*** 2.0724 -5.53 -2.6222*** 0.8729 -3.00
Ln(Employeess) 1.0270*** 0.1278 8.04 0.7765*** 0.0810 9.59
Part-time -1.0217 0.6572 -1.55 -0.0871 0.4211 -0.21
Turnover -0.9573* 0.5572 -1.72 -0.0563 0.5425 -0.10
Age21 1.6785** 0.7285 2.30 -0.9338* 0.5670 -1.65
Age50 -1.0288 0.9605 -1.07 0.2411 0.4843 0.50
Shifts 0.1935 0.3253 0.59 0.0402 0.1818 0.22
Overtime 0.0433 0.0830 0.52 0.1053*** 0.0395 2.67
Union 0.8082** 0.4004 2.02 0.5581* 0.3044 1.83
Committee 0.2560 0.2583 0.99 0.0127 0.1620 0.08
Pay 4.73e-05* 2.57e-05 1.84 -2.29e-05 1.74e-05 -1.32
Fixed 0.2764 0.5508 0.50 -0.2353 0.4591 -0.51
Hstrain 0.4196 0.2897 1.45 -0.3661** 0.1503 -2.44
Resultspay -0.7730** 0.3275 -2.36 0.2513 0.2000 1.26
Sickpay -0.0643 0.3019 -0.21 0.3649** 0.1615 2.26
Redundancy -0.0109 0.0069 -1.57 -0.0008 0.0050 -0.16
Apprais -0.1424*** 0.0554 -2.57 0.0437 0.0324 1.35
Discrete -0.1645 0.1458 -1.13 -0.1236 0.1030 -1.20
Control 0.1097 0.1729 0.63 -0.0180 0.0942 -0.19
Team 0.0718 0.0720 1.00 0.0110 0.0328 0.34
Flex -0.0907 0.2393 -0.38 -0.1014 0.1637 -0.62
Night 0.5996* 0.3361 1.78 0.3028 0.1953 1.55
Home 0.0353 0.4436 0.08 0.4043** 0.1767 2.29
Electricity -0.4975 0.8230 -0.60 -0.6674 0.6261 -1.07
Construction -0.2885 0.7045 -0.41 -0.6362 0.4420 -1.44
Wholesale 0.9507 0.7060 1.35 -0.0280 0.3501 -0.08
Hotel 0.2514 0.7685 0.33 -0.7721 0.5286 -1.46
Transport -2.2412*** 0.5480 -4.09 0.0823 0.3649 0.23
Financial 0.9532 0.9887 0.96 0.1270 0.4857 0.26
Real estate 1.6187*** 0.5619 2.88 -0.0467 0.3338 -0.14
Public admin 3.2408*** 0.8726 3.71 0.7985* 0.4275 1.87
Education 1.7249** 0.8119 2.12 0.2216 0.4642 0.48
Health 1.7718*** 0.6730 2.63 0.8092** 0.3772 2.15
Community 1.1247 0.7945 1.42 0.1407 0.36227 0.39
Skilled Trades 4 4171*** 1.1451 3.86 0.7309 0.6405 1.14
Managers 3.1172* 1.7419 1.79 -0.2821 0.9054 -0.31
Machine Operatives 5.3162*** 0.9407 5.65 -0.5382 0.6334 -0.85
Professional 0.6033 0.9979 0.60 -0.4404 0.6319 -0.70
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Service 1.4651* 0.8586 0.60 -0.6060 0.4979 -1 . 2 2
Unskilled 3.4151*** 0.8658 3.94 0.1309 0.5238 0.25
Sales 3.8465*** 1.1554 3.33 0.2508 0.5144 0.49
Technical -0.3360 0.9172 -0.37 -0.6582 0.5074 -1.30
Avskill 0.6682* 0.3605 1.85 0.0446 0.1782 0.25
Avrelations -0.0464 0.2478 -0.19 -0.3227** 0.1305 -2.47
Avsecurity -0.0913 0.2933 -0.31 0.0072 0.1348 0.05
Avforty 0.2510 0.2103 1.19 0.2815** 0.1243 2.26
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
Workplaces with 10 or more Employees
Variables INJURIES ILLNESSES
No. o f  Obs 1124 1069
Wald chi2 285.82 376.44
Log pseudo-likelihood -12.4605 -37.0148
Coefficient Std error z Coefficient Std error z
Constant -11.9317*** 1.5859 -7.52 -2.1377** 0.8689 -2.46
Ln(Employeess) 1.1372*** 0.1323 8.60 0.8041*** 0.0828 9.72
Part-time -1.3243** 0.5967 -2 . 2 2 0.1389 0.4333 0.32
Turnover -1.7796*** 0.6084 -2.92 -0.1837 0.4191 -0.44
Age21 1.9445** 0.9658 2 .0 1 -0.6182 0.4746 -1.30
Age50 -0.2124 0.9374 -0.23 -0.4076 0.5289 -0.77
Shifts 0.3000 0.2718 1 . 1 0 0.2106 0.1710 1.23
Overtime 0.0097 0.0666 0.14 0.0882** 0.0387 2.28
Union 0.5192 0.4223 1.23 0.3753 0.2756 1.36
Committee 0.5151** 0.2467 2.09 0.1306 0.1658 0.79
Pay 3.51e-05 2.48e-05 1.42 -5.29e-06 1.97e-05 -0.27
Fixed 0.7068 0.4938 1.43 -0.0156 0.4446 -0.04
Hstrain 0.5779** 0.2727 2 . 1 2 -0.2495 0.1556 -1.60
Resultspay -0.3495 0.2814 -1.24 0.0153 0.1808 0.08
Sickpay -0.3554 0.2876 -1.24 0.1601 0.1696 0.94
Redundancy -0.0059 0.0085 -0.69 -0.0006 0.0050 -0 .1 1
Apprais -0.1262** 0.0548 -2.30 0.0439 0.0335 1.31
Discrete -0.1882 0.1463 -1.29 0.0515 0.0929 0.55
Control 0.2596* 0.1352 1.92 -0.0470 0.0928 -0.51
Team -0.0309 0.0525 -0.59 0.0249 0.0328 0.76
Flex -0.2522 0.2639 -0.96 -0.1998 0.1763 -1.13
Night 0.8425*** 0.2596 3.25 0.2332 0.1730 1.35
Home -0.4956 0.3392 -1.46 0.5562*** 0.1769 3.14
Electricity 0.3852 0.6516 0.59 -0.6512 0.5639 -1.15
Construction 0.4110 0.5123 0.80 -0.0461 0.4297 -0 .1 1
Wholesale 1.1183* 0.6032 1.85 0.0544 0.3580 0.15
Hotel 0.4286 0.6968 0.62 -1.2373*** 0.4710 -2.63
Transport -1.9576*** 0.5260 -3.72 0.1479 0.3676 0.40
Financial 1.5350* 0.8596 1.79 0.6535 0.5324 1.23
Real estate 1.4400*** 0.4775 3.02 -0.3548 0.3403 -1.04
Public admin 3.7439 0.8059 4.65 0.5376 0.4163 1.29
Education 1.9926** 0.7878 2.53 0.1072 0.4494 0.24
Health 1 7 7 9 9 ** 0.7253 2.45 0.5622 0.3832 1.47
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Community 0.8022 0.6112 1.31 0.3932 0.3855 1 . 0 2
Skilled Trades 2.9918*** 1.0415 2.87 -0.7116 0.6458 - 1 . 1 0
Managers 1.7096 1.8617 0.92 -2.7153*** 1.0103 -2.69
Machine Operatives 4.0673*** 1.0889 3.74 -1.1958* 0.6435 - 1 . 8 6
Professional 0.7365 1.0198 0.72 -0.9709 0.6208 -1.56
Service 1.0492 1.0075 1.04 -0.8474* 0.5031 - 1 . 6 8
Unskilled 2.9564*** 0.9669 3.06 -0.1781 0.5048 -0.35
Sales 3.1512*** 0.8701 3.62 -0.0372 0.5485 -0.07
Technical -0.0545 1.0674 -0.05 -0.8657 0.5452 -1.59
Avskill 1.1368*** 0.2872 3.96 -0.0315 0.1957 -0.16
Avrelations 0.1897 0 . 2 2 0 2 0 . 8 6 -0.2500* 0.1311 -1.91
Avsecurity -0.5636** 0.2297 -2.45 -0.1331 0.1414 -0.94
Avforty 0.3573** 0.1442 2.48 0.2317* 0.1237 1.87
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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CHAPTER 5 APPENDICES
Appendix 5.1: VSL Estimates
STUDY COUNTRY VSL
(MILLION 2000 US$)
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) UK $4.2
Siebert and Wei (1994) UK $9.4-$ 11.5
Sandy and Elliott (1996) UK $5.2-$69.4
Arabsheibani and Marin (2000) UK $19.9
Sandy et al. (2001) UK $5.7-$74.1
Thaler and Rosen (1975) US $1
Brown (1980) US $1.9
Moore and Viscusi (1988) US $3.2-$9.4
Herzog and Schlottman (1990) US $11.7
Leigh (1991) US $7.1-$15.3
Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) US $8.7-$20.3
Source: Viscusi and Aldy (2003)
Appendix 5.2; Fatal Descriptive Statistics Assigning Average Risk
3 DIGIT FATAL
ALL WORKERS
Number 17079
Mean 0.0185
Standard Deviation 0.0251
MANUAL WORKERS
Number 5580
Mean 0.0350
Standard Deviation 0.0372
MALE WORKERS
Number 9313
Mean 0.0272
Standard Deviation 0.0299
MALE MANUAL WORKERS
Number 3956
Mean 0.0422
Standard Deviation 0.03937
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Appendix 5.3: Explanatory Variables Constructed Using WERS
VARIABLE DEFINITION
EDUC1 Dummy variable equals one if highest qualification is GCSE level.
EDUC2 Dummy variable equals one if highest qualification A level.
EDUC3 Dummy variable equals one if respondent has a degree or 
postgraduate degree.
EDUC4 Dummy variable equals one if respondent has no academic 
qualifications (excluded in estimation).
TENURE 1 Dummy variable equals one if respondent has worked for the firm for 
less than 1 year (excluded in estimation).
TENURE2 Dummy variable equals one if respondent has worked for the firm for 
between 1 to less than 2 years.
TENURE3 Dummy variable equals one if respondent has worked for the firm for 
between 2 to less than 6 years.
TENURE4 Dummy variable equals one if respondent has worked for the firm for 
between 5 to less than 10 years.
TENURE5 Dummy variable equals one if respondent has worked for the firm for 
10 years or more.
OVERTIME Corresponds to the overtime or extra hours the respondent usually 
works each week, paid or unpaid.
FLEXITIME Dummy variable equal to one if respondent has a flexitime 
arrangement available to them if needed.
SUPERVISE Dummy variable equal to one if respondent supervises other 
employees.
PERMANENT Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is a permanent 
employee.
AGE Equal to between 0-8, with 8 indicating the employee is aged between 
16-17 and a value of 8 indicating they are aged 65 or over.
NEMPS Equal to the number of employees on the payroll in the firm.
MERITPAY Dummy variable equal to one if some employees receive merit pay.
PUBLIC Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent works in the public 
sector.
RECOGUNION Dummy variable equal to one if management report recognising a 
trade union for negotiating pay and conditions
UNIONCOV Dummy variable equal to one of the respondent works for a firm 
where there is a trade union.
HS1 Dummy variable equal to one if there is a consultative committee 
exclusively for health and safety matters with all employee 
representatives chosen by unions.
HS2 Dummy variable equal to one if there is a consultative committee 
exclusively for health and safety matters with some employee 
representatives chosen by unions.
HS3 Dummy variable equal to one if there is a consultative committee 
exclusively for health and safety matters with no employee 
representatives chosen by unions.
HS4 Dummy variable equal to one if there is a consultative committee for 
health and safety and other matters with all employee representatives 
chosen by unions.
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HS5 Dummy variable equal to one if there is a consultative committee for 
health and safety and other matters with some employee 
representatives chosen by unions.
HS6 Dummy variable equal to one if there is a consultative committee for 
health and safety and other matters with no employee representatives 
chosen by unions.
HS7 Dummy variable equal to one if there is no committee but there is a 
workforce representative.
HS8 Dummy variable equal to one if management deals with health and 
safety matters without any form of consultation.
EMPREP Dummy variable equal to one if the workplace has a safety 
representative
COMM
GENERAL
Dummy variable equal to one if the workplace has a consultative 
committee that deals with a range of issues including health and 
safety.
COMM
SPECIFIC
Dummy variable equal to one if the workplace has a specific health 
and safety committee.
NO
HSCONSULT
Dummy variable equal to one if management deals with health and 
safety matters without any form of consultation.
Appendix 5.4: Interval Regression Results (Fatal and Fatal2)
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
MANUAL
WORKERS
MALE MANUAL 
WORKERS
Obs 5474 3897
Wald chi2 3124.12 1284.72
Log pseudo likelihood 10972.553 -7767.1885
Constant 4.8170***
(0.0444)
4.6670***
(0.0582)
Educl 0.1276***
(0.0104)
0.1237***
(0.0121)
Educ2 0.0508***
(0.0161)
0.0452**
(0.0189)
Educ3 0.2143***
(0.0188)
0.2105***
(0.0215)
Tenure2 -0.0002
(0.0188)
-0.0214
(0.0224)
Tenure3 0.0482***
(0.0157)
0.0529***
(0.0182)
Tenure4 0.0676***
(0.0164)
0.0599***
(0.0190)
Tenure5 0.1410***
(0.0163)
0.1415***
(0.0188)
Overtime 0.0067***
(0.0008)
0.0076***
(0.0010)
Flexitime 0.0014
(0.0109)
0.0008
(0.0128)
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Supervise 0.1374***
(0.0119)
0.1319***
(0.0138)
Runion 0.0777***
(0.0114)
0.0554***
(0.0132)
Commspecific 0.0370***
(0.0102)
0.0446***
(0.0118)
Permanent 0.0630***
(0.0231)
0.0653**
(0.0287)
Age 0.2211***
(0.0171)
0.2789***
(0.0223)
Age2 -0.0210***
(0.0019)
-0.0256***
(0.0024)
Nemps 4.47e-05***
(1.32e-05)
5.33e-05***
(1.55e-05)
Nemps2 -5.28e-09**
(2.46e-09)
-6.60e-09**
(3.13e-09)
Meritpay 0.0537***
(0.0113)
0.0477***
(0.0128)
Public -0.0546***
(0.0128)
-0.0907***
(0.0149)
Female -0.3111***
(0.0120)
Fatal 2.1217***
(0.3281)
2.3083***
(0.3664)
Fatal2 -10.3406***
(1.9443)
-11.1342***
(2.1311)
Lnsigma -1.1082***
(0.0135)
-1.1408***
(0.01622)
Sigma 0.3302
(0.0044)
0.3196
(0.0052)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Appendix 5.5: Interval Regression Results (Fatal, Maior Injun, Over 3-Dav 
Injury)
Dependent Variables: Lnwapyl Lnwpayh
ALL
WORKERS
MANUAL
WORKERS
MALE
WORKERS
MALE MANUAL 
WORKERS
Obs 16791 5474 9191 3897
Wald chi2 13033.85 3185.88 6679.77 1387.64
Log pseudo 
likelihood
-34309.312 -10966.354 -18414.398 -7750.0498
Constant 4.8163***
(0.0322)
4.8451***
(0.0444)
4.6199***
(0.0513)
4.7032***
(0.0585)
Educl 0.1079***
(0.0072)
0.1239***
(0.0104)
0.1213***
(0.0095)
0.1192***
(0.0121)
Educ2 0.1205***
(0.0074)
0.0475***
(0.0104)
0.1110***
(0.0105)
0.0438**
(0.0186)
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Educ3 0.2863***
(0.0077)
0.2040***
(0.0186)
0.2569***
(0.0105)
0.1972***
(0.0211)
Tenure2 0.0202*
(0.0117)
-0.0028
(0.0189)
0.0282*
(0.0169)
-0.0233
(0.0225)
Tenure3 0.0531***
(0.0100)
0.0460***
(0.0157)
0.0833***
(0.0141)
0.0494***
(0.0182)
Tenure4 0.0428***
(0.0109)
0.0683***
(0.0164)
0.0594***
(0.0150)
0.0604***
(0.0189)
Tenure5 0.1032***
(0.0108)
0.1424***
(0.0163)
0.1198***
(0.0148)
0.1412***
(0.0188)
Overtime 0.0095***
(0.0006)
0.0069***
(0.0008)
0.0097***
(0.0008)
0.0080***
(0.0010)
Flexitime 0.0207***
(0.0063)
-0.0032
(0.0108)
0.0234***
(0.0088)
-0.0071
(0.0127)
Supervise 0.2389***
(0.0067)
0.1297***
(0.0119)
0.2530***
(0.0092)
0.1188***
(0.0137)
Runion 0.0194**
(0.0083)
0.0968***
(0.0144)
0.0527***
(0.0118)
0.0768***
(0.0180)
Commspecific 0.0293***
(0.0064)
0.0441***
(0.0103)
0.0327***
(0.0087)
0.0498***
(0.0118)
Permanent 0.0524***
(0.0149)
0.0715***
(0.0230)
0.0496**
(0.0215)
0.0751***
(0.0283)
Age 0.3063***
(0.0136)
0.2272***
(0.0171)
0.3720***
(0.0221)
0.2883***
(0.0225)
Age2 -0.0274***
(0.0015)
-0.0218***
(0.0019)
-0.0321***
(0.0024)
-0.0269***
(0.0024)
Nemps 5.64e-05***
(7.29e-06)
4.49e-05***
(1.34e-05)
7.15e-05***
(1.09e-05)
5.0e-05***
(1.62e-05)
Nemps2 _7.44e_09***
(1.20e-09)
-6.08e-09**
(2.56e-09)
-1.08e-08***
(2.08e-09)
-7.38e-09**
(1.62e-05)
Meritpay 0.1037***
(0.0069)
0.0538***
(0.0113)
0.0968***
(0.0093)
0.0469***
(0.0127)
Public 0.0060
(0.0076)
-0.0614***
(0.0132)
-0.0320***
(0.0106)
-0.0848***
(0.0161)
Female -0.2518***
(0.0066)
-0.3311***
(0.0115)
Fatal -0.0494
(0.2615)
0.3636
(0.2639)
-0.8305***
(0.2700)
0.0410
(0.2775)
Major Injury -0.0168***
(0.0045)
0.0132***
(0.0048)
-0.0065
(0.0050)
0.0200***
(0.0054)
Over 3-day Injury -0.0017***
(0.0006)
-0.0030***
(0.0006)
-0.0024***
(0.0007)
-0.0043***
(0.0007)
Fatal* Runion 1.0250***
(0.2250)
-0.4246*
(0.2543)
1.1716***
(0.2452)
-0.2951
(0.2946)
Lnsigma -0.9797***
(0.0078)
-1.1094***
(0.0135)
-0.9759***
(0.0113)
-1.1454***
(0.0162)
Sigma 0.3754
(0.0029)
0.3298
(0.0045)
0.3769
(0.0043)
0.3181
(0.0052)
* * * = s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  ^ g  jo/0 ievei- **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
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Appendix 5.6: Interval Regression Results (Average Fatal Value Assigned to
Occupations with Zero Death Rate)
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
MANUAL WORKERS MALE MANUAL WORKERS
Obs 5474 3897
Wald chi2 3089.55 1261.57
Log pseudo 
likelihood
-10988.186 7785.0845
Constant 4.8381*** 4.7037***
(0.0444) (0.0584)
Educl 0.1264*** 0.1223***
(0.0105) (0.0122)
Educ2 0.0464*** 0.0396**
(0.0160) (0.0189)
Educ3 0.2119*** 0.2089***
(0.0188) (0.0215)
Tenure2 -0.0005 -0.0211
(0.0190) (0.0226)
Tenure3 0.0480*** 0.0532***
(0.0158) (0.0183)
Tenure4 0.0684*** 0.0609***
(0.0165) (0.0191)
Tenure5 0.1425*** 0.1421***
(0.0164) (0.0189)
Overtime 0.0007*** 0.0076***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Flexitime -0.0002 -0.0021
(0.0109) (0.0129)
Supervise 0.1338*** 0.1253***
(0.0119) (0.0138)
Runion 0.0882*** 0.0561***
(0.0140) (0.0175)
Commspeciflc 0.0412*** 0.0475***
(0.0103) (0.0119)
Permanent 0.0675*** 0.0695**
(0.0231) (0.0286)
Age 0.2235*** 0.2814***
(0.0171) (0.0223)
Age2 -0.0212*** -0.0259***
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Nemps 4.7e-05*** 5.46e-05***
(1.33e-05) (1.57e-05)
Nemps2 -5.88e-09** -7.16e-09**
(2.49e-09) (3.22e-09)
Meritpay 0.0545*** 0.0483***
(0.0114) (0.0129)
Public -0.0749*** -0.1135***
(0.0123) (0.0145)
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Female -0.3311***
(0.0113)
Fatal 0.6290*** 0.4340**
(0.1775) (0.2016)
Fatal* Runion -0.3380** -0.0490
(0.1461) (0.2840)
Lnsigma -1.1053*** -1.1360***
(0.0135) (0.0163)
Sigma 0.3311 0.3211
(0.0045) (0.0052)
VSL (2004 £) £10,285,823 £7,838,057
VSL (2000 US$) $14,779,073 $11,280,827
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Appendix 5.7: Interval Regression Results (Fatal, Unioncov)
ALL
WORKERS
MANUAL
WORKERS
MALE
WORKERS
MALE MANUAL 
WORKERS
Obs 16791 5474 9191 3897
Wald chi2 12392.55 3053.87 6315.91 1262.62
Log pseudo 
likelihood
-34501.792 -10980.699 -18515.954 -7780.9814
Constant 4.7550***
(0.0322)
4.8455***
(0.0440)
4.5712***
(0.0515)
4.6993***
(0.0577)
Educl 0.1191***
(0.0073)
0.1247***
(0.0104)
0.1301***
(0.0097)
0.1214***
(0.0121)
Educ2 0.1289***
(0.0075)
0.0463***
(0.0160)
0.1202***
(0.0106)
0.0410**
(0.0188)
Educ3 0.3036***
(0.0077)
0.2110***
(0.0187)
0.2769***
(0.0105)
0.2064***
(0.0215)
Tenure2 0.0205*
(0.0118)
-0.0050
(0.0190)
0.0289*
(0.0171)
-0.0260
(0.0226)
Tenure3 0.0552***
(0.0101)
0.0434***
(0.0157)
0.0880***
(0.0142)
0.0483***
(0.0183)
Tenure4 0.0393***
(0.0111)
0.0609***
(0.0164)
0.0579***
(0.0152)
0.0540***
(0.0191)
Tenure5 0.0982***
(0.0109)
0.1334***
(0.0163)
0.1168***
(0.0150)
0.1349***
(0.0189)
Overtime 0.0092***
(0.0006)
0.0067***
(0.0008)
0.0094***
(0.0008)
0.0076***
(0.0010)
Flexitime 0.0310***
(0.0064)
0.0030
(0.0109)
0.0352***
(0.0089)
-0.0010
(0.0128)
Supervise 0.2530***
(0.0067)
0.1341***
(0.0119)
0.2710***
(0.0092)
0.1274***
(0.0138)
Unioncov 0.0058
(0.0078)
0.1008***
(0.0138)
0.0387***
(0.0114)
0.0730***
(0.0173)
Commspeciflc 0.0173*** 0.0395*** 0.0212** 0.0465***
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(0.0064) (0.0103) (0.0087) (0.0118)
Permanent 0.0523***
(0.0151)
0.0639***
(0.0231)
0.0466**
(0.0217)
0.0705**
(0.0285)
Age 0.3036***
(0.0136)
0.2227***
(0.0170)
0.3663***
(0.0221)
0.2816***
(0.0222)
Age2 -0.0268***
(0.0015)
-0.0212***
(0.0019)
-0.0312***
(0.0024)
-0.0259***
(0.0024)
Nemps 5.5e-05***
(7.32e-06)
4.38e-05*** 
(1.3 le-05)
6.89e-05***
(1.08e-05)
5.20e-05***
(1.56e-05)
Nemps2 -6.97e-09***
(1.21e-09)
-5.14e-09**
(2.39e-09)
-9.45e-09***
(2.02e-09)
-6.70e-09**
(3.13e-09)
Meritpay 0.1066***
(0.0070)
0.0548***
(0.0113)
0.0997***
(0.0094)
0.0488***
(0.0128)
Public -0.0049
(0.0072)
-0.0666***
(0.0120)
-0.0489***
(0.0100)
-0.1123***
(0.0141)
Female -0.2409***
(0.0067)
-0.3250***
(0.0114)
Fatal -1.6639***
(0.1516)
0.6765***
(0.1784)
-1.6931***
(0.1682)
0.5812***
(0.2009)
Fatal* Unioncov 0.7845***
(0.2091)
-0.4773*
(0.2544)
0.9554***
(0.2375)
-0.2782
(0.2902)
Lnsigma -0.9677***
(0.0077)
-1.1066***
(0.0133)
-0.9639***
(0.0112)
-1.1371***
(0.0161)
Sigma 0.3800
(0.0029)
0.3307
(0.0044)
0.3814
(0.0043)
0.3208
(0.0052)
VSL (2004 £) £11,062,574 £10,496,495
VSL (2000 USS) $15,921,674 $15,106,951
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Appendix 5.8: Descriptive Statistics By Union Status (Mean and Standard 
Deviation)
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Covered Uncovered Covered Uncovered
Obs. 3111 2469 2278 1678
Wkincome 333.1531
(132.472)
290.8539
(137.1949)
362.3650
(129.8704)
326.7213
(137.4774)
Anincome 17323.96 15124.40 18842.98 16989.51
Wpayl 302.7724
(118.2643)
263.6879
(125.1147)
329.1103
(115.2189)
296.7959
(124.56)
Wpayh 361.7016
(142.9971)
314.4329
(143.2844)
393.2336
(140.5282)
352.3882
(143.8491)
Commspecific 0.5558
(0.4970)
0.2463
(0.4309)
0.5929
(0.4914)
0.2473
(0.4316)
Fatal 0.0310
(0.0374)
0.0350
(0.0391)
0.0383
(0.0391)
0.0451
(0.0407)
Major Injury 5.0293
(3.8257)
5.0110
(3.8399)
5.6544
(3.8227)
5.6438
(3.7803)
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Appendix 5.9: Interval Regression (Fatal, Commspecific, Commgeneral)
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5474 3897
Wald chi2 3111.46 1269.82
Log pseudo likelihood -10984.538 -7780.6166
Constant 4.8419*** 4.7042***
(0.0443) (0.0585)
Educl 0.1265*** 0.1216***
(0.0105) (0.0122)
Educ2 0.0461*** 0.0396**
(0.0160) (0.0188)
Educ3 0.2119*** 0.2073***
(0.0188) (0.0216)
Tenure2 -0.0003 -0.0215
(0.0189) (0.0225)
Tenure3 0.0486*** 0.0530***
(0.0158) (0.0183)
Tenure4 0.0686*** 0.0610***
(0.0165) (0.0191)
Tenure5 0.1438*** 0.1441***
(0.0164) (0.0190)
Overtime 0.0066*** 0.0076***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Flexitime 0.0004 -0.0011
(0.0109) (0.0129)
Supervise 0.1341*** 0.1252***
(0.0119) (0.0138)
Runion 0.0925*** 0.0581***
(0.0145) (0.0181)
Commspecific 0.0274* 0.0430**
(0.0142) (0.0180)
Commgeneral 0.0334 0.0618**
(0.0252) (0.0304)
Permanent 0.0664*** 0.0680**
(0.0231) (0.0286)
Age 0.2225*** 0.2801***
(0.0171) (0.0223)
Age2 -0.0211*** -0.0258***
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Nemps 4.41e-05*** 4.99e-05***
(1.35e-05) (1.58e-05)
Nemps2 -5.45e-09** -6.42e-09**
(2.49e-09) (3.18e-09)
Meritpay 0.0555*** 0.0497***
(0.0113) (0.0128)
Public -0.0749*** -0.1159***
(0.0124) (0.0145)
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Female -0.3279***
(0.0115)
Fatal 0.5452*** 0.4572**
(0.1980) (0.2195)
Fatal* Runion -0.5692** -0.2363
(0.2700) (0.3077)
F atal * Commspecific 0.5939** 0.3604
(0.2844) (0.3255)
Fatal * Commgeneral 0.0420 -0.2213
(0.5040) (0.5443)
Lnsigma -1.1059*** -1.1372***
(0.0135) (0.0163)
Sigma 0.3309 0.3207
(0.0045) (0.0052)
VSL (2004 £) £8,915,470 £8,257,050
VSL (2000 US$) $12,831,480 $11,883,858
♦♦♦^significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Appendix 5.10: Descriptive Statistics by Health and Safety Committee Presence 
(Mean and Standard Deviation)
ALL]MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Commspecific No Commspecific Commspecific No Commspecific
Obs. 2336 3244 1765 2191
Wpay 338.9095
(139.7704)
296.8606
(130.7706)
368.2719
(136.1913)
330.3674
(130.3059)
Annual
pay
17623.2940
(7628.061)
15436.7510
(6800.071)
19150.1390
(7081.948)
17179.1050
(6775.905)
Fatal 0.0323
(0.0327)
0.0331
(0.0417)
0.0375
(0.0328)
0.0441
(0.0446)
Major
Injury
5.4315
(4.1609)
4.7258
(3.5473)
5.8433
(4.0835)
5.4941
(3.5568)
Appendix 5.11: Union Instrumental Variables and Descriptive Statistics (Mean 
and Standard Deviation)
VARIABLE DEFINITION
MGRF Taken from the management survey equals 1 if manager reports 
they are in favour of trade unions.
MGRNF Equals 1 if the manager reports they are not in favour of trade 
unions
MGRNET Equals 1 if managers report a neutral attitude towards trade unions 
(excluded in probit).
WRKMGRF Taken from the worker survey equals 1 if the worker reports 
managers are in favour of trade unions
WRKMGRNF Equals 1 if worker reports managers are not in favour of unions.
WRKMGRNET Equals 1 if workers report managers have a neutral attitude towards
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trade unions (excluded in probit).
WRKAGREE Taken from the worker survey, equals 1 if workers agree or 
strongly agree that unions make a difference to the firm (nearest 
proxy for worker attitude)
WRKDIS Equals 1 if workers disagree of strongly disagree that unions make 
a difference to the firm.
WRKNET Equals 1 if workers are neutral to the above statement (excluded in 
probit).
VARIABLE ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Recogunion 0.5575 0.5758
(0.4967) (0.4943)
Mgrf 0.3563 0.3567
(0.4789) (0.4791)
Mgmf 0.1120 0.1226
(0.3154) (0.3280)
Mgmet 0.5303 0.5187
(0.4991) (0.4997)
Wrkmgrf 0.1658 0.1752
(0.3719) (0.3802)
Wrkmgmf 0.1729 0.1951
(0.3782) (0.3964)
Wrkmgmet 0.1957 0.2123
(0.3968) (0.4090)
Wrkagree 0.2204 0.2437
(0.4146) (0.4294)
Wrkdis 0.1106 0.1229
(0.3136) (0.3283)
Wrknet 0.1765 0.1782
(0.3813) (0.3827)
Appendix 5.12; Union Selection Instrument check
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5474 3897
Wald chi2 3168.21 1325.83
Log pseudo likelihood -10963.968 -7763.7556
Constant 4.8631*** 4.6964***
(0.0443) (0.0583)
Educl 0.1236*** 0.1203***
(0.0104) (0.0121)
Educ2 0.0499*** 0.0433**
(0.0161) (0.0188)
Educ3 0.2109*** 0.2065***
(0.0187) (0.0214)
Tenure2 0.0004 -0.0190
(0.0190) (0.0227)
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Tenure3 0.0498***
(0.0159)
0.0559***
(0.0185)
Tenure4 0.0724*** 0.0663***
(0.0166) (0.0192)
Tenure5 0.1419*** 0.1413***
(0.0166) (0.0192)
Overtime 0.0065*** 0.0075***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Flexitime -0.0050 -0.0082
(0.0109) (0.0129)
Supervise 0.1329*** 0.1250***
(0.0119) (0.0138)
Runion 0.0741*** 0.0314
(0.0159) (0.0203)
Commspecific 0.0372*** 0.0423***
(0.0102) (0.0117)
Permanent 0.0645*** 0.0679**
(0.0231) (0.0287)
Age 0.2254*** 0.2839***
(0.0171) (0.0222)
Age2 -0.0216*** -0.0263***
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Nemps 4.31e-05*** 5.04e-05***
(1.34e-05) (1.57e-05)
Nemps2 -5.23e-09** -6.18e-09*
(2.54e-09) (3.20e-09)
Meritpay 0.0540*** 0.0516***
(0.0113) (0.0128)
Public -0.0854*** -0.1279***
(0.0125) (0.0144)
Female -0.3250***
(0.0114)
Fatal 0.6806*** 0.5110**
(0.1846) (0.2050)
Fatal* Runion -0.4830* -0.2120
(0.2570) (0.2915)
Mgrf 0.0280** 0.0542***
(0.0118) (0.0140)
Mgmf 0.0427*** 0.0280
(0.0157) (0.0175)
Wrkmgrf 0.0541*** 0.0347**
(0.0133) (0.0153)
Wrkmgrnf -0.0062 -0.0136
(0.0122) (0.0138)
Wrkagree 0.0302** 0.0245*
(0.0126) (0.0146)
Wrkdis -0.0222 -0.0353**
(0.0146) (0.0159)
Lnsigma -.1.1098*** -7.7477***
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(0.0136) (0.0164)
Sigma 0.3296 0.3193
(0.0045) (0.0052)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5%  level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Appendix 5.13: Health and Safety Committee Instrumental Variables and 
Descriptive Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation)
VARIABLE DEFINITION
HSMEET Taken from the management survey equal to 1 if health and safety 
issues are discussed at meetings between senior managers and the 
whole workforce
HSDISPROC Taken from the management survey equal to 1 if there are formal 
procedures for dealing with health safety collective disputes raised 
by employees
HSGRIEV Taken from the management survey equal to 1 if health and safety 
grievances have been raised in the past year
VARIABLE ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Hsmeet 0.5776 0.5536
(0.4940) (0.4972)
Hsdisproc 0.5125 0.5185
(0.4999) (0.4997)
Hsgriev 0.1654 0.1681
(0.3716) (0.3740)
Appendix 5.14: Health and Safety Committee Selection Instrument check
Dependent Variables: Lnwpayl Lnwpayh
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 5474 3897
Wald chi2 3107.75 1267.88
Log pseudo likelihood -10985.839 -7781.4111
Constant 4.8275*** 4.6880***
(0.0445) (0.0583)
Educl 0.1271*** 0.1220***
(0.0105) (0.0122)
Educ2 0.0471*** 0.0401**
(0.0160) (0.0188)
Educ3 0.2117*** 0.2075***
(0.0188) (0.0215)
Tenure2 -0.0004 -0.0217
(0.0189) (0.0226)
Tenure3 0.0485*** 0.0533***
(0.0158) (0.0184)
Tenure4 0.0685*** 0.0609***
(0.0165) (0.0191)
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Tenure5 0.1428***
(0.0164)
0.1421***
(0.0189)
Overtime 0.0066*** 0.0076***
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Flexitime -0.0009 -0.0027
(0.0109) (0.0128)
Supervise 0.1337*** 0.1249***
(0.0119) (0.0138)
Runion 0.0871*** 0.0560***
(0.0146) (0.0183)
Commspecific 0.0397*** 0.0485***
(0.0103) (0.0120)
Permanent 0.0648*** 0.0675**
(0.0231) (0.0285)
Age 0.2239*** 0.2827***
(0.0171) (0.0223)
Age2 -0.0212*** -0.0260***
(0.0019) (0.0024)
Nemps 4.69e-05*** 5.65e-05***
(1.35e-05) (1.59e-05)
Nemps2 -5.93e-09** -7.44e-09**
(2.51e-09) (3.27e-09)
Meritpay 0.0541*** 0.0474***
(0.0114) (0.0129)
Public -0.0750*** -0.1143***
(0.0125) (0.0148)
Female -0.3287***
(0.0115)
Fatal 0.6724*** 0.5203**
(0.1834) (0.2034)
Fatal* Runion -0.4111** -0.1489
(0.1552) (0.2903)
Hsmeet 0.0103 0.0209*
(0.0095) (0.0110)
Hsdisproc 0.0105 -0.0010
(0.0098) (0.0115)
Hsgriev 0.0168 0.0192
(0.0120) (0.0138)
Lnsigma -1.1057*** 1.1370***
(0.0135) (0.0163)
Sigma 0.3310 0.3208
(0.0045) (0.0052)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
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Appendix 5.15: Risk Instrumental Variables and Descriptive Statistics (Mean
and Standard Deviation)
VARIABLE DEFINITION
MARRIED Equal to 1 if the worker is married or living with a partner.
CHILDREN Equal to 1 if the worker has dependent children (aged 0-18)
DISABILITY Equal to 1 if the worker describes themselves as having a long-term 
illness, health problem, or disability.
PENSION Equal to 1 if manager reports workers in the largest occupational 
group are entitled to an employee pension scheme.
CAR Equal to 1 if manager reports workers in the largest occupational 
group are entitled to a company car or car allowance.
HEALTHINS Equal to 1 if manager reports workers in the largest occupational 
group are entitled to private health insurance.
IND1 Equal to if workplace in manufacturing industry.
IND2 Equal to if workplace in electricity industry.
IND3 Equal to if workplace in construction industry.
IND4 Equal to if workplace in wholesale industry (excluded).
IND5 Equal to if workplace in hotel industry.
IND6 Equal to if workplace in transport industry.
IND7 Equal to if workplace in financial industry.
IND8 Equal to if workplace in other industry.
IND9 Equal to if workplace in public industry.
INDIO Equal to if workplace in education industry.
IND11 Equal to if workplace in health industry.
IND12 Equal to if workplace in other community industry.
VARIABLE ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Married 0.6683 0.6903
(0.4709) (0.4624)
Children 0.3737 0.4200
(0.4838) (0.4936)
Disability 0.1385 0.1413
(0.3455) (0.3484)
Pension 0.7776 0.7912
(0.4159) (0.4065)
Car 0.1204 0.1198
(0.3255) (0.3248)
Heal thins 0.1398 0.15091
(0.3255) (0.3580)
Indl 0.3142 0.3678
(0.4642) (0.4823)
Ind2 0.0201 0.0265
(0.1403) (0.1608)
Ind3 0.0692 0.0948
(0.2538) (0.2930)
Ind4 0.0713 0.0872
(0.2574) (0.2822)
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Ind5 0.0367 0.0255
(0.1881) (0.1578)
Ind6 0.1344 0.1663
(0.3411) (0.3724)
Ind7 0.0036 0.0033
(0.0598) (0.0572)
Ind8 0.0665 0.0756
(0.2492) (0.2644)
Ind9 0.0181 0.0187
(0.1333) (0.1355)
IndlO 0.0525 0.0245
(0.2231) (0.1547)
Indl 1 0.1522 0.0485
(0.3592) (0.2149)
Indl 2 0.0613 0.0612
(0.2400) (0.2397)
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CHAPTER 7 APPENDICES
Appendix 7.1: Derived Variables
VARIABLE DEFINITION
SMOKER Equals 1 if respondent smokes.
NOCIGS Usual number of cigarettes smoked per day.
LIGHTSMOKE Dummy equals 1 if respondent smokes 1-15 cigarettes per day.
MODSMOKE Dummy equals 1 if respondent smokes more than 16 cigarettes per 
day.
EVSMOKE Dummy equals 1 if respondent has ever reported being a smoker in 
any of the waves.
SMOKE 16 Dummy equals 1 if the respondent began to smoke at 16 or younger.
SMOKE18 Dummy equals 1 if the respondent began to smoke at 18 or younger.
FATAL Average fatality rate of respondent’s occupation (over 3 year period) 
matched according to 3 digit SOC 2000 (LFS 2002-2004 per 1000 full 
time and part time workers).
MAJOR As above, major injury rate.
OVER 3-DAY 
INJURY
As above, over 3-day injury rate.
ACCIDENT Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent had any kind of accident as a 
result of which had to see a doctor or go to hospital in last 12 months.
NOACCIDENTS Number of above accidents in last 12 months.
AGE Age at interview.
RACEW Dummy variable, white.
RACEB Dummy variable, black.
RACEO Dummy variable, other.
EDUCO Dummy variable, respondent has no academic qualifications.
EDUC1 Dummy variable, respondent has a degree.
EDUC2 Dummy variable, respondent’s highest qualification A level.
EDUC3 Dummy variable, respondent’s highest qualification GCSE/O LEVEL.
MARRIED Dummy variable, respondent married.
COHABMARR Dummy variable, respondent married or cohabiting.
SDW Respondent separated, divorced or widowed.
NEVERMARR Respondent never married.
DISABLED Dummy variable, respondent considers themselves to be disabled.
NOCHILD Number of children respondent parent to.
HEALTH Health status over 12 months values 0-4, 4= excellent 0= very poor.
WORKHEALTH Dummy equals 1 if difficulty performing work or other activities 
because of health problems.
PERMANENT Dummy equals 1 if job permanent.
SUPERVISE Dummy equals 1 if a manager or supervise other workers.
PUBLIC Dummy equals 1 of work in the public sector.
NOEMPS Number of employees at current workplace: 1=1-24 workers, 2=25-99 
workers, 3=100-199 workers, 4=200-499 workers, 5=500-999 
workers, 6=1000+.
NOHRS Number of hours usually worked per week.
PAIDOVER Amount of paid overtime hours in usual week.
OVERTIME Usual overtime hours per week (paid and unpaid).
93
WKGROSSPAY Weekly gross pay.
BONUS Dummy equals 1 of pay includes bonuses or profit share.
PERFPAY Dummy equals 1 of pay includes performance related pay.
PRESUNION Dummy equals 1 of union or staff association at workplace.
UNIONMEMB Equals 1 if respondent a union member.
FLEXITIME Dummy equals 1 if flexible working hours in main job.
REGIONAL
VARIABLES
Dummy variables for region.
OWNHOUSE Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent owns a house outright of with 
a mortgage.
NEWEMP Dummy equals 1 if employed at current workplace for 1 year or less.
Appendix 7.2: Descriptive Statistics (Mean, Standard Deviation and T test)
Male Sample
VARIABLES WHOLE
SAMPLE
SMOKERS NON-
SMOKERS
T TEST
Obs 2873 795 2078
Age 39.0056
(12.0886)
36.5648
(11.7731)
39.9394
(12.0801)
6.7457***
Racew 0.9008
(0.2990)
0.8805
(0.3246)
0.9086
(0.2883)
2.1393**
Raceb 0.0059
(0.0767)
0.0088
(0.0935)
0.0048
(0.0692)
1.0968
Raceo 0.0191
(0.1371)
0.0164
(0.1269)
0.0202
(0.1408)
0.6961
EducO 0.1389
(0.3459)
0.2013
(0.4012)
0.1150
(0.3191)
5 442i***
Educl 0.1898
(0.3922)
0.0860
(0.2806)
0.2293
(0.4205)
10.5605***
Educ2 0.3393
(0.4736)
0.3107
(0.4631)
0.3502
(0.4772)
2.0011**
Educ3 0.3298
(0.4702)
0.3979
(0.4898)
0.3039
(0.4601)
4.6788***
Married 0.5468
(0.4979)
0.4075
(0.4917)
0.6001
(0.4900)
9.4163***
Cohabmarr 0.7264
(0.4459)
0.6704
(0.4703)
0.7478
(0.4344)
4.0291***
SDW 0.0581
(0.2340)
0.0742
(0.2623)
0.0520
(0.2220)
2.1142**
Nevermarr 0.2155
(0.4112)
0.2553
(0.4363)
0.2002
(0.4002)
3.0971***
Disabled 0.0237
(0.1520)
0.0277
(0.1641)
0.0221
(0.1472)
0.8414
Fatal 0.0261
(0.0411)
0.0342
(0.0017)
0.0231
(0.0008)
6.4830***
Major Injury 3.2033 3.9046 2.9352 6.7635***
94
(3.4470) (0.1295) (0.0735)
Over3-Day
Injury
12.9764
(17.6021)
15.5135
(0.6461)
12.0067
(0.3814)
4.7720***
Childlive 0.6227
(0.9506)
0.5912
(0.9707)
0.6347
(0.9427)
1.0974
Health 3.0247
(0.7985)
2.8742
(0.8288)
3.0823
(0.7792)
6.1200***
Workhealth 0.0655
(0.2474)
0.0792
(0.2703)
0.0602
(0.2379)
1.7407*
Accident 0.1218
(0.3271)
0.1484
(0.3557)
0.1116
(0.3150)
2.5584**
Noaccident 0.1351
(0.3859)
0.1673
(0.4357)
0.1227
(0.3643)
2.5637***
Permanent 0.9718
(0.1656)
0.9635
(0.1876)
0.9750
(0.1562)
1.5366
Supervise 0.4186
(0.4934)
0.3389
(0.4736)
0.4491
(0.4975)
5.5015***
Public 0.1861
(0.3893)
0.1298
(0.3363)
0.2077
(0.4057)
5.2346***
Noemps 2.7283
(1.6822)
2.5344
(1.6180)
2.8016
(1.7004)
3.9040***
Nohrs 39.9567
(6.4302)
40.7608
(7.3959)
39.6493
(5.9938)
3.7881***
Paidover 2.6523
(5.4752)
3.8101
(6.8738)
2.2093
(4.7624)
6.0355***
Overtime 4.7584
(6.6974)
5.1585
(7.2841)
4.6054
(6.4542)
1.8775*
Wkgrosspay 481.8103
(419.2101)
405.8805
(236.8930)
510.3918
(466.7226)
7.8909***
Bonus 0.3621
(0.4807)
0.3274
(0.4696)
0.3754
(0.4844)
2.3962***
Perfpay 0.1708
(0.3764)
0.1465
(0.3538)
0.1801
(0.3844)
2.2225**
Presunion 0.4839
(0.4998)
0.4172
(0.4934)
0.5093
(0.5000)
4.4331***
Unionmemb 0.6067
(0.4887)
0.5524
(0.4980)
0.6236
(0.4847)
3.4957***
Flexitime 0.1344
(0.1344)
0.0868
(0.2817)
0.1526
(0.3596)
5.1690***
Scotland 0.2050
(0.4038)
0.2277
(0.4196)
0.1963
(0.3973)
1.8207*
Wales 0.1772
(0.3819)
0.1811
(0.3854)
0.1756
(0.3806)
0.3543
Northeast 0.0442
(0.2056)
0.0365
(0.1876)
0.0472
(0.2120)
1.3181
Northwest 0.0769
(0.2665)
0.0755
(0.2643)
0.0775
(0.2674)
0.1799
Yorkshire 0.0661
(0.2486)
0.0730
(0.2602)
0.0635
(0.2440)
0.8905
95
Eastmids 0.0623
(0.2417)
0.0579
(0.2336)
0.0640
(0.2448)
0.6051
Westmids 0.0560
(0.2300)
0.0491
(0.2161)
0.0587
(0.2351)
1.0392
Easteng 0.0271
(0.1625)
0.0352
(0.1845)
0.0241
(0.1533)
1.5087
Southwest 0.0658
(0.2479)
0.0528
(0.2238)
0.0707
(0.2565)
1.8398*
London 0.0533
(0.2246)
0.0541
(0.2263)
0.0529
(0.2240)
0.1281
Southeast 0.1298
(0.3362)
0.1321
(0.3388)
0.1290
(0.3352)
0.2211
Ownhouse 0.8131
(0.3899)
0.6843
(0.4651)
0.8624
(0.3446)
9.8153
Newemp 0.2826
(0.4504)
0.3421
(0.4747)
0.2599
(0.4387)
4.2388***
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; “^significant at the 10% level 
T tests adjust for unequal variance where appropriate.
Female Sample
VARIABLES WHOLE
SAMPLE
SMOKERS NON-
SMOKERS
T TEST
Obs 1971 475 1496
Age 38.0380
(12.0691)
36.4968
(12.6049)
38.3924
(11.8592)
2.8958***
Racew 0.8850
(0.3191)
0.8632
(0.3440)
0.8957
(0.3057)
1.8411*
Raceb 0.0086
(0.0921)
0.0084
(0.0915)
0.0080
(0.0892)
0.0846
Raceo 0.0147
(0.1205)
0.0021
(0.0459)
0.0194
(0.1379)
4.1779***
EducO 0.1778
(0.3824)
0.1937
(0.3956)
0.0996
(0.2996)
4.7682***
Educl 0.2205
(0.4147)
0.1368
(0.3440)
0.2667
(0.4424)
6.6641***
Educ2 0.2785
(0.4484)
0.2674
(0.4431)
0.3068
(0.4613)
1.6371
Educ3 0.3232
(0.4678)
0.2674
(0.4908)
0.3269
(0.4692)
2.3810**
Married 0.4369
(0.4988)
0.3389
(0.4739)
0.4947
(0.5001)
5.9894***
Cohabmarr 0.6711
(0.4699)
0.6021
(0.4900)
0.6872
(0.4638)
3.4362***
SDW 0.1136
(0.3174)
0.1389
(0.3463)
0.1090
(0.3117)
1.6783*
Nevermarr 0.2153
(0.4111)
0.2589
(0.4385)
0.2039
(0.4030)
2.4274**
Disabled 0.0181 0.0147 0.0194 0.7140
96
(0.1332) (0.1206) (0.1379)
Fatal 0.0042
(0.0139)
0.0055
(0.0006)
0.0038
(0.0004)
2.2856**
Major Injury 1.3837
(1.8299)
1.8708
(0.1104)
1.2076
(0.0379)
7.2420***
Over3-Day
Injury
5.9992
(10.3303)
8.9954
(0.6432)
4.8798
(0.2052)
8.0117***
Childlive 0.4007
(0.7476)
0.3895
(0.7334)
0.4111
(0.7612)
0.5435
Health 2.9948
(0.8230)
2.8587
(0.8193)
3.0261
(0.8303)
3.8403***
Workhealth 0.1055
(0.3073)
0.1074
(0.3099)
0.1049
(0.3066)
0.1544
Accident 0.0868
(0.2816)
0.1011
(0.3017)
0.0822
(0.2748)
1.2147
Noaccident 0.0903
(0.3211)
0.1179
(0.3771)
0.0896
(0.3146)
1.4802
Permanent 0.9640
(0.1864)
0.9558
(0.2058)
0.9666
(0.1798)
1.0261
Supervise 0.4018
(0.4904)
0.4136
(0.4930)
0.4036
(0.4908)
0.3865
Public 0.4061
(0.4912)
0.3059
(0.4613)
0.4346
(0.4959)
5.2008***
Noemps 2.7298
(1.7258)
2.6825
(1.7071)
2.7398
(1.7392)
0.6283
Nohrs 36.460
(5.6003)
36.4852
(6.2706)
36.3099
(5.3616)
0.5489
Paidover 1.3042
(3.6073)
1.9368
(4.3613)
1.2193
(3.4624)
3.2730***
Overtime 3.4259
(5.4046)
3.6442
(5.6421)
3.6611
(5.4664)
0.0582
Wkgrosspay 375.1874
(442.4847)
320.6982
(180.7469)
392.6288
(496.8047)
4.7047***
Bonus 0.2446
(0.4300)
0.2426
(0.4291)
0.2453
(0.4304)
0.1192
Perfpay 0.1399
(0.3470)
0.0930
(0.2908)
0.1549
(0.3619)
3.7983***
Presunion 0.5924
(0.4915)
0.5408
(0.4989)
0.6086
(0.4882)
2.6230***
Unionmemb 0.6551
(0.4755)
0.6245
(0.4852)
0.6636
(0.4727)
1.5605
Flexitime 0.1697
(0.3754)
0.1600
(0.3670)
0.1878
(0.3907)
1.4157
Scotland 0.2205
(0.4147)
0.2482
(0.4326)
0.2112
(0.4083)
1.6458*
Wales 0.1782
(0.3828)
0.1684
(0.3746)
0.1745
(0.3796)
0.3061
Northeast 0.0428
(0.2024)
0.0358
(0.1860)
0.0455
(0.2084)
0.9611
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Northwest 0.0789
(0.2696)
0.0842
(0.2780)
0.0762
(0.2654)
0.5523
Yorkshire 0.0613
(0.2400)
0.0568
(0.2318)
0.0655
(0.2475)
0.7009
Eastmids 0.0547
(0.2274)
0.0589
(0.2358)
0.0575
(0.2328)
0.1138
Westmids 0.0532
(0.2245)
0.0442
(0.2058)
0.0528
(0.2237)
0.7766
Easteng 0.0285
(0.1665)
0.0316
(0.1751)
0.0274
(0.1633)
0.4628
Southwest 0.0499
(0.2178)
0.0568
(0.2318)
0.0508
(0.2197)
0.4976
London 0.0680
(0.2517)
0.0632
(0.2435)
0.0668
(0.2498)
0.2790
Southeast 0.1326
(0.3392)
0.1326
(0.3395)
0.1344
(0.3412)
0.1003
Ownhouse 0.7719
(0.4197)
0.7263
(0.4463)
0.8443
(0.3627)
3.6408***
Newemp 0.2267
(0.4188)
0.2800
(0.4495)
0.2299
(0.4209)
2.1484**
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
T tests adjust for unequal variance where appropriate.
Appendix 7.3: Industry Dummy Variables Descriptive Statistics (Mean and 
Standard Deviation)
Whole sample Manual sample
Obs 4977 1876
IND1 Agriculture hunting forestry 
mining
0.0113
(0.1055)
0.0203
(0.0203)
IND2 Manufacturing 0.1609
(0.3675)
0.2452
(0.4303)
IND3 Electricity 0.0086
(0.0926)
0.0091
(0.0948)
IND4 Construction 0.0619
(0.2410)
0.1178
(0.3225)
IND5 Wholesale (excluded in 
estimation)
0.1073
(0.3095)
0.0938
(0.2917)
IND6 Hotels 0.0325
(0.1775)
0.0560
(0.2299)
IND7 Transport 0.0619
(0.2410)
0.1066
(0.3087)
IND8 Financial 0.0366
(0.1877)
0.0027
(0.0516)
IND9 Real estate 0.1019
(0.3025)
0.0485
(0.2149)
IND10 Public admin and defence 0.0908
(0.2874)
0.0155
(0.1234)
IND11 Education 0.0743
(0.2624)
0.0336
(0.1802)
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IND12 Health 0.1089
(0.3115)
0.1023
(0.3032)
IND13 Other com social and personal 0.0235
(0.1515)
0.0293
(0.1687)
Appendix 7.4: Risk Regression Estimates
FATAL MAJOR INJURY OVER 3-DAY 
INJURY
No. o f  Obs 4478 4478 4478
R2 0.2668 0.2543 0.2191
A d jR 2 0.2617 0.2491 0.2066
Constant -0.0061 1.2431** 4.8393
(0.0064) (0.5677) (2.9958)
Married -2.39e-05 0.0646 0.0240
(0.0010) (0.0931) (0.4915)
Child 0.0011 0.1035 0.4023
(0.0206) (0.0701) (0.2646)
Disabled -0.0012 0.2129 1.1546
(0.0029) (0.2615) (1.3799)
Indl 0.0683*** 1.6233*** 0.2699
(0.0042) (0.3723) (1.9645)
Ind2 0.0064*** 1.1725*** 5.8756***
(0.0015) (0.1295) (0.6835)
Ind3 0.0083* 0.6356 0.2467
(0.0048) (0.4255) (2.2455)
Ind4 0.0431*** 2.2037*** 2.3982**
(0.0020) (0.1801) (0.9505)
Ind6 -0.0087*** -0.3855 -1.5259
(0.0027) (0.2388) (1.2604)
Ind7 0.0042** 0.9916*** 8.7313***
(0.0020) (0.1775) (0.9369)
Ind8 -0.0102*** -1.5747*** -7.0546***
(0.0025) (0.2239) (1.1812)
Ind9 -00033** -0.5530*** -2.8217***
(0.0017) (0.1473) (0.7773)
IndlO -0.0060*** 0.0962 0.8414
(0.0022) (0.1959) (1.0340)
Indl 1 -0.0127*** -0.9360*** -6.1603***
(0.0022) (0.1973) (1.0411)
Indl 2 -0.0124*** -0.7853*** -1.7845**
(0.0018) (0.1635) (0.8626)
Indl 3 -0.0024 -0.5833** -3.5084**
(0.0030) (0.2638) (1.3919)
Educl -0.0135*** -1.7389*** -8.1666***
(0.0017) (0.1548) (0.8170)
Educ2 -0.0100*** -1.2107*** -5.4985***
(0.0015) (0.1360) (0.7175)
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Educ3 -0.0075*** -0.6204*** -2.0973***
(0.0015) (0.1327) (0.7001)
Newemp 0.0001 -0.0136 -0.5709
(0.0010) (0.0931) (0.4911)
Overtime 0.0002*** 0.0336*** 0.1566***
(0.0001) (0.0063) (0.0334)
Permanent 0.0005 -0.0139 -0.3910
(0.0027) (0.2426) (1.2801)
Age 4.39e-05 -0.0340 -0.1557
(0.0003) (0.0235) (0.1240)
Age2 9.82e-07 0.0005 0.0019
(3.25e-06) (0.0003) (0.0015)
Noemps -7.4e-05 0.3748*** 2.7642***
(0.0012) (0.1111) (0.5862)
Noemps2 -7.83e-05 -0.0608*** -0.4124***
(0.0002) (0.0162) (0.0856)
Supervise -0.0052*** -0.8077*** -4.1789***
(0.0009) (0.0832) (0.4390)
Public 0.0031* -0.1320 -0.1473
(0.0016) (0.1467) (0.7739)
Presunion 0.0023** 0.6313*** 3.6849***
(0.0011) (0.0999) (0.5272)
Flexitime -0.0043*** -0.7989*** -4.1684***
(0.0013) (0.1157) (0.6106)
Nohrs 0.0007*** 0.0521*** 0.2122***
(7.27e-05) (0.0065) (0.0342)
Smoker 0.0040*** 0.4010*** 1.5379***
(0.0010) (0.0918) (0.4844)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
Appendix 7.5: Risk Regression Smoking Estimates
Male Sample
FATAL MAJOR
INJURY
OVER 3-DAY 
INJURY
No. Obs 2641 2641 2641
R2 0.2677 0.2576 0.2217
Adj R2 0.2590 0.2488 0.2124
SMOKER 0.0046*** 0.2670** 0.3324
(0.0016) (0.1363) (0.7179)
R2 0.2678 0.2576 0.2218
Adj R2 0.2589 0.2485 0.2123
LIGHTSMOKE 0.0048** 0.3053* 0.7001
(0.0020) (0.1673) (0.8814)
MODSMOKE 0.0048** 0.2159 -0.1868
100
(0.0023) (0.1976) (1.0408)
R2 0.2663 0.2576 0.2218
Adj R2 0.2576 0.2488 0.2126
EVSMOKE 0.0027*
(0.0014)
0.2431**
(0.1231)
0.5781
(0.6486)
R2 0.2662 0.2579 0.2224
AdjR2 0.2574 0.2491 0.2132
SMOKE 16 0.0031*
(0.0019)
0.3510**
(0.1550)
1.3457*
(0.8162)
R2 0.2661 0.2573 0.2219
A d jR 2 0.2573 0.2485 0.2126
SMOKE 18 0.0026
(0.0016)
0.2361*
(0.1405)
0 . 6 6 8 8
(0.7399)
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
Female Sample
FATAL MAJOR
INJURY
OVER 3-DAY 
INJURY
No. Obs 1837 1837 1837
R2 0.1125 0.1761 0.1635
Adj R2 0.0972 0.1620 0.1492
SMOKER 0 . 0 0 1 1
(0.0007)
0.4743***
(0.0897)
2.7754***
(0.5144)
R2 0.1130 0.1775 0.1646
A d jR 2 0.0972 0.1629 0.1498
LIGHTSMOKE 0.0015*
(0.0008)
0.5582***
(0.1041)
3.1157***
(0.5972)
MODSMOKE 0.0006
(0.0013)
0.3485**
(0.1566)
2.4389***
(0.8980)
R2 0.1128 0.1745 0.1613
Adj R2 0.0975 0.1603 0.1469
EVSMOKE 0 .0 0 1 1 *
(0.0006)
0.3940***
(0.0798)
2.2544***
(0.4579)
R2 0.1148 0.1734 0.1602
AdjR2 0.0996 0.1592 0.1458
SMOKE 16 0.0019***
(0.0007)
0.4175***
(0.0893)
2  3 9 4 9 *** 
(0.5121)
R2 0.1135 0.1668 0.1537 08ftAR y f i
Co 1
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A djR 2 0.0983 0.1525 0.1392
SMOKE 18 0.0018**
(0.0008)
0.2862***
(0.1043)
1.6696***
(0.5983)
♦♦♦^significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
Appendix 7.6: Fatal Variable Frequencies
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Sample Size 1818 1332
FATAL VALUE Frequency Frequency
0 144 (8%) 33 (2.5%)
0.001691 152 30
0.002578 89 36
0.002858 41 32
0.004191 32 48
0.005722 24 58
0.006773 73 21
0.007859 101 45
0.010162 66 33
0.014723 38 19
0.017299 18 98
0.024238 99 25
0.027238 42 97
0.030904 98 60
0.035839 60 80
0.036868 91 2
0.040018 2 3
0.042554 9 33
0.053087 19 18
0.053206 142 137
0.057875 78 70
0.062412 32 32
0.063739 112 112
0.071012 75 63
0.135691 43 42
0.181659 27 26
0.194836 50 49
0.252348 17(1%) 15 (1%)
Appendix 7.7: Wage Estimation Results
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
Obs 1432 1067
R2 0.4495 0.3944
A djR 2 0.4404 0.3822
SMOKER -0.0315 -0.0805**
(0.0215) (0.0405)
MAJOR INJURY 0.0061** 0.0011
(0.0028) (0.0037)
MAJOR* SMOKER -0.0141 0.0064
(0.0087) (0.0062)
R2 0.4609 0.3923
A djR 2 0.4524 0.3800
MODSMOKE -0.0004 -0.0404
(0.0449) (0.0535)
MAJOR INJURY 0.0067** 0.0021
(0.0029) (0.0032)
MAJOR*MODSMOKE 0.0036 -0.0404
(0.0076) (0.0535)
R2 0.4608 0.3939
A djR 2 0.4523 0.3817
EVSMOKE -0.0113 -0.0555
(0.0312) (0.0389)
MAJOR INJURY 0.0073** 0.0025
(0.0037) (0.0040)
MAJOR* EVSMOKE -0.0004 0.0020
(0.0052) (0.0059)
R2 0.4613 0.3923
Adj R2 0.4528 0.3801
SMOKE 16 -0.0321 -0.0591
(0.0340) (0.0452)
MAJOR INJURY 0.0049 0.0019
(0.0032) (0.0034)
MAJOR* SMOKE 16 0.0075 0.0064
(0.0056) (0.0068)
R2 0.4610 0.3914
Adj R2 0.4526 0.3791
SMOKE 18 -0.0087 -0.0166
(0.0330) (0.0428)
MAJOR INJURY 0.0056* 0.0029
(0.0033) (0.0035)
MAJOR* SMOKE 18 0.0046 0.0019
(0.0055) (0.0066)
Other variables included in estimation: educl educ2 educ3 racew disabled presunion age age2 permanent supervise
public newemp noemps noemps2 perfpay flexitime nohrs overtime female
***=significant at the 1% level; **=significant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level
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Appendix 7.8: Wage Estimation Risk Coefficients
Dependent variable: Lnwage
ALL MANUAL MALE MANUAL
SMOKED NEVER
SMOKED
SMOKED NEVER
SMOKED
Obs 673 754 510 554
R2 0.4456 0.4929 0.4068 0.4014
A d jR 2 0.4286 0.4790 0.3838 0.3801
MAJOR 0.0089** 0.0059 0.0036 0.0048
INJURY (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0044) (0.0041)
R2 0.4511 0.4931 0.4144 0.4020
Adj R2 0.4334 0.4785 0.3904 0.3796
MAJOR 0.0084** 0.0060 0.0033 0.0049
INJURY (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0412) (0.0041)
ACCIDENT 0.0930** -0.0213 0.1039** -0.0331
(0.0365) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0461)
Other variables included in estimation: educl educ2 educ3 racew disabled presunion age age2 
permanent supervise public newemp noemps noemps2 perfpay flexitime nohrs overtime female 
***=significant at the 1% level; * ^ sign ificant at the 5% level; *=significant at the 10% level 
Standard errors in parenthesis
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